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El presente trabajo ofrece una caracterización morfosemántica de las nominalizaciones 
deadjetivales en español, que en las últimas décadas han despertado el interés de los 
investigadores de distintas disciplinas del conocimiento, como la ciencia cognitiva, la filosofía y, 
en especial, la lingüística teórica, donde se enmarca esta tesis. El objetivo es proporcionar una 
explicación detallada de las propiedades semánticas y morfológicas de los distintos tipos de 
nominalizaciones deadjetivales del español, prestando particular atención a las que llamo aquí 
nominalizaciones de ejemplar y de clase de estado, que definiré más abajo. 
 Las nominalizaciones deadjetivales son sustantivos que derivan de adjetivos, como altura < 
alto y belleza < bello. El estudio de las nominalizaciones deadjetivales tiene especial importancia 
para la lingüística teórica porque plantea muchas preguntas desde el punto de vista semántico, 
morfológico y sintáctico que aún no han recibido respuesta, y algunas de estas cuestiones se 
abordan en esta tesis. En relación con el punto de vista semántico, las nominalizaciones 
deadjetivales codifican conceptos abstractos, los cuales se caracterizan por que no tienen un 
referente claramente delimitado en el mundo real. Por ejemplo, mientras que el sustantivo 
concreto gato puede designar un animal en particular que se puede ver y tocar, el sustantivo 
abstracto altura no se refiere a ninguna entidad tangible. Por este motivo, el uso, definición y 
representación de estos conceptos es un asunto escurridizo y ha generado un intenso debate 
sobre su semántica y la composición de la ontología semántica de las lenguas naturales. En 
concreto, con el fin de dar cuenta del significado expresado por las nominalizaciones 
deadjetivales, la bibliografía se ha servido de ‘grados’, ‘cualidades’, ‘tropos’ y ‘estados’, lo que ha 
planteado la pregunta de cuáles de estos conceptos pertenecen realmente a nuestra ontología 
semántica y cuáles pueden derivarse de otras nociones más simples o, sencillamente, 
desecharse por innecesarios. 
 En lo relativo a la morfología, el análisis de las nominalizaciones deadjetivales, especialmente 
en comparación con las deverbales (como destrucción < destruir), también plantea preguntas 
interesantes. En particular, mientras que las nominalizaciones deverbales se forman a partir de 
verbos, que llevan morfemas de tiempo, aspecto de punto de vista y modo, las nominalizaciones 
deadjetivales se forman a partir de adjetivos, los cuales no incluyen morfología verbal. Esta 
diferencia nos hace plantearnos si hay algún tipo de información que puedan codificar las 
nominalizaciones deverbales ajena a las nominalizaciones deadjetivales. En esta tesis, mostraré 
que hay un interesante contraste con relación al aspecto de punto de vista, esto es, con relación 
a la (im)perfectividad, lo que arroja serias dudas sobre el supuesto de que las nominalizaciones 




Otra importante cuestión morfológica que abordo aquí es la correspondencia de la gradación 
adjetival con el dominio de masa; en otras palabras, las nominalizaciones deadjetivales se 
forman a partir de adjetivos graduables y constituyen nombres de masa en circunstancias 
normales, así que se torna necesario explicar cómo interactúan estas dos propiedades.        
 Finalmente, desde el punto de vista sintáctico, las nominalizaciones deadjetivales participan 
en distintas construcciones sintácticas y expresan significados diferentes en cada una de ellas. 
Considérense (i) y (ii):   
 
(i)  a. la altura de Víctor 
  b. la belleza de la tormenta 
(ii)  a. La belleza está en el interior. 
  b. El puente tiene una altura {increíble / de diez metros}. 
  c. El puente tiene {mucha / dos metros de} altura. 
  d. Los electrones tienen altura. 
 
 Aunque la bibliografía sobre nominalizaciones deadjetivales se ha centrado en las que 
denomino de ejemplar de estado, ejemplificadas en (i), hay otros contextos sintácticos que nos 
ayudan a desvelar sus propiedades sintácticas y semánticas. Por un lado, las nominalizaciones 
de (i) van precedidas del determinante definido y seguidas de un sintagma preposicional que 
introduce el individuo del cual se predica la propiedad nominal. Por otro lado, ninguna de las 
nominalizaciones de (ii), que denomino nominalizaciones de clase de estado, se predica de un 
individuo en concreto: en (iia) belleza aparece precedida por el determinante definido; en (iib) 
altura va precedida por el determinante definido y seguida de un adjetivo o un sintagma de 
medida; en (iic) la nominalización va precedida del cuantificador de masa mucha o un sintagma 
de medida; en último lugar, la nominalización aparece en solitario. Teniendo en cuenta estos 
datos básicos, un estudio cabal de las nominalizaciones deadjetivales debe explicar por qué 
muestran dicha distribución sintáctica y qué diferencias semánticas hay entre cada estructura.   
 En suma, la importancia de estudiar las nominalizaciones deadjetivales para la lingüística 
teórica es extraordinaria, en la medida en que aquellas plantean algunos problemas semánticos, 
morfológicos y sintácticos que no se han resuelto aún. Con objeto de ser más explícito con 
respecto a estos problemas, a continuación proporciono un breve resumen de los contenidos de 
cada capítulo de la tesis.  
 En el capítulo 1, presento el concepto de ‘nombres abstractos’ y destaco su relevancia en la 
ciencia cognitiva, la filosofía y la lingüística teórica y los problemas que dichas disciplinas han 




naturaleza escurridiza. Pongo el foco en la lingüística teórica y asumo la propuesta de Bosque 
(1999), según la cual la distinción concreto-abstracto no constituye una propiedad léxica 
independiente de los sustantivos, sino que deriva de otras nociones más específicas, como los 
usos metafóricos, las interpretaciones de clase, los predicados de eventualidad, etc.    
 Asimismo, presento el objeto de estudio, el objetivo y la hipótesis de la tesis: el objeto de 
estudio son los distintos tipos de nominalizaciones deadjetivales que se pueden formar en 
español en función de sus propiedades morfosemánticas y sintácticas, prestando especial 
atención a las que yo llamo nominalizaciones de ejemplar y de clase de estado; el objetivo de la 
tesis es explicar las propiedades fundamentales de las nominalizaciones deadjetivales y 
proporcionar un análisis formal que capte dichas propiedades; y la hipótesis principal consiste 
en que nuestra ontología semántica incluye clases de estados, merced a lo cual podemos dar 
cuenta de las propiedades de las nominalizaciones que se estudian aquí. Asimismo, hago uso  
de la noción de ‘clases’ y ‘ejemplares’ (de Carlson 1977), muestro su creciente importancia en la 
lingüística teórica y explico su aplicación al dominio de las entidades, los eventos y los estados. 
En cuanto al marco teórico en el que se enmarca este trabajo, la tesis descansa sobre los 
principios y métodos de la lingüística formal; en concreto, para dar cuenta de las 
caracterizaciones morfosemánticas, empleo el aparato formal de Heim y Kratzer (1998), que 
consta de una ontología de objetos semánticos y distintas reglas de composición, combinado 
con un mecanismo construccionista de formación de palabras, de acuerdo con el cual las 
palabras se forman y se combinan en la sintaxis.   
 Además, extraigo de la bibliografía las propiedades empíricas más básicas de las 
nominalizaciones deadjetivales, a fin de proveer al lector del conocimiento básico en esta 
materia. También paso revista a los tratamientos teóricos previos sobre nominalizaciones 
deadjetivales, muestro las limitaciones de los modelos basados en grados, cualidades y tropos y 
aporto pruebas empíricas de que son los modelos basados en estados los que captan 
correctamente la naturaleza estativa y abstracta de las nominalizaciones de ejemplar de estado.  
 Puesto que en esta tesis la estatividad constituye la columna vertebral del análisis de las 
nominalizaciones deadjetivales, en el capítulo 2 proporciono una definición específica de los 
estados, basada en la caracterización tradicional de Vendler (1957) y Dowty (1979), como 
propiedades temporales que no involucran cambio en ninguno de sus participantes. Para 
delimitar el concepto en términos precisos, también examino la interacción de la estatividad con 
la causa, la homogeneidad y la gradación, que desempeñan un papel central en la configuración 
de la tipología de estados que presento en esta tesis. A este respecto, proporciono pruebas 
empíricas de que la clasificación tripartita formada por los estados de individuo, de estadio y 




distinción relativo-absoluto, como se afirma en la bibliografía, sino en la causa. En concreto, los 
estados de individuo expresan propiedades no causadas; los de estadio expresan propiedades 
externamente causadas, donde la causa externa debe entenderse como una causa directa en el 
sentido de Maienborn y Herdtfelder (2017); y, siguiendo a Leferman (2017), los estados 
davidsonianos expresan propiedades internamente causadas.   
 A propósito de la homogeneidad, basándome en Dowty (1979) y Rothstein (2004), 
argumento que los predicados atélicos, a saber, los estados y las actividades, son cumulativos; 
las actividades no son divisibles estrictamente hablando o en todo caso son divisibles en 
intervalos, mientras que hay estados divisibles en subintervalos (v. g. saber la respuesta) y otros 
que son divisibles en intervalos (v. g. dormir). En relación con la gradación, argumento frente a 
Baglini (2015) que los estados no se definen como predicados graduables, ya que hay 
predicados estativos, como pertenecer, que no son graduables; por tanto, la gradación tampoco 
constituye una propiedad definitoria de los estados. 
 Para concluir el examen de la estatividad, y dado que asumo que las nominalizaciones 
deadjetivales provienen de los adjetivos graduables, presento los aspectos básicos de mi 
modelo sobre gradación, que se enmarca en la tradición clase-ejemplar (desde Carlson 1977). 
En particular, postulo siguiendo a Anderson y Morzycki (2015) que los adjetivos graduables 
expresan estados y que los grados no son objetos ontológicos, sino que derivan de las clases de 
estados. No obstante, a partir de la propuesta de Gehrke (2011, 2015, 2017) en relación con las 
pasivas adjetivales del alemán, donde los predicados eventivos se analizan como predicados de 
clases de eventos en lugar de ejemplares de eventos, postulo que los adjetivos graduables son 
predicados de clases de estados en lugar de ejemplares de estados. Cuando la propiedad se 
predica de un individuo en concreto, un nudo funcional se ensambla a la derivación para asociar 
una clase de estado del conjunto de clases de estado con un ejemplar de estado. 
 Tras proporcionar una caracterización precisa de la estatividad y esbozar mi modelo sobre la 
gradación, en el capítulo 3 abordo el análisis de las nominalizaciones de ejemplar de estado, las 
cuales he ejemplificado en (i) y han monopolizado la bibliografía sobre las nominalizaciones 
deadjetivales. Mi propuesta se alinea con los modelos basados en estados, y proporciono 
argumentación empírica de que las nominalizaciones deadjetivales expresan estados, lo cual se 
halla en consonancia con el hecho de que sus adjetivos de base expresen estados con 
independencia de que sean predicados de individuo, estadio o estados davidsonianos. Las 
nominalizaciones de ejemplar de estado se caracterizan sintácticamente por estar flanqueadas 
por el determinante definido y sus argumentos, normalmente un sintagma preposicional que 
introduce el sujeto o individuo del que se predica la propiedad, y semánticamente por expresar 




 No obstante, a diferencia de los enfoques existentes basados en los estados, sostengo que 
las nominalizaciones deadjetivales expresan estados imperfectivos, pues aceptan modificadores 
de tiempo y de frecuencia, pero rechazan los modificadores de aspecto introducidos por 
durante pese a ser atélicas. La razón por la que expresan eventualidades imperfectivas es que no 
incluyen la cópula en la derivación, y los adjetivos solo legitiman interpretaciones perfectivas 
cuando la morfología verbal está presente; dado que los modificadores aspectuales solo 
coaparecen con interpretaciones perfectivas, el hecho de que las nominalizaciones deadjetivales 
no los acepten se explica directamente.  
 La distinción clase-ejemplar se presenta muy útil también para dar cuenta de la combinación 
de las nominalizaciones deadjetivales con los adjetivos de frecuencia y manera y con los 
sintagmas de medida. De acuerdo con Gehrke y McNally (2015), los adjetivos de frecuencia (v. g. 
frecuente, habitual, etc.) pueden desencadenar lecturas temporales y no temporales; en esta 
línea, argumento que en español los adjetivos de frecuencia pueden desatar lecturas temporales 
en posición predicativa, prenominal y posnominal, caso en el cual operan sobre ejemplares, 
pero solamente pueden desatar lecturas no temporales en posición posnominal, y en tal caso 
operan sobre clases. Por ejemplo, su frecuente tristeza significa ‘sus frecuentes estados de estar 
triste’, mientras que su altura frecuente significa ‘su frecuente grado de altura’. 
 Los adjetivos de manera (v. g. extraño, sorprendente, etc.) pueden analizarse como predicados 
de clases de estados que hacen intersección con el conjunto de las clases de estados denotado 
por la nominalización, y proporciono evidencia empírica de que, a diferencia de los adverbios 
correspondientes, no dan lugar a entrañamientos de la forma positiva del adjetivo: por ejemplo, 
extrañamente alto entraña alto, mientras que extraña altura no entraña alto. Mantengo que la 
razón de esta asimetría radica en que las nominalizaciones no se evalúan con respecto a un 
estándar de comparación en ausencia de un cuantificador o un modificador explícitos. Por 
último, también analizo los sintagmas de medida, v. g. de diez metros en La altura del puente es 
de diez metros, como predicados de clases de estados, pero se diferencian de los adjetivos de 
manera en que aquellos denotan clases de estados ordenadas inherentemente.    
 El capítulo concluye con una reflexión sobre la contribución semántica de los sufijos 
deadjetivales; en concreto, postulo que estos pueden tomar como aducto bien el dominio 
completo de los adjetivos a los que se adjuntan, que es la situación más habitual, o bien pueden 
restringir el dominio tomando solo un subconjunto propio de las clases de estados denotadas 
por el adjetivo de base. Este último análisis trata de dar cuenta de la especialización del 
significado o el hecho de que hay algunas (pocas) nominalizaciones que expresan un significado 
más específico que el de sus adjetivos de base: por ejemplo, simple puede significar ‘sencillo’ o 




concluyo que los sufijos deadjetivales no aportan ningún otro significado relevante que pueda 
sistematizarse desde el punto de visto léxico-semántico.  
 Una vez desarrollado un análisis minucioso de las principales propiedades semánticas y 
morfológicas de las nominalizaciones de ejemplar de estado, en el capítulo 4 exploro su 
composición semántica y las comparo con los nombres de masa canónicos (v. g. agua). Las 
nominalizaciones deadjetivales constituyen nombres de masa porque denotan conjuntos de 
elementos, en concreto de clases de estados, ordenados entre ellos. Sin embargo, los nombres 
de masa canónicos y las nominalizaciones están asociados a dominios distintos: los primeros 
están parcialmente ordenados por la relación parte-todo. En cambio, siguiendo a Francez y 
Koontz-Garboden (2017a), las segundas están asociadas a escalas, que defino como conjuntos 
de clases de estados totalmente preordenadas; mi propuesta difiere de la de estos autores en 
que para ellos las escalas integran porciones de sustancia en lugar de clases de estados. 
 Asimismo, delimito el papel de la gradación y la atelicidad en el dominio de la masa. En línea 
con Grimm (2014), argumento que el análisis estándar (desde Mourelatos 1978) de acuerdo con 
el cual hay una correspondencia entre la atelicidad y el dominio de la masa no se sostiene. A 
diferencia de Grimm, que no ofrece una propuesta alternativa precisa, postulo que existe una 
correspondencia entre la gradación y el dominio de masa y que dicha correspondencia se da 
porque tanto los predicados graduables como los nombres de masa denotan conjuntos de 
elementos ordenados entre ellos. Además, disocio la contabilidad de la pluralización 
morfológica y muestro que esta entraña aquella, pero no al revés. La pluralización requiere 
heterogeneidad y, dado que los estados son homogéneos en tanto que son atélicos, estos 
rechazan el plural en circunstancias normales (v. g. *sus tristezas). No obstante, también muestro 
que las nominalizaciones estativas se pueden pluralizar (v. g. sus alturas) si se hallan 
involucrados ciertos factores.  
 Asimismo, estudio todos los tipos de nominalizaciones de clase de estado ejemplificados en 
(ii), que, con pocas excepciones, no han sido examinados en la bibliografía. Las nominalizaciones 
de clase de estado se caracterizan sintácticamente por no ir acompañadas de sus argumentos y 
semánticamente por tener una interpretación genérica, esto es, por expresar propiedades que 
no pueden situarse en un tiempo determinado. Las nominalizaciones definidas, ejemplificadas 
en (iia), van precedidas del determinante definido. En contraste con Roy (2010), que afirma que 
la lectura genérica se deriva de la estativa cuando aparece un operador genérico GEN en 
ausencia de los argumentos nominales, yo argumento, en línea con la tradición de clase-
ejemplar en general y con Espinal y Borik (2015) en particular, que la interpretación genérica 
como clase de estado es la básica, mientras que la interpretación episódica como ejemplar de 




 También estudio las nominalizaciones indefinidas y las cuantificadas, que ejemplifico en (iib) 
y (iic), respectivamente. Las primeras van precedidas del determinante indefinido y seguidas de 
un adjetivo de manera o un sintagma de medida que funciona como modificador adnominal, 
mientras que las segundas van precedidas de un cuantificador de masa o un sintagma de 
medida que funciona como cuantificador de masa. Asumo con Eguren y Pastor (2014, 2015) que 
las nominalizaciones indefinidas proyectan sintagmas nominales, mientras que las cuantificadas 
proyectan sintagmas cuantificadores; además, a partir del análisis de las estructuras 
pseudopartitivas y los compuestos del inglés desarrollado por Schwarzschild (2002), argumento 
que las nominalizaciones indefinidas constituyen nombres contables, mientras que las 
cuantificadas constituyen nombres de masa. En lo concerniente a las nominalizaciones escuetas, 
ejemplificadas en (iid), argumento que son excepcionales en español, en contraste con otras 
lenguas, como el ulwa y el wólof, porque requieren un contexto que imponga un cero en la 
escala de la nominalización.  
 Asimismo, repaso brevemente las nominalizaciones de participante y de evento y muestro 
que la distinción entre clase y ejemplar también es adecuada para captar su formación y 
significado. Considérense los datos siguientes: 
 
(iii) a. Tengo varias durezas en el pie. 
  b. El político cometió varias irregularidades. 
 
 En (iiia) la nominalización de participante durezas denota un conjunto plural de entidades a 
las que se atribuye la propiedad adjetival, es decir, denota entidades duras. En cambio, en (iiib) 
la nominalización irregularidades denota un conjunto plural de eventos a los que se atribuye la 
propiedad adjetival, esto es, denota eventos que se consideran irregulares. 
 Desde una perspectiva morfológica más general, planteo la pregunta de si el fenómeno de la 
nominalización es irrestricto o si, por el contrario, podemos predecir el número y el tipo de 
nominalizaciones que puede formar la misma base predicativa. A este respecto, proporciono 
evidencia empírica de que los argumentos de la base (evento, agente, tema, etc.) desempeñan 
un papel fundamental, si bien hay que tener en cuenta otros aspectos idiosincrásicos del 
español. Para cerrar el análisis, en virtud de la evidencia empírica proporcionada en esta tesis 
según la cual no hay nominalizaciones que denoten en el dominio de los grados, concluyo que 
podemos prescindir de estos como argumentos con su propio tipo ontológico.  
 Como se resume en el capítulo 5, la contribución principal de esta tesis consiste en que 
nuestra ontología semántica debe incluir clases y ejemplares en general, y clases de estado y 




sintáctico de las nominalizaciones deadjetivales del español. Al incorporar las clases y los 
ejemplares en nuestra ontología semántica, no es necesario postular la existencia de los grados, 
que se derivan de las clases de estados, ni de las cualidades o los tropos, cuya existencia 
simplemente no se justifica. 
 Hay otras contribuciones interesantes que resultan de la principal: por ejemplo, esta tesis 
ofrece una caracterización precisa de la estatividad y de su relación con la causa, la 
homogeneidad y la gradación, nociones cuya interacción a menudo no se delimita con precisión 
en la bibliografía. Otra contribución importante de esta tesis es que explora la interfaz 
morfología-semántica, que no es precisamente un terreno frecuentado en la investigación, y 
emplea un aparato teórico que combina la semántica formal con las teorías construccionistas de 
formación de palabras, mostrando que ambas perspectivas se complementan. Delimitar el papel 
de la gradación y la telicidad con respecto a los nombres de masa y la pluralización morfológica 
es otra contribución relevante e innovadora. 
 Asimismo, esta tesis proporciona una caracterización meticulosa de las nominalizaciones de 
ejemplar y clase de estado, con arreglo a la cual las primeras desatan lecturas episódicas porque 
se predican de un individuo en un tiempo determinado, mientras que las segundas desatan 
lecturas genéricas porque no se predican de ningún individuo en un tiempo determinado. Por 
una parte, del análisis de la combinación de las nominalizaciones de ejemplar de estado con los 
modificadores temporales, de frecuencia y de aspecto, se derivan interesantes consecuencias 
teóricas respecto al aspecto léxico y, especialmente, al de punto de vista. Por otro, el simple 
hecho de analizar las nominalizaciones de clase de estado es otra contribución relevante de la 
tesis, ya que la bibliografía, con pocas excepciones, las ha pasado por alto. Desentrañar sus 
propiedades semánticas y morfosintácticas sobre la base de la dicotomía clase-ejemplar aporta 
resultados esclarecedores que nos permiten delinear los distintos tipos de nominalizaciones 
deadjetivales en términos precisos, mostrando el impacto específico de los determinantes, los 
adjetivos de manera y los sintagmas de medida en la configuración sintáctica. 
 Esta tesis también proporciona una mejor comprensión del proceso de nominalización como 
un fenómeno semánticamente restringido, en el que interactúan las propiedades de las bases 
predicativas, los argumentos, los nudos funcionales que van asociados a ellas y los 
nominalizadores para crear los significados complejos que pueden expresar las 
nominalizaciones. Por último, espero que esta tesis sea útil para aquellos lectores interesados en 
descubrir fenómenos empíricos novedosos del español, en particular en relación con las 






The present work offers a morphosemantic characterization of deadjectival nominalizations in 
Spanish, which in the last decades has interested researchers from different academic 
disciplines, like cognitive science, philosophy and, especially, theoretical linguistics, where my 
dissertation is framed. My goal is to provide a detailed explanation of the semantic and 
morphological properties of the different types of deadjectival nominalizations, with a particular 
attention to what I call state-token and state-kind nominalizations, which I will define below. 
 Deadjectival nominalizations are nouns that are derived from adjectives, like altura ‘height’ < 
alto ‘tall’ and belleza ‘beauty’ < bello ‘beautiful’. The study of deadjectival nominalizations is of 
special importance for linguistic theory because it raises many questions from the semantic, 
morphological and syntactic point of view that are not solved yet, and some of these questions 
are addressed in this dissertation. Regarding the semantic point of view, deadjectival 
nominalizations encode abstract concepts, which do not have a clearly delimitated referent in 
the actual world. For instance, while the concrete noun gato ‘cat’ can refer to a particular animal 
that we can see and touch, the abstract noun altura ‘height’ does not refer to any tangible 
entity. For that reason, the use, definition and representation of these concepts is elusive and 
has brought up an intense debate about their semantics and the composition of the semantic 
ontology of natural languages. In particular, to capture the meaning expressed by deadjectival 
nominalizations, the literature has made use of ‘degrees’, ‘qualities’, ‘tropes’ and ‘states’, which 
has raised the question of which of these concepts actually belong to our semantic ontology 
and which can be derived from other more basic notions or simply dispensed with.  
 As for the morphological point of view, the study of deadjectival nominalizations, especially 
in comparison with deverbal ones (like destrucción ‘destruction’ < destruir ‘to destroy’), also 
raises interesting questions. Particularly, while deverbal nominalizations are formed out of verbs, 
which carry verbal morphemes of tense, viewpoint aspect and mood, deadjectival 
nominalizations are formed out of adjectives, which do not include verbal morphology. This 
dissimilarity raises the question of whether there is some type of information that deverbal 
nominalizations, unlike deadjectival ones, can encode. In this dissertation, I will show that there 
is an interesting contrast in relation to viewpoint aspect, that is, to (im)perfectivity, which casts 
serious doubts on the standard assumption that Spanish nominalizations are not supposed to 
encode viewpoint aspect-related information. Another important morphological consideration 
that I address here is the correlation between adjectival gradability and the mass domain; in 
other words, deadjectival nominalizations come from gradable adjectives and constitute mass 




 Finally, from the syntactic point of view, deadjectival nominalizations participate in different 
syntactic constructions and display distinct meanings in each of them. Consider (i) and (ii):  
 
(i)  a. la   altura de Víctor 
     the height of Víctor 
  ‘Víctor’s height’ 
  b. la  belleza de la tormenta 
     the beauty of the  storm  
(ii)  a. La  belleza está en el interior. 
     the  beauty   is   in the interior 
  ‘Beauty is inside.’ 
  b. El  puente tiene una altura {increíble / de diez metros}. 
      the bridge   has   a   height incredible  of   ten  meters 
  ‘The bridge has a(n) {incredible height / height of ten meters}.’ 
  c. El  puente tiene {mucha / dos metros de} altura. 
     the bridge   has    much    two  meters  of  height  
  d. Los electrones tienen altura. 
      the   electrons   have  height 
  ‘Electrons have some height.’ 
   
 Although the literature on deadjectival nominalizations has focused on the ones that I call 
here state-token nominalizations, which are exemplified in (i), there are other syntactic contexts 
that help us shed light on their syntactic and semantic properties. On the one hand, the 
nominalizations involved in (i) are preceded by the definite determiner and followed by a 
prepositional phrase that introduces the individual of whom the nominal property is predicated. 
On the other hand, none of the nominalizations in (ii), which I call state-kind nominalizations, are 
predicated of a specific individual. In (iia) the nominalization belleza ‘beauty’ is preceded by the 
definite determiner; in (iib) altura ‘height’ is preceded by the indefinite determiner and followed 
by an adjective or by a measure phrase; in (iic) the nominalization is preceded by the mass 
quantifier mucha ‘much, a lot of’ or by a measure phrase; finally, in (iid) the nominalization 
appears in isolation. Taking these basic data into consideration, a thorough study on 
deadjectival nominalizations has to explain why they show the previous syntactic distribution 
and what semantic differences each structure exhibits. 
 In brief, the importance of studying deadjectival nominalizations for linguistic theory is 




not solved yet. In order to be more explicit with respect to these issues, in what follows I provide 
a summary of the contents of each chapter of this dissertation. 
 In chapter 1, I present the concept of ‘abstract nouns’ and highlight their relevance in 
cognitive science, philosophy and theoretical linguistics and the problems that these disciplines 
have pointed out in characterizing abstract nouns as a consequence of their elusive nature. I 
place the focus on theoretical linguistics and assume Bosque’s (1999) insights according to 
which the concrete-abstract distinction does not constitute an independent lexical property of 
nouns, but rather it is derived from other more specific notions, like metaphorical uses, kind 
interpretations, eventuality predicates, etc.  
 In addition, I present the object of study, goals and hypothesis of this dissertation: the object 
of study are the different types of deadjectival nominalizations that can be formed in Spanish 
depending on their morphosemantic and syntactic properties, with a particular attention to the 
ones that I call state-token and state-kind nominalizations; the goals of the dissertation are to 
explain the fundamental properties of deadjectival nominalizations and to provide a formal 
analysis that captures these properties; and the hypothesis is that our semantic ontology must 
include state-kinds in order to account for the properties of the nominalizations under study. I 
bring to light the notions of ‘kinds’ and ‘tokens’, show their increasing relevance in linguistic 
theory since Carlson (1977) and explain their application to the domain of entities, events and 
states. Regarding the theoretical framework in which this work is set, the thesis follows the 
principles and methods of formal linguistics. In particular, to provide morphosemantic 
characterizations I employ Heim & Kratzer’s (1998) basic formal apparatus, which consists of an 
ontology of semantic objects and distinct rules of composition, in conjunction with a 
constructionist device of word formation, according to which words are both formed and 
combined in the syntax.  
 Furthermore, I extract the most basic empirical properties of deadjectival nominalizations 
from the literature, in order to provide the reader with the necessary basic knowledge on this 
topic. I also review previous theoretical accounts on deadjectival nominalizations, showing the 
limitations of degree-based, quality-based and trope-based approaches and providing evidence 
that state-based approaches make the correct prediction of capturing the abstract and 
eventuality nature of state-token nominalizations.  
 Given that stativity constitutes the backbone of the analysis of deadjectival nominalizations 
in this dissertation, in chapter 2 I provide a specific definition of states, based on the classical 
view by Vendler (1957) and Dowty (1979), as temporal properties that do not involve change in 
any of their participants. In order to delimitate the concept in precise terms, I also explain the 




configuring the typology of states that I present in this dissertation. In this respect, I provide 
evidence that the three-way classification of states into individual-level, stage-level and 
Davidsonian states is not based on spatiotemporality, aspect or the relative-absolute distinction, 
as claimed in the literature, but rather on causation. Specifically, individual-level states express 
non-caused properties; stage-level states express externally caused properties, where the 
external cause must be understood as a direct cause in the sense of Maienborn & Herdtfelder 
(2017); and, following Leferman (2017), Davidsonian states express internally caused properties. 
 Regarding homogeneity, based on Dowty (1979) and Rothstein (2004), I argue that atelic 
predicates, namely, states and activities, are cumulative; activities are not divisible strictly 
speaking or are just divisible in intervals, while there are states that are divisible in subintervals 
(e.g. saber la respuesta ‘to know the answer’) and others that are divisible in intervals (e.g. dormir 
‘to sleep’), so divisibility is not a defining property of states. In relation to gradability, I argue 
against Baglini (2015) that states are not defined as gradable predicates, since there are stative 
predicates like pertenecer ‘to belong’ that are not gradable, so gradability does not constitute a 
defining property of states either. 
 To complete the examination of stativity, and given that I assume that deadjectival 
nominalizations are derived from gradable adjectives, I present the basic aspects of my model of 
gradability, which is framed within the kind-token tradition (from Carlson 1977, 2003). In 
particular, I follow Anderson & Morzycki (2015) in positing that gradable adjectives express 
states and that degrees are not ontological objects, but rather they are derived from state-kinds. 
Nonetheless, in the spirit of Gehrke’s (2011, 2015, 2017) insights on German adjectival passives, 
where eventive predicates are taken as predicates of event-kinds rather than event-tokens, I 
posit that gradable adjectives are predicates of state-kinds rather than state-tokens. When the 
property is predicated of a specific individual, a functional node attaches to the derivation to 
associate a state-kind from the set of state-kinds with a state-token. 
 Once I have provided a precise characterization of stativity and sketched my view on 
gradability, in chapter 3 I deal with the analysis of state-token nominalizations, the ones that 
are exemplified in (i) and have monopolized the literature on deadjectival nominalizations. I side 
with state-based approaches and argue that deadjectival nominalizations express states, which 
is in accordance with the fact that their base adjectives express states irrespective of whether 
they are individual-level, stage-level or Davidsonian states. State-token nominalizations are 
syntactically characterized by being flanked by the definite determiner and their arguments, 
usually a prepositional phrase introducing the holder or the individual of whom the property is 
predicated, and semantically characterized by expressing an episodic property, that is, a 




 Nonetheless, unlike the existing state-based approaches, I contend that deadjectival 
nominalizations express imperfective states, since they accept temporal and frequency 
modification, but they reject aspectual modifiers introduced by durante ‘for’ even though they 
are atelic. The reason why they express imperfective eventualities is that they do not include the 
copula in their derivation, and adjectives can only license perfective interpretations when verbal 
morphology is present; given that aspectual modifiers can only co-occur with perfective 
interpretations, the fact that deadjectival nominalizations do not accept them is 
straightforwardly explained.  
 The kind-token distinction is proven to be useful when accounting for the combination of 
deadjectival nominalizations with frequency and manner adjectives and with measure phrases. 
Frequency adjectives (e.g. frecuente ‘frequent’, habitual ‘usual’, etc.) can trigger temporal or non-
temporal readings according to Gehrke & McNally (2015); I argue that, in Spanish, frequency 
adjectives can trigger temporal readings when combined with deadjectival nominalizations in 
prenominal, post-nominal and predicative position, in which case they operate over state-
tokens, but they can only trigger non-temporal interpretations in post-nominal position, in 
which case they operate over state-kinds. For instance, su frecuente tristeza ‘their frequent 
sadness’ means ‘their frequent states of being sad’, whereas su altura frecuente ‘(lit.) their height 
frequent’ means ‘their frequent degree of height’.  
 Manner adjectives (e.g. extraño ‘strange’, sorprendente ‘surprising’, etc.) can be taken as 
predicates of state-kinds that intersect with the set of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization 
and I provide evidence that, unlike their manner adverbial counterparts, they do not give rise to 
entailments to the positive: for example, extrañamente alto ‘strangely tall’ entails alto ‘tall’, while 
extraña altura ‘strange height’ does not entail alto ‘tall’. I contend that this asymmetry holds 
because nominalizations do not have to be evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison 
in the absence of an explicit quantifier or modifier, as will be explained in due time. Finally, I also 
analyze measure phrases, e.g. de diez metros ‘(lit.) of two meters’ in La altura del puente es de 
diez metros ‘The height of the bridge is ten meters, as predicates of state-kinds, but they differ 
from manner adjectives in that the former denote state-kinds that are inherently ordered.  
 The chapter concludes with a reflection on the semantic contribution of deadjectival suffixes; 
particularly, I posit that deadjectival suffixes can take as their input either the domain of the 
adjectives to which they attach, which is the most usual situation, or can restrict their domain by 
taking a proper subset of the set of state-kinds denoted by the base adjectives. This analysis 
captures semantic narrowing or the fact that there are (few) nominalizations that express a more 
specialized meaning than their corresponding bases: for instance, simple can mean ‘simple’ or 




this, I conclude that deadjectival suffixes do not contribute any other relevant meaning that can 
be systematized from the lexical-semantic point of view.  
 Having developed a careful examination of the main semantic and morphological properties 
of state-token deadjectival nominalizations, in chapter 4 I explore their internal composition 
and compare them to canonical mass nouns like agua ‘water’. Deadjectival nominalizations 
constitute mass nouns because they denote sets of elements, specifically state-kinds, that are 
ordered with respect to one another. However, canonical mass nouns and deadjectival 
nominalizations are associated with different domains: the former are partially ordered by a 
mereological part-whole relation. In contrast, following Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2017a), 
the latter are associated with scales, which I take to be sets of totally preordered state-kinds; my 
proposal differs from Francez & Koontz-Garboden’s in that these authors claim that scales are 
composed of portions of a substance instead of state-kinds.  
 In addition, I delimit the role of gradability and atelicity in the mass domain. In line with 
Grimm (2014), I argue that the standard analysis (from Mourelatos 1978) according to which 
there is a mapping from atelicity onto the mass domain in untenable. Unlike Grimm, who does 
not offer a precise alternative proposal, I posit that there is a mapping from gradability onto the 
mass domain and that this mapping holds because both gradable predicates and mass nouns 
can be construed as sets of elements that are ordered with respect to each other. In addition, I 
disassociate countability from morphological pluralization, showing that the latter entails the 
former, but not the other way around. Pluralization requires heterogeneity and, given that states 
are homogeneous inasmuch as they are atelic, they reject the plural in normal circumstances 
(e.g. *sus tristezas ‘their sadnesses’). Nevertheless, I also show that stative nominalizations can 
pluralize (e.g. sus alturas ‘their heights’) if certain factors are involved.  
 Furthermore, I study all types of state-kind nominalizations exemplified in (ii), which have not 
been studied in the literature, with few exceptions. State-kind nominalizations are syntactically 
characterized by not being accompanied by their arguments and semantically characterized by 
triggering generic interpretations, that is, by expressing properties that cannot be placed at a 
particular time. Definite nominalizations, exemplified in (iia), are preceded by the definite 
determiner. In contrast to Roy (2010), who claims that the generic reading is derived from the 
stative reading when a generic operator GEN occurs in the absence of the nominal arguments, I 
argue, in the spirit of the kind-token tradition in general and Espinal & Borik’s insights (2015) in 
particular, that the generic qua state-kind reading is the basic one, while the episodic qua state-
token reading is the derived one.  
 I also study indefinite and quantified nominalizations, which are exemplified in (iib) and (iic), 




adjective or a measure phrase functioning as an adnominal modifier, while the latter are 
preceded by a mass quantifier or a measure phrase functioning as a mass quantifier. I assume 
with Eguren & Pastor (2014, 2015) that indefinite nominalizations project nominal phrases, while 
quantified nominalizations project quantifier phrases; in addition, based on Schwarzschild‘s 
(2002) insights on English pseudopartitives and compounds, I argue that indefinite 
nominalizations constitute count nouns, while quantified nominalizations constitute mass nouns. 
Concerning bare nominalizations, exemplified in (iid), I argue that they are exceptional in 
Spanish, in contrast to languages like Ulwa and Wolof, because they require a context that 
imposes a zero on the scale of the nominalization.  
 In addition, I briefly study participant and event nominalizations and show that the kind-
token distinction is also appropriate to account for their formation and meaning. Consider the 
following data:  
 
(iii) a. Tengo      varias   durezas    en  el  pie. 
     have.1.SG  several hardnesses on the foot 
  ‘I have several calluses on my foot.’ 
  b. El     político     cometió   varias irregularidades. 
      the  politician  committed several  irregularities 
 
 In (iiia) the participant nominalization durezas ‘(lit.) hardnesses, calluses’) denotes a plural set 
of entities to which the adjectival property is ascribed, that is, hard entities. In contrast, in (iiib) 
the nominalization irregularidades (‘lit.) irregularities’ denotes a set of plural events to which the 
adjectival property is ascribed, that is, events that are considered irregular. 
 From a more general morphological perspective, I pose the question of whether the 
phenomenon of nominalization is unconstrained or rather we can predict the number and types 
of nominalizations that the same predicative base is able to form. I provide evidence that the 
process of nominalization is semantically constrained, and the arguments of the base (event, 
agent, theme, etc.) play a crucial role, although certainly there are other idiosyncratic aspects of 
Spanish involved. To conclude the analysis, in light of the empirical evidence provided in this 
dissertation according to which there are no nominalizations denoting in the degree domain, I 
wrap up by stating that degrees can be dispensed with as arguments with their own ontological 
type. 
 As summarized in chapter 5, the main contribution of this dissertation is that our semantic 
ontology must include kinds and tokens in general and state-kinds and state-tokens in 




nominalizations in Spanish. By including kinds and tokens in our semantic ontology, we do not 
need to postulate the existence of degrees, which are derived from state-kinds, or qualities or 
tropes, whose existence is simply unjustified.  
 There are other interesting contributions that stem from the main one: for instance, this 
dissertation offers a precise characterization of stativity and its interaction with causation, 
homogeneity and gradability, which is often treated inaccurately in the literature. Another 
important contribution is that this dissertation explores the morphology-semantics interface, 
which is not precisely a crowded field for investigation, and makes use of a theoretical apparatus 
that blends formal semantics with constructionist theories of word formation, showing that the 
two different perspectives complement each other. The delimitation of the role of gradability 
and atelicity with respect to the mass domain and morphological pluralization is another 
relevant and innovative contribution. 
 In addition, this dissertation provides a meticulous characterization of state-token and state-
kind nominalizations, according to which the former trigger an episodic reading because they 
are predicated of an individual at a particular time, whereas the latter trigger a generic reading 
because they are not predicated of any specific individual at any particular time. On the one 
hand, the examination of the combination of state-token nominalizations with temporal, 
frequency and aspectual modifiers has interesting theoretical consequences with respect to 
lexical and, especially, viewpoint aspect. On the other hand, the simple fact of analyzing state-
kind nominalizations is another relevant contribution of my dissertation, because these have 
been overlooked in the literature on gradability, with very few exceptions. Disentangling their 
semantic and morphosyntactic properties on the basis of the kind-token dichotomy provides 
insightful results that allow us to delineate the different types of deadjectival nominalizations in 
precise terms, showing the specific impact of the definite and indefinite determiners, manner 
adjectives and measure phrases on the syntactic configuration.  
 This dissertation also contributes a better understanding of the process of nominalization as 
a semantically constrained phenomenon, in which the properties of predicative bases, their 
arguments, the functional nodes that are involved and the nominalizers interact to give rise to 
the complex meanings that nominalizations can express. Finally, I hope that this dissertation is 
useful to those readers who are interested in discovering novel empirical facts about Spanish, 
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The present work explores Spanish deadjectival nominalizations at the morphology-semantics 
interface. The goal is to provide a thorough characterization of the different types of 
deadjectival nominalizations, focusing on the analysis of what I call state-token and state-kind 
nominalizations and showing why the study of deadjectival nominalizations is important for 
linguistic theory. Before entering into details, it is useful to zoom out and situate the study of 
deadjectival nominalizations in a broader frame, considering that they are just a subclass of so-
called abstract nouns, which have attracted the interest of researchers from different academic 
disciplines, particularly cognitive science, philosophy and theoretical linguistics, the latter 
perspective constituting the frame of my investigation.  
 
1.1 Abstract nouns: a cross-disciplinary perspective   
Deadjectival nominalizations like happiness and honesty, which I will define below, belong to a 
wider group of nouns that refer to concepts that lack a tangible referent in the actual world, 
which are called abstract nouns, such as happiness and honesty themselves, and accident, war, 
party, time, week, love, hunger, pain, etc. These nouns are opposed to concrete nouns, which 
refer to concepts with a clearly identifiable and delimited actual referent, such as horse, boat, 
table, sand, water, salt, etc. For example, if we want to explain what the meaning of the word 
table is, we can point to a certain piece of furniture that has a slab fixed on several legs; in 
contrast, if we want to explain what time is, we need to resort to more or less precise theoretical 
definitions of the concept. Thus, while concrete nouns refer to real objects that we can see and 
touch, abstract concepts involve feelings, actions, situations, experiences, human qualities and, 
in principle, even sensations that are perceived by smell, hearing and taste; for example, 
concepts like ‘fragrance’, ‘whistle’ and ‘bitterness’ do not point to clear referents in the actual 
world, although they are perceived by three of our five senses.  
 The fact that abstract nouns lack a clear referent in the actual world is the fundamental 
reason why they pose serious difficulties in defining them and it is precisely due to their 
elusiveness that they have attracted the attention of different academic disciplines, especially 
cognitive science, philosophy and theoretical linguistics. From the perspective of cognitive 
science, Borghi et al. (2017) point out that abstract nouns pose the challenge of explaining their 




abstract thought. Specifically, in discussing recent theories on the characterization of abstract 
concepts, they raise the question of whether they are grounded (or embodied), that is, 
influenced, like concrete nouns such as cat, by the kind of body that organisms possess to be 
grounded in perception, action and emotion systems. For example, seeing a cat, caressing it or 
hearing it meow activates internal stimulation of perceptual, motor and emotional experiences; 
in contrast, it is not clear if abstract concepts are also grounded, given the lack of a clear 
referent in the actual world.  
 Another question that the authors raise is whether abstract concepts are defined in the same 
terms as concrete concepts with respect to their statistical distribution by the co-occurrence of 
words in large corpora and, consequently, whether their meaning could be derived from the 
relationship between associated words rather than between words and their referents. Linguistic 
factors are also taken into consideration: specifically, the existing theories on cognitive science 
discuss the role of language focusing on its multi-folded aspects, as a bodily, social and 
emotional experience, as well as to underline the role of language as a medium of thought, 
which is able to extend our cognitive abilities and social experience. Finally, conceptual 
acquisition and the relationship between acquisition and brain representation is at stake, taking 
into account the fact that abstract concepts are acquired later than concrete ones, at a time 
when children have already mastered many other words. To sum up, providing an explanation of 




 From the philosophical perspective, abstract nouns, especially the ones that involve human 
properties like wisdom, have already attracted the attention of philosophers since Aristotle. The 
literature in this respect is vast, so I do not intend to be exhaustive and will focus on the main 
important aspects of the tradition. Of great importance is the Aristotelian conception of 
‘universals’, which are predicates that can be particularized by many specific objects, which are 
called ‘particulars’. For example, red is a universal property because it can be predicated of my 
shirt, which is a particular, but also of my former car, which is another particular; accordingly, 
universals differ from particulars in that they can be present in different objects and at different 
times. 
 Abstract concepts have been recently retrieved by Moltmann (2004, 2009, 2015), who 
develops an analysis based on kinds of tropes and tropes. The notion of a linguistic ‘kind’, which 
is crucial for the purposes of this dissertation and which I will define later on in precise terms, is 
tantamount to what Moltmann conceives as universals. In linguistic semantics, the bare mass 
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noun gold in, for example Gold is beautiful, is considered a term referring to a kind whose 
instances are particular gold quantities, as in This is gold. Analogously, in Tigers are common, the 
bare plural tigers is a term that refers to a kind whose instances are individual tigers, as in I love 
these tigers. With this in mind, Moltmann claims that bare nouns like wisdom refer to kinds of 
tropes, which are universal properties, since they can be particularized by many individuals: 
Socrates, Aristotle, Plato, etc. In contrast, determiner phrases (DPs) like Socrates’ wisdom refer to 
tropes, which are particularized properties or concrete manifestations of a property in an 
individual. Thus, tropes are individualized properties, which means that Socrates’ wisdom and 
Aristotle’s wisdom refer to different tropes even assuming that Socrates and Aristotle were 
equally wise. 
 According to Moltmann, tropes were considered one of the four categories of beings in 
Aristotle’s Categories (substances, secondary substances and qualities being the other three 
categories), and the category of tropes had subsequently been taken for granted in Aristotelian 
metaphysics, throughout the Middle Ages (Ockham, Aquinus), early modern philosophy (Locke, 
Spinoza), up to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics (Lowe) as well as the more radical 
trope-based one-category ontologies (Williams, Campbell). Moltmann goes a step further and 
claims that the notion of ‘tropes’ must be introduced in the semantic ontology of theoretical 
linguistics, particularly casting doubts that degree-based and state-based approaches are able 
to provide a satisfactory explanation for the semantics of deadjectival nominalizations. In section 
1.4, I will contend that, although the spirit of her proposal according to which universals and 
particulars play a relevant role in determining the semantics of deadjectival nominalizations, the 
trope-based theory does not offer any substantial advantages over the state-based approach, 
which I embrace in this dissertation. Regardless, and zooming out from Moltmann’s particular 
treatment of abstract nouns, their role in philosophy since Aristotle in relation to the ontological 
categories of natural language lays bare their importance in yet another discipline. 
 Finally, abstract nouns have also played an important role in theoretical linguistics, 
specifically in the configuration of nominal typologies. As claimed by Bosque (1999), among the 
different classifications that are traditionally proposed for nouns (like proper/common, 
individual/collective and count/mass nouns), the concrete-abstract distinction is the most 
problematic from the linguistic point of view due to their elusive nature. Etymologically, abstract 
means ‘disassociated, detached’, so abstract nouns refer to entities that are disassociated from 
real objects, like characteristics related to their shape, size, color, composition, use, etc., and 
traditional grammars often employ this or similar descriptions.   
 As Bosque (1999) points out for Spanish, the notion that underlies abstract nouns is precisely 




attempting to define it. Bosque classifies these notions into four groups: kind interpretations 
and imaginary referents, figurative uses, mass/count nouns and eventuality nouns.  
 In relation to kind interpretations and imaginary referents, take the noun caballo ‘horse’, 
which is supposed to refer to a concrete entity. However, in El caballo es un cuadrúpedo ‘(lit.) The 
horse is a quadruped, Horses are quadrupeds’, we do not refer to a tangible horse. In that case, 
the alleged abstract interpretation for the noun is derived from a kind reading. On the other 
hand, we can suppose that unicornio ‘unicorn’ is an abstract noun because it refers to an 
imaginary animal; however, the grammar is not sensitive to the real-imaginary distinction. Both 
caballo and unicornio are not classified into different lexical classes or, in other words, both 
nouns are predicates of entities that participate in the same syntactic contexts. The same holds 
for barco ‘boat’ in el barco que vi ayer ‘the boat I saw yesterday’ vs. El barco con el que soñé ayer 
nunca existirá ‘The boat I dreamt about yesterday will not exist ever’, although we might think 
that only the first statement alludes to a tangible boat.  
 Concerning figurative uses, in principle nouns like camino ‘path’ or campo ‘field’ refer to 
concrete objects, as in camino pedregoso ‘stony path’ or campo verde ‘green field’. In contrast, 
they are supposed to refer to abstract objects in el camino a la victoria ‘the way to victory’ or el 
campo de la tecnología ‘the field of technology’. In the former case, the noun is used literally, 
while in the latter case it is used metaphorically. Analogously, corona ‘crown’ refers to a concrete 
object in corona de oro ‘golden crown’, but it refers to an abstract object in el respeto a la corona 
‘the respect to the crown’, where the latter case is called a metonymic use.  
 As far as mass/count nouns are concerned, although abstract properties like belleza ‘beauty’ 
are usually lexicalized as mass nouns, there are also count nouns like semana ‘week’ or confusión 
‘confusion’ that have abstract referents. Regardless of whether caballo ‘horse’ and confusión 
‘confusion’ refer to tangible objects or not, morphosyntactically they behave as count nouns; 
analogously, arena ‘sand’ and belleza ‘beauty’ behave as mass nouns even though belleza does 
not refer to a tangible object.  
 Finally, as for eventuality nouns, certain nouns like accidente ‘accident’ and preocupación 
‘concern’ express eventualities, that is, temporal objects and, thereby, have abstract referents. 
The noun accidente ‘accident’ expresses an event, while preocupación ‘concern’ expresses a state. 
Thus, their abstract character is derived from the fact that they express eventualities rather than 
entities. It is important to keep this claim in mind, because in this dissertation I explain the 
abstract character of deadjectival nominalizations by virtue of their eventuality nature. 
 In summary, Bosque (1999) shows that the concrete-abstract distinction is linguistically 
elusive because it is based on our world knowledge rather than on independent lexical 




abstract; rather, his claim is that its abstractness is derived from other more specific linguistic 
notions. This conclusion, which is the starting point of this dissertation, poses the question as to 
which specific semantic notion lies behind the abstract nature of deadjectival nominalizations 
like belleza ‘beauty’. Throughout this dissertation, I will show that stativity is the central notion 
that articulates the semantics of these nominalizations, from which their abstractness is derived. 
The theoretical implications of this analysis are numerous, especially as to how gradable 
predicates and states are semantically structured, and I hope that my analysis sheds light on 
some of the puzzling aspects that abstract nouns pose for morphology and semantics. In the 
following section, I present the aim of the dissertation, the object of study and the main 
hypothesis. 
 
1.2 Aim of the dissertation, object of study and main hypothesis 
The present dissertation investigates the morphology-semantics interface in the domain of 
Spanish deadjectival nominalizations. Deadjectival nominalizations are nouns that are derived 
from adjectives, such as altura ‘height’ < alto ‘tall’, tristeza ‘sadness’ < triste ‘sad’ and honestidad 
‘honesty’ < honesto ‘honest’, by means of their attachment to certain suffixes (-ura, -eza, -idad, 
etc.), which are called deadjectival suffixes or nominalizers. The goals of this dissertation are the 
following: (a) to draw a comprehensive picture of all types of deadjectival nominalizations 
that can be formed in Spanish, focusing on what I call state-token and state-kind 
nominalizations; (b) to explain their fundamental semantic and morphosyntactic 
properties; and (c) to provide a formal analysis that captures these properties. Under the 
assumption that our ontology of semantic objects includes kinds and tokens (since Carlson 
1977, 2003), the main hypothesis of this dissertation is that state-kinds and state-tokens 
play a central role in capturing the properties of deadjectival nominalizations. 
 As previously shown, deadjectival nominalizations are a subset of so-called abstract nouns, 
which, unlike concrete nouns, do not have a clear and delimitated real referent in the actual 
world. The interest that these nouns have attracted in different disciplines stems from the fact 
that they are associated with notions that present many difficulties in their representation and 
characterization. Focusing on theoretical linguistics, the existence of deadjectival 
nominalizations poses many questions related to our ontology of semantic objects, their specific 
semantic structure, their morphological composition and their syntactic distribution. By 
examining deadjectival nominalizations, this dissertation does not only aim to offer a precise 
characterization of their semantic and morphosyntactic properties, but also to show the 
empirical and theoretical consequences derived from the study of these nominalizations with 




 In particular, this dissertation provides a comprehensive characterization of stativity, 
focusing on its relation to causation, homogeneity and gradability and its interaction with 
lexical and viewpoint aspect, which is not always clearly demarcated in linguistic theory. I also 
provide a thorough analysis of deadjectival nominalizations that illustrates the similarities and 
differences with respect to canonical mass nouns like water, in order to posit a precise 
structure for the two types of nouns and the relationship between gradability and the mass 
domain. Moreover, this dissertation supports a model of gradability that makes use of the most 
basic tools that are necessary to explain the empirical phenomena, taken as basics the model of 
degrees as kinds designed by Anderson & Morzycki (2015) and elaborating on their 
fundamental aspects to capture the main advantages of degree-less and degree-based theories. 
 This dissertation also offers a comparison between gradable adjectives and their 
nominalizations, highlighting the intimate relationship between copular and possessive 
structures in Spanish and their cross-linguistic relevance, focusing on languages like Ulwa and 
Wolof, which employ possessive structures as the natural way to express property concepts like 
tall, big, old, red, cold, beautiful, smart, etc. in the sense of Dixon (1982). Furthermore, this 
dissertation offers an across-the-board analysis of deadjectival nominalizations by 
reconciling syntactic and semantic approaches, showing that they do not operate 
independently, but rather they complement each other, to account for the formation and 
meaning of the different types of nominalizations compositionally, which has a crucial impact on 
our understanding of the morphology-semantics interface. Finally, I show that the 
phenomenon of nominalization is not unconstrained, but rather it is regulated by general 
principles even though it sometimes gives the impression of being an arbitrary process. To wrap 
up, this dissertation embraces the job of providing a complete description of deadjectival 
nominalizations in Spanish with the ultimate goal of contributing a better understanding of the 
morphosyntactic and semantic principles that regulate natural languages.  
 The analysis of the semantic and morphosyntactic behavior of deadjectival nominalizations 
endorses the proposal that our ontology of semantic objects must contain kinds and tokens in 
general (Carlson 1977, 2003; a.o.) and state-kinds and state-tokens in particular (Anderson & 
Morzycki 2015). Recall from the previous section that there is a long philosophical tradition that 
dates back to Aristotle according to which natural languages make reference to universals and 
particulars. Carlson (1977, 2003) develops these insights and posits the existence of linguistic 
kinds and tokens (see also Zamparelli 1995; Chierchia 1998a; Landman & Morzycki 2003; Dayal 
2004; McNally & Boleda 2004; Landman 2006; Castroviejo & Schwager 2008; Espinal & McNally 
2011; Gehrke 2011, 2015, 2017; Umbach & Gust 2014; Gehrke & McNally 2015; Espinal & Borik 




world, while a token is simply one of those objects in a certain world. Readers who are not 
familiar with the kind-token literature may think about tokens as ordinary entities, states and 
events, which refer to unique and particular objects, and think about kinds as pluralities of 
entities, states and events. Observe the following examples: 
 
(1)  a. La   jirafa   se comió las ramas. 
     the  giraffe REFL  ate   the branches 
  ‘The giraffe ate the branches.’ 
  b. La  jirafa  es un animal  herbívoro.  
     the giraffe is  an animal herbivorous 
  ‘Giraffes are herbivorous animals.’  
  
 In (1a) there is a particular giraffe that ate the braches, whereas in (1b), which is treated in 
traditional grammar as a synecdoche or a metonymy use insofar as the part is taken as the 
whole, the DP la jirafa ‘(lit.) the giraffe’ refers to a plurality of giraffes in any given world. 
According to the kind-token tradition, we can claim that in (1a) the DP la jirafa ‘the giraffe’ 
denotes an entity-token, while the same DP denotes an entity-kind in (1b).  
 The kind-token dichotomy has been also applied to the domain of eventive verbs to account 
for German adjectival passives (Gehrke 2011, 2015, 2017) and to the domain of states to account 
for the combination of gradable adjectives with degree and manner modifiers (Anderson & 
Morzycki 2015); the specific details of these proposals are explained in chapter 2. Building on 
this literature, the hypothesis of this dissertation is that the kind-token dichotomy can also be 
applied to the domain of deadjectival nominalizations. Observe the following examples: 
 
(2)  a. la   belleza   del   jardín 
     the  beauty of.the garden  
  b. La  belleza está en  el  interior. 
     the  beauty   is    in the interior 
  ‘Beauty is inside.’ 
 
 In (2a) the nominalization is followed by a prepositional phrase (PP) introducing the 
individual of which the nominal property is predicated, which we can call holder, while in (2b) the 
PP does not occur and beauty is taken as a general notion. What I argue for is that the DP la 




particular time; in contrast, in (2b) the DP la belleza ‘the beauty’ refers to all possible states of 
beauty in a given world.  
 There are other types of deadjectival nominalizations that can be formed out of gradable 
adjectives, which I illustrate next: 
 
(3)  a. {mucha / dos metros de} altura 
      much      two  meters  of  height 
  b. una altura {increíble / de dos metros} 
       a   height  incredible  of  two  meters 
  ‘a(n) {incredible height / height of two meters}’ 
  c. Los electrones tienen altura. 
      the   electrons  have  height 
  ‘Electrons have some height.’ 
(4)  Tengo      varias   durezas    en  el  pie. 
  have.1.SG several hardnesses on the foot 
  ‘I have several calluses on my foot.’ 
(5)  El     político     cometió   varias irregularidades. 
  the  politician committed several  irregularities 
 
 Note that the same lexical item can constitute different types of nominalizations depending 
on its syntactic distribution and semantic properties, such as altura ‘height’ in (3). The 
nominalizations occurring in (3) are characterized by the absence of any arguments, and I argue 
that they denote in the domain of state-kinds, like belleza ‘beauty’ in (2b): in (3a) the 
nominalization is preceded by a mass quantifier or a measure phrase that functions as a mass 
quantifier; in (3b) the nominalization is preceded by the indefinite determiner una ‘a’ and 
followed by an adjective or a measure phrase that functions as an adnominal modifier; and in 
(3c) the nominalization appears in isolation. The study of state-kind deadjectival 
nominalizations, which constitutes a novelty in the literature on deadjectival nominalizations 
(with very few exceptions), is not only important to provide a better characterization of their 
semantic structure and syntactic behavior; particularly, it also sheds light to one of the most 
problematic issues related to the morphology-semantics interface, namely, the relationship 
between atelicity and gradability with respect to mass and count nouns in the stative domain. I 
advance more details of the proposal in section 1.5.  
 The complete picture of deadjectival nominalizations includes so-called participant and event 




admits pluralization; following Fábregas (2016), I assume that this is a participant nominalization 
and denotes in the domain of entities. Finally, in (5) the nominalization appears without 
arguments, admits pluralization and can be the complement of the verb cometer ‘to commit’; 
based on Arche & Marín (2015) and Arche et al. (to appear), they express events. In this 
dissertation, although I do not focus my attention on participant or event deadjectival 
nominalizations, I show that their analysis provides additional evidence in favor of incorporating 
kinds and tokens in our semantic ontology. 
 Throughout this dissertation, I justify the typology of deadjectival nominalizations presented 
here, exemplified in (2)-(5), on the basis of the different morphosemantic and syntactic 
properties that they display. I also present empirical evidence that the hypothesis that our 
semantic ontology must include kinds, and state-kinds in particular, is the most appropriate one 
to account for their properties and morphological formation.  
 In conclusion, the object of study of this dissertation are the different types of deadjectival 
nominalizations in Spanish, with a particular look at state-token and state-kind nominalizations, 
and its ultimate goal is to provide a morphosyntactic and semantic analysis that captures their 
main properties. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the state-kind/state-token distinction 
must also be applied to the domain of deadjectival nominalizations. In the following section, I 
explain the basic methodology employed in this work. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
To achieve the goals described in the previous section, I count on rigorous data collection and 
the analytic tools and tenets from theoretical linguistics. The main data that I examine are taken 
from my introspection as a native speaker of European Spanish and from the literature on 
deadjectival nominalizations. I focus on the literature on Spanish, although I compare Spanish 
data to English and French, as well as Ulwa (based on Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2015, 2017a, 
2017b) and Wolof (based on Baglini 2015) when useful, insofar as the latter two languages make 
use of possessive structures as their natural and common mechanism to express property 
concepts (I illustrate the contrast in subsection 1.4.1). Exceptionally, I also show some data taken 
from the Internet when necessary to support personal acceptability judgments that may 
generate doubts to native speakers of Spanish. Most of the data offered in this dissertation do 
not cast serious doubts about their (un)acceptance; in exceptional cases in which the judgments 
might not be completely clear, I offer an explanation as to why this could be the case and how 
they can be accounted for. 
 Below I describe the basic theoretical assumptions that sustain the analysis, which consist in a 




composition. In relation to morphosyntax, the theories on word formation can be divided into 
two big groups: on the one hand, in lexicalist theories (Halle 1973; Aronoff 1976; Wasow 1977; 
Anderson 1992; Pustejovsky 1995; Lieber 2004, 2016; a.o.) syntax and morphology are two 
independent components with their own rules: the former contains the rules that account for 
the combination of words, while the latter contains the rules that account for the formation of 
words. On the other hand, constructionist theories (Halle & Marantz 1993; Marantz 1997, 2000; 
Alexiadou 2001, 2011a, 2013a, 2013b; Borer 2005, 2013; Embick 2004; Embick & Marantz 2008; 
Acquaviva 2009, 2014; Harley 2014; Fábregas 2016; a.o.) challenge the hypothesis that 
morphological rules are different from syntactic rules and posit that the two types are the same. 
Accordingly, constructionist models rely on the assumption that the unique generative 
component is the syntax, to which all the regularities must be ascribed. Thus, the formation of 
words is subject to the same syntactic constraints that the combination of words is subject to, 
whereas semantic irregularities or idiosyncrasies belong to the lexicon. Certainly, in Distributed 
Morphology, the dominant sub-theory of constructionist theories, morphology is an 
independent component with its own rules (e.g. fusion, fission, impoverishment, etc.). However, 
these rules do not regulate the formation of words, but rather they constitute adjustment rules 
that mediate between syntax and phonology. Thus, the fundamental insight of constructionist 
theories is that the formation of words as well as its combination holds in the syntax.  
 For the purposes of this work, I will show that the formation and syntactic distribution of 
deadjectival nominalizations can be accounted for without the assistance of another generative 
component other rather than the syntax. The basic syntactic rules are merge and move (from 
Chomsky 1981):
2
 merge is the operation whereby two constituents (affixes, words, phrases and 
sentences) are combined together to form complex constituents, while move is the operation 
whereby a constituent moves from one position to another one higher in the structure. The 
meaning of a complex constituent is determined compositionally, that is, by the interaction of 
the meaning of its constitutive parts by means of certain composition rules. 
 In relation to semantic assumptions, in order to determine the meaning of a complex 
constituent properly, we need a semantic apparatus that includes an ontology of basic objects 
or types and semantic rules of composition. Regarding the former, I assume an ontology that 
includes kinds and tokens. Recall that a kind consists in a plurality of objects that share a certain 
property in any given world, while a token is just one of its members; I develop the proposal in 
chapter 2. Accordingly, the usual sets of entities, events and states can be divided into entity-
kinds, event-kinds and state-kinds, on the one hand, and entity-tokens, event-tokens and state-
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tokens, on the other. In addition, I assume the existence of the domain of the truth values 1 for 
true and 0 for false and the domain D⟨σ,τ⟩ of an infinite number of functions or complex types 




(6)  a. Dek is the set of entity-kinds in the domain D. Variables: xk, yk, zk… 
  b. Dvk is the set of event-kinds in D. Variables: ek, ek’… 
  c. Dsk is the set of state-kinds in D. Variables: sk, sk’… 
  d. De is the set of entity-tokens in D. Variables: x, y, z… 
  e. Dv is the set of event-tokens in D. Variables: e, e’… 
  f. Ds is the set of state-tokens in D. Variables: s, s’… 
  g. Dt = {1, 0}, the set of the two truth values. Variable: t. 
  h. D⟨σ,τ⟩ is the set of functions from Dσ to Dτ. Functions: F, G, R… 
 
 With respect to the rules of semantic composition, I assume the usual rules that appear in 
Heim & Kratzer (1998), where ⟦ ⟧ stands for the interpretation function: 
 
(7)  Terminal Node (TN) 
  If σ is a terminal node, ⟦𝜎⟧ is specified in the lexicon. 
(8)  Functional Application (FA) 
  If α is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, and ⟦β⟧ is a function whose  
  domain contains ⟦γ⟧, then ⟦α⟧ = ⟦β⟧(⟦γ⟧). 
(9)  Predicate Modification (PM) 
  If α is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, and ⟦β⟧ and ⟦γ⟧ are both of type 
  <n,t>, then ⟦α⟧ = λn : n ∊ Dn. ⟦β⟧(n) ∧ ⟦γ⟧(n).
4
 
(10) Lambda Abstraction (λ-A) 
  If α is a branching node whose daughters are a binder index λi and β, then ⟦α⟧
g





 I also see the need to employ (a version of) Kratzer’s (1996) Event Identification rule. In its 
original formulation, this rule allows an event predicate to combine with its external argument, 
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 In this dissertation, I assume an extensional rather than an intensional semantics, so I do not make use of variables to 
represent world indices despite the fact that kinds can be defined as pluralities in any given world. Likewise, for 
convenience sake, I do not employ time variables to formally capture the temporal location of eventualities in the past, 
the future or the present. 
4
 In its original formulation, Predicate Modification operates when two predicates of type <e,t> are involved; however, 
since Davidsonian and Neo-Davidsonian semantics, where eventuality predicates are supposed to encode an event 
argument e or a state argument s, it was extended to eventualities of type <v,t> and <s,t>. In this dissertation, where 




and Wellwood (2014) extends its application to states. In this dissertation, I posit that eventuality 
predicates, which include events and states following Bach (1986), denote in the kind rather than 
the token domain, so the rule must be reformulated in order to allow eventuality-kinds to 
combine with their external argument. Specifically, I call this rule Eventuality Identification (EI) 
and propose the following reformulation for predicates of state-kinds: 
 
(11) Eventuality Identification (EI) 
  If α is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, and ⟦β⟧ is in D<n,< sk,t>> and ⟦γ⟧ is 
  in D<sk,t>, then ⟦α⟧ = λn : n ∊ Dnλsk : sk ∊ Dsk. ⟦β⟧(sk, n) ∧ ⟦γ⟧(sk). 
 
 In prose, this rule establishes that a predicate of state-kinds of type <sk,t> can combine with 
a subject of the underspecified type n, which includes entities, as in The table is terrible; events, 
as in The war was terrible; states, as in Your sadness is terrible, etc., although the most usual case 
is the one in which the subject is an entity. The reason why I posit that state-kinds rather than 
state-tokens take subjects is that, in the spirit of Gehrke (2011, 2015, 2017), who claims that 
eventive verbs are predicates of event-kinds rather than event-tokens, I extend this insight to 
the stative domain and posit that stative predicates denote state-kinds. I explain Gehrke’s 
proposal and develop mine in depth in chapter 2. Finally, I assume the rule of Existential Closure 
(∃C) for those variables that remain unbound in the derivation. Although in its original 
formulation (Heim 1982) it was only applied at the end of the derivation, following usual 
practice I assume that this rule can operate in any syntactic position if the derivation demands it.  
 Given that this dissertation transits on the semantics-morphology interface, the analysis 
offered here intends to reconcile the basic assumptions of constructionist theories on word 
formation and the ones of the formal semantic apparatus with the principle of compositionality, 
which is the backbone assumption of modern natural language semantics. Particularly, in 
addition to positing a semantic denotation for gradable adjectives and deadjectival suffixes that 
is consistent with the innovative vision offered here, I provide a semantic denotation for the 
functional projections that are involved in the formation of deadjectival nominalizations in 
accordance with constructionist theories. 
 In sum, in this section I have presented my morphosyntactic and semantic assumptions. On 
the one hand, I assume a constructionist device of word formation according to which words are 
formed in the syntax by means of syntactic rules. The meaning of a nominalization is determined 
compositionally by the interaction of the meanings of words, affixes and functional nodes, by 




complex meaning. In the following section, I describe the main contributions of previous 
accounts on deadjectival nominalizations. 
  
1.4 Deadjectival nominalizations in linguistic theory 
In this section, I provide the reader with the necessary background to understand why the study 
on deadjectival nominalizations is relevant for linguistic theory and to understand the details of 
the analysis proposed in this dissertation. In this respect, the literature on deadjectival 
nominalizations is heterogeneous and significantly biased for one type thereof, which I call here 
state-token nominalizations. To be true to the said heterogeneity and bias, this section is 
divided into two subsections: in subsection 1.4.1, I provide an outlook of the fundamental 
properties of deadjectival nominalizations that the literature has identified, particularly looking 
at Spanish data; thus, this subsection is fundamentally descriptive, does not enter into details 
and does not assume any specific theoretical background from the reader. In subsection 1.4.2, I 
review previous approaches on what I call state-token deadjectival nominalizations, the ones 
that dominate the landscape of deadjectival nominalizations and have monopolized the 
literature on this topic. I classify them depending on their main empirical and theoretical 
contributions and examine the specific theoretical assumptions and technical details on which 
these analyses are based, ranging from generative syntax to formal semantics.  
 
1.4.1 Basic empirical properties 
As I have mentioned before, the literature on deadjectival nominalizations is highly 
heterogeneous. The proposals vary substantially depending on whether they place the focus on 
morphosyntactic, semantic, syntactic and even philosophical considerations, where the semantic 
issues are highly variable for two reasons. First, the semantic contributions differ considerably 
depending on which aspects are considered more relevant: for example, some proposals are 
concerned with the individual-level/stage-level distinction, others with the combination of 
nominalizations with temporal, frequency or manner modifiers, others focus on the similarities 
and differences of nominalizations with respect to regular mass nouns like water, etc.  
 Second, the elusive nature of abstract nouns, particularly of deadjectival nominalizations, 
according to which they lack a tangible referent in the actual world, as shown in section 1.1, 
leads the authors to search for the most appropriate semantic object that characterizes its 
domain, in particular states, qualities, degrees or tropes. Certainly, eventive nouns like accident 
do not have a tangible referent in the actual world either, but they have not given rise to intense 
debates about their nature because of the long linguistic tradition that has delimitated the 




and ‘tropes’, which are difficult to accurately tell apart. Due to these complexities, let us show 
first the fundamental morphosyntactic and semantic properties of deadjectival nominalizations 
without taking theoretical considerations into account, which will be examined in the following 
subsection.   
 The formation of deadjectival nominalizations can be subsumed under the more general 
phenomenon of nominal derivation, according to which a nominalizer attaches to a certain base 
(an adjective, a verb or even a noun) to form a noun. Focusing on deadjectival nominalizations, 
these are nouns that result from the attachment of an adjective to a deadjectival suffix. The 
number of deadjectival suffixes in Spanish is quite high; below, the most usual ones are 
presented in order to acquaint the reader with them (see more details in Santiago & Bustos 
Gisbert 1999 and RAE & ASALE 2009: chapter 6).  
 
(12) a. -dad, -edad, -idad, -tad  
cruel > crueldad;  sol(o) > soledad;    fiel >  fidelidad;     leal > lealtad 
cruel     cruelty     alone    loneliness faithful faithfulness   loyal   loyalty 
b. -ez, -eza, -icie, -icia 
  tozud(o) > tozudez;    bell(o) > belleza; calv(o) > calvicie;  avar(o) > avaricia 
  stubborn  stubbornness beautiful  beauty    bald     baldness   greedy      greed 
  c. -ura 
  dulc(e) > dulzura. 
  sweet     sweetness  
  d. -or 
  amarg(o) > amargor 
  bitter          bitterness 
  e. -ía 
  valient(e) > valentía 
  brave        braveness 
  f. -era 
borrach(o) > borrachera. 
     drunk         drunkness 
g. -ería 
  tont(o) > tontería 
  silly         silliness 





  h. -ia, -ncia 
  eficaz >  eficacia;  elega(nt)(e) > elegancia. 
  effective effectiveness     elegant         elegance 
  i. -ismo 
  fatal > fatalismo. 
  fatal     fatalism 
  j. -ud, -tud, -itud 
  inquiet(o) > inquietud;  joven > juventud;  verosímil > verosimilitud
5
 
  restless       restlessness  young  youngness   credible       credibility 
 
 Note that the most visible consequence of adopting a synchronic perspective of word 
formation is the necessity of positing that the nominalization does not take the gender vowel 
from the adjective. This and other morphophonological consequences, like positing different 
forms or allomorphs for the same suffix (-dad, -edad, -idad and -tad) in (12a), the 
monophthongization of the base (e.g. valient(e) ‘brave’ > val(i)entía ‘braveness’) in (12e), vocalic 
alterations (e.g. joven ‘young’ > *juven > juventud ‘youngness’ in (12j) and suppletion (e.g. fiel 
‘faithful’ > fidelidad ‘faithfulness’) in (12a) constitute post-syntactic phenomena and will not be 
examined here. For the different treatments of post-syntactic phenomena in constructionist 
theories, the reader is referred to the literature in Distributed Morphology (Halle & Marantz 
1993; Marantz 1997; Embick & Marantz 2008; Harley 2014; a.o.), according to which there is an 
independent component called morphology with its own rules of adjustment that mediates 
between the syntax and phonology, and also to the Nanosyntax literature (Starke 2009, 2011; 
Caha 2009; Taraldsen 2009; Fábregas 2016), according to which such component does not exist, 
and the phenomena illustrated here and others are rather a matter of the syntax-phonology 
interface. 
 Once I have presented the main suffixes that are involved in the formation of Spanish 
deadjectival nominalizations, I will describe the main properties of the latter. First, although 
there are few cases of deadjectival nominalizations that are derived of apparent non-gradable 
adjectival bases, which I briefly discuss in chapter 5, deadjectival nominalizations are usually 
formed out of gradable adjectives. The literature on gradable adjectives since Bolinger (1972) is 
enormously vast, in particular compared to the literature on deadjectival nominalizations, so I 
will not review the different proposals on the market (see e.g. Morzycki 2015 and references 
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therein). For the purposes of this section, it is sufficient to show that gradable adjectives express 
properties that may hold to a higher or lower degree. Observe the following data: 
 
(13) a. muy triste / honesto / tozudo / valiente 
     very   sad      honest   stubborn    brave 
  b. tristeza / honestidad /  tozudez  /  valentía 
      sadness     honesty   stubbornness braveness 
 
 (13a) shows that triste ‘sad’, honesto ‘honest’, tozudo ‘stubborn’ and valiente ‘brave’ refer to 
properties that can be graded and, thus, combine with the degree modifier muy ‘very’, which 
indicates that the property holds to a high degree. Importantly, these adjectives can form 
nominalizations, see (13b). The challenge that these data pose is to provide a comprehensive 
analysis that captures both the morphological and semantic properties of deadjectival 
nominalizations on the basis of the adjectives from which they are derived in accordance with 
the principle of compositionality.  
 Second, as a general rule, deadjectival nominalizations constitute mass nouns:  
 
(14) a. mucha arena  agua /  tristeza  /  honestidad  /  tozudez  /  valentía 
      much   sand   water    sadness       honesty     stubbornness  braveness 
  ‘a lot of sand/water/sadness/honesty/stubbornness/braveness’ 
  b. *mucha mesa / silla / tormenta / guerra 
       much   table   chair     storm        war 
 
 (14a) shows that canonical mass nouns like arena ‘sand’ and agua ‘water’ combine with the 
mass quantifier mucha ‘much, a lot of’ and that deadjectival nominalizations also accept it. In 
contrast, count nouns like the ones in (14b), regardless of whether they express entities, such as 
mesa ‘table’ and silla ‘chair’, or events, such as tormenta ‘storm’ or guerra ‘war’, are incompatible 
with mass quantifiers.  Nonetheless, some authors have pointed out that deadjectival 
nominalizations can accept morphological pluralization, which is a property of count nouns. For 
example, Grimm (2014) notes for English the following examples: 
 
(15)  a. Please, let’s not insult both our intelligences by pretending this is open to question.  





  b. Warrick, Sara, and Grissom handle this case, dealing with their ignorances about the  
  deaf community. (Google) 
  (From Grimm 2014: 194, 195) 
 
 These data, which are also applicable to Spanish, e.g. nuestras inteligencias ‘our intelligences’ 
or sus ignorancias ‘their ignorances’, pose the challenge of explaining why they are licensed and 
which constraints regulate their formation. Beyond this issue, they pose the challenge of 
providing a thorough characterization of deadjectival nominalizations that allows us to explain 
their usual behavior as mass nouns, but also taking into consideration their less usual behavior 
as count nouns. Ultimately, the analysis of deadjectival nominalizations plays a central role in 
determining how mass and count nouns are construed in natural languages and what structural 
properties differentiate them. All these issues will be tackled in chapter 4. 
 Nevertheless, this is not the end of the story with respect to the mass and count issue. 
Tovena (2001) observes for Italian and French, and her observation is applicable to Spanish, that 
canonical mass nouns differ from abstract nouns, including deadjectival nominalizations, when 
appearing in certain syntactic contexts that involve exclamative determiners (see also Brucart & 
Rigau 2002 for Catalan; Baglini 2015 for Wolof; Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2017a for Ulwa, 
English and Hebrew): 
 
(16) a. quanto coraggio! = che coraggio! 
               what   courage 
  ‘How much courage! = What a courage!’ 
  b. quanto   burro! ≠ che  burro! 
      what a lot of  butter  what (good) butter  
  ‘How much butter! ≠ What a butter!’ 
(From Tovena 2001: 573) 
 
 While in (16b) the exclamative determiner quanto ‘how much’ induces a reading according to 
which there is a lot of butter and the exclamative determiner che ‘what a’ induces a reading 
according to which the type of butter is good (or bad, strange, etc.), that distinction is 
neutralized in (16a), where both determiners induce a reading according to which there is a lot 
of courage. This contrast, which reveals the intrinsic complexity of the domain of deadjectival 
nominalizations, reinforces the necessity of a comprehensive analysis that captures not only 




 To conclude the mass and count issue, Arche & Marín (2015) and Fábregas (2016) note that 
there are other cases in which morphological pluralization is valid: 
 
(17) a. Juan   cometió  dos imprudencias / varias crueldades. 
        Juan committed two  imprudencies  several   cruelties 
  ‘Juan carried out two imprudent acts / several cruel acts.’ 
  b. Esta mañana han  tenido lugar varias imprudencias/injusticias. 
          this morning have taken place several imprudencies  injustices 
  ‘This morning several imprudent acts / injustices have taken place.’ 
(From Arche & Marín 2015: 264, 265) 
(18) a. Juan tiene algunas rojeces  en  la  piel. 
     Juan  has    some  rednesses on the skin 
  ‘Juan has some blotches on his skin.’ 
  b. No me molestes con  pequeñeces. 
      not me   bother   with  smallnesses  
  ‘Don’t bother me with trivialities.’ 
(From Fábregas 2016: 218, translation mine) 
 
 However, these cases differ radically from the ones shown by Grimm (2014) in (15) insofar as 
they express either events or entities. Thus, imprudencias ‘lit. imprudencies, imprudent acts’, 
crueldades ‘(lit.) cruelties, cruel acts’ and injusticias ‘(lit.) injustices, unjust acts’ in (16) refer to 
events that are imprudent, cruel and unfair, respectively, while in (17) rojeces ‘(lit.) rednesses, 
blotches’ and pequeñeces ‘(lit.) smallnesses, trivialities’ refer to red entities and small entities, 
respectively. In contrast, whatever the nominalizations in (15) express, namely, degrees, qualities, 
states or tropes, the plural does not turn out to change their nature. Thus, what is important to 
take into consideration up to now is that deadjectival nominalizations often form mass nouns, 
but they can also form count nouns under certain circumstances (which will be analyzed in due 
time). For expository reasons, previous approaches on participant and event deadjectival 
nominalizations are postponed until chapter 4, where I also provide an analysis thereof and 
explain why their study is also important for the semantics-morphology interface.  
 Third, another prominent aspect of deadjectival nominalizations is that they preserve the 
semantic relation that their adjectival bases maintain with their arguments or, in other words, 
inherit argument structure (see Pena 2004, Villalba 2013 and Zato 2020 for Spanish; Roy 2010 
for French; Borer 2013 for English). The most powerful argument in favor of argument structure 




(19) a. Mi trabajo es  compatible con mis aficiones. 
     my  work    is  compatible with my  hobbies 
  b. la  compatibilidad de mi trabajo con mis aficiones 
     the   compatibility  of  my  work   with my  hobbies 
(20) a. El    museo  está próximo a  la  estación. 
     the  museum  is      close   to the  station 
  b. la  proximidad del    museo   a  la  estación 
      the   closeness of.the museum to the  station 
 
 On the one hand, the examples in (19a) and (20a) illustrate that adjectives like compatible 
‘compatible’ and próximo ‘close’ select for two arguments, some of which are headed by a 
certain preposition. On the other hand, (19b) and (20b) show that argument structure is 
preserved in their corresponding nominalizations. Note that the holder of the nominalization is 
introduced by de ‘of’, while the other argument retains the PP subcategorized by its base 
adjective. 
 In this respect, the interaction of deadjectival nominalizations with their arguments brings to 
light interesting contrasts. Roy (2010) claims for French that deadjectival nominalizations can 
appear in two main syntactic environments: 
 
(21) a. La popularité (constante) de ses chansons m’impressionne. 
     the popularity   constant   of  his     songs      me.impresses 
  b. La popularité (*constante) est une qualité  qui     lui     fait  défaut. 
     the popularity    constant     is    a   quality that  to.him  does default 
(From Roy 2010: 146) 
  
 These data, which are also applicable to Spanish, show that deadjectival nominalizations can 
be predicated of their arguments, as in (21a), in which case they admit frequency modifiers 
(which Roy calls aspectual modifiers). In contrast, when deadjectival nominalizations are not 
accompanied by their arguments, as in (21b), frequency modifiers like constante ‘constant’ are 
unlicensed. Although these data do not show the whole picture of the combination of 
deadjectival nominalizations with time-related modifiers, which I divide into frequency, temporal 
and aspectual modifiers due to their different behavior, they constitute a good sample of the 
semantic differences displayed by deadjectival nominalizations depending on whether they co-
occur with their arguments or not. The challenge that these data pose is to figure out the 




arguments of deadjectival nominalizations, which has an important impact on the syntax-
semantics interface.  
 The fact that the literature on deadjectival nominalizations does not distinguish the different 
types of time-related modifiers poses serious difficulties when it comes to showing the reader a 
detailed state of the art at this point of the dissertation, so I will enter into details in the 
following subsection. So far, it is interesting to note that Fábregas (2016) shows that there is a 
crucial contrast between temporal and aspectual modifiers when interacting with deadjectival 
nominalizations: 
 
(22) a. *La    ofuscación  de Juan durante varios minutos fue muy grande. 
      the  bewilderment of Juan     for    several minutes was very    big 
  ‘Juan’s bewilderment for several minutes was very big.’ 
  b. La    ofuscación   de Juan durante la  fiesta fue   notable.  
     the  bewilderment of  Juan  during the party was noticeable 
  ‘Juan’s bewilderment during the party was noticeable.’ 
(From Fábregas 2016: 127, 128. My translation)  
   
 (22a) shows that the nominalization ofuscación ‘bewilderment’ cannot co-occur with 
aspectual modifiers introduced by durante ‘for’, while (22b) shows that the nominalization can 
co-occur with temporal modifiers introduced by durante ‘during’. Fábregas claims that the 
occurrence of temporal modifiers is usually unacceptable; however, as I will show in chapter 3, 
data like (22b) are not isolated, but rather they are systematic. A correct interpretation of the 
contrast in (22) is necessary to account for the semantics of deadjectival nominalizations and, 
especially, for their relation to lexical and viewpoint aspect. In addition, an accurate analysis 
must be able to explain the apparent contradiction of these contrasts with (21), where it appears 
to be that deadjectival nominalizations are sensitive to time-related modification when the 
arguments are not realized, taking into consideration that in (22) the contrast is produced when 
arguments are actually realized. 
 Fourth, the literature on English nominalizations has pointed out that they show a semantic 
contrast with respect to underived nouns like height, width, weight, etc. (see Moltmann 2009, 
Baglini 2015, Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2017b). While phrases like Paul’s heaviness entail that 
Paul is heavy, phrases like Paul’s weight does not prompt that entailment. These contrasts are 
not common in Spanish (cf. peso ‘weight’ vs. gordura ‘fatness’); however, as Fábregas (2016) 
points out, most deadjectival nominalizations can trigger what the author calls either a scale or a 




informal explanation here and postpone the details of his proposal for the following subsection. 
In the scale reading deadjectival nominalizations are used for naming the dimension, while in 
the quality reading they are used for naming the adjectival property. For example, in the scale 
reading la belleza de Paul ‘Paul’s beauty’ refers to the amount of beauty that is associated with 
Paul, with no reference to whether that amount is big or small, and we do not know whether 
Paul is beautiful or not. In contrast, in the quality reading la belleza de Paul ‘Paul’s beauty’ refers 
to Paul’s quality of being beautiful, in which case Paul has enough amount of beauty to be 
considered beautiful.  
 Finally, the literature has highlighted the tight connection of adjectival structures, which 
include an adjective plus a copular verb, with possessive structures. In Dixon’s (1982) seminal 
work on what the author calls property concepts, Dixon points out that languages differ in the 
mechanisms they make use of to express them. According to the author, there are seven main 
types of property concepts, and English expresses them by means of adjectives: dimension (big, 
small, long, tall, short, wide, deep, etc.), age (new, young, old, etc.), value (good, bad, lovely, 
atrocious, perfect, proper, etc.), color (black, white, red, etc.), physical (hard, soft, heavy, wet, 
rough, strong, hot, sour, etc.), speed (fast, quick, slow, etc.), human propensity (jealous, happy, 
kind, clever, generous, cruel, proud, etc.). This classification, although not explicitly justified from 
the lexical-semantic point of view by Dixon, constitutes a good starting point to illustrate how 
English lexicalizes this type of concepts by means of adjectives. In this regard, Francez & Koontz-
Garboden (2015, 2017a) and Baglini (2015) show concerning Ulwa and Wolof, respectively, that 
the most natural way of expressing property concepts in these languages is by means of 
possessive structures: 
 
(23) a. Alas pan-ka 
     3.SG stick-3.SG 
  ‘His/her stick’ 
  b. Yang as-ki-na minisih-ka. 
      1.SG shirt-1.SG   dirty-ka 
  ‘My shirt is dirty.’ 
 (Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2017a: 31, 32) 
(24) a. Aïda  am  na-∅      ceeb. 
     Aïda have FIN-3.SG  rice 






  b. Aïda   am   na-∅     xel  
      Aïda have FIN.3.SG mind 
  ‘Aïda is smart.’ 
 (Baglini 2015: 133) 
    
 On the one hand, according to Francez & Koontz-Garboden, in (23a) -ka is a possessive 
morpheme that can be used for expressing alienable possession, while (23b) shows that the 
same morpheme is involved in the syntax of property concepts. On the other hand, according to 
Baglini (2015), am ‘to have’ is the verb that is used for alienable possession in (24a), while it can 
also be used to express property concepts, see (24b). Thus, the relationship between adjectival 
and possessive structures has a great cross-linguistic importance, since there are languages that 
tend to use one of the two structures to express the same property.  
 This dissertation also offers empirical evidence that in Spanish adjectival and possessive 
structures are strongly connected. For example, what I call quantified and indefinite 
nominalizations participate in possessive structures involving the verb tener ‘to have’: 
 
(25) a. El  puente tiene {mucha / dos metros de} altura. 
     the bridge   has    much    two  meters  of   height 
  b. El  puente tiene una altura {increíble / de dos metros}. 
     the bridge   has    a   height  incredible  of  two  meters 
  ‘The bridge has a(n) {incredible height / height of two meters}.’ 
 
 Quantified nominalizations, like altura ‘height’ in (25a), are preceded by a mass quantifier or 
a measure phrase functioning as a mass quantifier, while indefinite nominalizations, like altura 
‘height’ in (25b), are preceded by the indefinite determiner una ‘a’ and followed by a manner 
adjective or a measure phrase functioning as an adnominal modifier. Crucially, both types of 
nominalizations appear as the internal argument of the possessive verb tener ‘to have’. With the 
exception of the syntactic analysis on Spanish measure phrases developed by Eguren & Pastor 
(2014, 2015), these nominalizations have not been studied in the literature on gradability. 
 Concerning bare nominalizations, Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2017a: 2, 38) note for English 
that the possessive structure Krishna has wisdom, where wisdom can be taken as a bare 
nominalization because it appears in isolation, is “limited” and “a more marked way of saying 
Krishna is wise”. This type of structure also holds in Spanish and, although it is true that it is 
more limited than the adjectival one, I will show in chapter 4 that there is more to say about 




that they are not just a more marked way of expressing the adjectival property. For the purposes 
of this section, what is important to take into account is that there is a tight connection between 
adjectival and possessive structures when expressing property concepts, and this connection has 
important implications both cross-linguistically and intra-linguistically. 
 To recapitulate the main ideas, in this subsection I have described deadjectival 
nominalizations focusing on their most visible properties. First, they are derived from gradable 
adjectives by means of their attachment to deadjectival suffixes. Second, they generally form 
mass nouns, although they can sometimes form count nouns too; in the former case, they differ 
from canonical mass nouns in the readings that they can trigger in certain syntactic contexts, 
like the ones involving exclamative determiners. Third, they inherit argument structure from 
their base adjectives and reject frequency modifiers when they are not accompanied of their 
arguments; in addition, when their arguments are present, they accept temporal modifiers, but 
they reject aspectual ones. Fourth, Spanish deadjectival nominalizations can trigger a scale 
reading, in which case the nominalization is used for naming the dimension, or a quality reading, 
in which case the nominalization is used for naming the adjectival property. Fifth, deadjectival 
nominalizations play a crucial role in languages like Ulwa and Wolof, since they are involved in 
possessive structures, which are the primary form of expressing property concepts. As for 
Spanish, possessive structures typically occur when quantified and indefinite nominalizations are 
involved and are exceptional when they include bare nominalizations.  
 With this brief description of the main fundamental properties of deadjectival 
nominalizations, particularly in Spanish, I hope I have shown the reader a basic picture of the 
phenomenon devoid of any particular theoretical bias. In the following subsection, I explore the 
different proposals that address the formation and meaning of deadjectival nominalizations and 
provide a critical review of their empirical and theoretical implications. 
 
1.4.2 Theoretical proposals 
In this section, I review previous proposals on what I call here state-token deadjectival 
nominalizations, examining their basic theoretical assumptions. Given the elusiveness of these 
nominalizations, the literature has focused on determining what semantic notion is the most 
appropriate to account for their core meaning, namely, degrees, qualities, tropes and states. In 
this review, I leave aside the proposals on participant and event nominalizations, which will be 
examined in chapter 4.   
 As a general critique, we will see that the approaches that posit that DPs containing 
deadjectival nominalizations like la belleza de la torre ‘the beauty of the tower’ denote degrees 




are subject to time. Regarding tropes, they do not contribute any significant differences with 
respect to states that justify their existence as ontological objects. By contrast, state-based 
approaches fare better than the other proposals insofar as they are able to account for the fact 
that deadjectival nominalizations are subject to time, given that states constitute temporal 
objects or eventualities. Nevertheless, some critical refinements will be proposed; specifically, 
previous state-based proposals are not able to explain why deadjectival nominalizations are 
incompatible with aspectual modifiers preceded by durante ‘for’ even though this is expected 
because they express atelic eventualities, as will be shown below. As developed in chapter 3, the 
explanation I propose has to do with the fact that these nominalizations express imperfective 
states, which do not include their temporal boundaries.  
 Before reviewing each proposal, two important caveats must be made at this point: first, 
although for the sake of clarity I classify the proposals depending on whether they make use of 
one of these four concepts: degrees, qualities, tropes or states, some proposals integrate more 
than one. Second, the characterization of each concept varies depending on each proposal, 
which supplies this review with some additional complexity that I will attempt to disentangle.  
 
1.4.2.1 Degrees as primitive objects 
1.4.2.1.1 Basic tools 
In Bochnak’s (2013) study of Luganda nominalizations, the author claims that DPs containing 
deadjectival nominalizations denote degrees. To understand the proposal, a basic background is 
necessary. The most influential theory on adjectival gradability is the degree-based approach 
(Seuren 1973; Cresswell 1976; von Stechow 1984; Bierwisch 1989; Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 
2002; Kennedy 1997, 2007; Kennedy & McNally 2005; Fults 2006; Morzycki 2008, 2009, 2015; 
a.o.), in which degrees are considered abstract representations of measurement of type d.
6
 Thus, 
degrees are just points (or intervals in Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002) on a scale, which can be 
defined as a totally ordered set of degrees along a dimension (like height, cost, depth, etc.). As 
total orders, scales are antisymmetric, which means that two degrees that occupy the same 
place in the ordering are necessarily the same.
7
 For example, if John and Mary are equally tall, 
they are associated with exactly the same degree of height. 
 On the other hand, it is usually assumed that gradable adjectives denote relations between 
individuals and degrees of type <d,<e,t>>. In order for the adjective to be predicated of an 
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 For Creswell (1976), degrees are equivalence classes of individuals. For example, the degree two meters is not a 
numerical representation, but rather the set of all individuals that are precisely that tall. On the other hand, for Anderson 
& Morzycki (2015), degrees are equivalence classes of states, so the degree two meters is the set of states of being 
precisely that tall. In this dissertation, I assume the latter approach for the reasons that will be given in chapter 2. 
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individual, the degree argument must be bound by degree modifiers (such as very, more, quite, 
etc.), see (26).
8
 Measures phrases, like two meters in John is two meters tall, are usually 
considered to denote degrees and saturate the adjectival degree argument, see (27).
9
 In the 
absence of an explicit degree modifier, it is assumed that the null morpheme POS (from 
Cresswell 1976) binds the degree argument, which accounts for the fact that the adjectival 
property holds to a contextually salient degree, see (28). In other words, John is tall does not 
mean ‘John has some degree of height’, but rather ‘John has certain degree of height that at 




(26) a. ⟦𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑑𝜆𝑥. height(𝑥, 𝑑). 
  b. ⟦𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑑,<𝑒,𝑡≫𝜆𝑥. ∃𝑑[𝐺(𝑥, 𝑑) ∧ 𝑑 ≫ 𝑠𝑡𝐺]. 
  c. ⟦𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑥. ∃𝑑[height(𝑥, 𝑑) ∧ 𝑑 ≫ 𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡]. 
  d. ⟦𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛 (𝑖𝑠) 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 1 iff ∃𝑑[height(j, 𝑑) ∧ 𝑑 ≫ 𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡]. 
(27) a. ⟦𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑑𝜆𝑥. height(𝑥, 𝑑). 
  b. ⟦𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠⟧ = two meters. 
  c. ⟦𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑥. height(𝑥, two meters). 
  d. ⟦𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛 (𝑖𝑠) 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 1 iff height(j, two meters). 
(28) a. ⟦𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑑𝜆𝑥. height(𝑥, 𝑑). 
  b. ⟦𝑃𝑂𝑆⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑑,<𝑒,𝑡≫𝜆𝑥. ∃𝑑[𝐺(𝑥, 𝑑) ∧ 𝑑 ≥ 𝑠𝑡𝐺]. 
  c. ⟦𝑃𝑂𝑆 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑥. ∃𝑑[height(𝑥, 𝑑) ∧ 𝑑 ≥ 𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡]. 
  d. ⟦𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛 (𝑖𝑠) 𝑃𝑂𝑆 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 1 iff ∃𝑑[height(j, 𝑑) ∧ 𝑑 ≥ 𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡]. 
 
 Informally, (26d) is a true proposition iff John is associated with a degree of height that 
surpasses a contextual standard st by a large degree (I take the denotation of very from 
Morzycki 2015: 115; see Kennedy & McNally 2005 for a different implementation). As for (27d), 
the statement is true iff John is associated with the degree two meters on the scale of height. 
Finally, (28d) is true iff John is associated with a degree of height that at least meets a contextual 
standard st.  
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 Another widely accepted option is to assume that gradable adjectives denote measure functions of type <e,d> and 
that degree modifiers, which are of type <<e,d>,<e,t>>, combine with them to turn them into properties of individuals 
of type <e,t> (see Bartsch & Vennemann 1973 and Kennedy 1999). 
9
 Another less popular option is to posit that measure phrases are, like the rest of degree modifiers, of type 
<<d,<e,t>>,<e,t>> (see Kennedy & McNally 2005). 
10
 See Fults (2006), Rett (2008), Panzeri & Foppolo (2012) and Wellwood (2014, 2015) for discussion on why gradable 
adjectives are evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison in the absence of an explicit degree modifier. For 
discussion on possible overt realizations of the null morpheme POS in Chinese and Arabic, see Grano (2012) and Grano & 




 In short, degree-based theories rely on the assumption that gradable adjectives carry a 
degree argument of type d, which must be bound by degree modifiers or saturated by measure 
phrases. In addition, gradable adjectives lexicalize scales, which are sets of totally ordered 
degrees along a dimension. Degrees are conceived as abstract representations of measurement, 
that is, points (or intervals) on a scale. 
 
1.4.2.1.2 Degrees as arguments of deadjectival nominalizations 
Having explained the most basic tools of degree-based analyses, we are ready to understand 
how they can be applied to the domain of nominalizations. Assuming an ontology that includes 
degrees as basic types, Bochnak (2013) argues that Luganda gradable adjectives denote 
relations between individuals and degrees of type <d,<e,t>>. Deadjectival nominalizers, he 
claims, change the order of the arguments, so deadjectival nominalizations denote relations 
between degrees and individuals of type <e,<d,t>>. (29) represents how the adjective -wanvu 
‘tall’ combines with the nominalizer bu- to form the nominalization buwanvu ‘height’:   
 
(29) a. ⟦−𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑣𝑢⟧ = 𝜆𝑑𝜆𝑥. height(𝑥) ≥ 𝑑. 
  b. ⟦𝑏𝑢 −⟧ = 𝜆𝐺𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑑. G(𝑥, 𝑑). 
  c. ⟦𝑏𝑢𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑣𝑢⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑑. height(𝑥) ≥ 𝑑. 
(From Bochnak 2013: 130, 131) 
 
 Omitting several steps in the derivation that are irrelevant here, once the individual argument 
x is saturated, the maximality operator max (Link 1983; Rullmann 1995) takes the maximal 
degree from the sets of degrees d associated with the individual x. The output of an expression 
like obuwanvu bwa Lydia ‘Lydia’s height’ would be the maximal degree of height associated with 
Lydia:  
 
(30) ⟦𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑣𝑢 𝑏𝑤𝑎 𝐿𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑎⟧ = max(𝜆𝑑. height(l) ≥ 𝑑). 
(Bochnak 2013: 127) 
 
 According to the author, this analysis captures the general intuition that Lydia’s height means 
‘Lydia’s degree of height’, and actually it can be paraphrased like that.  
 However, although Bochnak’s analysis is appealing insofar as it is compositional and 
coincident with our intuitions about the meaning of phrases like Lydia’s height, it runs into 
several problems. First, given that two degrees that occupy the same position on the scale must 




nominalizations in which distinct individuals have the same degree on the scale denote identical 
objects. I illustrate the phenomenon in Spanish, but it is also applicable to English and, 
presumably, to Luganda by extension. Consider the following data: 
 
(31) a. La  altura de María sorprendió a   David. 
     the height of María    surprised ACC David 
  ‘María’s height surprised David.’ 
  b. La  altura de Mario sorprendió a  David. 
     the height of  Mario   surprised ACC David 
  ‘Mario’s height surprised David.’ 
 
 In a context in which María and Mario are equally tall, Bochnak’s analysis predicts that the DP 
la altura de María ‘María’s height’ in (31a) and la altura de Mario ‘Mario’s height’ in (31b) denote 
the same degree of height, that is, denote identical objects. However, in a context in which 
María’s height surprised David, it should be possible to utter, according to Bochnak, that Mario’s 
height surprised David, but it is not necessarily the case. Lucas Champollion makes a similar 
remark concerning Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2017a) in personal communication: in a 
context in which John and Mary have the same weight and John’s weight broke a chair, it would 
be possible to affirm Mary’s weight broke the chair if John’s weight and Mary’s weight denoted 
degrees, but this is not the case. Thus, DPs containing deadjectival nominalizations or underived 
nouns like height do not denote identical objects if the property is predicated of different 
individuals even though these individuals are associated with the same degree on the scale; 
briefly formulated, the DPs involved have different identity conditions (I will come back to this 
issue in subsections 1.4.2.2.1 and 1.4.2.3, in the review of quality-based and trope-based 
approaches). 
 Second, degrees, either defined as points/intervals on a scale, equivalences classes of 
individuals (Cresswell 1976) or equivalence classes of states (Anderson & Morzycki 2015), cannot 
be located in time. In other words, degrees are not temporal objects and, if DPs containing 
deadjectival nominalizations denoted degrees, it would be expected that they could not be 
located in time. However, throughout this dissertation I will show and provide enough empirical 
evidence that the occurrence of temporal modification is possible and regular:  
 
(32) a. la anchura del   lago en invierno 





  b. la   tristeza   del  estudiante durante el confinamiento 
     the sadness  of.the   student    during the   lockdown 
 
 The combination of deadjectival nominalizations with temporal modifiers is examined in 
depth in chapter 3, where I argue that they express states. For the purposes of this section, it is 
enough to note that DPs containing deadjectival nominalizations express properties that hold in 
time, which captures their combination with temporal modifiers, as shown in (32).  
 In sum, Bochnak’s analysis whereby DPs containing deadjectival nominalizations denote 
degrees makes two incorrect predictions: first, that two DPs involving different individuals that 
are associated with the same degree on the scale denote identical objects; second, that DPs 
containing deadjectival nominalizations are incompatible with temporal modifiers. In conclusion, 
DPs containing deadjectival nominalizations cannot denote degrees. In the following subsection, 
I review quality-based approaches. 
 
1.4.2.2 The quality domain 
In this section, I review previous proposals on deadjectival nominalizations according to which 
they express qualities. Although the precise characterization of the concept of ‘quality’ depends 
on each proposal, the aspect that these proposals have in common is that qualities constitute 
properties that are not subject to time. I will divide the proposals into two groups: the first 
group (Levinson 1978, 1980; Nicolas 2004, 2010; Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2015, 2017a, 
2017b) characterizes qualities as abstract mass nouns, while the second group (Martin 2013; 
Fábregas 2016; Jaque & Martín 2019) characterizes them as atemporal properties. 
 
1.4.2.2.1 Qualities as abstract mass nouns 
In this subsection, I review the approaches in which deadjectival nominalizations express 
qualities, which are defined as abstract mass nouns. The term quality dates back to Levinson 
(1978, 1980), who claims that nouns like redness express qualities, while phrases like being red 
express properties. The main difference between the two concepts is that properties are 
conditions or states, while qualities are stuff, hence their treatment as abstract mass nouns. In 
other words, qualities like redness and canonical mass nouns like water are substances or 
entities, but they differ in that the former are concrete, while the latter are abstract. 
 Similarly, Nicolas (2004, 2010), who does not employ the term quality explicitly, claims that 
both canonical mass nouns like water and deadjectival nominalizations are mereologically 






 For example, wisdom denotes a relation between a property x and a bearer i 
of that property, see (33a). As for Julie’s wisdom, it denotes an entity of type e, specifically the 
particular instance of wisdom instantiated by Julie, see (33b). 
 
(33) a. ⟦𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑜𝑚⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑖. wisdom(𝑥, 𝑖). 
  b. ⟦𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒′𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑜𝑚⟧ = 𝜄𝑥. wisdom(𝑥, j). 
 
 Finally, Francez & Koontz-Garboden also claim that property concept nouns express 
qualities, which they define by two crucial assumptions:  
 
 Assumption 1. They are ordered by a total preorder ≤, thought of a size ordering; thus, 
≤ induces an equivalence relation consisting of all and only those portions that are of 
the same size. The total preorder ≤ is transitive, reflexive, but not antisymmetric, which 
means that two portions of a quality that are of the same size (i.e. they occupy the same 
place in the ≤ ordering) are not identical.  
 Assumption 2. They are partially ordered by a mereological part relation ≼. The size 
preorder ≤ preserves ≼, so that given a quality P and two portions p, q ∈ P: p ≼ q → p ≤ 
q.  
 
 Assumption 1 accounts for two facts: first, it explains why qualities and canonical mass nouns 
prompt different readings in certain contexts, like in exclamatives (as explained in section 1.4.1 
in relation to Tovena’s 2001 data in Italian). For example, the utterance What strength Kim has! is 
equivalent to How much strength Kim has!; in contrast, What blood you have! is not equivalent 
to How much blood you have! Francez & Koontz-Garboden argue that this contrast is due to the 
fact that qualities, unlike canonical mass nouns, are totally preordered by size. Quality-nouns like 
strength are inherently gradable; in other words, they invoke a scale, namely, the scale provided 
by the total preorder. Thus, two portions of strength are ordered relative to one another, and 
what the authors call a property reading arises in wh-exclamatives, under the assumption that 
the descriptive and expressive contents of wh-exclamatives are always built on a gradation. In 
contrast, canonical mass nouns are not inherently gradable. Thus, two portions of blood are not 
necessarily ordered relative to one another, and a property reading cannot arise in wh-
exclamatives.  
 The second fact accounted for by the assumption 1 is linked with antisymmetry and identity 
conditions (recall subsection 1.4.2.1.2 in relation to degree-based theories). If the ordering ≤ is 
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not antisymmetric, it explains why, even if a rose and a tulip are equally beautiful, the rose’s 
beauty and the tulip’s beauty are not the same thing. In other words, even though a rose and a 
tulip are equally beautiful, the phrases the beauty of the rose and the beauty of the tulip do not 
denote identical objects. Finally, assumption 2 accounts for the fact that property concepts 
constitute mass nouns.  
 In their analysis of Ulwa property concepts, Francez & Koontz-Garboden claim that roots 
denote qualities. For example, the root minisih- denotes a predicate of qualities of type <p,t>, 
see (34a). In order to predicate a quality of an individual x, possessive morphology is necessary: 
in Ulwa, possessive morphology is provided by the morpheme -ka. This morpheme introduces 
the function π, which associates an individual x with the portion z of the substance P, see (34b). 
The interval I includes all and only portions of dirtiness that rank above a certain threshold, that 
is, all and only the portions of dirtiness that are considered big enough in the context. When the 
root minisih- combines with the possessive morpheme -ka, the resulting noun is minisihka, 
which can be translated as ‘dirty’ and whose denotation is offered in (34c).  
 
(34) a. ⟦𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑖ℎ −⟧ = dirtiness ⊆ 𝐷𝑝 . 
  b. ⟦−𝑘𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝑃<𝑝,𝑡>𝜆𝑥<𝑒>𝜆𝐼𝜄 ⊂ 𝑃. ∃
𝐼𝑧[𝜋(𝑥, 𝑧)]. 
  c. ⟦𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝑥<𝑒>𝜆𝐼𝜄 ⊂ dirtiness. ∃
𝐼𝑧[𝜋(𝑥, 𝑧)]. 
 
 Thus, property concept mass nouns, and deadjectival nominalizations by extension, are like 
canonical mass nouns like water insofar as they are predicates of substances that are 
mereologically ordered, but they differ in that deadjectival nominalizations are also totally 
preordered by size.  
 Although I assume with Francez & Koontz-Garboden, and provide additional evidence in 
chapter 4, that deadjectival nominalizations are associated with a total preorder, this proposal 
presents the same empirical problem as Levinson’s and Nicolas’, since qualities are also 
characterized as predicates that are not subject to time. As shown in section 1.4.2.1, deadjectival 
nominalizations can combine with temporal and frequency modifiers, which reveals that they do 
hold in time. In a nutshell, although the identification of qualities with abstract mass nouns 
correctly captures the mass condition of deadjectival nominalizations, it incorrectly predicts that 
they are not subject to time. In the following subsection, I present the second group of 







1.4.2.2.2 Qualities as atemporal properties 
In this section, I review the approaches in which the term quality is used to refer to certain 
nouns that express atemporal properties. The proposals do not make use of a formal semantics 
apparatus, so they do not define what atemporal properties are in formal terms, but we can take 
them as inherent properties that characterize an individual. 
 
a) Deadjectival nominalizations as predicates of atemporal properties 
This proposal states that deadjectival nominalizations express properties that are not subject to 
time. According to Fábregas (2016), the ontology of semantic objects must include degrees and 
qualities. Qualities are defined as non-dynamic properties that are not subject to time, in 
contrast to states, which are non-dynamic properties that are actually subject to time. 
Deadjectival nominalizations can trigger two readings in the absence of an explicit mass 
quantifier or a measure phrase: a quality and a scale reading. For example, from la hermosura de 
María ‘María’s beauty’, it can follow that María is beautiful, that is, that she is associated with a 
degree of beauty that exceeds a contextual standard of comparison. This is the quality reading. 
In contrast, from la dureza del talco ‘the hardness of the talc’, it does not follow that the talc is 
hard (actually its hardness is minimal in the Mohs scale), but rather it is conveyed that the talc is 
associated with some degree of hardness. This is the scale reading. Most of Spanish deadjectival 
nominalizations can prompt the two readings. In order to distinguish them, the author makes 
use of the phrase no es suficiente ‘is not enough’ as a diagnostic: 
 
(35) a. La belleza de esta persona no es suficiente (para casarse con ella). 
     the beauty of  this   person  not  is   enough    for    marry  with  her 
  ‘The beauty of this person is not enough to marry them.’  
  b. La hermosura de esta persona no es suficiente para llamarla hermosa.  
     the    beauty    of   this   person  not is   enough    for   call.her  beautiful 
  ‘The beauty of this person is not enough to call them beautiful.’ 
(From Fábregas 2016: 206. Translation mine) 
 
 (35a) expresses that the person is beautiful, but that their quality of being beautiful is not 
enough for achieving something (here, marrying somebody). In contrast, (35b) conveys that the 
degree of beauty associated with that person is not enough for being considered beautiful. 
Fábregas assumes that gradable adjectives are associated with scales and project the functional 




Bowers (1993) and Baker (2003), the author also assumes that adjectives project PredP 
(dominating DegP), which allow them to select for a subject. 
 Regarding nominalizations, Fábregas assumes a constructionist device of word formation 
according to which words are built up in the syntax. Deadjectival nominalizations are formed 
when a deadjectival nominalizer merges with an adjectival structure. In order to account for the 
quality and scale readings, Fábregas posits that DegP must only be included in the derivation in 
the former case, which predicts that the degree of the base adjective has a contextual value on 
the scale if no mass quantifier or measure phrase is present. With respect to PredP, it must be 
present in both types of nominalizations in order to capture their ability to select for a subject. 
The morphosyntactic representation is as follows: 
 
(36)  NP 
     PredP 
       DegP 
         AP 
Quality reading 
(37)  NP 
     PredP 
       AP 
Scale reading 
 
 Thus, the nominalizer attaches to an adjectival structure and projects NP. In the quality 
reading, the node DegP enters the derivation: this correctly predicts that the quality reading 
entails the meaning of the positive form of the adjective (we presume that DegP is projected by 
the null morpheme POS, although Fábregas does not say that explicitly). In contrast, the absence 
of DegP in the scale reading predicts that the standard of comparison is not met, and the 
degree associated with the individual has an unspecified value on the scale: consequently, the 
nominalization does not entail the meaning of the positive form of the adjective and, the author 
claims, can express all the values of degrees on the scale. 
 Fábregas argues that deadjectival nominalizations cannot express states because they 
typically reject aspectual or temporal modification, although he admits that temporal modifiers 
are sometimes accepted, as shown in (22). Regarding frequency modifiers, the author claims 
that they are compatible with deadjectival nominalizations, as in su constante belleza ‘their 
constant beauty’, but they are licensed conceptually: they do not modify the property itself, but 




nominalizations express qualities (or degrees in the scale reading) rather than states. In sum, 
Fábregas claims that deadjectival nominalizations do not accept temporal or aspectual modifiers 
in normal circumstances, but they can sometimes accept temporal modifiers; they also accept 
frequency modifiers, but their licensing does not prove that they are subject to time.    
 Fábregas’ proposal makes the interesting contribution of showing that deadjectival 
nominalizations can express two readings: a quality reading, in which a standard of comparison 
is entailed, and a scale reading, in which that standard of comparison is not entailed. However, 
the existence of these two different readings does not mean that DPs containing deadjectival 
nominalizations denote degrees or qualities, since these do not constitute temporal objects. In 
this sense, the proposal presents the same shortcomings as the other proposals reviewed so far: 
first, in defining degrees and qualities as atemporal objects, the combination of deadjectival 
nominalizations with frequency modifiers remains unexplained and cannot be attributed to 
conceptual information. If this were the case, we could not explain why they are systematically 
rejected when the arguments of the nominalization are not present, as shown in (21a). 
 Second, with respect to the combination of deadjectival nominalizations with temporal 
modifiers, unlike what is claimed by the author, it is a regular rather than an exceptional 
phenomenon. In other words, deadjectival nominalizations combine naturally with temporal 
modifiers: 
 
(38) a. la  anchura  del  mar en verano 
     the   width of.the sea  in summer 
  b. la  belleza   del    jardín durante la  tormenta 
     the beauty of.the  garden during  the   storm 
 
  In (38) I include two of the numerous examples of deadjectival nominalizations that combine 
with temporal modifiers, which proves that they express properties that are subject to time, 
hence neither degrees nor qualities.  
 Finally, the fact that deadjectival nominalizations do not accept aspectual modifiers does not 
necessarily mean that they do not hold in time. Instead, as I will argue in chapter 3, I take these 
data as evidence for saying that they express imperfective states. Aspectual modifiers inform 
about the duration of eventualities and only perfective eventualities, the ones that are finished 
or do include their boundaries, are compatible with them. Thus, the incompatibility of 
deadjectival nominalizations with aspectual modification does not necessarily mean that they 
are not subject to time; in fact, I will argue that this incompatibility can be explained if we 




 In sum, Fábregas’ proposal makes the important contribution that deadjectival 
nominalizations trigger either a scale or a quality reading in the absence of an explicit mass 
quantifier or measure phrase, where only the latter reading entails a standard of comparison. 
However, the problem of positing that DPs containing deadjectival nominalizations denote 
degrees or qualities is that it counterfactually predicts that deadjectival nominalizations express 
properties that are not subject to time. The fact that they cannot combine with aspectual 
modifiers need not be an argument in favor of their atemporal nature; in fact, I argue that it 
suggests that they express imperfective states, which do not include their temporal boundaries. 
In chapter 3, I develop the insight that deadjectival nominalizations can trigger scale (which I call 
degree) and quality readings, but they express imperfective states in both cases.  
 In the following subsection, I review the approaches in which deadjectival nominalizations 
derived from individual-level predicates express qualities, while the ones derived from stage-
level predicates express states. 
 
b) Individual-level nominalizations as predicates of atemporal properties 
Martin (2013) for French and Jaque & Martín (2019) for Spanish propose that the individual-
level/stage-level distinction is crucial to explain the semantics of deadjectival nominalizations: 
broadly speaking, the ones that are derived from individual-level predicates express qualities/ 
dispositions and habits, while the ones that are derived from stage-level predicates express 
states. In this subsection, I will focus on Martin’s (2013) proposal on French because it includes 
more empirical details. Following standard assumptions (since Carlson 1977), Martin identifies 
individual-level predicates with permanency and stage-level states with transitoriness. With 
respect to the former, there are nominalizations that express qualities/dispositions and habits. 
Qualities or dispositions are properties that are not subject to time. In contrast, habits must be 
instantiated many times in order to be ascribed to individuals and, therefore, express states. This 
observation is based on the licensing of deadjectival nominalizations with the predicates durer 
‘to last’ or perdurer ‘to perpetuate’ depending on whether they express qualities or habits: 
 
(39) a. Cette habitude  a    duré / perduré   des années. 
       this    habit    has  lasted   endured  some  years  
  ‘This habit lasted/perpetuated for years.’ 
  b. ??Cette qualité / ?Cette disposition   a  duré / perduré  des années. 
          this  quality       this    disposition has lasted endured some  years  





 The author shows that there is subset of nominalizations that pattern with qualities and 
another subset that can express both qualities and habits, but the occurrence of durer ‘to last’ 
and perdurer ‘to perpetuate’ induce the habitual reading: 
 
(40) a. ??Son intelligence dure / perdure depuis une éternité. 
         his   intelligence lasts    endures   since    a  enternity 
  ‘His intelligence lasts/perpetuates from time immemorial.’ 
  b. ??Une intelligence de dix  ans / de toute une vie. 
           a   intelligence  of  ten years  of    all     a   life 
  ‘An intelligence of ten years / of a whole life.’ 
(41) a. Cette inconstance dure depuis le     début    de la saison. 
       this  inconstancy  lasts   since  the beginning of the season 
  b. Son despotisme  a   perduré  à travers  les   siècles. 
       his   despotism  has  endured  through  the  centuries  
  ‘His despotism perpetuated through centuries.’ 
(42) Heureusement que son despotisme    n'a   jamais  pu    se manifester. 
     fortunately    that  his   despotism not.has  never could REFL manifest  
  ‘Fortunately, his despotism could never manifest itself.’ 
 
 In (40) the nominalization intelligence cannot combine with the predicates durer ‘to last’ or 
perdurer ‘to perpetuate’ or with other temporal modifiers like de dix ans ‘of ten years’ and de 
toute la vie ‘of a whole life’, which indicates that intelligence expresses a quality or disposition. In 
contrast, (41) shows that inconstance ‘inconstancy’ and despotisme ‘despotism’ are compatible 
with such modifiers; in that case, they have a habitual reading, which indicates that they express 
eventualities, specifically states. Regarding (42), it illustrates that the nominalization despotisme 
‘despotism’ can also express qualities when used in a context in which the property was never 
manifested.  
 On the other hand, Martin admits that it is possible that certain quality denoting nouns, 
which are supposed to express atemporal properties, can express transitory qualities or 
transitory dispositions. This is the case of despotisme ‘despotism’, which can be linked to an event 
like hurler ‘to shout’, hence it expresses a quality that has a duration: 
 
(43) Pierre   a     hurlé  pendant toute la  réunion. Ce  despotisme    n'a      plu     à  personne. 
  Pierre  has shouted during     all  the  meeting this  despotism not.has pleased to  anybody 




 In short, Martin argues that nominalizations derived from individual-level predicates can 
express either qualities or dispositions, which are not subject to time, or habits, which are 
actually subject to time and can be considered states. In addition, the author accepts that 
certain dispositional nouns can express transitory qualities.  
 This said, this proposal runs into three problems, which are explained in what follows. First, in 
accepting that certain nominalizations can express temporary qualities or dispositions, the 
definition of qualities as atemporal objects becomes blurred. Specifically, if qualities are 
properties that are not subject to time, it is contradictory to accept that there exist transitory 
qualities. Second, Martin’s proposal mistakenly predicts that certain deadjectival nominalizations 
derived from individual-level adjectives are not subject to time. Specifically, the problem with 
this proposal is that it overlooks that even deadjectival nominalizations derived from individual-
level predicates accept temporal modifiers naturally. Consider the following examples in 
Spanish, although the observation is also applicable to French: 
 
(44) a. la   validez de este argumento durante  el  Renacimiento 
     the  validity of  this   argument   during   the  Renaissance   
  b. la  popularidad de esta canción en 1990 
     the   popularity   of  this    song    in 1990 
 
 The nominalizations validez ‘validity’ and popularidad ‘popularity’ are derived from the 
individual-level predicates válido ‘valid’ and popular ‘popular’ and (44) shows that they can 
combine with temporal modifiers. What these data suggest is that the fundamental property of 
deadjectival nominalizations that are derived from individual-level predicates cannot be that 
they are not subject to time. 
 The third problem of Martin’s proposal is related to the use of the predicates durer ‘to last’ 
and perdurer ‘to perpetuate’ and phrases like de dix ans ‘(lit.) of two years’ as tests to identify 
eventualities. Here I examine their Spanish equivalent verbal predicates durar ‘to last’ and 
perdurar ‘to perpetuate’ and the phrase de diez años ‘(lit.) of ten years’. In this respect, two 
observations are in order. First, there are deadjectival nominalizations derived from individual-
level predicates that accept them: 
 
(45) a. Su    popularidad  duró  poco,  hasta que tuvieron  el accidente. 
     their    popularity  lasted shortly  until  that had.3.PL the accident 





  b. La belleza   del  palacio  perduró durante siglos,  hasta que  se incendió. 
    the beauty  of.the palace   endured     for  centuries  until  that REFL  burnt 
  ‘The beauty of the palace endured for centuries, until it burnt.’ 
(46) a. Esta canción tuvo una popularidad de diez años. 
      this   song    had    a     popularity   of  ten years 
  b. Este contrato tuvo una validez de dos años.  
      this contract  had    a   validity  of  two years  
 
 Second, the verbs durar ‘to last’ and the phrase de diez años ‘(lit.) of ten years’ are also 
compatible with entity-denoting nouns, which suggests that they do not make reliable tests to 
identify eventualities: 
 
(47) a. La   silla   duró  varios  meses. 
     the chair  lasted several months 
  b. un vino de varios / siete años 
      a  wine of  several  seven years   
 
 Although I will come back to this question in chapter 3, we can conclude that the analysis 
according to which deadjectival nominalizations that are derived from individual-level predicates 
express qualities or dispositions qua atemporal properties incorrectly predicts that they are not 
subject to time. In chapter 2, I examine the individual-level/stage-level distinction and argue that 
this is based on causation rather than spatiotemporality or aspect. In the following section, I 
review the trope-based approach. 
  
1.4.2.3. The trope-based approach      
As explained in section 1.1, building on a long philosophical tradition that dates back to 
Aristotle, Moltmann (2004, 2009, 2015) suggests to enrich the ontology of semantic objects by 
including tropes (see also Richtarcikova 2017 for Slovak), which can be defined as particular 
manifestations of a property in an individual. The author claims that, while nominalizations like 
redness refer to kinds of tropes, DPs containing deadjectival nominalizations, such as the redness 
of the box, refer to tropes. In other words, while redness is the universal that can be instantiated 
by different individuals, the redness of the box refers to a particularized property with a 
spatiotemporal localization. According to Moltmann (2009: 51, 52), the trope is “spatio-
temporally located just where the box is located while it is red”. For John’s happiness, the author 




(48)  ⟦𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛′𝑠 ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠⟧𝑤,𝑖 = f(John, happy, w, i). 
(Moltmann 2009: 60) 
  
 Informally, in (48) a function f maps the individual John, the property happy, the world w, and 
the time i onto the trope that is the particular manifestation of the property happy in the 
individual John in a given world w at a given time i. Moltmann is especially interested in 
comparing the trope-based analysis to degree-based and state-based approaches. Regarding 
degree-based approaches, first Moltmann claims that her analysis can account for identity 
conditions (see section 1.4.2.1) or the fact that John’s height and Mary’s height do not refer to 
identical objects even though John and Mary are equally tall; the reason is that involving 
different individuals results in different manifestations of the property. Second, deadjectival 
nominalizations can be modified by adjectives that express manner rather than degrees, as in 
exquisite/strange beauty. According to the author, degrees cannot be strange or beautiful, 
whereas tropes can combine with manner modifiers because these express the particular way in 
which tropes are realized.  
 With respect to state-based approaches, which will be reviewed in section 1.4.2.4, Moltmann 
(2009: 58) claims that there is a crucial difference between states and tropes, namely, that only 
the latter are grounded, which means that tropes can be “described and evaluated with regard to 
the particular way in which they manifest a property”. As a consequence, deadjectival 
nominalizations can act as the complement of the verbs to admire and to describe. Observe the 
following data:   
 
(49) a. John described Mary’s beauty. 
  b. John admires Mary’s beauty. 
(50) a. ??John described Mary’s being beautiful. 
  b. ??John admires Mary’s being beautiful. 
(Moltmann 2009: 58) 
  
 Assuming that phrases like Mary’s being beautiful denote states, phrases like Mary’s beauty 
must denote a different object, since they do not participate in the same syntactic contexts, as 
shown in (49) and (50). Moltmann claims that deadjectival nominalizations express tropes, which 
involve the particular way in which the property is manifested in the individual; in contrast, the 
verbal gerunds or gerundives (I take this term from Zucchi 1993) that occur in (50) express states, 




in which the property manifests itself in the object” (Moltmann 2009: 58). As a consequence, 
tropes, but not states, can be described or admired. 
 Although Moltmann makes interesting contributions to the analysis of deadjectival 
nominalizations, which I will mention below, I conclude with Jaque (2014) and Anderson & 
Morzycki (2015) that tropes do not contribute any relevant linguistic differences with respect to 
states, which renders them unnecessary in our semantic ontology. Specifically, it is true that 
Moltmann’s analysis presents the advantage over degree-based theories that is able to account 
for identity conditions and the combination of deadjectival nominalizations with manner 
modifiers. Nonetheless, the fact that degree-based approaches are limited in this sense does not 
mean that we need to make use of tropes instead of states. If DPs containing deadjectival 
nominalizations denote states, identity conditions are directly explained, since two states that 
involve two different participants are necessarily different. The same holds with manner 
modifiers, although the explanation requires a deeper elaboration that will be detailed in 
chapters 2 and 3; for the moment, it is sufficient to note that there is nothing in the 
characterization of states that prevents them from co-occurring with manner modifiers; in other 
words, states can be strange and beautiful. Thus, Moltmann’s proposal presents empirical 
advantages over degree-based theories, but these advantages are not exclusive of a model that 
includes tropes in its semantic ontology.  
 Consequently, the crucial aspect on which Moltmann’s analysis is based is the specific 
difference between tropes and states, namely, that only the former are grounded. In this respect, 
Moltmann claims that deadjectival nominalizations express tropes, which are grounded, and 
therefore can be the complement of the verbs to describe and to admire. However, Moltmann’s 
claim is based on two controversial assumptions: (a) that the phrases containing gerundives in 
(50) denote states and (b) that states are not grounded. Certainly, although the literature has 
not provided an entirely satisfactory analysis of gerundives yet (see Vendler 1968; Chomsky 
1970; Zucchi 1993; Siegel 1998; Alexiadou et al. 2010; Alexiadou 2013a; a.o.), insofar as it is 
unclear what specific semantic object is denoted by English gerundive phrases, there is empirical 
evidence that they do not denote eventualities. Consider the following data that include 
eventive verbs in the form of a gerundive and a nominalization:  
 
(51) a. *Bill Clinton’s destroying the memo took place at noon. 
  b. Clinton’s destruction of the memo took place at noon. 





 (51a) shows that gerundives are incompatible with the predicate to take place; in contrast, 
(51b) shows that the nominalization is actually compatible with the predicate. Given that events 
take place at some particular time and place, what these data show is that the structure Bill 
Clinton’s destroying the memo does not denote an event, although it includes a verbal structure 
that does express an event. Empirical evidence that English gerundives have an internal verbal 
structure is mainly provided by their combination with adverbs and their compatibility with the 
accusative case: 
 
(52) Pat disapproved of my quietly/*quiet leaving the room. 
(Alexiadou et al. 2010: 551) 
  
 (52) shows that the internal argument of the gerundive is realized as a direct object (the 
room) and that the gerundive can be modified by the adverb quietly, but cannot be modified by 
the adjective quiet. These two properties, among others pointed out in the literature cited 
above, reveal that English gerundives have an internal verbal structure that presumably 
expresses an event. However, the whole gerundive structure does not denote an event. As an 
extension of this analysis, the contrast of (49) with (50) cannot be attributed to the fact that that 
in (49) the nominalizations express tropes and in (50) the gerundives express states, since 
gerundives cannot express eventualities, but rather to the fact that gerundives express a 
different object from states. Finding out the specific object that is expressed by gerundives is 
not the goal of this dissertation; the reader is especially referred to Zucchi (1993: 207), who 
claims that they express state of affairs, which are defined as “things of which one may be aware, 
may be informed, but which, unlike propositions, cannot properly be said to have the property 
of truth or falsehood, or be objects of belief”. The reader is also referred to Serrano (2015) for an 
analysis of Spanish complement clauses, as well as infinitival complements, introduced by the 
definite determiner, which could show analogous patterns.  
 The second controversial assumption on which Moltmann’s analysis is based is that the 
author claims that states are not grounded. However, if groundedness is defined as the particular 
way in which a state is manifested, states can be grounded insofar as they are compatible with 
manner modifiers. Ernst (2016) provides empirical evidence that the combination of manner 
modifiers with stative predicates is more constrained than the combination with events because 
the latter are more complex, but it is more frequent than is often assumed. Examples like She 
loved him unevenly and She belongs to the club tenaciously are only two of the numerous 
examples provided by the author. Hence, if states are compatible with manner modifiers, there 




 In conclusion, although Moltmann’s proposal makes interesting contributions with respect to 
the kind-token dichotomy, on which my hypothesis is based, it relies on the unnecessary 
existence of tropes as ontological objects. Identity conditions, the combination of deadjectival 
nominalizations with manner modifiers and groundedness are properties that can be captured 
by positing that deadjectival nominalizations express states rather than tropes. In the following 
subsection, I review the last type of approaches to deadjectival nominalizations, namely, state-
based approaches, on which my proposal is essentially based. 
 
1.4.2.4 State-based approaches 
This subsection examines the analyses according to which deadjectival nominalizations encode 
states (Roy 2010; Villalba 2013; Borer 2013; Baglini 2015), which I consider more appropriate to 
capture the properties associated with those nominalizations. Given that Borer’s (2013) and 
Villalba’s (2013) proposals are applications of Roy’s (2010) analysis to English and Spanish, 
respectively, I will only review Roy’s (2010) and Baglini’s (2015) works. We will see that, although 
these proposals make the correct prediction that deadjectival nominalizations express states, 
these approaches must be refined in order to account for the fact that deadjectival 
nominalizations have an imperfective nature, that is, they express eventualities that do not 
include their temporal boundaries, as will be explained in chapter 3 in detail.  
 
1.4.2.4.1 Deadjectival nominalizations as predicates of eventualities 
Roy’s (2010) seminal work on French deadjectival nominalizations is based on the observation 
that these can express two readings: a state and a quality reading. Inspired by Grimshaw’s (1990) 
analysis on deverbal nominalizations, Roy argues that the occurrence of the arguments of the 
nominalization induces an eventuality reading, specifically a state reading, hence the acceptance 
of frequency modifiers (which the author calls aspectual modifiers), see (53a). In contrast, the 
absence of argument structure gives rise to a quality reading, hence the rejection of frequency 
modifiers, see (53b).  
 
(53) a. La  popularité constante *(de ses chansons) m’impressionne. 
     the  popularity  constant    of  his     songs      me.impresses 
  b. La   popularité (*constante) est une qualité  qui      lui    fait  défaut. 
     the    popularity  constant     is    a   quality  that  to.him does default  





 The morphosyntactic structure proposed by Roy for state and quality nominalizations, 
respectively, is reproduced below: 
 
(54)  DP/NP 
      N’ 
     N    PredP 
      spec    Pred’ 
         [-ité]    AP  
               A 
                 nasal 
(From Roy 2010: 149) 
(55)  DP/NP 
  N’ 
    N    PredP 
      Proarb    Pred’ 
         Pred    AP  
 
         /-N/     A 
(From Roy 2010: 151) 
 
 According to Roy, the adjectives that can appear in predicative position can select for a 
subject, which can be syntactically captured by positing that they project the functional node 
PredP over AP, and Spec-PredP introduces the subject. If adjectives that appear in predicative 
position project PredP and form nominalizations, both state and quality nominalizations must 
include PredP; in fact, the author claims that the nominalizer is the spell out of head-PredP. In 
(54), since the author assumes that gradable adjectives are predicates of states, the stative 
properties of their derived nouns are straightforwardly explained. As for quality nominalizations 
in (55), the absence of temporality comes from a generic interpretation when a generic operator 
GEN binds a null subject Proarb, which appears in Spec-Pred. Thus, the quality reading is not 
derived from an alleged ambiguity of gradable adjectives according to which they can express 
either states or qualities, but rather it emerges when the state is involved in a generic context. 
 In short, Roy argues that there are two types of deadjectival nominalizations, namely, state 
and quality nominalizations. The stative reading results directly from the stative properties of the 




nominalizations express eventualities and can combine with frequency modifiers; in contrast, 
quality nominalizations do not combine with frequency modifiers. 
 In this dissertation, I assume with Roy (2010) that there is a crucial difference between 
deadjectival nominalizations whose arguments are present and deadjectival nominalizations 
whose arguments are absent. In addition, I assume that the difference is that the former express 
episodic properties, that is, particular situations, while the latter express generic properties, that 
is, properties that do not make reference to any particular situation (Carlson 2011). However, for 
the specific reasons that are laid out in chapter 4, this difference must not be expressed in terms 
of states and qualities, where the latter are derived from the former when a generic 
interpretation arises. On the contrary, more in line with the kind-token tradition, I posit that the 
basic reading is the generic qua kind reading, while the stative qua token reading is the derived 
one. 
 The other aspect in which my analysis differs from Roy’s is that the author says nothing with 
respect to the incompatibility of deadjectival nominalizations with aspectual modifiers even 
when their arguments are present, as shown in section 1.4.1. This incompatibility does not 
constitute an argument against the eventuality nature of deadjectival nominalizations (cf. 
Fábregas 2016), but rather I argue that it naturally follows from the fact that deadjectival 
nominalizations express imperfective states. In chapter 3, based on García Fernández (1999, 
2000), I will show that aspectual modifiers are licensed when a perfective interpretation is 
available. Specifically, gradable adjectives express imperfective states by default in the absence 
of the copula; given that deadjectival nominalizations do not include the copula in their 
derivation, they can only express imperfective states, that is, states that do not include their 
temporal boundaries.    
 In conclusion, Roy’s analysis for deadjectival nominalizations constitutes the point of 
departure of this dissertation, insofar as it posits that deadjectival nominalizations express states 
when their arguments are present. However, Roy’s proposal does not explain why deadjectival 
nominalizations do not combine with aspectual modifiers even though they express 
eventualities. In addition, as will be shown in chapter 4, my proposal differs from Roy’s insofar as 
the quality qua kind reading is the basic reading, while the stative qua token reading is the 
derived one. In the following subsection, I review Baglini’s (2015) analysis of property concept 
nouns as stative predicates, where states are defined as gradable predicates. 
 
1.4.2.4.2 States as gradable predicates  
Baglini (2015) is concerned with the similarities and differences between canonical mass nouns 




the author shows that there are systematic differences that hold cross-linguistically. Particularly, 
she shows that Wolof (from the Niger-Congo family) exhibits analogous contrasts as the ones 
brought to light by Tovena (2001) with respect to Italian and French. First, the degree modifier 
lool ‘very’ is incompatible with canonical mass nouns like ceeb ‘rice’ and compatible with 
gradable adjectives like rafet ‘pretty’, as expected; interestingly, it can also co-occur with 
property concept nouns like xel ‘wit’: 
 
(56) a. Awa  am      na-∅ ceeb (*lool). 
      Awa have FIN-3SG rice    very 
  ‘Awa has rice.’ 
  b. Awa     rafet-na-∅   (lool). 
       Awa pretty-FIN-3SG  very 
  ‘Awa is (very) pretty.’ 
  c. Awa   am     na-∅  xel (lool). 
      Awa have FIN-3SG wit very 
  ‘Awa is (very) witty.’ 
(Baglini 2015: 17) 
 
 Second, Wolof makes use of two distinct verbs to express comparison: ëpp and gën, which 
can be translated as ‘to exceed’. While the former does not discriminate between canonical mass 
nouns and property concept nouns, the latter is incompatible with canonical mass nouns: 
 
(57) a. Aïda    mu-a    ëpp   doole  Binta. 
      Aïda   3SG-S-F   EXC  strength Binta 
  ‘Aïda is stronger than Binta.’  
  b. Aïda       mu-a   ëpp   ceeb  Binta 
       Aïda   3SG-S-F   EXC    rice    Binta 
  ‘Aïda has more rice than Binta.’ 
(58) a. Aïda  mu-a   gën-a   am   doole   Binta. 
      Aïda 3SG-S-F  EXC    have strength Binta 
  ‘Aïda has more strength than Binta.’ 
  b. *Aïda  mu-a  gën-a   am   ceeb  Binta. 
       Aïda 3SG-S-F  EXC    have  rice   Binta 
  Intended: ‘Aïda has more rice than Binta.’ 




 Third, property concept nouns, like count nouns and unlike canonical mass nouns, are 
compatible with the indefinite singular determiner b-enn ‘any, a single’ in negative sentences: 
 
(59) a. Am-u-ma             b-enn     doole. 
     have-NEG-1SG.FIN  CL-some  strength 
  ‘I don’t have any strength.’ 
  b. Jend-u-ma         b-enn cigarette. 
        buy-NEG-1SG.FIN   CL-some cigarette 
  ‘I didn’t buy a single cigarette.’ 
  c. *Naan-u-ma          benn    ndox. 
      drink-NEG-1SG.FIN  CL-some water 
  Intended: ‘I didn’t drink any water’ / I didn’t drink any drop of water. 
(Baglini 2015: 97) 
 
 Baglini concludes that there is enough empirical evidence that canonical mass nouns and 
property concept nouns denote in different domains. The former have a mereological structure 
in the sense of Link (1983) or, in other words, are associated with parthood relations. In contrast, 
property concept nouns are associated with scales, which are totally preordered in intensity 
(recall from section 1.4.2.2.1 that Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2017a propose the same 
ordering, although applied to qualities rather than states). According to Baglini, this dissimilarity 
can be captured by positing that property concept nouns express states, which are totally 
preordered in intensity because of their strict homogeneity and give rise to degrees through 
equivalence classes. In contrast, canonical mass nouns are predicates of substances and have a 
mereological structure. 
 The fundamental property that characterizes states in contrast to events according to Baglini 
(see also Baglini & Kennedy 2019) is that the former can be graded intensively in equivalence 
classes of states or degrees (what Fleischhauer 2016 calls degree gradation), while the latter can 
be graded extensively in frequency or duration (what Fleischhauer 2016 calls extent gradation). 
Accordingly, in (60a) the stative predicate to love, unlike the eventive predicate to run in (60b), 
cannot trigger temporal readings in gradable constructions:  
 
(60) a. Sam loves his mother a lot/a little/so much.       (*FREQUENCY/*DURATION) 





 (60a) means that Sam loves his mother to a certain degree, but it cannot mean that Sam 
loves his mother frequently or for some time. In contrast, (60b) means that John ran many times 
or for a long time. In short, the author identifies gradability (i.e. degree gradation) with stativity.  
 The other important insight in Baglini’s analysis is that constructions involving the copula 
plus an adjective in languages like English are tightly connected with possessive constructions 
involving deadjectival nominalizations in Wolof, as shown in subsection 1.4.1. In fact, in Wolof 
the equivalent structure of Ali is intelligent is Ali has intelligence, which equates them with 
alienable possession structures like Ali has rice. The semantic composition for am ceeb ‘to have 
rice’ and Ali am xel ‘Ali is intelligent, (lit.) Ali has intelligence’ is reproduced below: 
 
(61) a. ⟦𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑏⟧ = 𝜆𝑦. rice(𝑦). 
  b. ⟦𝑎𝑚⟧ = 𝜆𝑃<𝛼,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝛼 ∈<𝛼,𝑅>
𝐷↑ . 𝑃(𝛼) ∧ 𝜋(𝛼)(𝑥). 
  c. ⟦𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑏⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑦 ∈<𝑒,≤𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡>
𝐷↑ . rice(𝑦) ∧ 𝜋(𝑦)(𝑥). 
(62) a. ⟦𝑥𝑒𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. mind(𝑠) = {𝑠 | 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆≽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑}. 
  b. ⟦𝑎𝑚⟧ = 𝜆𝑃<𝛼,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝛼 ∈<𝛼,𝑅>
𝐷↑ . 𝑃(𝛼) ∧ 𝜋(𝛼)(𝑥). 
  c. ⟦𝑎𝑚 𝑥𝑒𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠 ∈<𝑠,≻𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑>
𝐷↑ . mind(𝑠) ∧ 𝜋(𝑠)(𝑥). 
  d. ⟦𝐴𝑙𝑖 𝑎𝑚 𝑥𝑒𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑠 ∈<𝑠,≻𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑>
𝐷↑ . mind(𝑠) ∧ 𝜋(𝑠)(Ali). 
  e. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝑃<𝑠,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. 𝑃(𝑠) ∧ [𝑠] ≽𝛿 stnd𝛿,𝐶 . 
  f. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿 𝐴𝑙𝑖 𝑎𝑚 𝑥𝑒𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. mind(𝑠) ∧ 𝜋(𝑠)(Ali) ∧ ∃[𝑠] ≽𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑 stnd𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑,𝐶 . 
(From Baglini 2015: 176, 177) 
 
 The verb am ‘have’ takes a predicate of type <α,t>, where α stands for entities or states, and 
returns a function from individuals to entities/states. Therefore, Baglini introduces a possession 
relation in the denotation of am, which associates an entity/state with a possessor. If states are 
involved, she assumes that the null morpheme EVAL (from Rett 2008) recues the derivation from 
having the trivial meaning ‘Ali has some degree of intelligence’. This null morpheme, reminiscent 
of POS in degree-based theories, captures the intended meaning: ‘Ali has certain degree of 
intelligence that reaches a contextual standard of comparison’. 
 In sum, Baglini argues that, while canonical mass nouns are predicates of substances, 
property concept nouns are predicates of states. The former are associated with a mereological 
ordering, while the latter are associated with degrees through equivalence classes of states, 
which are totally preordered. The fact that states, unlike events, do not prompt temporal 
readings in gradable contexts is explained because states are ordered intensively in degrees, 




 Baglini’s analysis is in accordance with the idea defended in this dissertation that property 
concept nouns express states. Moreover, I assume with the author that the fundamental 
difference between canonical mass nouns and deadjectival nominalizations is that the former 
are mereologically ordered, while the latter are associated with scales as equivalence classes of 
states, which are totally preordered. However, as pointed out with respect to Roy’s (2010) 
analysis, I refine the existing state-based analyses by positing that deadjectival nominalizations 
express imperfective states.  
 Regardless, my most important disagreement with Baglini’s analysis is related to her 
conception of states as eventualities that are gradable, which departs from the classical 
conception of stativity based on Vendler (1957) and Dowty (1979) according to which states are 
defined by their lack of dynamism. A precise characterization of stativity is offered in chapter 2; 
for the moment, it is sufficient to note that, if states were defined by being gradable, we could 
not account for the existence of non-gradable states like pertenecer ‘to belong’ and poseer ‘to 
own’, which do not participate in gradable constructions (I provide examples in Spanish, but 
they can also be applied to English): 
 
(63) a. *Sam perteneció mucho  al   equipo. 
       Sam  belonged    a.lot  to.the team  
  b. *Sam   poseyó   el   récord mucho. 
       Sam    owned   the  record   a.lot     
 
 As shown in (63), the verbs pertenecer ‘to belong’ and poseer ‘to own’ do not give rise to any 
acceptable reading in gradable constructions: they cannot trigger a durative/frequentative 
reading because they do not express events, but they cannot express a degree reading either 
because they do not constitute gradable predicates. What these data suggest is that states are 
not defined on the basis of gradability. I develop this insight in chapter 2, where I argue that 
states are defined as temporal objects that do not involve any changes in their participants, 
irrespective of whether they are gradable or not. 
 To sum up, on the one hand, Baglini’s analysis is consistent with the idea defended in this 
dissertation that property concept nouns express states that lexicalize scales, which consist of 
degrees as totally preordered equivalence classes of states. On the other, this proposal does not 
explain why deadjectival nominalizations do not accept aspectual modifiers even though they 




1.4.2.5 Conclusions of the section 
In this subsection, previous approaches on deadjectival nominalizations are reviewed from a 
theoretical perspective. Specifically, the proposals are divided into four groups depending on 
which ontological objects they deploy: degrees, qualities, tropes and states. I have shown that 
degree-based and quality-based approaches fail to capture the fact that deadjectival 
nominalizations express properties that are subject to time. As for tropes, they do not show any 
relevant differences with respect to states that allow us to distinguish them properly. Thus, 
neither qualities nor tropes need to be included in our semantic ontology to account for the 
meaning of deadjectival nominalizations. With respect to degrees, in chapter 2 I argue that they 
can be derived from state-kinds, so I do not take degrees as basic semantic objects either.  
 By contrast, state-based approaches are shown to be superior to the rest of approaches 
insofar as they can account for the fact that deadjectival nominalizations express properties that 
are subject to time. Nevertheless, these approaches require a specific refinement in order to 
explain why deadjectival nominalizations are incompatible with aspectual modifiers, which I take 
as evidence that they express imperfective states.  
 
1.5 Overview of the dissertation   
After having gone over the main properties of deadjectival nominalizations and the different 
theoretical views on them, I turn to the questions that the present dissertation attempts to 
address. In the remaining of this chapter, I guide the reader into the structure of this work. 
Starting with chapter 2, I present in some detail the theoretical model on which my analysis is 
based. Specifically, in this chapter I pose the following questions: 
 
(a) What is the defining property of states? 
(b) Do gradable adjectives, which constitute bases for nominalizations, express states? 
(c) What lies behind the distinction among individual-level, stage-level and Davidsonian states? 
(d) What is the role of strict homogeneity and gradability in relation to stativity? 
(e) What is the basic composition of gradable adjectives and their nominalizations?  
 
 Thus, in this chapter I provide a thorough scrutiny of stativity, which constitutes the 
backbone of the analysis. Specifically, the most important question is (a) to define what a state is 
in precise terms and (b) to find out whether gradable adjectives express states. I argue that 
states are eventualities that do not involve change in any of their participants and that gradable 
adjectives express states. Regarding question (c), I examine individual-level, stage-level and 




aspectual properties that may call into question the hypothesis that gradable adjectives express 
states; I argue that they all express states, but they differ as to how causation is manifested in 
each case. Thus, causation is an important property that distinguishes the main three types of 
stative predicates, but it does not constitute a defining property of stativity. With respect to 
question (d), I argue that strict homogeneity and gradability do not constitute defining 
properties of stativity either, although they play an important role in the delineation of the 
whole typology of states presented in this dissertation.  
 With regard to (e), I address the question of how the domain of gradable adjectives must be 
structured. Essentially, my model of gradability includes insights from Kennedy & McNally 
(2005), Kennedy (2007), Gehrke (2011, 2015, 2017), Anderson & Morzycki (2015) and Francez & 
Koontz-Garboden (2015, 2017a), which will be collated in due time. Specifically, what I propose 
is that gradable adjectives are predicates of state-kinds, which can express state-tokens when 
their arguments are present. In addition, I posit that gradable adjectives and their 
nominalizations are associated with scales, which are sets of degrees qua state-kinds that are 
totally preordered.  
 In chapter 3, I propose an analysis of state-token nominalizations, which are characterized 
by being flanked by the definite determiner and their arguments, usually a PP introducing the 
participant of which the property is predicated or holder, as illustrated in (64).  
 
(64) a. la   altura de Víctor 
     the  height of Víctor 
  ‘Víctor’s height’ 
  b. la  belleza de la tormenta 
     the  beauty of the  storm  
 
 The analysis addresses the following questions: 
 
(a) What do these deadjectival nominalizations express? What theoretical implications does it 
have? 
(b) Why is the kind-token dichotomy important to account for these nominalizations?  
(c) Are there any relevant distinctions between gradable adjectives and their nominalizations? 
(d) What is the role of the nominalizer? 
 
 Regarding (a), the question boils down to positing whether DPs containing deadjectival 




topic. My analysis is in accordance with Roy (2010), Villalba (2013), Borer (2013), Baglini (2015) 
and Glass (2019), who claim that these nominalizations express states. Empirical evidence that 
they express states comes mainly from the fact that they are compatible with temporal and 
frequency modification. However, I propose an important refinement for state-based analyses, 
namely, that these nominalizations express imperfective states, which explains why they are 
incompatible with aspectual modifiers. The implications of such an analysis are related to the 
composition of our semantic ontology and to the properties that nominalizations can encode 
not only with respect to lexical aspect, but also with respect to viewpoint aspect.  
 Concerning (b), I argue that the kind-token distinction is relevant to account for the 
combination of state-token nominalizations with frequency and manner adjectives and measure 
phrases. Based on Gehrke & McNally’s (2015) insights, I show that the distribution and 
interpretation of frequency adjectives can be explained depending on whether they operate in 
the kind or token domains; as for manner adjectives and measure phrases, I follow Anderson & 
Morzycki (2015) in positing that they operate in the kind domain.  
 To answer question (c), we need to find out whether the properties that characterize 
gradable adjectives, like the endpoints encoded by their scales, the individual-level/stage-level 
distinction, argument structure, etc., are maintained by their corresponding nominalizations. I 
argue that all the adjectival properties are inherited by their corresponding nominalizations, but 
gradable adjectives and their nominalizations differ with respect to one interesting property: 
gradable adjectives invoke a standard of comparison in the absence of an explicit degree 
modifier, whereas deadjectival nominalizations are not obligatory assessed with respect to a 
standard of comparison. 
 Finally, in relation to question (d), the aim is to determine what the semantic contribution of 
deadjectival nominalizers is, if there is one, especially taking into consideration that there are 
(few) cases of pairs of nominalizations derived from the same base, like simplicidad ‘simplicity’ / 
simpleza ‘foolishness’ < simple ‘foolish, simple’, which express a more specialized meaning than 
their base. What I argue for is that the deadjectival nominalizer acts as a filter of the domain of 
their bases: it can take as its input the adjectival domain, which is the most usual situation, or 
can restrict it, but it cannot broaden it. To put it differently, the nominalizer can only take some 
of the senses that the base adjective can express. For instance, the base simple can mean 
‘simple’ or ‘foolish’, while their derived nominalizations simplicidad ‘simplicity’ and simpleza 
‘foolishness’ restrict the domain of the adjective by taking only one of the adjectival senses. 
 In chapter 4, I explore the internal structure of deadjectival nominalizations with a particular 




which are not accompanied by their arguments and trigger generic interpretations, as illustrated 
in (65).  
 
(65) a. La  belleza está en el interior. 
     the  beauty   is   in the interior 
  ‘Beauty is inside.’ 
  b. El  puente tiene una altura {increíble / de diez metros}. 
     the  bridge  has    a   height incredible  of   ten   meters 
  ‘The bridge has a(n) {incredible height / height of ten meters}.’ 
  c. El  puente tiene {mucha / dos metros de} altura. 
     the bridge  has     much    two  meters  of  height  
  d. Los electrones tienen altura. 
      the   electrons   have  height 
  ‘Electrons have some height.’ 
 
 The questions that I will attempt to answer are the following ones: 
 
(a) Must the analysis of deadjectival nominalizations be subsumed under the analysis of canonical 
mass nouns? 
(b) What is the constraint that regulates the formation of mass nominalizations? 
(c) Why is the kind-token dichotomy important to account for state-kind nominalizations? 
(d) What are the constraints that regulate the process of nominalization? 
 
 In order to answer question (a), I compare canonical mass nouns like agua ‘water’ to 
deadjectival nominalizations and conclude that, even though they are similar insofar as they can 
be taken as sets of elements that are ordered with respect to each other, they are associated 
with different domains, which explains the semantic differences that they exhibit in certain 
syntactic contexts, like exclamatives. Canonical mass nouns are associated with a mereological 
partial order of portions, while deadjectival nominalizations are associated with a total preorder 
of state-kinds.  
 Regarding (b), I discuss whether the basic constraint that regulates the formation of mass 
nominalizations is that the base predicate has to be either atelic, as usually assumed since 
Mourelatos (1978), or gradable. On the one hand, I provide empirical evidence that there is a 
mapping from gradability onto the mass domain, so it is gradable predicates that form mass 




morphological pluralization, which I disassociate from countability: atelic predicates do not 
pluralize in normal circumstances regardless of whether they constitute mass or count nouns, 
although I set out three conditions in which the plural marking is licit. 
 In relation to question (c), I study the four types of state-kind nominalizations that I illustrate 
in (65), which have received little attention in the literature. I argue that all the nominalizations 
that appear in (65) denote in the domain of state-kinds because they are incompatible with 
temporal and frequency modifiers. In addition, I analyze the specific properties that each type of 
nominalization displays and the role of the light verb tener ‘to have’. 
 To conclude, question (d) inquires whether we can predict the number and type of 
nominalizations that can be formed out of the same predicative base. To complete the inventory 
of deadjectival nominalizations that can be formed in Spanish, I examine participant and event 
nominalizations succinctly, exemplified in (66a) and (66b), respectively.  
 
(66) a. Tengo     varias   durezas    en  el  pie. 
     have.1.SG several hardnesses on the foot 
  ‘I have several calluses on my foot.’ 
  b. El     político   cometió   varias  irregularidades. 
     the  politician committed several   irregularities 
 
 In order to account for the existence state-token, state-kind, participant and event 
nominalizations, I defend that nominalization is a constrained phenomenon whereby the 
domain of the arguments of predicative bases constitutes the domain of the resulting 
nominalizations, although there are other idiosyncratic factors that have to be taken into 
consideration to provide a thorough picture of the phenomenon. In particular, deadjectival 
nominalizations can express states, entities and events because their base adjectives encode a 
state argument and are typically predicated of entity-denoting individuals, but they can also be 
predicated of events in certain circumstances; I will develop these insights in chapter 4.  
 Lastly, chapter 5 summarizes the main contributions of this dissertation, which are derived 
from the general conclusion that a model that makes use of state-kinds is best suited to provide 
a satisfactory explanation for the morphosyntactic and semantic properties of deadjectival 
nominalizations. Additionally, I mention some extensions of the analysis, pose new questions 
about other related phenomena and briefly describe the main problems that they raise, which 






Stativity and its interaction with causation, homogeneity and gradability 
 
In the previous chapter, I concluded that the group of approaches that makes better predictions 
about the semantics of deadjectival nominalizations is the state-based approach, given that 
deadjectival nominalizations express properties that are subject to time. In this chapter, I present 
the theoretical assumptions that underlie the analysis that will be defended in this dissertation, 
where stativity plays a central role. Focusing on the verbal and adjectival domains, I argue (a) 
that states are defined as temporal objects that do not involve change in any of their 
participants and (b) that stativity interacts with different concepts that are not always 
differentiated correctly in the literature, among which ‘causation’, ‘strict homogeneity’ and 
‘gradability’ stand out; specifically, these concepts play an important role to configure the 
typology of states that I present here, although they do not constitute defining properties. In 
section 2.1, I present a precise characterization of ‘stativity’ in the spirit of Vendler (1957) and 
Dowty (1979) and provide evidence that gradable adjectives, which are the bases of deadjectival 
nominalizations, express states.  
 In section 2.2, I examine the three main types of states that have been identified in the 
literature on stativity, namely, individual-level, stage-level and Davidsonian states. I claim that, 
although the division into the three categories is correct, their fundamental properties are 
related to causation rather than other notions like spatiotemporality, aspect or the relative-
absolute distinction. Specifically, I propose that individual-level states express non-caused 
properties; stage-level states express externally caused properties; and, based on Leferman 
(2017), Davidsonian states express internally caused properties.  
 In section 2.3, I provide a specific characterization of gradability and homogeneity, where the 
latter is based on cumulativity and divisibility in terms of Krifka (1989, 1992). On the one hand, I 
argue against Baglini (2015) that stativity is not necessarily linked to gradability and that 
Davidsonian states are not necessarily characterized by being extensively gradable in the sense 
of Fleischhauer (2016). On the other hand, in line with Dowty (1979) and Rothstein (2004), I also 
show that, while states and activities are cumulative, not all stative predicates are divisible in 
instants. Additionally, I provide evidence that only activities and some Davidsonian states are 
divisible in intervals, and it is this property that allows them to be measured extensively. 
 In section 2.4, I present Anderson & Morzycki’s (2015) model, in which gradable adjectives 
encode a state variable and degrees are derived from state-kinds. I conclude that this model is 




degree-less approaches, as well as the fact that gradable adjectives express eventualities. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of Gehrke’s (2011, 2015, 2017) analysis of German adjectival passives, I 
propose one modification to Anderson & Morzycki’s model, namely, that gradable adjectives are 
predicates of state-kinds, but they can express state-tokens when predicated of an individual, in 
which case additional functional material is responsible for instantiating a state-kind.  
 Finally, section 2.5 summarizes the main ideas of the chapter. 
 
2.1. Stativity and aspect 
The goals of this section are to develop a precise characterization of states, by identifying their 
fundamental properties, and to provide evidence that gradable adjectives express states, since 
they express properties that are subject to time and do not involve change in any of their 
participants.  
 Since Vendler (1957), there has been a long tradition that defines states on the basis of 
negative tests with respect to events. In other words, many authors have defined states as those 
eventualities that do not pass the standard tests usually employed for identifying events. This 
method works well when verbs and adjectives (in combination with the copula) are involved, 
since there is a wide consensus that they can only express either events or states; thus, when 
verbs and adjectives are involved, we can accept that what is not an event is a state.
12
 However, 
in the nominal domain, where other ontological objects like substances, degrees, qualities and 
tropes are good candidates for constituting their core semantics, that reasoning cannot be valid. 
In other words, neither the DP the dog nor the DP John’s belonging to the team passes the 
standard tests employed for identifying events in the nominal domain, but that does not entail 
that both DPs are associated with the same semantics. The goal of this section is, thus, to 
identify a property that defines states in positive terms. Based on Vendler (1957) and Dowty 
(1979), I assume that states, like events and unlike the rest of objects, are subject to time or, in 
other words, are temporal objects, so they have to combine with time-related modifiers, i.e. 
temporal, aspectual and frequency modifiers. In the following subsection, I present empirical 
evidence that this is the case.  
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 Nevertheless, some specific refinements must be done. Since Carlson (1977), it is argued that individual-level 
adjectives like (be) intelligent express properties inherent in an individual. Therefore, if these adjectives expressed 
atemporal properties, this could indicate that they do not express states, but rather a more impoverished object like a 
quality or disposition (in the sense of Martin 2013). In this respect, it must be noted that the term state has been 
traditionally used either in a broad sense, which includes the semantics of those verbs and adjectives that do not express 
events, or in a narrow sense, whereby stage-level predicates, but not individual-level ones, deserve that denomination. In 
this dissertation I argue that both individual-level and stage-level predicates hold in time, so they can be considered 




2.1.1. States as non-dynamic eventualities 
Since Vendler (1957) and Dowty (1979), there has been a broad agreement that verbs are 
predicates of either events, which express dynamic properties, or states, which express non-
dynamic properties (see also Davidson 1967; Higginbotham 1985; Parsons 1990; Smith 1991; 
Pustejovsky 1995; Landman 2000; Rothstein 2004; Borik 2006; Rothmayr 2009; a.o.). In order to 
identify events, different tests have been employed; given that I focus on Spanish data in this 
dissertation, I will review some of the tests that are widely used in the literature on Spanish (see 
Bosque 1989, 1999; Picallo 1991, 1999; De Miguel 1999; RAE & ASALE 2009; Marín 2013; Jaque 
2014; Fábregas 2016; a.o.), which are the equivalent tests originally used for other languages 
with the necessary adaptations.  
 First, events, unlike states, accept anaphoric reference by means of Esto tuvo lugar… ‘This 
took place…’. In (1a), the eventive predicate esconderse ‘to hide’ can be retrieved by means of 
that anaphoric expression, while in (1b) the stative predicate gustar ‘to like’ cannot: 
 
(1)  a. El   fugitivo se escondió en  otro       país.   Esto tuvo lugar hace muchos años. 
     the  fugitive REFL   hid      in another country.  this  took place ago   many  years 
  ‘The fugitive hid in another country. This took place many years ago.’ 
b. A Juan   le  gustó la película. *Esto tuvo lugar   ayer. 
   to Juan  him liked the movie.    this took place yesterday 
‘Juan liked the movie. This took place yesterday.’ 
 
 Second, events are compatible with both auxiliary verbs parar ‘to stop’ and dejar ‘to stop, to 
give up, to cease’, while states are only compatible with the latter. Note that, if parar is used in 
(2a), which involves an event, it indicates that a unique event of smoking is interrupted; in 
contrast, if dejar is used, what is interrupted is the habit of smoking. In (2b) a state is involved, so 
only dejar is licensed.  
 
(2)  a. María paró/dejó de fumar. 
  ‘María stopped/gave up smoking.’ 
  b. Ana *paró/dejó de saber inglés. 
  ‘Ana stopped/gave up knowing English.’ 
 
 Third, events, unlike states, are compatible with celerative modifiers (in the sense of Cinque 




puerta ‘to paint the door’ can hold at a particular speed, the stative predicate parecerse a su 
hermano ‘to resemble his brother’ cannot: 
 
(3)  a. Mónica  pintó   la  puerta rápidamente/lentamente. 
     Mónica painted the  door      quickly         slowly 
  b. *Raúl  se    parece    a  su hermano rápidamente/lentamente. 
       Raúl REFL resembles  to his  brother      quickly         slowly 
  ‘Raúl resembles his brother quickly/slowly.’   
 
These tests show that events and states differ in that only the former express dynamic 
properties or properties that involve change over time. Since Vendler (1957), it has been 
accepted that there are three main types of events: accomplishments, achievements and 
activities. Accomplishments and achievements are telic or heterogeneous events, so they 
constitute predicates for which only a non-arbitrary subpart of the eventuality being described 
satisfies the predicate in question (McNally 2017). Traditionally, (a)telicity has been defined 
depending on whether the predicate includes a natural final endpoint, in which case it would be 
telic, or whether the predicate does not include a natural final endpoint, in which case it would 
be atelic (see Smith 1991 for instance). Even following this definition, telic predicates are 
heterogeneous, while atelic predicates are homogeneous, so the choice of one definition or the 
other one does not have critical consequences. As usually noted, telic events combine with 
aspectual modifiers introduced by en ‘in’; the difference between accomplishments and 
achievements is that the former are also durative events. Consider the following sentences:  
 
(4)  a. Cuco construyó la   casa  en dos años. 
     Cuco      built    the  house in  two years 
  b. Cuco  llegó  en diez minutos. 
      Cuco arrived in  ten  minutes 
 
 (4a) expresses an accomplishment, so it means ‘It took Cuco two years to build the house’; in 
contrast, (4b) expresses an achievement, so it does not mean ‘It took Cuco ten minutes to 
arrive’, but rather ‘Cuco arrived after ten minutes’. When combined with punctual temporal 
modifiers such as a las diez ‘at ten’, accomplishments trigger an inchoative reading, as in (5a), 
which means ‘Lorena started to build the house at ten’, while achievements trigger a terminative 





(5)  a. Lorena construyó la   casa   a las diez.  
     Lorena     built     the  house at the ten 
  b. Lorena  llegó  a las diez.  
     Lorena arrived at the ten 
 
Regarding activities, they are atelic or homogeneous, since, according to McNally (2017), 
they constitute predicates for which any arbitrary subpart of the eventuality being described can 
satisfy the predicate in question, where “any arbitrary subpart” only holds to a certain level of 
granularity (I will provide a precise definition of homogeneity in section 2.3). As usually noted, 
activities combine with aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’ and reject en ‘in’: 
 
(6)  a. Diego nadó durante/*en  varias horas. 
    Diego  swam    for       in  several hours 
 b. Marta patinó durante/*en varias horas. 
    Marta  skated     for       in several hours 
 
States show the same pattern as activities, since they can also combine with durante-phrases 
and reject en-phrases, so they also constitute atelic or homogeneous eventualities:   
 
(7)  a. Juan quiso  a   María durante/*en muchos años.  
     Juan loved ACC María     for       in   many   years  
  ‘Juan loved María for/in many years.’ 
  b. Luis  poseyó  el  record durante/*en muchos años. 
     Luis    owned  the record     for       in   many   years 
  ‘Luis owned the record for/in many years.’ 
 
 As mentioned above, the difference with respect to activities is that states do not involve 
change in any of their participants over time. The type of change that is related to events is a 
more complex question than the traditional classification encompasses. The most salient 
characteristic of the notion of ‘change’ is that, while certain events like quemar ‘to burn’ and 
comer ‘to eat’ impact on the constitutive parts of a certain participant, for instance turning a 
participant into ashes or making it disappear, in other cases the change is mental, as in engañar 
‘to deceive’, or spatial, as in moverse ‘to move’. Even in the case in which the change is of the 
same type, there exist more specific relevant differences. For example, both llegar ‘to arrive’ and 




telic events, they accept aspectual modification of PPs headed by en ‘in’, see (8); as 
achievements, they start and finish at a temporal point, see (9). 
 
(8)  a. Juan  llegó   a   la  estación en diez minutos.  
     Juan arrived at  the  station   in  ten  minutes 
  b. Juan  se escondió en su casa  en diez minutos.  
     Juan  REFL    hid     at  his home in  ten minutes 
  ‘Juan hid at home in ten minutes.’ 
(9)  a. Juan  llegó   a  las diez.  
     Juan arrived at the  ten 
  ‘Juan arrived at ten.’ 
  b. Juan se escondió a las diez.  
     Juan REFL   hid      at the ten 
  ‘Juan hid at ten.’ 
 
 However, only esconderse ‘to hide’ gives rise to a result state, which is revealed by its 
combination with a durante-phrase, see (10). Thus, while (10a) is an unacceptable utterance, 
(10b) is acceptable and means ‘Juan hid and remained hidden for several hours’. 
 
(10) a. *Juan  llegó  durante varias horas. 
       Juan arrived    for    several hours 
  b. Juan  se escondió durante varias horas. 
     Juan  REFL   hid         for     several hours 
  ‘Juan hid for several hours.’ 
 
 Analogously, nadar ‘to swim’ and bailar ‘to dance’ are activities that involve the movement of 
a certain participant. However, only in the former case does the verb encode information with 
respect to a distance (more technically, the verb lexicalizes a scale of path), which explains why 
only the former can co-occur with measure phrases, like doscientos metros ‘two hundred meters’:  
 
(11) a. Lucía nadó   doscientos  metros. 
     Lucía swam two.hundred  meters 
  b. *Lucía  bailó    doscientos  metros. 





 It is not the goal of this dissertation to present a precise characterization of the notion of 
‘change’. Rather, what I aim is to show is that events involve a certain type of change in at least 
one of their participants, while states do not. Some of the most relevant semantic type of 
changes that are associated with events are explained in Smith (1991), Pustejovsky (1991, 1995), 
Verkuyl (1993), Tenny (1994), Kennedy & Levin (2008), De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla (2000), 
Beavers (2010, 2011, 2013), Levin (1993, 2017), Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2005, 2013), 
Rappaport Hovav & Levin (1998, 2008, 2012), among many others.
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If ‘dynamism’ or ‘change’ is the notion that distinguishes events from states, their internal 
temporal composition or lexical/inner aspect (Verkuyl 1972, 1993) is the notion that relates them 
and, following Bach (1986), we can group events and states under the name of eventualities. 
According to Ramchand (2005: 370), eventualities are “abstract entities with constitutive 
participants, and with a constitutive relation to the temporal dimension”. In other words, 
eventualities are temporal objects that involve participants. If both events and states constitute 
objects that are subject to time, it is predicted that both types combine with time-related 
modifiers, such as temporal, aspectual and frequency modifiers.  
For example, in (12a) the temporal modifier hace muchos años ‘many years ago’ locates the 
state of having a pub at some moment of the past, and in (12b) the temporal modifier en 
primavera ‘in spring’ locates the queen’s arrival at some point of the spring. In relation to (13), as 
we will show in chapter 4 in more depth, aspectual modification is licit only if the eventuality is 
perfective, that is, if it includes its boundaries; in that case, the predicate can combine with 
aspectual modifiers preceded by durante ‘for’ or en ‘in’ depending on whether the eventuality is 
atelic or telic. Accordingly, in (13a) the atelic state of knowing the truth lasted ten years, while in 
(13b) the telic event of eating the sandwich lasted twenty minutes. Finally, both events and 
states can also combine with frequency modifiers if they hold in an appropriate context in which 
they can re-hold, as in (14). In (14a) the frequency modifier constantemente ‘constantly’ indicates 
that the state of having a new car holds many times, while in (14b) the frequency modifier 
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 A different question, which will not be addressed here, is whether the dynamism associated with events is apparent 
and arises as a result of a succession of heterogeneous states that may give the false impression that they involve 
change when transitioning from one state to another one (think about cartoons, for example, in which the succession of 
heterogeneous images gives the false impression that they move). I include a brief discussion about this issue in chapter 





(12) a. Rosa tuvo un bar hace muchos años. 
     Rosa  had  a   bar  ago   many   years 
  ‘Rosa had a bar many years ago.’ 
  b. La  princesa llegó   en primavera. 
     the  princess arrived  in    spring 
(13) a. Su   madre  supo  la verdad durante diez años. 
    their mother knew  the truth      for      ten years 
  b. El nene  se comió  el bocadillo en veinte minutos. 
     the kid   REFL  ate   the sandwich in twenty minutes 
  ‘The kid ate the sandwich in twenty minutes.’   
(14) a. Rubén tiene un coche nuevo constantemente. 
     Rubén   has   a    car     new       constantly 
  ‘Rubén constantly has a new car.’ 
  b. Jose  olvida  la  contraseña frecuentemente. 
      Jose  forgets the   password      frequently    
  ‘Jose frequently forgets the password.’  
 
Concerning gradable adjectives, I argue that they express states according to the tests 
illustrated above, irrespective of whether they are derived from individual-level, stage-level or 
Davidsonian states (see Parsons 1990; Landman 2000; Mittwoch 2005; Engelberg 2005; 
Anderson & Morzycki 2015; Ernst 2016, among others, for adjectives in English). Specifically, 
individual-level predicates like (ser) famoso ‘(to be) famous’, stage-level ones like (estar) cansado 
‘(to be) tired’ and Davidsonian states like (ser) amable ‘(to be) kind’ do not accept anaphoric 
reference by means of the verb tener lugar ‘to take place’, see (15), although the third type are 
less unacceptable because they presuppose an event (Martin 2006, 2008, 2015), as we will see in 
chapter 3; they do not combine with the periphrastic verb parar de ‘to stop’, see (16); and they 
reject celerative modifiers, see (17). What all these data reveal is that gradable adjectives do not 
express events. By contrast, they combine with temporal, aspectual and frequency modifiers, see 
(18), (19) and (20), which reveals that they hold in time, have a duration and can re-hold and, 
ultimately, that they constitute eventualities, specifically states. 
 
(15) a. Alberto fue famoso durante muchos años. *Esto tuvo lugar en  su juventud. 
     Alberto was famous     for      many   years    this  took place  in  his   youth 
 b. Luisa estuvo cansada durante varias horas. *Esto tuvo lugar   ayer. 




 c. María fue amable con Laura en la  reunión. ?Esto tuvo lugar  ayer. 
    María was   kind   with Laura in the meeting   this took place yesterday 
 ‘María was kind to Laura in the meeting. This took place yesterday.’ 
(16) *Lucas   paró   de   ser   famoso / estar cansado / ser amable con Manolo. 
   Lucas stopped of   being  famous   being    tired    being  kind   with Manolo 
  ‘Lucas stopped being famous / tired / kind to Manolo.’ 
(17) *Rocío fue famosa / estuvo cansada / fue amable con Lucas rápidamente. 
   Rocío was famous     was      tired      was   kind   with  Lucas     quickly 
  ‘Rocío was famous / tired / kind to Lucas quickly.’ 
(18) a. Ana fue  famosa en los años noventa. 
     Ana was famous  in the years  ninety 
  ‘Ana was famous in nineteen nighties.’ 
  b. Ana fue famosa durante muchos años. 
     Ana was famous    for       many   years 
  c. Ana fue habitualmente famosa en aquella época. 
     Ana was     usually        famous  in   that      time 
(19) a. Teresa estuvo cansada    ayer. 
    Teresa    was      tired   yesterday 
 b. Teresa estuvo cansada durante varias horas. 
     Teresa   was      tired        for   several  hours 
 c. Teresa está constantemente cansada. 
    Teresa    is       constantly         tired 
(20) a. Lina fue amable con David durante la reunión. 
     Lina was  kind    with David during  the meeting 
 ‘Lina was kind to David during the meeting.’ 
 b. Lina fue amable con David durante varios años. 
        Lina was   kind   with David    for     several years 
 ‘Lina was kind to David for several years.’ 
 c. Lina fue frecuentemente amable con David. 
    Lina was    frequently         kind   with David 
 ‘Lina was frequently kind to David.’ 
 
 In sum, in this section I have provided a specific definition for stativity in the spirit of Vendler 
(1957) and Dowty (1979): on the one hand, states are eventualities, that is, objects that hold in 




dynamism, that is, their participants do not undergo any changes over time. Finally, I have 
shown that gradable adjectives do not express events according to the standard tests: they 
reject anaphoric reference with Esto tuvo lugar… ‘This took place…’ and are incompatible with 
the periphrastic verb parar de ‘to stop’ and with celerative modifiers. Nonetheless, gradable 
adjectives express eventualities, specifically states, because they accept time-related 
modification: temporal, aspectual and frequency modifiers. The fact that gradable adjectives can 
express states is crucial when examining the nominalizations that they can form, which will be 
analyzed in chapters 3 and 4. Specifically, we will see that deadjectival nominalizations inherit 
the core adjectival properties, which constitutes the main argument in favor of positing that they 
can also express eventualities. In the following subsection, I explain how stativity is represented 
in the Neo-Davidsonian tradition. 
 
2.1.2. How to represent stativity 
In this subsection, I argue that states must contain an eventuality variable s, in line with the Neo-
Davidsonian semantics and other contemporary authors (Higginbotham 1985; Parsons 1990; 
Landman 2000; Mittwoch 2005; Engelberg 2005; Wellwood 2014, 2015; Glass 2014, 2019; Baglini 
2015). The discussion on whether or not representing stativity by means of a state variable s 
occurs in the context in which it is widely accepted that events must be represented by a 
variable e, so the discussion ultimately boils down to deciding whether or not we must apply the 
same treatment to states. 
 Since Davidson (1967), events are formally represented by means of a variable e in order to 
account for the fact that temporal, manner, locative and other types of modifiers do not modify 
the participants of the event, but rather the event itself. For instance, for the sentence John 
buttered the toast slowly in the bathroom with a knife at midnight, the formal representation 
according to Davidson is the following one: 
 
(21 ) ∃e[butter(e, John, the toast) ∧ slowly(e) ∧ in(e, the bathroom) ∧ with(e, a knife)  
  ∧ at(e, midnight)]. 
 
 The verb butter lexicalizes an event e and selects for a subject that expresses the agent (John) 
and an object that expresses the theme (the toast). Manner (slowly), locative (in the bathroom), 
comitative (with a knife) and temporal (at midnight) modifiers operate over the event encoded 
by the verb, where prepositions are represented as predicates that select for their own 
arguments. On the other hand, Davidson claims that stative predicates do not encode an event 




 The so-called Neo-Davidsonian authors (mainly, Higginbotham 1985, Parsons 1990 and 
Landman 2000) propose two modifications on the Davidsonian system: first, thematic roles are 
introduced as predicates with their own functions. On the basis of passive sentences, where 
thematic roles are inverted (the agent is realized as the by-phrase and the theme is realized as 
the subject) and the subject does not have to be explicit, as in The toast was buttered (by John), 
they claim that thematic roles must be introduced independently as predicates. The 
representation for John buttered the toast slowly in the bathroom with a knife at midnight is 
therefore the following one:  
 
(22 ) ∃e[butter(e) ∧ agent(e, John) ∧ theme(e, the toast) ∧ slowly(e) ∧ in(e, the bathroom) ∧  
  with(e, a knife) ∧ at(e, midnight)]. 
 
 The representation proposed by Davidson in (21) cannot account for these two phenomena, 
insofar as it is not flexible enough: first, the verb introduces a function that necessarily associates 
an event with a subject that is an agent and with an object that is a theme. Second, given that 
the function butter includes two variables that correspond to the two participants, they must 
appear in the representation in all cases, so there is no place for the optionality of the agent. 
 Neo-Davidsonian authors make another important contribution: they posit an eventuality 
variable s for states. The first main observation that endorses their analysis is due to Parsons 
(1990: 188), who notes that some states accept manner and locative modification, as in Mary 
believes fervently that John loves her and That statue stood on the grass.
14
 The second main 
observation is due to Landman (2000: 23), who claims that states can be referred to by means of 
anaphoric elements, as in Oedipus was in love with Jocasta. It didn’t feel good to him, where it can 
only refer to the state in which Oedipus was in love with Jocasta. 
 This dissertation incorporates the two contributions proposed by the Neo-Davidsonian 
approach, in line with other more modern authors like Mittwoch (2005), Engelberg (2005), 
Wellwood (2014, 2015), Glass (2014, 2019) or Baglini (2015). On the one hand, introducing 
thematic roles as independent predicates allows for the optionality of the holder of the state, 
which is crucial to account for state-kind nominalizations like La honestidad abunda ‘Honesty 
abounds’, where there are no arguments present and the nominalization has a generic 
interpretation (see the details of the analysis in chapter 4). On the other hand, positing that 
states encode a state variable s allows us to account for the fact that states can be modified by 
temporal, aspectual, frequency and even manner and locative modifiers. Finally, the most 
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 Certainly, this is not a very powerful example. It could be argued that on the grass is a locative argument rather than 
an adjunct. Nevertheless, there are other clearer cases, as in Peter was happy in New York, which are discussed in Ernst 




powerful argument in favor of positing an eventuality variable s for states is that there are DPs 
that refer explicitly to states, as in the cases involving mass deadjectival nominalizations (la 
belleza del jardín ‘the beauty of the garden’)
15
 and some deverbal nominalizations (la 
pertenencia de María al club ‘María’s belonging to the club), which we could not account for 
unless we make use of a state variable.  
 Against the Neo-Davidsonian view, Katz (2000, 2003, 2008) argues that states should not be 
represented by means of an eventuality variable because these deadjectival and deverbal 
nominalizations do not refer to states, but rather to other more impoverished ontological 
objects, presumably facts or propositions, which are not subject to time. However, Katz 
overlooks the fact that deadjectival nominalizations admit, for instance, temporal, frequency and 
locative modification: la belleza del jardín durante la tormenta ‘the beauty of the garden during 
the storm’, la frecuente paciencia de María con Juan ‘María’s frequent patience to Juan’, la 
felicidad de Juan en Vitoria ‘Juan’s happiness in Vitoria’, which reveals that they express 
eventualities. (An extensive argumentation that these nominalizations express imperfective states 
is offered in chapter 3).  
 Katz also claims that there are no adverbial adjuncts that modify states exclusively, which the 
author calls the stative adverb gap (cf. Mittwoch 2005 for two possible candidates for English, 
namely, permanently and temporarily). However, if both states and events are subject to time, 
but only the latter involve dynamism by definition, it is predicted that both of them can combine 
with time-related modifiers and that the latter can also combine with other modifiers that 
involve dynamism, like celerative modifiers such as rápidamente ‘quickly’. It is also predicted that 
events accept locative modification more easily, since events take place in some place 
necessarily, while states hold irrespective of their location (Ernst 2016). Ultimately, events are 
more complex than states, hence their compatibility with more types of modifiers. In sum, the 
fact that there are no adjuncts that can combine exclusively with states is predicted by their 
definition, on the one hand, and does not constitute a strong argument against the eventuality 
nature of states, on the other.     
 We can conclude that states must be represented by a state variable s, which allows us to 
account for the fact that they can combine with time-related modification and the fact that they 
can be referred to by means of nominalizations and anaphors. In the following section, I classify 
the different types of stative predicates depending on their causal properties. 
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 In fact, Parsons (1990) is, to my knowledge, the first author to claim that DPs containing deadjectival nominalizations, 
like Brutus’s nakedness and Agatha’s cleverness, are used for referring explicitly to states, which the author takes as an 
argument in favor of positing a state variable s. However, Parsons (1990: 199) does not offer empirical evidence of that 




2.2. The typology of states 
In this section, I examine the three different types of stative predicates that the literature on 
stativity has identified so far, namely, individual-level, stage-level and Davidsonian states (or 
stative causatives in Leferman 2017). The goal of this chapter is to determine the basic 
properties of the predicates that serve as the base for deadjectival nominalizations. My 
investigation is crucially focused on individual-level predicates, which are traditionally defined 
since Carlson (1977) as properties that an individual has inherently, that is, as atemporal 
properties that characterize an individual. I concentrate on them because their alleged 
atemporality could pose the main objection to the analysis defended here according to which 
deadjectival nominalizations express states. In other words, if individual-level predicates are 
defined as properties that hold in an individual atemporally, insofar as states are defined as 
objects that are subject to time, it would be expected that deadjectival nominalizations that are 
derived from individual-level predicates do not express eventualities.  
 However, as we will see in this section, temporality does not underlie the individual-
level/stage-level distinction, since both types of predicates are actually subject to time, as 
concluded by Arche (2006, 2012). Rather, I develop an innovative proposal according to which 
causation is the relevant factor.
16
 Although in subsection 3.2.2 I provide a precise definition of 
causation and the three types of stative predicates that it gives rise to, I can advance here an 
informal characterization: specifically, individual-level states express non-caused properties, 
while stage-level states express externally caused properties. Finally, based on Leferman (2017), I 
argue that there is a third type of states called stative causatives that express internally caused 
properties, which correspond to Davidsonian states in Maienborn (2005a, 2005b, 2007). In 
chapter 3, I show that deadjectival nominalizations are subject to time regardless of whether 
they are derived from individual-level states, stage-level states or stative causatives, which is in 
accordance with the fact that their adjectival bases are also subject to time.  
 The individual-level/stage-level distinction has attracted the interest of a huge number of 
linguists (Milsark 1974; Carlson 1977; Schmitt 1992; McNally 1994; Kratzer 1995; Chierchia 1995; 
Fernández-Leborans 1999; Jäger 2001; Maienborn 2005b; Arche 2006, 2012; Gallego & 
Uriagereka 2009, 2016; Husband 2010; Marín 2010, 2015; Sassoon & Toledo 2011; Camacho 
2012; Gumiel-Molina et al. 2015; Pérez-Jiménez et al. 2015; Silvagni 2017; see Fábregas 2012a 
for a state of the art). The main goal of the dissertation is not to develop a sophisticated 
proposal on the topic; rather, what I aim is to show that both individual-level and stage-level 
predicates are subject to time and, consequently, both predicates and their nominalizations can 
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express states. Accordingly, I will not scrutinize the specifics of the abundant literature on the 
distinction, but I will rather group the different proposals depending on their main 
contributions, showing that they present problems when attempting to account for the 
empirical phenomena. The proposals will be divided into two big groups: the first group 
includes the proposals according to which the individual-level/stage-level distinction is based on 
spatiotemporality or aspect, while the second group includes the proposals according to which 
the distinction relies on the relative-absolute distinction. In the following subsection, I review the 
main previous accounts on the individual-level/stage-level distinction.   
 
2.2.1. The individual-level/stage-level distinction 
For the moment, I leave Davidsonian states (or stative causatives) aside and will focus exclusively 
on individual-level and stage-level predicates. Most proposals agree on the idea that individual-
level predicates like (to be) tall tend to express permanent or stable properties that characterize 
an individual, while stage-level predicates like (to be) sad tend to express transitory or accidental 
properties that do not characterize an individual. Let us review how these approaches address 
the phenomenon. 
 
2.2.1.1 Spatiotemporality and aspect 
The first group of proposals that I will examine are the ones in which individual-level predicates 
express properties that hold atemporally or are inherent in an individual, while stage-level 
predicates express properties that hold at a time and a space. Consequently, only the latter 
could be considered eventualities, specifically states (the former could be considered qualities or 
dispositions in Martin’s 2006, 2008, 2013 terminology).  
 The most influential analysis on individual-level and stage-level predicates is due to Carlson 
(1977), who, based on Milsark (1974), argues that individual-level predicates express properties 
that are predicated of an individual directly, which means that they are properties inherent in 
the individual; in contrast, stage-level predicates are predicated of the stage in which the 
individual is, where stages are defined as spatiotemporal environments: 
 
(23) a. ⟦𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡⟧ = 1 iff inteligent(j). 
  b. ⟦𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒⟧ = 1 iff ∃𝑦[available(𝑦) ∧ 𝑅(𝑦, j)]. 
(Adapted from Carlson 1977: 77) 
 
 In (23a) the individual-level predicate intelligent is predicated directly of John, while in (23b) 




individual John with a certain stage y. Thus, (23a) is true iff there is an individual that is 
inherently intelligent, while (23b) is true iff there is an individual that is available at a certain 
stage, that is, at a certain spatiotemporal frame. 
 This distinction has been very productive in theoretical linguistics, since it allows us to explain 
the opposite behavior of these two types of adjectives semantically and syntactically. First, if 
only stage-level predicates, like the ones in (25), are predicated of a spatiotemporal 
environment, only these are compatible with temporal and spatial modifiers. In contrast, 
individual-level predicates, see (24), are incompatible with those modifiers (the contrast was 
originally proposed for English, but it is also applicable to Spanish). 
 
(24) a. *Juan fue  alto    ayer.  
       Juan was  tall yesterday 
b. *María fue hermosa en Madrid. 
     María was beautiful in  Madrid  
(25) a. Jaime estuvo triste    ayer. 
     Jaime   was     sad  yesterday 
  b. Pedro estuvo desnudo en la  playa. 
      Pedro   was     naked    at the beach 
 
 According to Kratzer (1995), stage-level predicates, unlike individual-level predicates, are 
compatible with temporal sentences preceded by the conjunctions whenever or when. This is 
explained again because only stage-level predicates are subject to time (again the contrast was 
originally proposed for English, but it is also applicable to Spanish conjunctions siempre que 
‘whenever’ or cuando ‘when’): 
 
(26) a. *Siempre que Juan es   guapo,     se   hace  una  foto. 
         Whenever   Juan  is handsome  REFL makes  a   photo 
  ‘Whenever Juan is handsome, he takes a photo of himself.’ 
  b. Siempre que Juan está cansado, se  duerme en  el   sofá. 
        Whenever   Juan   is      tired    REFL   sleeps  on the couch 
  ‘Whenever Juan is tired, he sleeps on the couch.’ 
 
 It has been pointed out that the individual-level/stage-level distinction is crucial to explain 




that can combine with both copulas, it is widely assumed that they can express both types of 
properties depending on the copula that they co-occur with: 
 
(27) a. La  revista    es / *está   semanal/tecnológica/presidencial. 
     the journal is.SER is.ESTAR  weekly technological presidential  
b. Juan   *es / está     cansado/preocupado/molesto. 
   Juan  is.SER is.ESTAR      tired       worried       upset 
c. Juan    es / está   alto/rubio/débil. 
   Juan is.SER is.ESTAR  tall blond weak 
 
Relational adjectives (in the sense of Bally 1944; see also Bosque & Picallo 1996, Demonte 
1999, McNally & Boleda 2004; a.o.), like the ones in (27a), can only combine with the copula ser 
‘to be’, which indicates that they express individual-level states. In contrast, resultative 
adjectives, like the ones in (27b), can only combine with the copula estar ‘to be’, which suggests 
that they express stage-level states. Other adjectives like the ones in (27c) can combine freely 
with both copulas, so they have a variable behavior.   
Although so far I have exemplified the distinction with adjectives, other NPs, DPs and PPs are 
sensitive to the individual-level/stage-level distinction: 
 
(28) a. Juan    fue   /   *estuvo     (el) presidente. 
     Juan was.SER    was.ESTAR  the   president 
  b. Mary es  /  *está     de  Mánchester.  
     Mary is.SER  is.ESTAR from Manchester 
  c. Mary *es   /  está  en Mánchester. 
     Mary is.SER   is.ESTAR  in  Manchester 
 
 Now I turn to my critical review. Despite the advantages of the spatiotemporal-based 
analysis, some data remain unexplained. Specifically, there are individual-level states that 
combine with both temporal and locative modifiers, which indicates that spatiotemporality 
cannot be the property that lies behind the distinction: 
 
(29) a. Mario   fue     rubio  en su juventud. 






  b. Mi vida   fue   interesante hace muchos años. 
     my  life was.SER interesting  ago   many   years 
  ‘My life was interesting many years ago.’  
(30) a. Chimo    fue    famoso en Valencia. 
     Chimo was.SER  famous  in Valencia 
  b. Irene    fue   celadora en La Paz.  
      Irene was.SER  porter   in  La Paz 
 
 The predicates rubio ‘blond’ and interesante ‘interesting’ in (29) can be considered individual-
level predicates, insofar as they combine with the copula ser and could describe a property that 
is inherent in an individual: for instance, in (29a) Mario could be characterized as being blond, 
while in (29b) my life could be characterized as interesting. However, they can be modified by 
temporal adjuncts, which indicates that these properties are subject to time. Analogously, in (30) 
the predicates famoso ‘famous’ and celadora ‘porter’ turn out to describe properties that 
characterize an individual regardless of their location; however, they admit locative modification, 
which restricts the validity of the state to a certain location. 
 It could be argued (see Maienborn 2001 for English and Marín 2013, Jaque 2014 and Silvagni 
2017 for Spanish) that these adjuncts are not true locative modifiers, but rather they restrict the 
topic time of a sentence (in the sense of Klein 1994). In fact, what these authors claim is that true 
locative modifiers are only compatible with events (and with Davidsonian states, as we will see in 
subsection 2.2.3). In this respect, Maienborn argues that the alleged locative modifiers that co-
occur with states are rather frame-setting modifiers, like adverbs or PPs that typically appear in 
the left periphery (e.g. Yesterday/In Chicago, there was a traffic jam), since (a) they can be 
paraphrased by temporal clauses preceded by when and/or (b) do not give rise to the same 
entailments as true locative modifiers. However, Ernst (2016) provides empirical evidence for 
English that Maienborn’s analysis is not well motivated; I apply his reasoning to Spanish 
examples.  
 Regarding temporal paraphrases, if we assume that en Valencia ‘in Valencia’ in (30a) is rather 
a temporal frame-setting modifier just because it can be paraphrased by a when-clause, as in 
Chimo fue famoso cuando estuvo en Valencia ‘Chimo was famous when he was in Valencia’, we 
could not explain why the same adjunct can also be paraphrased by a when-clause when 
modifying an event, as in María limpió el coche en Valencia / cuando estuvo en Valencia ‘María 
washed the car in Valencia / when she was in Valencia’. And the same holds for (30b) mutatis 
mutandis. Regarding entailment patterns, Maienborn observes that sentences including locative 




frame-setting modifiers do not (her original observation is for German, but it is also applicable 
to Spanish): 
 
(31) a. María   lavó     el coche en su  casa. ⊨ María    lavó    el  coche. 
     María washed  the car    in her house   María washed  the  car 
  ‘María washed the car at home.’ ⊨ ‘María washed the car.’ 
  b. María es muy silenciosa en su  casa ⊭ María es muy silenciosa. 
      María is  very     quiet     in her house   María is  very    quiet 
  ‘María is very quiet at home.’ ⊭ ‘María is very quiet.’ 
 
 In (31a), which includes an event, if we omit the adjunct en su casa ‘in her house, at home’, 
the semantics of the rest of the sentence remains true; in this case, the adjunct is a locative 
modifier according to Maienborn. In contrast, in (31b), which includes a state, if we omit the 
adjunct, the semantics of the rest of the sentence does not remain true; in this case, the adjunct 
would be a frame-setting modifier. However, as Ernst (2016) shows, this argument is misleading, 
since employing the present tense in (31b) triggers a generic interpretation. If, alternatively, we 
employ the simple past tense, which induces an episodic interpretation, the entailment is 
fulfilled:  
 
(32) María fue muy silenciosa en su  casa ⊨ María fue muy silenciosa. 
  María was very    quiet     in her house   María was very   quiet 
  ‘María was very quiet at home.’ ⊨ ‘María was very quiet.’ 
  
 We can conclude with Ernst (2016) that there are no reasons to posit that locative modifiers 
that appear in post-verbal position are frame-setting modifiers. Consequently, individual-level 
states can also accept locative modification; hence, this cannot be a fundamental property of 
these predicates (I will come to this question in chapter 3). 
 In relation to the test provided by Kratzer (1995) with respect to the incompatibility of 
individual-level predicates with temporal clauses preceded by whenever and when (in Spanish 
siempre que and cuando, respectively), some authors have already argued that it is not 
grounded on temporality, but rather on the predicate’s ability of re-holding (Hoop & de Swart 







(33) a. Siempre que Juan era famoso, ganaba  mucho dinero. 
        whenever    Juan was famous   earnt    a.lot.of  money 
  ‘Whenever Juan was famous, he used to earn a lot of money.’  
  b. Siempre que Juan ha  sido   adicto   a  las drogas, se   ha   metido   en problemas. 
        whenever    Juan has been addicted to the  drugs  REFL has put.inside in   problems 
  ‘Whenever Juan has been addicted to drugs, he has got into trouble.’  
  c. Siempre que el  Real Madrid es campeón, lo celebran en la Cibeles. 
        whenever   the Real Madrid  is  champion it  celebrate in the Cibeles 
  ‘Whenever Real Madrid is the champion, they celebrate it in Cibeles.’ 
 
 Arche (2006) notes that even individual-level predicates like rubio ‘blond’, which do not take 
part in that construction in normal circumstances, are acceptable if an appropriate context is 
provided, as in En sus reencarnaciones, siempre que Juan era rubio, era admirado por todo el 
mundo ‘In his reincarnations, whenever Juan was.SER blond, he was admired by everyone’. 
Nevertheless, arguably most individual-level predicates need a very special context to occur in 
that construction, which suggests that they must encode a certain property that renders them 
resistant to it. In this dissertation, I claim that that property is that they express non-caused 
properties, which makes them prone not to be repeated in time. In contrast, stage-level 
predicates involve a cause, so they can re-hold in time much more easily, given that the cause 
can reactivate the eventuality whenever it intercedes. I develop this insight in subsection 2.2.2.  
 In relation to lexical aspect, both individual-level and stage-level predicates can combine 
with aspectual modifiers preceded by durante ‘for’ and reject the ones that are preceded by en 
‘in’, which demonstrates that both types of predicates are atelic and, therefore, that (a)telicity 
does not distinguish one type of predicate from the other one: 
 
(34) a. Laura fue hermosa durante/*en muchos años. 
     Laura was beautiful    for       in   many   years 
  b. Lorena estuvo enferma durante/*en varios días. 
      Lorena  was       sick         for       in several days  
 
 It must be noted that it is common in the literature on Spanish to treat individual-level 
predicates as unbounded or imperfective and stage-level predicates as bounded or perfective 
(Bosque 1990; De Miguel 1999; Herranz & Suñer 1999; Marín 2010; Gallego & Uriagereka 2009, 
2016). In this case, the labels perfective/imperfective are not equivalent to the classic notions of 




respectively, as we will see in chapter 3. Rather, they are used in a loose sense for characterizing 
properties that hold at a particular period of time, for stage-level predicates, and properties that 
characterize an individual irrespective of their duration, for individual-level predicates. However, 
that opposition is elusive, insofar as it is difficult to conceive why individual-level predicates 
should express properties that characterize an individual if these can hold only for a delimited 
period of time. In this respect, for Gallego & Uriagereka (2016) the labels perfective/imperfective 
rather refer to permanent/transient properties, which identifies this notion of ‘aspect’ with the 
notion of ‘spatiotemporality’ in Carlson (1977). We can conclude that characterizing the 
individual-level/stage-level distinction in aspectual grounds does not offer any significant 
contributions with respect to the traditional view based on spatiotemporality.  
 Camacho (2012: 464) claims that individual-level and stage-level predicates do differ with 
respect to aspect, but, instead of appealing to the end of the eventuality or its (a)telicity 
properties, the author appeals to the beginning of the eventuality. For Camacho, neither 
individual-level nor stage-level predicates involve a transition, but the latter are inchoative or 
select for “the beginning boundary of the state”. For instance, in Juan está alegre ‘Juan is.ESTAR 
happy’, “estar selects for the inception of the state of being happy”. However, there is empirical 
evidence that there is no contrast between individual-level and stage-level predicates with 
respect to their beginning boundaries. First, when combined with punctual temporal modifiers, 
stage-level predicates, unlike true inchoative predicates, do not give rise to an inchoative 
reading: 
 
(35) a. El cantante se  desmayó a las diez. 
     the  singer REFL   fainted  at the ten 
  ‘The singer fainted at ten.’ 
  b. El  fugitivo  se escondió a  las diez.  
     the fugitive  REFL    hid    at  the ten 
  ‘The fugitive hid at ten.’ 
(36) a. Este cantante estuvo enfadado a las diez.  
      this   singer     was       angry    at the ten 
  ‘The singer was angry at ten.’ 
  b. El fugitivo estuvo triste a las diez.  
    the fugitive   was     sad at the  ten 





 On the one hand, (35) includes true inchoative predicates: (35a) means that the singer started 
being unconscious at ten and (35b) means that the millionaire started being hidden at ten. On 
the other hand, (36) includes stage-level predicates, which express inchoative states according 
to Camacho. However, as incorrectly predicted by the author, (36a) does not mean that the 
singer started being angry at ten and (36b) does not mean that the millionaire started being sad 
at ten.   
 Second, it is not clear to what extent it is correct to postulate a beginning boundary for 
stage-level predicates, given that both individual-level and stage-level predicates are 
compatible with adjuncts preceded by desde ‘since’, which provide the temporal point from 
which the eventuality starts: 
 
(37) a. Ese chico es pobre desde su   niñez. 
     that  guy   is   poor   since  his childhood 
  b. Juan fue médico desde 1999. 
     Juan was  doctor   since  1999 
  ‘Juan was a doctor since 1999.’ 
(38) a. María estuvo cansada desde las ocho. 
     María    was      tired    since   the eight 
  ‘María was tired since eight.’ 
  b. El pianista estuvo borracho desde   ayer. 
     the pianist    was      drunk    since yesterday 
 
 What all these data show is that there is no empirical evidence that stage-level states differ 
from individual-level predicates in that only the former select for the beginning boundary of the 
state, unlike Camacho defends. We can conclude with Arche (2006, 2012) that neither 
spatiotemporality nor aspect can be the fundamental property that distinguishes individual-level 
from stage-level properties.  
 Before closing this section, it is interesting to reflect on Condoravdi’s (1992) and McNally’s 
(1994) hypothesis, according to which individual-level predicates, unlike state-level ones, are 
associated with an inference of temporal persistence, which can be cancelled if an appropriate 
context is provided. For example, John is smart is used to describe a property that persists in 
time in principle, but an appropriate context is able to cancel that inference, as in John was 
smart until he suffered the accident. I agree with Condoravdi and McNally on this observation, 
but the authors do not explain from which semantic property that inference is derived. In other 




types of predicates. As shown in the subsection 2.2.2, the inference of temporal persistence is 
directly accounted for by positing that individual-level states express non-caused properties, 
which makes them prone to persist in time. Having ruled out the proposals that base the 
distinction on spatiotemporality or aspect, in the following subsection I review the proposals 
that link the individual-level/stage-level distinction with the relative-absolute distinction.  
 
2.2.1.2 The relative-absolute distinction 
The second group of proposals dealing with the individual-level/stage-level distinction is based 
on the properties of the gradable adjectives associated with them (Husband 2010; Sassoon & 
Toledo 2011; McNally 2011; Gumiel-Molina et al. 2015, 2020). Specifically, these authors claim 
that individual-level predicates are associated with relative interpretations, while stage-level 
predicates are associated with absolute interpretations. These proposals are, in principle, 
compatible with the hypothesis of this dissertation according to which both individual-level and 
stage-level predicates express states. However, they present empirical problems that will be 
commented on below. In order to understand the machinery that underlies these analyses, it is 
necessary to describe the differences between relative and absolute interpretations. 
 According to Kennedy & McNally (2005) and Kennedy (2007), based on Unger (1975), 
Rusiecki (1985), Yoon (1996) and Rotstein & Winter (2004), there are two types of gradable 
adjectives: relative and absolute adjectives. The former lexicalize open scales, which do not 
include maximal or minimal points; in contrast, absolute adjectives are associated with scales 
that have maximal, minimal or both points. Degree modifiers like perfectly and slightly are 
sensitive to the different endpoints: 
 
(39)  a. ??perfectly/??slightly {tall, deep, expensive, likely}. 
b. ??perfectly/??slightly {short, shallow, inexpensive, unlikely}. 
(40)  a. ??perfectly/slightly {bent, bumpy, dirty, worried}. 
b. perfectly/??slightly {straight, flat, clean, unworried}. 
(41)  a. perfectly/??slightly {certain, safe, pure, accurate}. 
b. ??perfectly/slightly {uncertain, dangerous, impure, inaccurate}. 
(42)  a. perfectly/slightly {full, open, opaque}. 
b. perfectly/slightly {empty, closed, transparent}. 
(From Kennedy 2007: 34) 
  
 Gradable adjectives that are associated with open scales, like the ones in (39), reject both 




bound scales, like the ones in (41b) and (40a), can only combine with maximizers. Adjectives that 
are associated with lower-bound scales, like the ones in (41a) and (40b), can only combine with 
minimizers. Finally, adjectives whose scales are totally closed, like the ones in (42), can combine 
with both maximizers and minimizers. 
 Another crucial aspect in which gradable adjectives differ depending on the scale that they 
lexicalize is with respect to entailment patterns. Observe the following examples: 
 
(43) a. Marc es más  alto que Pau. ⊭ Marc es alto. 
      Marc is more  tall than Pau    Marc  is  tall 
  ‘Marc is taller than Pau.’ ⊭ ‘Marc is tall.’ 
  b. La  mesa está más sucia que   la   silla. ⊨ La  mesa está sucia. 
     the  table   is  more dirty than the chair     the table   is   dirty 
  ‘The table is dirtier than the chair.’⊨ ‘The table is dirty.’ 
  c. La  mesa está más limpia que  la    silla. ⊨ La  silla   no  está limpia. 
     the  table   is  more clean than the chair    the chair not   is    clean 
  ‘The table is cleaner than the chair.’ ⊨ The chair is not clean.’ 
 
 Relative adjectives do not give rise to entailments to the positive form, so (43a) does not 
entail that Marc is tall. In contrast, gradable adjectives that are associated with lower-closed 
scales do give rise to entailments to the positive; accordingly, (43b) does entail that the table is 
dirty. Finally, gradable adjectives that are associated with upper-closed (and totally closed) 
scales give rise to negative entailments to the positive form; accordingly, (43c) entails that the 
chair is not clean.  
 In sum, the relative-absolute distinction is crucial to explain the distribution of maximizers 
and minimizers and the different entailment patterns that are associated with gradable 
adjectives. With this in mind, we can review the proposals that link the individual-level/stage-
level distinction with relative and absolute interpretations.  
 Inspired by Bartsch & Vennemann (1973), Cresswell (1976), Klein (1980), von Stechow (1984) 
Fults (2006), Solt (2009) and van Rooij (2011a, 2011b), who claim that gradable adjectives invoke 
comparison classes, Sassoon & Toledo (2011; see also McNally 2011 for a similar analysis) argue 
that individual-level predicates invoke comparisons between individuals and are associated with 
relative interpretations, while stage-level predicates invoke comparisons within the same 
individual and are associated with absolute interpretations. For example, in (44a) tall is an 
individual-level predicate, while in (44b) dirty is a stage-level predicate. In addition, tall is a 




minimizers and maximizers. In order to evaluate whether (44a) is true or false, a comparison 
between individuals is invoked, so the elephant is tall when compared to other similar elephants. 
In contrast, in (44b) dirty is an absolute adjective, since it lexicalizes a lower-closed scale, so it 
can combine with minimizers but not with maximizers. In order to evaluate whether (44b) is true 
or false, we do not need to compare the shirt to other similar shirts, but rather we have to 
compare the situation in which the shirt actually is to other possible indices or stages in which it 
might be.
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(44) a. The elephant is (*slightly/*completely) tall. 
  b. The shirt is (slightly/*completely) dirty. 
 
 This said, Husband (2010) observes that the classification proposed by Sassoon & Toledo is 
too rigid, inasmuch as there are adjectives of variable behavior. For example, dry invokes an 
open scale when it behaves as an individual-level predicate, while it invokes a close scale when it 
behaves as a stage-level predicate. Thus, the association of individual-level and relative 
interpretations, on the one hand, and stage-level and absolute interpretations, on the other, is 
correct, but it is not lexical; rather, in order to account for cases like dry, it is necessary to posit 
that scales are invoked in the syntax. In (45a) dry expresses a property that characterizes an 
individual and cannot accept maximizers because it is associated with an open scale; in contrast, 
in (45b) dry expresses a property that is not inherent in the individual and accept maximizers 
because it is associated with an upper close scale.  
 
(45) a. The region is (*completely) dry. 
  b. The glasses are (completely) dry.   
 
 Finally, Gumiel-Molina et al. (2015) argue in line with Husband (2010) that scales are invoked 
in the syntax and that the proposal can explain the distribution of the two Spanish copulas (ser 
and estar). Assuming that the copula ser is associated with individual-level interpretations and 
the copula estar is associated with stage-level interpretations, the variable behavior of seco ‘dry’ 
in (46) with respect to degree modification is explained: in the individual-level interpretation, it 
combines with the copula ser and reject maximizers, so it behaves as a relative adjective; in the 
stage-level interpretation, it combines with the copula estar and accept maximizers, so it 
behaves as an absolute adjective.  
                                                          
17
 Sassoon & Toledo (2011) equate the notion of ‘stages’ with the notion of ‘counterparts’ in Lewis (1986), which are 




(46) a. La región es   (*completamente) seca. 
     the región is.SER        completely        dry 
  b. Las gafas    están   (completamente) secas. 
     the glasses are.ESTAR     completely      dry 
 
 Thus, the proposals reviewed so far connect individual-level predicates with relative 
interpretations, on the one hand, and stage-level predicates with absolute interpretations, on 
the other, and differ on whether the distinction is lexically or syntactically encoded. However, 
there is empirical evidence that the distinction between individual-level and stage-level 
interpretations does not rely on the relative-absolute distinction. For example, puro ‘pure’, 
compatible ‘compatible’ and plano ‘flat’ trigger individual-level interpretations, since they 
combine with the copula ser. However, we do not need to invoke a comparison between 
individuals in order to evaluate their truth conditions and they can combine with maximizers, so 
they are associated with an absolute interpretation: 
 
(47) a. Este lingote es   completamente puro. 
      this  ingot is.SER     completely     pure  
  b. Su   trabajo  es    completamente compatible con  sus  aficiones.  
     their  work   is.SER     completely      compatible with their  hobbies 
  c. Esta superficie  es  completamente plana. 
     this    surface  is.SER    completely      flat 
 
 In order to evaluate whether (47a) is true or false, it is not necessary to compare the ingot to 
other similar ingots; analogously, in order to evaluate whether (47b) is true or false, it is not 
necessary to compare the work to other similar works; and, in order to evaluate whether (47c) is 
true or false, it is not necessary to compare the surface to other similar surfaces. Moreover, the 
three adjectives can combine with maximizers, so they trigger an absolute interpretation. 
However, they combine with the copula ser, so they are associated with an individual-level 
interpretation, as incorrectly predicted by these proposals. 
 Gumiel-Molina et al. (2015: 18) claim that the entailment patterns of adjectives of variable 
behavior support their analysis. Observe the following examples:  
 
(48) a. Mi     hija    es más  alta que   tu   hijo, pero mi      hija     no es alta. 
     my daughter is more tall than your son   but  my  daughter not is  tall  




  b. #Mi    hija    está  más alta  que   tu   hijo, pero mi     hija     no está alta. 
      my daughter  is    more tall  than your son   but  my daughter not  is   tall 
  ‘My daughter is.ESTAR taller than your son, but my daughter is.ESTAR not tall.’ 
(From Gumiel-Molina et al. 2015: 18)  
  
 According to the authors, the predicate alto ‘tall’ only invokes a lower-closed scale when 
combined with the copula estar, see (48b), in which case it gives rise to entailments to the 
positive. Hence, only (48b), which includes a discursive continuation that denies that the 
individual in question is tall, results in an incompatibility. However, the judgment according to 
which (48b) is anomalous is not clear to me and other native speakers who I have consulted. In 
this respect, when the predicate alto means ‘high’, it only combines with the copula estar, but 
there is no doubt that it does not give rise to an entailment to the positive, as counterfactually 
predicted by Gumiel-Molina et al.: 
 
(49) Este cuadro está más alto  que  ese  en la pared, pero ninguno de los  dos está alto. 
  this painting  is  more high than that on the wall    but   neither   of  the  two   is   high 




 Finally, another argument against the association of individual-level and relative 
interpretations, on the one hand, and stage-level and absolute interpretations, on the other, is 
that this proposal cannot be directly applied to non-gradable predicates: 
 
(50) a. Rosa es   (*ligeramente/*completamente/*muy) la camarera. 
     Rosa is.SER      slightly          completely       very  the  waitress 
  b. Rosa está   (*ligeramente/*completamente/*muy) en Madrid.  
     Rosa is.ESTAR      slightly          completely      very    in  Madrid 
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 In Gumiel-Molina et al. (2020), the authors claim that there is a crucial contrast between predicates of variable 
behavior like alto ‘tall’ with respect to minimizers like ligeramente ‘slightly’ depending on whether they combine with the 
copula ser or estar: 
 
(i)  a. *Juan    es    ligeramente alto/gordo/bajo/delgado. 
       Juan is.SER       slightly      tall     fat     short    thin 
  b. Juan     está   ligeramente  alto/gordo/bajo/delgado. 
      Juan  is.ESTAR     slightly       tall      fat    short    thin 
 
 According to the authors, in (ib) the adjective combines with the copula estar and, therefore, invokes a within 
comparison class and triggers an absolute interpretation. However, I find (ib) unacceptable unless an external standard 
of comparison is implicitly assumed, as in Juan está ligeramente gordo para pasar por el túnel ‘Juan is.ESTAR slightly fat to 





 Put it differently, insofar as these proposals rely on the relative-absolute distinction, which is 
a characteristic of gradable predicates exclusively, the behavior of non-gradable predicates 
remains unexplained. We can conclude that the individual-level/stage-level distinction should 
not be accounted for in terms of relative and absolute interpretations, since there is no any clear 
correspondence between them. 
 Although it is not the goal of this dissertation to provide an explanation of how the standard 
of comparison is calculated, I can show empirical evidence that the existence of relative and 
absolute interpretations hinges on the endpoints of the scale lexicalized by the adjective and on 
whether a between or within comparison class is invoked exclusively, while the individual-
level/stage-level distinction is irrelevant. Open-scale adjectives like alto ‘tall’ trigger a relative 
interpretation in all cases, since they do not encode endpoints on their scales; as a consequence, 
they do not combine with maximizers or minimizers and do not give rise to entailments to the 
positive in comparatives, as discussed above.  
 If upper-close scales are involved, an absolute interpretation arises when they invoke a within 
comparison class, whereas a relative interpretation arises when they invoke a between 
comparison class. Observe the following examples: 
 
(51) a. El  suelo  está (completamente) limpio. 
     the floor is.ESTAR    completely      clean 
  b. Este suelo  es (*completamente) limpio. 
      the  floor  is.SER     completely      clean 
  c. Las elecciones fueron (completamente) limpias. 
     the  elections  were.SER     completely       clean 
   
 In (51a) the adjective limpio ‘clean’ combines with the copula ser, which flanks individual-
level predicates, and rejects the maximizer completamente ‘completely’; in contrast, in (51b) the 
adjective combines with the copula estar, which accompanies stage-level predicates, and 
accepts the maximizer. Regarding (51c), the adjective combines with ser, but, crucially, it can 
combine with the maximizer completamente ‘completely’. What these data indicate, on the one 
hand, is that the individual-level/stage-level distinction does not have any impact on 
determining the standard of comparison, as expected on the basis of my hypothesis. On the 
other hand, the maximizer can only appear if the adjective invokes a comparison within the 
same individual, see (51a) and (51c), while it is unacceptable if the adjective invokes a 
comparison between similar individuals, see (51b). In other words, while we need to compare the 




floor to other similar floors in the case of (51a) or to compare the elections to other similar 
elections in the case of (51c). Thus, upper-close scale adjectives like limpio ‘clean’ trigger an 
absolute interpretation, and therefore license maximizers, when a within comparison class is 
invoked, while they trigger a relative interpretation when a between comparison class is 
involved. The individual-level/stage-level distinction does not have an influence on determining 
the standard.  
 Regarding lower-close scale adjectives, the situation is similar, but minimizers can be licensed 
if an external comparison class is implicitly assumed. Consider the following data:  
 
(52) a. Las  gafas    están   ligeramente húmedas. 
     the glasses are.ESTAR    slightly       humid 
  b. #Este  clima    es    ligeramente húmedo. 
        this climate is.SER      slightly      humid 
 
 In (52a) the adjective invokes a within comparison class, so we need to compare the situation 
in which the glasses are to other situations in which the same glasses might be in order to 
determine whether (52a) is true or false. In contrast, in (52b) the adjective invokes a between 
comparison class, so we need to compare the climate to other similar climates to determine 
whether the climate is humid or not. In (52b) the minimizer is unlicensed unless there is an 
implicit standard whereby the climate is slightly humid for children / to live there, hence the 
symbol #. In this line of reasoning, Sassoon (2012) claims that minimizers are not sensitive to 
scale endpoints, but rather to minimal standards, which accounts for the fact that open-scale 
adjectives are compatible with minimizers if a standard is specified, as in slightly tall for her age 
and slightly too short to reach the ceiling. I will not discuss the licensing of minimizers in depth, 
since it is beyond the goal of this dissertation; the reader is referred to Sassoon (2012) and 
Gumiel-Molina et al. (2020) and references therein.  
 We can conclude that the relative-absolute distinction relies on the adjectival scalar 
properties and on whether the predicate invokes a comparison between/within individuals. The 
individual-level/stage-level distinction does not have any impact on determining the standard of 
comparison and, therefore, on triggering absolute or relative interpretations. In the following 
subsection, I explain my alternative proposal. 
  
2.2.2. Causation 
Previously, I have concluded that neither spatiotemporal nor aspectual properties underlie the 




In this section, I argue that causation is the relevant factor that distinguishes individual-level 
states from stage-level states. While the former express non-caused properties, the latter 
express properties that hold due to an external cause. The intuition that stage-level predicates 
hold due to an external cause derives from Sanromán’s (2003, 2012) study on stative nouns like 
respeto ‘respect’ and asombro ‘astonishment’. On the basis of their different combinatory 
patterns, principally with respect to light verbs, the author concludes that respeto ‘respect’ 
expresses a property that the subject experiences as a consequence of making an assessment 
about a certain object or person, while asombro ‘astonishment’ expresses a property that the 
subject experiences as a reaction to an external factor. Sanromán characterizes the former as 
internally caused and the latter as externally caused. As I will show below, I do not follow 
Sanromán in her characterization of individual-level predicates; in my view, these predicates 
hold with no reference to a cause, while it is Davidsonian states (or stative causatives) that are 
internally caused (I will explain what an internal cause is in subsection 2.2.3.2). I do follow this 
author in the characterization of stage-level predicates, which hold due to an external causer. 
 Inspired by Sanromán’s (2003, 2012) study on stative nouns, other authors have put forth 
similar insights in relation to stage-level predicates: 
 
[In the case of stage-level predicates], “the speaker predicates the properties of the subject on a particular occasion, 
linked to external reasons”.  
(Arche 2006: 239) 
 
“There is a wide agreement on defining stage-level predicates as those that express characteristics that arise due to an 
external situation, which is often, although not necessarily, a previous action”. 
(Fábregas 2016: 232. My translation) 
  
 What Arche and Fábregas calls “external reasons” and “external situation”, respectively, is 
formulated here as an external cause, that is, a cause that is not a participant of the state but 
brings the state about. In this respect, it must be noted that, although Arche (2006, 2012) 
concludes that neither aspect nor spatiotemporality is behind the individual-level/stage-level 
distinction, she does not develop an alternative analysis of stage-level predicates as externally 
caused predicates. Regarding Fábregas (2016), the author posits that causal properties have an 
impact on aspect, according to which stage-level predicates project an additional aspectual 
node that is endowed with perfective information (in line with Zagona 2009, 2015; Gallego & 
Uriagereka 2009, 2016; Brucart 2012; Camacho 2012). Finally, Sanromán (2003, 2012), on the one 
hand, relates the fact that individual-level predicates are internally caused to the traditional 




the fact that stage-level predicates are externally caused to the traditional hypothesis that they 
are predicated of stages as spatiotemporal environments. In sum, none of the three proposals in 
which stage-level predicates are linked to an external factor/cause develops an analysis based 
on this property exclusively. The novelty of my proposal is that it takes causal properties as 
defining properties that do not have any impact on aspect or any other properties. Thus, 
individual-level and stage-level predicates differ solely in their causal properties.   
 At this point, it is necessary to explore the data on which my analysis is based. The first hint 
that stage-level predicates express states that are externally caused comes from the observation 
that many stage-level adjectival predicates express the result state of their corresponding verbs: 
for example, roto ‘broken’ is the result state of romper ‘to break’, preocupado ‘worried’ is the 
result state of preocupar ‘to worry’, limpio ‘clean’ is the result state of limpiar ‘to clean’, etc.  
 In addition, the data examined in subsection 2.2.1 linked to cancellable inferences of 
temporal persistence and habitual/iterative contexts receive a natural explanation if we adopt 
the analysis proposed here. On the one hand, the inference of temporal persistence that 
individual-level predicates have according to Condoravdi (1992) and McNally (1994) is derived 
from the fact that they hold with no reference to a specific cause. For example, the individual-
level predicate guapo ‘handsome’ in Daniel es guapo ‘Daniel is.SER handsome’ expresses a 
property that holds in an individual spontaneously, which may create the false impression that 
the individual has that property inherently or that that property persists in time. In contrast, 
triste ‘sad’ in Daniel está triste ‘Daniel is.ESTAR triste’ expresses a property that is caused by an 
external factor; given that that property does not arise spontaneously, the inference of temporal 
persistence or the impression that the property is inherent in the individual is not activated. 
 On the other hand, the facility, although not the exclusivity, of stage-level predicates to take 
part in habitual/iterative contexts, especially the ones that involve temporal clauses preceded by 
siempre que ‘whenever’ or cuando ‘when’, is also due to the fact that they involve a cause. 
Specifically, if they are obligatorily associated with an external participant that triggers the state, 
it is more likely that they can re-hold in time whenever the external cause intercedes. In contrast, 
non-caused states are able to re-hold too, but they are less prone to that because of the lack of 
a cause that triggers the eventuality. For example, if the state expressed by Daniel está triste 
‘Daniel is.ESTAR sad’ is triggered by an external cause, for example Real Madrid’s defeat, that 
state can re-hold whenever that cause intercedes, e.g. whenever Real Madrid loses a game. In 
contrast, if the state expressed by Daniel es guapo ‘Daniel is.SER handsome’ holds with no 
reference to a cause, it is more unlikely that it re-holds because there is no cause that can 




 My proposal is also endorsed by the study of certain semantic contrasts that have gone 
unnoticed in the literature on the individual-level/stage-level distinction, which include causal 
adjuncts headed by the preposition de ‘from’ and purpose clauses and agentive adverbs that are 
only compatible with stage-level predicates. Before showing these original data on which I also 
base my analysis, let us start exploring the semantics of causation in more detail, in particular 
the distinction between direct and indirect causation, which is crucial in my analysis because I 
posit that stage-level predicates have an external cause that must be understood as a direct 
cause. 
 The contrast between direct and indirect causation has been already observed in the 
literature (Shibatani 1976; Talmy 1976; Dowty 1979; Wolff 2003; Vecchiato 2011; Copley & Wolff 
2014) and is especially retrieved by Maienborn & Herdtfelder (2017) with respect to the 
difference between German von ‘from’ and wegen ‘because of’ (and English from and because 
of). Specifically, these authors claim that German von (and English from) introduces a direct 
causer, while German wegen (and English because of) introduces an indirect causer: 
 
(53) a. *Maria ist müde  von  dem kaputten Spaten. 
       Maria is   tired  from   the   broken    spade 
  b. Maria ist müde    wegen   des kaputten Spatens 
      Maria is   tired because.of  the   broken    spade 
(54) a. Paul ist müde  von der Reise. 
     Paul  is  tired   from the  trip 
  b. Paul is müde    wegen   der Reise. 
     Paul is  tired  because.of  the  trip 
(From Maienborn & Herdtfelder 2017: 288) 
 
 Maienborn & Herdtfelder argue that in (53) it is not possible to conceive that the broken 
spade made Maria be tired directly, but it is possible to conceive that the broken spade is the 
indirect cause of that state if Maria used the spade to dig; consequently, only wegen is licensed. 
In contrast, in (54) the trip can be conceived as the direct cause that made Paul be tired, hence 
both von and wegen are accepted. Based on Wolff (2003), Maienborn & Herdtfelder (2017: 289) 
posit that direct causation is subject to the no-intervening-cause criterion, whereby “direct 
causation is present between the causer and the final causee in a causal chain (1) if there are no 
intermediate entities at the same level of granularity as either the initial causer or final causee, or 
(2) if any intermediate entities that are present can be construed as an enabling condition rather 




(in)compatibility of individual-level predicates with a direct cause either in German or in English. 
My main contribution with respect to Spanish is that the direct cause is incompatible with 
individual-level predicates, which I take as evidence that they express non-caused properties. Of 
course, both individual-level and stage-level predicates might involve an indirect cause. 
 In Spanish, causal adjuncts preceded by de ‘from’ are not, presumably, as productive as in 
German or in English, but we can posit that the ones that appear in (55)-(58) are true causal 
adjuncts, since they express a cause that directly triggers the eventuality. Thus, what I argue here 
is that Spanish causal adjuncts preceded by de ‘from’ introduce a direct causer:  
 
(55) a. Quijote   es   sabio (*de   leer   tantos   libros de caballería). 
     Quijote  is.SER  wise  from  read so.many  books of   chivalry 
  b. Quijote   está    loco (de    leer   tantos  libros de caballería). 
      Quijote is.ESTAR crazy from read so.many books of   chivalry 
(56) a. Juan   es   moreno (*de   tomar el  sol). 
     Juan is.SER  tanned   from   take  the sun 
  b. Juan  está     moreno (de  tomar el  sol). 
     Juan is.ESTAR   tanned  from  take  the sun 
(57) a. Juan   es  gordo (*de  comer muchas hamburguesas). 
     Juan is.SER   fat    from   eat    so.many      burgers 
  b. Juan   está   gordo (de  comer muchas hamburguesas). 
             Juan is.ESTAR   fat    from   eat   so.many     burgers 
(58) a. Esta pared  es    muy sucia (*de    tanto manosearla). 
     this    wall  is.SER  very dirty  from so.much  touch.it 
  b. Esta pared  está   muy sucia (de    tanto  manosearla). 
      this   wall is.ESTAR  very dirty from so.much   touch.it 
  
 In (55) we deal with two predicates that admit each only one interpretation: sabio ‘wise’ only 
combines with the copula ser, while loco ‘crazy’ only combines with the copula estar. The latter, 
unlike the former, can combine with causal sentences preceded by de ‘from’, which indicates 
that the state of being crazy is triggered by Quijote’s reading chivalric books. Note that wisdom 
and craziness are properties that could characterize an individual (and actually the case of loco 
‘crazy’ is usually used as evidence that the copula estar is not always associated with stage-level 
interpretations), but only the latter can hold as a consequence of an external factor. 




characterize an individual or not is semantically irrelevant; rather, the distinction lies on 
causation and only stage-level predicates express properties that are (externally) caused. 
 (56)-(58) include examples in which the same predicate behaves either as an individual-level 
or as a stage-level state depending on the copula that it combines with. Crucially, only when the 
copula estar is involved, is the causative sentence headed by de ‘from’ accepted. In (56b) 
sunbathing triggers the state in which Juan is tanned, in (57b) eating many burgers triggers the 
state in which Juan is fat and in (58b) touching the wall triggers the state in which the wall is 
dirty. 
 Causal adjuncts introduced by por ‘because of’ or porque ‘because’ are compatible with both 
individual-level and stage-level predicates: the reason why this is the case is that these elements 
introduce an indirect rather than a direct cause. Observe the following examples:  
 
(59) a. Pipo es gordo     por     sus padres / porque sus padres también lo son. 
      Pipo is    fat  because.of   his parents   because his parents    too      it  are 
  ‘Pipo is.SER fat because of his parents / because his parents are.SER too.’ 
  b. Pipo está gordo     por     sus padres / porque sus padres también lo están. 
      Pipo   is     fat  because.of  his  parents   because his  parents    too     it   are 
  ‘Pipo is.ESTAR fat because of his parents / because his parents are.ESTAR too.’ 
 
 The fact that the predicate gordo ‘fat’, either when combined with the copula ser or with 
estar, as in (59), can co-occur with indirect causal adjuncts preceded by por ‘because of’ or by 
the conjunction porque ‘because’ is unsurprising. Note that these adjuncts are not triggers of the 
state in which Pipo is fat, but rather they inform about an indirect cause that explains the 
existence of that state. In other words, (59a) conveys that that Pipo is fat, for instance, because 
he inherited his parents’ genes or something along these lines rather than because their parents 
made him be fat. What this means is that the no-intervening-cause criterion for direct causes is 
not met, because there are intermediate entities, for instance Pipo’s parents’ genes, between the 
causer, Pipo’s parents, and the causee, the state of Pipo’s being fat.   
 We can conclude that direct causal adjuncts are only compatible with stage-level predicates, 
which provides additional evidence that stage-level predicates express properties that are 
brought about by an external and direct cause: external because the trigger of the state is none 
of their arguments, although it can be introduced by adjuncts, and direct because the cause 
triggers the state with no any other intervening cause involved. In contrast, individual-level 
states are incompatible with direct causal adjuncts because they express non-caused properties 




 Another set of data that has not been explored in the literature is the combination of 
individual-level and stage-level predicates with purpose clauses: e.g. para ganar dinero ‘(in 
order) to earn money’. If it is the case that stage-level predicates make reference to an external 
cause, it is predicted that we can insert purpose clauses that force the occurrence of an external 
agentive participant that causes the state. Following standard assumptions (see Dowty 1979; 
Ramchand 2008; Davis 2011; Williams 2015, and references therein), agents can be taken as 
volitional causers, that is, participants that have intentions that lead them to initiate 
eventualities. Thus, while causers are the generic term referring to just what Ramchand calls 
initiators or are participants that trigger eventualities irrespective of their intentionality (which 
includes inanimate causers like the key in The key opened the door), agents are causers that 
trigger eventualities intentionally, which necessarily involves animate individuals. Observe the 
following data: 
 
(60) a. El    nene     está sentado para que  no moleste. 
     the toddler is.ESTAR   sat       to   that  not  bother 
  ‘The toddler is sitting in order for him not to bother.’ 
  b. El pájaro  está  en  la  jaula para que  no  se escape. 
     the  bird is.ESTAR in the  cage   to   that not REFL escape 
  ‘The bird is in its cage in order for it not to escape.’ 
 
 In (60a) the purpose clause induces an interpretation in which somebody seated the toddler 
to prevent him from bothering other people, while in (60b) it induces an interpretation in which 
somebody put the bird in the cage to prevent it from escaping. Note that, in case in which 
stage-level predicates combine with purpose clauses, a change of state follows. For example, 
from (60a) it follows that the kid was not sitting before somebody seated him and from (60b) it 
follows that the bird was not in the cage before somebody put it there.  
 In other cases, it is possible to insert an infinitival purpose sentence that induces the 
interpretation that the holder of the state is also the causer, see (61). In these cases, it is also 
possible to insert an agentive adverb like voluntariamente ‘voluntarily’ or deliberadamente 
‘deliberately’, see (62). 
 
(61) a. Elvira   está sentada frente     al   ayuntamiento para protestar contra los recortes. 
     Elvira is.ESTAR  sat    in.front  to.the     city.hall       to     protest   against the   cuts 





  b. Antonio  está   en Madrid para firmar un contrato de trabajo. 
     Antonio is.ESTAR in  Madrid   to     sign   a   contract  of   work 
  ‘Antonio is in Madrid to sign an employment contract.’ 
(62) a. Elvira   está   sentada voluntariamente. 
     Elvira is.ESTAR    sat         voluntarily 
  b. Antonio   está  en Madrid deliberadamente. 
      Antonio is.ESTAR in Madrid     deliberately   
    
 In both (61a) and (62a) Elvira is both the holder and the causer of the state, so it follows that 
she sat in front of the city hall voluntarily. Analogously, in both (61b) and (62b) Antonio is the 
holder and the causer of the state, so it follows that he went to Madrid voluntarily too.  
 Crucially, individual-level predicates cannot combine either with purpose sentences, 
irrespective of whether the external causer is coincident with the holder of the state or not, or 
with agentive adverbs:  
 
(63) a. *El   actor   es   famoso para que sus padres vivan bien. 
       the actor is.SER  famous   to   that  his parents  live   well 
  b. *El   Real Madrid  es   campeón para que  sus fans lo celebren. 
       the Real Madrid is.SER champion  to   that their fans it  celebrate 
  c. *Marta    es     atea   para que sus   padres  no   se preocupen. 
   Marta is.SER  atheistic  to   that their parents not REFL   worry 
(64) a. *El   actor   es   famoso voluntariamente / para ganar dinero.   
   the actor is.SER famous     voluntarily           to   earn  money 
  b. *El   Real Madrid   es   campeón deliberadamente / para ganar dinero. 
   the Real Madrid is.SER  champion     deliberately         to    earn  money 
  c. *Marta   es     atea   intencionadamente / para ser feliz. 
       Marta is.SER atheistic     intentionally          to   be happy 
(65) a. *El   actor    es  gordo para representar a  Winston Churchill. 
       the actor is.SER   fat       to      portray  ACC Winston Churchill 
  b. El   actor   está  gordo para representar a  Winston Churchill. 
     the actor is.ESTAR  fat       to      portray  ACC Winston Churchill 
  c. El actor    *es / está   gordo voluntariamente. 





 (63) includes individual-level predicates and purpose clauses that make reference to an 
external cause, which results in an incompatibility. (64) includes individual-level predicates and 
an agentive adverb or purpose clauses that make reference to an external cause that is 
coincident with the holder of the state, which results in an incompatibility as well. In (65) the 
predicate of variable behavior gordo ‘fat’ is only compatible with an agentive adverb and 
purpose clauses when combined with the copula estar, which accompanies stage-level 
predicates. Note again that from the co-occurrence of purpose clauses and agentive adverbs 
with stage-level predicates it follows that there is a change of state. For example, from (65b) it 
follows that the actor becomes fat in order to portray Winston Churchill.   
 Certainly, there are apparent exceptions in which individual-level predicates are compatible 
with purpose clauses: 
 
(66) a. El   suelo de este bar   es    rugoso   para que los clientes no resbalen. 
     the  floor  of  this  bar is.SER  wrinkled    to   that the   clients  not   slip 
  ‘The floor of this bar is wrinkled in order for the clients do not slip.’ 
  b. En el    sur,  las   casas     son  blancas para que   se  mantengan frescas en verano. 
      in the south the  houses are.SER   white     to  that  REFL    remain       cool   in  summer 
  ‘In the south, houses are white in order for them to remain cool in summer.’ 
 
 However, (66a) does not mean that somebody took a floor and made it wrinkled, but rather 
than somebody installed a wrinkled floor. Analogously, (66b) does not mean that somebody 
painted the houses white, but rather that somebody built white houses. In other words, in both 
(66a) and (66b) there is an external participant that is responsible for the existence of some 
entities with a certain property, but that participant does not trigger the states. Note that, in 
these cases, a change of state does not follow: the floor and the houses could have been 
wrinkled and white, respectively, since the moment they were created. We can conclude that 
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 Other apparent counterexamples are the ones that include individual-level nouns that refer to professions or 
occupations, in which case the adverb voluntariamente ‘voluntarily’, but not deliberadamente ‘deliberately’ or 
intencionadamente ‘intentionally’, is licensed: 
 
(i)  Carlos es estudiante voluntariamente/*deliberadamente/*intencionadamente. 
  Carlos  is    student         voluntarily             deliberately               intentionally 
 
   However, the interpretation of (i) is not that Carlos is the trigger of the state of being a student, i.e. that Carlos became 
a student voluntarily, but rather that he can control the persistence of the state. In fact, it is possible to insert a 






 Another set of data that supports my analysis is taken from the literature on Spanish, but 
they were not taken as evidence that the individual-level/stage-level distinction relies on 
causation. Observe the following sentences:   
 
(67) a. Ricardo tiene preocupada / cansada / distraída / en Madrid a   María. 
     Ricardo   has     worried          tired      distracted   in  Madrid ACC María 
  b. *Ricardo tiene   atea / famosa / campeona / de   Madrid  a   María. 
       Ricardo  has  atheistic famous   champion   from  Madrid ACC María 
(68) a. Limpio el suelo, nosotros nos fuimos. 
      clean  the floor       we     REFL   went 
  ‘Once the floor was clean, we went.’ 
  b. Borrachos los asistentes,  se suspendió la  conferencia. 
         drunk    the attendants REFL  canceled  the conference 
  ‘Once the attendants were drunk, the conference was canceled.’ 
(69) a. *Popular María,  sus padres  se hicieron ricos. 
       popular María   her parents REFL make    rich 
  ‘Once María was popular, her parents become rich.’ 
  b. *Válido el análisis,  los científicos se marcharon. 
        valid  the analysis the  scientists REFL   went 
  ‘Once the analysis was valid, the scientists went.’  
(70) a. *Bart    es  elegante con  ese    traje. 
   Bart is.SER  elegant  with that tracksuit 
  b. Bart   está   elegante con  ese    traje. 
      Bart is.ESTAR  elegant  with that tracksuit 
(71) a. *Lisa   es   muy alta con  esos tacones. 
     Lisa is.SER very tall  with those  heels 
  b. Lisa   está   muy alta con esos tacones. 
      Lisa is.ESTAR very tall with those  heels 
 
 On the one hand, (67)-(69) show resultative contexts in which only stage-level predicates are 
licensed. (67) includes sentences with the verb tener ‘to have’ plus a participle or a PP, and (68) 
and (69) include absolute constructions. In the literature on Spanish, these data have been taken 
as evidence that stage-level predicates are perfective or bounded in the loose sense that I 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(ii)    Carlos es estudiante voluntariamente, pero no   se    hizo   estudiante voluntariamente. 
  Carlos  is     student         voluntarily        but  not REFL do.3.SG    student        voluntarily 




explained above (see Marín 2010 for instance). Alternatively, in assuming that stage-level 
predicates are externally caused, it is straightforwardly explained that these adjectives can be 
interpreted as the result of a previous action. In (67a) Ricardo is the direct cause of the state and 
in (68) there is an external causer that cleaned the floor and got the attendants drunk. In 
contrast, individual-level predicates, like the ones in (67b) and (69), are unacceptable in those 
contexts because they do not make reference to an external cause. 
 Regarding (70) and (71), in (70b) the tracksuit makes Bart be elegant and in (71b) the heels 
make Lisa be tall. Assuming that those adjuncts are direct causal adjuncts automatically explains 
why they are illicit in (70a) and (71a), given that the copula ser induces an individual-level 
interpretation in which there is no a direct cause involved.  
 Finally, the causal analysis also accounts for certain data in which the speaker gives an 
opinion about their taste: 
 
(72) a. *Esta carne  es  buena cocinada a  la   plancha. 
       this meat is.SER  good   cooked  on the  griddle 
  ‘(Int.) This meat is good if / because it was cooked on the griddle.’ 
  b. Esta carne   está   buena cocinada a  la plancha. 
      this  meat is.ESTAR  good   cooked  on the griddle 
 
 The examples in (72) include the so-called evidential use of the copula estar, where the term 
evidential is used in a loose sense, according to which the speaker must be considered an 
experiencer (see Roby 2009 and Gumiel-Molina et al. 2015 and references therein). In this sense, 
the copula estar would be associated with an evidential interpretation that forces the existence 
of an experiencer that tastes the meat. However, it must be noted that it is not necessary to 
taste the meat to utter (72b); rather, what differentiates it from (72a) is that there is an external 
cause that makes the meat be good, which is expressed by the participial adjunct cocinada a la 
plancha ‘(lit.) cooked on the griddle, grilled’.   
 The final conclusion for this section is that individual-level and stage-level predicates express 
states: the former express non-caused states, in the sense that they do not involve a direct 
cause, while the latter express externally caused states, in the sense that they involve a direct 
external cause. The reason why individual-level predicates may give the false impression that 
they express inherent or atemporal properties is that they express non-caused states, which 




 Below I represent a basic syntactic and semantic analysis proposed here for individual-level 
and stage-level states, leaving out their gradable semantics for convenience sake, which should 
include DegP. (I flesh out this analysis in chapter 3). 
 
(73)   PredP 
  Juan   Pred’ 
     Pred
0
  AP 
           alto 
(74) ⟦𝐽𝑢𝑎𝑛 (𝑒𝑠)𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜⟧ = ∃𝑠. tall(𝑠) ∧ holder(𝑠, j). 
(75)   StageP 
  Stage
0
  PredP 
     Juan  Pred’ 
       Pred
0
  AP 
            triste 
(76) ⟦𝐽𝑢𝑎𝑛 (𝑒𝑠𝑡á) 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒⟧ = ∃𝑠∃𝑐. sad(𝑠) ∧ holder(𝑠, j) ∧ stage(𝑠, 𝑐).         
       
 Individual-level states are the most basic ones: they include PredP, which is the functional 
node that introduces the holder or external argument (Bowers 1993; Baker 2003); as can be 
noted, there is not reference to any causal relation. In contrast, stage-level states are 
syntactically more complex, in line with Zagona (2009, 2015), Gallego & Uriagereka (2009, 2016), 
Brucart (2012), Camacho (2012) and Fábregas (2016). However, unlike these authors, who claim 
that stage-level states project a node with aspectual information, I argue that they project a 
node that introduces the function stage, which associates the state s with an external direct 
cause c.  
 The adjectival structure does not include more projections, but the derivation could continue 
with the attachment of the copula. In this respect, as is widely assumed, the copula does not 
contribute any semantics, but rather it is a verbalizer (I take the term from Schmitt 2005), whose 
main role is to allow the adjective to bear tense, viewpoint-aspectual and mood morphology. 
We can place the copula either in the head of VP, where VP dominates the adjectival structure, 
or we can place it directly in the head of TP, depending on our syntactic assumptions, which are 
irrelevant here (see Arche et al. 2017 and references therein for the different syntactic analyses 
proposed for the copula). In Spanish, the copula is spelled out as estar if the node StageP is 
included in the derivation, while it is spelled out as ser otherwise (although see next section, 
which shows that mental state adjectives like amable ‘kind’ project CauseP instead of StageP, 




 We conclude that individual-level and stage-level predicates express states: the former do 
not make any reference to a cause, while the latter involve an external cause that must be 
construed as a direct cause. Thus, both individual-level and stage-level predicates express 
eventualities, although they differ in that they are associated with different causal relations. In 
the following subsection, I study the third type of stative predicates depending on their causal 
properties. 
 
2.2.3. Davidsonian states as stative causatives  
The third type of stative predicates that remains to be examined are Davidsonian states, which 
are considered an intermediate category that is placed between pure states and events in 
Maienborn (2001, 2005a, 2007). Based on Leferman (2017), in this section I argue that 
Davidsonian states do not constitute such an intermediate category; rather, they are internally 
caused states. In other words, their holder is also the participant that is responsible for 
triggering the state. In the following subsection, I review Maienborn’s classification of stative 
predicates.  
 
2.2.3.1 Davidsonian states 
Inspired by certain insights in Dowty (1979) and Bach (1986), Maienborn (2001, 2005a, 2005b, 
2007) proposes an ontology that includes events, pure or Kimian states and Davidsonian states. 
According to Maienborn, events are spatiotemporal objects, while Kimian states are just 
temporal objects. Davidsonian events like to sit, to stand and to sleep constitute an intermediate 
category that is endowed with event properties. Specifically, both events and Davidsonian states, 
which the author groups as eventualities, are (a) perceptible, (b) can be located in space and 
time and (c) can vary in the way that they are realized. Hence, eventualities  
 
 (a) can serve as infinitival complements of perception verbs;  
 (b) can combine with locative and temporal modifiers; and  
 (c) can combine with manner adverbials, instrumentals, comitatives, etc.  
 
 In contrast, pure states, which are not considered eventualities, (a) are not accessible to direct 
perception and have no location, (b) are nonetheless accessible to (higher) cognitive operations 
and (c) can be located in time. As a consequence, pure or Kimian states  
 
 (a) cannot serve as infinitival complements of perception verbs and do not combine with 




 (b) are accessible for anaphoric reference; and  
 (c) combine with temporal modifiers. 
 
 Maienborn illustrates the contrast between Davidsonian and Kimian states in German. First, 
the Davidsonian states in (77), unlike the Kimian states in (78), can serve as complements of 
perception verbs: 
 
(77) a. Ich sah das Buch auf dem Tisch liegen. 
       I   saw the  book  on  the  table    lie 
  ‘I saw the book lie on the table.’ 
  b. Ich sah Bardo schlafen. 
       I  saw  Bardo   sleep 
  ‘I saw Bardo sleep.’ 
(78) a. ∗Ich hörte das Radio laut sein. 
        I   heard  the  radio loud  be 
  ‘I heard the radio be loud.’ 
  b. ∗Ich sah die Tomaten 1 Kg wiegen. 
         I   saw the tomatoes 1 kg  weigh 
  ‘I saw the tomatoes weigh 1 kg.’ 
 
 Second, Davidsonian states can combine with locative modifiers, see (79). Again Kimian 
states show the converse behavior, see (80). 
 
(79) a. Das Auto wartet an der  Ampel. 
      the  car    waits  at  the traffic.light 
  ‘The car is waiting at the traffic light.’ 
  b. Die Perlen glänzen in ihrem Haar. 
      the  pearls   gleam  in   her   hair 
  ‘The pearls are gleaming in her hair.’  
(80) a. ∗Das Kleid ist auf der Wäscheleine nass. 
       the  dress  is  on  the   clothesline   wet 
  ‘The dress is wet on the clothesline.’ 
  b. ∗Bardo weis       (gerade)         dort drüben die Antwort. 
       Bardo knows (at-this-moment) over   there   the  answer 




 Third, Davidsonian states can co-occur with manner and other similar expressions that 
involve variation, see (81), while Kimian states cannot, as shown in (82). 
 
(81) a. Bardo schläft friedlich / mit seinem Teddy / ohne Schnuller. 
      Bardo  sleeps  calmly    with   his     teddy   without dummy 
  ‘Bardo sleeps calmly / with his teddy bear / without dummy.’ 
  b. Carolin sas   reglos  /  kerzengerade     am  Tisch. 
      Carolin sat motionless straight.as.a.die  at.the table 
  ‘Carolin sat motionless / straight / at the table.’ 
(82) a ∗Carolin war  unruhig / geduldig durstig. 
      Carolin was  restlessly  patiently  thirsty 
  ‘Carolin was restlessly/patiently thirsty.’  
  b. ∗Bardo besitzt sparsam / spendabel   viel   Geld. 
       Bardo   owns   thriftily     generously much money 
  ‘Bardo owns a lot of money thriftily/generously.’ 
 
 Nevertheless, Kimian states are compatible with time-related modifiers: 
 
(83) a. Carolin war  gestern / immer / zweimal / tagelang müde. 
     Carolin was  yesterday always     twice      for.days   tired 
  ‘Carolin was (always) tired yesterday / twice / for some days.’ 
  b. Carolin kannte immer / nie / wieder letztes Jahr Leonardos Adresse. 
     Carolin   knew  always  never  again    last   year Leonardo’s  address 
  ‘Carolin (always/never) knew Leonardo’s address again / last year.’ 
 
 In addition, Kimian states can be referred to anaphorically: 
 
(84) a. Carolin ist wütend. Das wird bald vorbei sein. 
     Carolin  is  angry.    this  will soon   over    be 
  ‘Carolin is angry. This will be soon over.’ 
  b. Das Öl kostet 30 $. Das dauert nun schon 3 Monate. 
      the  oil  costs  30 $.  this   lasts    already   3  months 





 In sum, Maienborn concludes that Davidsonian states and events are true eventualities, since 
they can be perceived, spatially located and vary over time; therefore, they must be represented 
by an event variable e. In contrast, Kimian states cannot be perceived, spatially located or vary 
over time; therefore, they cannot be represented by an event variable e. Nonetheless, insofar are 
they can combine with temporal modification and can be referred to anaphorically, they must 
contain a poorer stative argument k, which is equivalent to our stative argument s. In the 
following subsection, I review Leferman’s (2017) analysis of Davidsonian states as stative 
causatives. 
 
2.2.3.2 Stative causatives 
According to Leferman (2017), positing the existence of an intermediate category of states with 
event properties is contradictory in essence (see also Rothmayr 2009). By studying mental state 
adjectives (I take the term from Stowell 1991) like honest, brave, kind, modest, etc., Leferman 
concludes that they express states, but they differ from other states insofar as they are internally 
caused or, in other words, their subjects trigger the state (for other proposals on the syntax and 
semantics of mental state adjectives, see Partee 1977; Kertz 2006; Martin 2006, 2008, 2015; 
Landau 2009; Demonte 2019). Based on Rappaport Hovav & Levin’s (2000) analysis of verbs like 
to gleam, to shine and to stink, Leferman concludes that mental state adjectives have the same 
properties as the predicates that are considered Davidsonian states in Maienborn (2005a, 2005b, 
2007) and the predicates that Rappaport Hovav & Levin (2000) consider stative causatives.  
 Leferman claims that mental state adjectives are stative causatives and, like Maienborn 
proposed for Davidsonian states, accept locative and manner modification, see (85a), and can 
serve as complements of the verb see, see (85b). In addition, they can appear in the progressive, 
see (85c), property that Maienborn does not mention. 
 
(85) a. Emma was being elegantly modest in the foyer. 
  b. I saw Emma be brave. 
  c. Emma is being brave. 
(From Leferman 2017: 178, 179, 199) 
 
 Based on Rappaport Hovav & Levin (2000), Leferman proposes that stative causatives are 
lexically causative, so their subject is always interpreted as a causer even though it lacks animate 
properties. For example, in The lamp is shining, the properties of the lamp are responsible for 




 In sum, Leferman (2017) argues that Davidsonian states do not encode an event argument. 
Rather, they are stative causatives, that is, states whose subject is responsible for bringing the 
state about. Stative causatives include the verbs of sound, light and smell emission examined by 
Rappaport Hovav & Levin, like to hum, to shine and to stink; the verbs considered Davidsonian 
states by Maienborn, like to wait, to sleep and to sit; and mental state adjectives, like honest, 
brave and kind. In the following subsection, I study mental state adjectives in Spanish and 
conclude that they express internally caused eventualities as well. 
 
2.2.3.3 Stative causatives in Spanish 
As mentioned in subsection 2.2.1.1, although stative causatives co-occur with locative and 
manner modifiers more easily than pure states, Ernst (2016) provides good evidence that 
locative and manner modifiers are also compatible with pure states, as in Everyone was quiet in 
the auditorium or He resembles a movie star stereotypically. Consequently, the two most reliable 
tests for identifying stative causatives are the ones related to the perception verb to see and the 
progressive.  
 In Spanish, mental state adjectives can serve as complements of the perception verb ver ‘to 
see’ and accept the progressive, which confirms that the analysis whereby they are stative 
causatives can be applied to this language, see (86) and (87). To dispel any doubts, (88) and (89) 
show that they combine easily with locative and manner modification as well. 
 
(86) a. Le    vimos  ser valiente. 
    him  see.1.PL  be   brave 
  ‘We saw him be brave.’ 
  b. La   vimos   ser cruel. 
       her saw.1.PL  be  cruel 
  ‘We saw her be cruel.’ 
(87) a. Ellos están siendo muy modestos. 
      they   are    being  very   modest 
  b. Ellas están siendo muy maleducadas. 
      they   are    being  very      rude 
(88) a. Luis fue muy amable en la universidad. 
     Luis was very   kind    in the  university 
  b. Luis fue violento en  su  país. 





(89) a. Luisa fue enigmáticamente amable. 
     Luisa  was   enigmatically      kind 
  b. Luisa fue discretamente valiente. 
      Luisa was    discreetly     brave 
 
 Mental state adjectives can combine with both copulas ser and estar and in principle do not 
exhibit different restrictions. Regardless of whether a mental state adjective co-occurs with ser or 
estar, it can realize an internal argument headed by the preposition con ‘with’ that expresses the 
participant that experiences, or is affected by, the state and can combine with temporal, 
aspectual, locative or manner modifiers:  
 
(90) a. Avelina   fue   /   estuvo  amable con Julio. 
     Avelina was.SER  was.ESTAR  kind   with Julio 
  ‘Avelina was.SER/was.ESTAR kind to Julio.’ 
  b. Avelina fue   /   estuvo  amable en la reunión. 
     Avelina was.SER was.ESTAR  kind   in the meeting 
  c. Avelina fue   /   estuvo amable durante varias semanas. 
  Avelina was.SER  was.ESTAR  kind       for    several  weeks 
  d. Avelina   fue   /   estuvo  amable en el autobús. 
      Avelina was.SER was.ESTAR  kind    in  the   bus 
  e. Avelina   fue   /   estuvo  extrañamente amable.
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     Avelina was.SER was.ESTAR    strangely       kind 
   
 What remains to be shown in this section is a basic composition for mental state adjectives 
that accounts for their causal properties (see Leferman 2017 for a different implementation that 
employs two different state variables instead of the node CauseP): 
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 Perhaps, the only contrast between the two Spanish copulas when mental state adjectives are involved is that the 
copula ser can admit an individual-level interpretation as well. Consider the following data: 
 
(i)  a. Pablo     fue    amable. 
      Pablo was.SER    kind 
  b. Pablo   estuvo   amable. 
      Pablo was.ESTAR   kind  
 
 (ia) can mean either that Pablo had the property of being a kind person, without entailing that he was kind to 
someone, or that Pablo was kind to someone who is not explicitly mentioned. In contrast, (ib) entails that Pablo was kind 
to someone. What these data may suggest is that mental state adjectives in Spanish are not lexically causative (as 
Leferman 2017 claims for English), but rather they can participate in two syntactic configurations: an individual-level and 
a stative causative configuration, where the copula estar can only appear in the latter. Given that this issue is orthogonal 




(91)    CauseP 
   Juani     Cause’ 
      Cause
0
  PredP 
         ti   Pred’ 
           Pred
0
  AP  
              amable 
(92) ⟦𝐽𝑢𝑎𝑛 (𝑓𝑢𝑒/𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑣𝑜) 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒⟧ = ∃𝑠. kind(𝑠) ∧ holder(𝑠, j) ∧ causer(𝑠, j).     
       
 The mental state adjective amable ‘kind’ projects an adjectival structure like the individual-
level alto ‘tall’ up to PredP. Unlike stage-level predicates, which project StageP, mental state 
adjectives project CauseP over PredP. This functional node, which I take from Fábregas (2016), 
introduces the function causer, which identifies the holder of the state with a cause. According 
to Fábregas, CauseP is the adjectival equivalent of the verbal node InitP in Ramchand (2008) and 
can be used to account for those adjectives whose subjects are also causers. That the holder of 
the state is also the causer is represented by means of movement of the DP Juan to Spec-
CauseP, leaving a trace in Spec-PredP. In relation to the copulas, I attribute their licensing to the 
presence of CauseP, which, I propose, is able to introduce both ser and estar. 
 We can conclude that mental state adjectives like amable ‘kind’ and honesto ‘honest’ are 
stative causatives, that is, their subjects are also responsible for triggering the state, in which 
case they project the functional node CauseP. In the following section, I provide a summary of 
the three types of stative predicates depending on their causal properties. 
  
Interim summary 
In this section, I have reviewed the three types of states that the literature on stativity had been 
identified, namely, individual-level, state-level and Davidsonian states. I have provided evidence 
that the distinction does not rely on spatiotemporality or aspect (or even the relative-absolute 
distinction), as generally assumed, but rather on causation. First, individual-level states do not 
involve a cause, either external or internal, and combine with the copula ser. Second, stage-level 
states involve an external cause, which must be a direct cause in the sense of Maienborn & 
Herdtfelder (2017), and combine with the copula estar, which is licensed by the functional node 
StageP. Third, following Leferman (2017), I have argued that Davidsonian states are stative 
causative predicates, whose holder is also the causer of the state; stative causatives accept the 
two copulas, which are licensed by the presence of CauseP. The most attractive point of this 
analysis is that it offers a unified account for the three types of states with respect to their 




differences do not rely on these notions, but rather on the type of causation that they involve. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the immediate consequence of this analysis is that we can 
treat the three types of predicates examined as eventualities, specifically as states. Having 
examined the notion of ‘causation’ and its specific relationship with stativity, in the following 
section I study the relationship of stativity with gradability and homogeneity. 
  
2.3. On gradability and homogeneity 
In this section, I provide evidence that, even though stativity is linked to gradability in many 
cases, namely, gradable adjectives like tall and some gradable verbs like to love, stativity does 
not entail gradability. In this respect, in this section I discuss the validity of Baglini’s (2015) 
conception of stativity, which differs from the traditional conception inspired by Vendler (1957) 
and Dowty (1979) inasmuch as stativity is defined in Baglini’s work on the basis of gradability. In 
addition, based on Dowty (1979) and Rothstein (2004), I also show that, although many states 
are cumulative and divisible in instants, there are stative predicates that, like activities, are 
cumulative but divisible in intervals. Specifically, I show that there are two types of stative 
causatives: the ones that are divisible in intervals and the ones that are divisible in instants. Thus, 
my contribution in this respect is that neither gradability nor divisibility constitutes defining 
properties of states, but they play an important role in the configuration of the whole typology 
of stativity.  
 Let us examine the relationship between stativity and gradability. Recall from chapter 1 that 
Baglini (2015; see also Baglini & Kennedy 2019) posits that states are gradable eventualities. 
Specifically, the author argues that, while events and Davidsonian states are gradable extensively 
or in time (what Fleischhauer 2016 calls extent gradation), states can be graded intensively (what 
Fleischhauer 2016 calls degree gradation). For example, while the event to run and the 
Davidsonian state to sit can receive a temporal interpretation in the comparative context of (93), 
the pure states to love and to be intelligent can only receive a degree interpretation, see (94): 
 
(93) a. John ran more than Mary.                  TEMPORAL/*DEGREE 
  b. Sam sat more than Ben.                  TEMPORAL/*DEGREE 
(94) a. Sam loved Mary more than Ben.                *TEMPORAL/DEGREE 
  b. Mary is more intelligent than Ben.
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               *TEMPORAL/DEGREE 
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 A very similar observation was already made by Maienborn (2005a), who noted that activities and Davidsonian states, 
unlike pure states, can trigger a temporal interpretation when they are modified by a little bit, as in John sweated / slept / 
loved Mary a little bit, where the activity to sweat and the Davidsonian state to sleep can trigger a temporal 




 This definition in which stativity is identified with an intensive gradability, while events and 
Davidsonian states are linked with a temporal or extensive gradability, raises empirical problems 
that must receive an alternative explanation. First, there are pure states like to own and to belong 
that are not gradable, which explains why they cannot trigger either a temporal or a degree 
reading in gradable constructions, see (95). In other words, Baglini’s analysis incorrectly predicts 
that these predicates are gradable. 
 
(95) a. *Alex owned the house more than Gabi.           *TEMPORAL/*DEGREE 
  b. *Gabi belonged to the club more than Alex.          *TEMPORAL/*DEGREE 
 
 Arguably, to own and to belong express states because they express (non-dynamic) 
properties that are subject to time, as shown in (96) with their combination with time-related 
modifiers, so the fact that they are not gradable does not impact on their stativity nature.  
 
(96) a. Alex owned the house some years ago. 
  b. Gabi belonged to the club for several years. 
 
 Second, not all Davidsonian states are not gradable in intensity; for example, as argued by 
Fábregas & Marín (2013), the Spanish verb brillar ‘to shine’ is a Davidsonian state because it 
accepts the progressive, see (97a), and can be the complement of the perception verb ver ‘see’, 
see (97b). However, brillar ‘to shine’ is also gradable in intensity and, accordingly, (97c) means 
‘The lamp is shining in intensity / with a lot of bright’.  
 
(97) a. La lámpara está brillando.  
     the   lamp     is     shining  
  b. Vi      brillar la lámpara.  
     Saw.1.SG shine  the  lamp 
  ‘I saw the lamp shine.’ 
  c. La lámpara está brillando mucho.  
     the   lamp     is     shining    a.lot 
 
 Third, not all Davidsonian states trigger a temporal interpretation in gradable constructions. 
For example, mental state adjectives, which were analyzed in the previous section, express 
Davidsonian states or stative causatives (see also Fábregas et al. 2013 and Leferman 2017). 




(98) a. #Matías fue muy amable con Elena.  
        Matías was very   kind   with Elena 
  b. #Matías fue  más amable con  Elena que Lorena.  
        Matías was more  kind    with Elena than Lorena 
 




We can conclude that states are not defined by being intensively gradable, and Davidsonian 
states and events are not defined by being extensively or temporally gradable. What the data in 
(93) and (94) actually show is that activity verbs and some Davidsonian states can trigger a 
temporal interpretation in gradable constructions. In what follows, I will argue that the reason 
for this behavior is that activities and some stative predicates are divisible in intervals. In order to 
understand this property, a little background on homogeneity, cumulativity and divisibility is 
necessary.  
The most influential proposal on homogeneity (see also Mourelatos 1978; Dowty 1979; Bach 
1986; Bosque & Masullo 1998; Rothstein 2004; Wellwood 2014, 2015; among others) is due to 
Krifka (1989, 1992), who claims that a predicate is homogeneous iff it is cumulative and divisible. 
On the one hand, according to Krifka, cumulative predicates are as those that, if they are true of 
their subjects separately, they are also true when collected: 
 
(99) P is cumulative iff ∀𝑥∀𝑦[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ 𝑃(𝑦) → 𝑃(𝑥 ⊔ 𝑦)]. 
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 Moreover, there are verbs expressing Davidsonian states that do not trigger a temporal reading either. This is the case 
of dirigir ‘to rule’ and gobernar ‘to govern’, among others. As Davidsonian states, they accept the progressive and can 
serve as complements of the verb ver ‘to see’:  
 
(i) a. Ellos están dirigiendo la   empresa adecuadamente.  
     they    are        ruling   the  company        properly  
 b. Ellos están gobernando el     país   con  severidad.  
     they    are      governing   the country with  severity 
(ii) a. Le     vimos   dirigir la  empresa adecuadamente.  
         him  saw.1.PL    rule  the  company       properly 
 ‘We saw him rule the company properly.’  
 b. La    vimos    gobernar el    país    con severidad.  
    her saw.1.PL     govern    the country with  severity 
 ‘We saw her govern the country severely.’  
  
 However, they do not give rise to temporal interpretations in gradable constructions (cf. Fábregas & Marín 2013, 
who do find possible a temporal interpretation for these verbs that other native speakers who I consulted and I do not 
find possible). If acceptable, the following sentences have a degree rather than a temporal reading, according to which 
Emilia and Felipe worked hard: 
 
(iii) a. #Emilia dirigió la   empresa  más  que  Cándido.  
       Emilia  ruled   the company  more than  Cándido  
 b. #Felipe  gobernó  el    país   mucho.  




 In prose, P is a cumulative predicate if and only if P(x) and P(y) can be grouped as a single 
predicate P(x ⊔ y). For example, two separate entities of water result in water when collected, 
and two separate events of swimming form one event of swimming when collected. In contrast, 
two separate books do not result in a single book when collected, and two separate events of 
reading a book do not form one event of reading a book when collected. 
 On the other hand, a predicate is divisible iff it is true of its subject and of any of the parts of 
its subject. The formal expression is provided below: 
  
(100) P is divisible iff ∀𝑥∀𝑦[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ (𝑦 ≤ 𝑥) → 𝑃(𝑦)]. 
 
Informally, P is a divisible predicate iff for any P(x), it is also true P(y) such that y is a part of x. 
For example, any part of the entity water is water,
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 and any part of the state of being on the 
table is being on the table. In contrast, not any part of a book is a book, and not any part of the 
event of building a house is building a house. 
Although it is often assumed that both activities and states are homogeneous insofar as they 
are cumulative and divisible, it must be noted that the latter is not exactly the case: while 
activities and states are cumulative, neither activities nor all stative predicates are divisible stricto 
sensu. The observation dates back to Dowty (1979), who examined the divisibility properties of 
eventualities in terms of strict homogeneity; in other words, what Dowty (1979) calls strict 
homogeneity is equivalent to divisibility in Krifka (1989, 1992). In this respect, Dowty (1979: 166) 
claims that states, as strictly homogeneous predicates, are subject to the subinterval property: “If 
α is a stative predicate, then α(x) is true at an interval I just in any case α(x) is true at all moments 
within I”. For example, the sentence The ball was on the floor for two hours is true iff the ball was 
on the floor at every instant of the interval expressed by the aspectual modifier for two hours. In 
contrast, activities are not strictly homogeneous, since they are not valid in all subintervals or 
instants. For instance, in Mark ran for two hours, a single instant within the period of two hours 
(think of instants as photos, in which movement cannot be captured) does not offer evidence 
that John ran; rather, we need an interval to evaluate whether the statement is true. Expressing 
this observation in Krifka’s terms, Rothstein (2004) claims that activities are not divisible strictly 
speaking or, in any case, are divisible in intervals but not in subintervals or instants.  
 On the other hand, Dowty also notes that verbs like to sit, to stand or to wait express states 
that, like activities, are valid in intervals, and the author calls them interval states. For example, in 
Alex waited for Jack for two hours, a single instant within that period does not offer evidence that 
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 Note that this is a linguistic distinction and does not have to correspond to our world knowledge. For instance, we 
know that a molecule of water is composed of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen, and even atoms are 




the statement is true or false, so we need an interval to evaluate its truth conditions. Thus, what 
Dowty concludes is that interval states, and activity predicates, are homogeneous in intervals, 
while the rest of states are strictly homogeneous or valid in instants. We can articulate this 
observation in terms of cumulativity and divisibility: activities and states like to wait are 
cumulative but not divisible or, in any case, are divisible in intervals; in contrast, the rest of states 
are cumulative and divisible. 
 My contribution is, therefore, that the defining property of states is that they do not involve 
change in any of their participants over time, and strict homogeneity or divisibility only 
characterizes one group thereof. Concerning cumulativity, activities and states, in contrast to 
accomplishments and achievements, are cumulative because they consist of either intervals or 
instants. In other words, activities and states are cumulative because they involve some kind of 
homogeneity insofar as they consist in sums of smaller parts (what McNally 2017 formulates as 
homogeneity to a certain level of granularity); in contrast, accomplishments and achievements 
constitute heterogeneous events, which are indivisible (either in intervals or instants). 
 Recall from section 3.1 that dynamism or change is related to the participants of the 
eventuality, while we have shown here that cumulativity and divisibility are related to the 
internal composition of the eventuality. Thus, activity verbs express events because at least one 
of their participants undergoes a change. In contrast, the participants of stative predicates do 
not undergo any changes. With this in mind, we can explain the following data, which illustrate 
the different behavior of activities and stative predicates in Spanish and are useful to refute 
Baglini’s (2015) proposal according to which Davidsonian states are gradable extensively or in 
time, while pure states are gradable in intensity. Consider the following examples, which include 
activity predicates: 
 
(101) a. Ana caminó varias  horas. Esto tuvo lugar   ayer. 
      Ana walked several hours  this  took place yesterday 
  b. Lucrecia  paró   de nadar. 
     Lucrecia stopped of  swim 
  ‘Lucrecia stopped swimming.’ 
  c. Pablo  bailó  lentamente. 
     Pablo danced    slowly 
(102) a. Ana caminó mucho. 
     Ana  walked   a.lot 
  b. Lucrecia nadó  más  que Ambrosio. 




  c. Pabló  bailó   más  que  Esteban. 
    Pablo  danced more than  Esteban 
 
 On the one hand, all the predicates in (101) express events: they accept anaphoric reference 
by means of the expression Esto tuvo lugar… ‘This took place’, see (101a), and are compatible 
with the periphrastic verb parar ‘to stop’, see (101b), and with celerative modifiers, see (101c). 
On the other hand, they can amount to temporal readings in gradable constructions: (102a) can 
have a reading in which Ana walked for a lot of time, (102b) can have a reading in which 
Lucrecia swam more time than Ambrosio and (102c) can have a reading in which Pablo danced 
more time than Esteban. Now consider the following stative predicates: 
 
(103) a. María perteneció a  nuestro equipo. *Esto tuvo lugar  el  año pasado. 
     María   belonged  to    our      team      this  took place the  last   year 
  b. *Jorge   paró   de dormir. 
       Jorge  stopped of   sleep 
  ‘Jorge stopped sleeping.’ 
  c. *Lorenzo fue amable con sus sobrinos rápidamente. 
       Lorenzo was   kind   with  his nephews      quickly 
  ‘Lorenzo was kind to his nephews quickly.’ 
(104) a. *María está perteneciendo a nuestro equipo. 
       María   is       belonging    to   our      team 
  a’. *Vi           a   María pertenecer a nuestro equipo. 
       saw.1.SG ACC María    belong    to    our     team 
  ‘I saw María belong to our team.’  
  b. Jorge está durmiendo. 
      Jorge   is      sleeping 
  b’. Vi          a   Jorge dormir plácidamente. 
     saw.1.SG ACC Jorge   sleep     pleasantly 
  ‘I saw Jorge sleep pleasantly.’ 
  c. Lorenzo está siendo amable con sus sobrinos.  
     Lorenzo    is    being    kind    with his  nephews 
  ‘Lorenzo is being kind to his nephews.’ 
  c’. Vi           a  Lorenzo ser amable con sus sobrinos. 
     saw.1.SG ACC Lorenzo be    kind    with his  nephews  




(105) a. Jorge durmió mucho. 
     Jorge   slept     a.lot 
  b. #Lorenzo fue   más amable con sus sobrinos que  su hermana. 
        Lorenzo was  more   kind   with his  nephews than his   sister 
  ‘Lorenzo was kinder to his nephews than his sister.’ 
  c. *María perteneció  al    equipo más que  Cristina. 
       María  belonged to.the  team  more than Cristina 
 
 All the predicates included in (103) express states, since the participants involved do not 
undergo any changes, so they reject the tests that are usually employed to identify events. The 
predicates dormir ‘to sleep’ and (ser) amable ‘(to be) kind’ in (104b, c), unlike pertenecer ‘to 
belong’ in (104a), express stative causatives or Davidsonian states according to the tests shown 
in subsection 2.2.3.3, namely, they accept the progressive and can serve as complements of the 
perception verb ver ‘see’. On the other hand, only the Davidsonian state dormir ‘to sleep’, which 
is cumulative and divisible in intervals, can trigger a temporal interpretation in gradable 
constructions, see (105a). In contrast, the Davidsonian predicate (ser) amable ‘(to be) kind’ is 
divisible in subinterval or instants, so it lacks constitutive temporal intervals and cannot be 
temporally measured, see (105b), where the symbol # indicates that a degree reading is 
acceptable. Finally, the pure state pertenecer ‘to belong’ is not gradable, so it cannot participate 
in gradable constructions, see (105c). 
 All these data show that Baglini’s (2015) analysis according to which activities and 
Davidsonian states are gradable in time, while pure states are gradable in intensity, must be 
refined, given that not all Davidsonian states give rise to temporal readings in gradable 
constructions and not all states are gradable. The reason why only some Davidsonian states are 
gradable in time is that, like activities, they are divisible in intervals.     
 In conclusion, in this section I have refuted the association between stativity and gradability 
and concluded that not all states are gradable. I have also shown that only activities and a 
certain group of stative causatives or Davidsonian states prompt temporal interpretations in 
gradable constructions. Based on Dowty (1979) and Rothstein (2004), I claim that the ones that 
do are cumulative but not divisible (or are divisible in intervals in any case), while the ones that 
do not are cumulative and divisible. We conclude that neither gradability nor divisibility 
constitutes defining properties of states, but they allow us to classify different types of stative 






Table 1: Typology of eventualities 
 
Eventualities (temporal objects) 

































leer un libro ‘to 
read a book’ 









2.4. Representing gradability 
Having offered a precise characterization of stativity and its relation to causation, homogeneity 
and gradability, in this section I describe my model about the representation of gradability in 
the stative domain. Adopting a well-founded model of gradability is essential for the purposes 
of this dissertation, since deadjectival nominalizations are derived from gradable adjectives.
24
 
Specifically, I will briefly review degree-less theories, degree-based theories and the state-kind-
based theory devised by Anderson & Morzycki (2015), who assume an intermediate stance: like 
degree-based approaches, the authors make use of degrees, although they do not consist in 
numerical representations, but rather equivalence classes of states; like degree-less approaches, 
they dispense with degrees as ontological objects of type d.  
 
2.4.1 Degrees as kinds 
The different approaches on gradability can be divided into two big groups: the ones that make 
use of degrees of type d, which can be called degree-based approaches, and the ones that do 
not, which are called here degree-less approaches. On the one hand, in degree-less approaches 
(Kamp 1975; Klein 1980; van Rooij 2011a, 2011b; Doetjes 2008; Doetjes et al. 2011; Burnett 2014; 
a.o.), both gradable and non-gradable adjectives are predicates of individuals of type <e,t>. 
Gradable predicates are context-dependent and associated with a domain that is partitioned 
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 In this dissertation, I assume that deadjectival nominalizations are derived from gradable adjectives, but I include 




into three subdomains: the first one is the positive subdomain, which contains individuals for 
which the adjectival property is true; the second one is the negative subdomain, which contains 
individuals for which the adjectival property is false; and the third one is an extension gap, which 
contains borderline cases or individuals for which the adjectival property is neither true nor false.  
 The warhorse and great advantage of degree-less approaches is that they do not need to 
postulate the existence of a null morpheme (usually POS, from Cresswell 1976, or EVAL, from Rett 
2008) to account for the semantics of the positive construction: for example, Mary is tall is true 
in a context c iff Mary belongs to the positive subdomain in c. A theory on gradability that does 
not make use of additional adjectival morphology in the positive construction is in principle 
preferable, since there is cross-linguistic evidence that the positive form of the adjective is 
morphologically simpler than the comparative or the equative forms (Bobalijk 2012).  
 However, as Kennedy (1997, 2011) notes (see also Bochnak 2013 and Morzycki 2015 for 
discussion), in dispensing with that null morpheme, we must face several empirical problems 
that do not have an easy solution; specifically, Kennedy (2011) focuses on explicit and implicit 
comparatives. Explicit comparatives include degree morphology, as in The box is bigger than the 
jeweler, while implicit comparisons do not, as in The box is big compared to the jeweler. Explicit 
comparatives allow for crisp judgments, that is, expressions that are used for expressing 
differences of a very small degree: for example, if the box is just 0.5 cm bigger than the jeweler, 
it is possible to utter The box is bigger than the jeweler. In contrast, implicit comparisons do not 
allow for crisp judgments; in the same context, it is not possible to utter #The box is big 
compared to the jeweler. However, degree-less approaches do not predict such a contrast, 
insofar as implicit comparatives, like explicit ones, do not include POS or, in other words, these 
approaches predict that both structures should be equivalent.  
 van Rooij (2011b) tackles the contrast by means of constraints: based on Klein (1980), the 
author posits that implicit comparatives are evaluated with respect to a context that only 
includes the two objects compared, the box and the jeweler, and are subject to a similarity 
constraint, which excludes the possibility of comparing entities with a similar size. In contrast, 
explicit comparatives are evaluated with respect to a context that includes other objects in 
addition to the box and the jeweler and are subject to a witness constraint, according to which 
some of the other objects are necessarily just a bit bigger and smaller than the two compared 
objects. However, as Kennedy (2011) points out, the existence of these objects need not 
correspond to actual objects in the world that the sentence is about and introduces abstract 
units of measurement in a different guise, which undermines the essence of degree-less 
approaches. In conclusion, in the light of the contrast between explicit and implicit 




morpheme POS is considerable, given that they need to resort to specific semantic constraints in 
order to cover the empirical phenomena with respect to the positive form of the adjective, 
which supposes an additional complexity that make them lose their main attractive points.     
 On the other hand, degree-based theories (Seuren 1973; Cresswell 1976; von Stechow 1984; 
Bierwisch 1989; Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002; Kennedy 1997, 2007, 2011; Kennedy & McNally 
2005; Fults 2006; Rett 2008; Morzycki 2008, 2009, 2015; a.o.) posit that gradable adjectives, 
which are traditionally of type <d,<e,t>> (or also <e,d> or <e,<d,t>>), invoke totally ordered 
sets of degrees or scales. In assuming a scalar ordering, they offer a thorough explanation for 
explicit and implicit comparisons. Explicit comparisons include an explicit degree modifier, while 
implicit comparisons include a null morpheme that introduces a standard of comparison. Thus, 
although degree-based approaches are more complex than degree-less ones insofar as they 
include a null morpheme to account for the positive form of the adjective, they are simpler 
insofar as they do not have to resort to specific constraints to cover all empirical phenomena.
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 However, neither degree-less nor traditional degree-based approaches makes use of an 
eventuality variable s for states, which is crucial to capture the eventuality properties of gradable 
adjectives and their nominalizations. In line with the Neo-Davidsonian semantics, Anderson & 
Morzycki (2015) design a model that captures the advantages of both degree-based and 
degree-less theories using an eventuality variable s for states and deriving degrees from so-
called state-kinds.
26
 The authors start from the observation made in Landman & Morzycki (2003) 
that, in certain languages, the same functional element is used for anaphorically referring to 
kinds, manner and degrees. This is the case of the Polish particle tak(i):  
 
(106) a. taki pies.                            KIND 
    such.M  dog 
  ‘such a dog, a dog of that kind’ 
  b. tak    się  zachowywać.                   MANNER 
   such REFL  behave 
  ‘behave that way’ 
                                                          
25
 The debate between the two approaches is vast and concerns other arguments that I ignore here. I refer the interested 
reader to the sources for the detailed picture. 
26
 Specifically, the authors claim that gradable adjectives express Davidsonian states in the sense of Maienborn (2005a, 
2005b, 2007), given that they can combine with manner and locative modification. I do not follow the authors in this 
respect, since manner and locative modification is not useful to identify Davidsonian states, given that pure (or Kimian in 
the sense of Maienborn) states accept it too: Peter loves Adam passionately; Jose was famous in Rome (see Ernst 2016 for 
an extensive argumentation). Davidsonian states, which are taken as stative causatives in this dissertation following 
Leferman (2017), can occur in the progressive and serve as infinitival complements of the verb see, as in John is being 
honest (to Paul); I saw Mary be rude (to Paul), where honest and rude are mental state adjectives. However, not all 
gradable adjectives express Davidsonian states: for instance, this is the case of tall and sad: *John is being tall, *I saw 
Mary be sad. In conclusion, gradable adjectives are predicates of states and only one group thereof, namely, mental state 




  c. tak  wysoki.                           DEGREE 
   such  tall 
  ‘that tall’ 
 
 In order to account for the similarities among kinds, manner and degrees, the authors 
develop a model that includes kinds as ontological objects, and derive manner and degrees 
from them. As already mentioned in chapter 1, since Carlson (1977, 2003), the kind-token 
dichotomy has acquired a great relevance in theoretical linguistics (Zamparelli 1995; Chierchia 
1998a; Landman & Morzycki 2003; Dayal 2004; McNally & Boleda 2004; Landman 2006; 
Castroviejo & Schwager 2008; Espinal & McNally 2011; Gehrke 2011, 2015, 2017; Umbach & 
Gust 2014; Gehrke & McNally 2015; Espinal & Borik 2015; Zhang 2020; a.o.). A kind consists in all 
objects that share a certain property in any given world, while a token is simply one of those 
objects in a certain world. For example, this dichotomy allows us to explain the semantic 
difference between a DP when referring to a specific individual, e.g. a token, and the same DP 
when referring to the class of individuals, e.g. a kind. Observe the following contrast: 
 
(107) a. La  jirafa   se  comió las  ramas. 
     the giraffe REFL   ate   the branches 
  ‘The giraffe ate the braches.’ 
  b. La   jirafa  es común. 
      the giraffe is common 
  ‘Giraffes are common.’ 
  
 In (107a) the DP la jirafa ‘the giraffe’ refers to a specific giraffe that ate the branches, while in 
(107b) the DP refers to the natural class of giraffes. In the kind-token tradition, the basic reading 
is the generic or kind reading, while the token reading is derived by means of an additional 
functional projection in the syntax. For example, in Espinal & Borik (2015), with respect to the 
domain of entities, the token reading is obtained by means of the functional projection 
NumberP (I flesh out this proposal in chapter 4).  
 Anderson & Morzycki claim that the kind-token dichotomy is also applicable to manner and 
degrees. Based on Chierchia (1998a), the authors treat kinds as functions from worlds into 
pluralities. For example, the kind RABBIT consists of all pluralities of rabbits in any given world, 
and being a realization of that kind, e.g. a token, is just to be one of its members. In addition, 
they identify event-kinds with manner, on the one hand, and state-kinds with manner and 




with manner, as will be explained below. With respect to events and manner, for example the 
event-kind CLUMSY consists of all possible events that are performed clumsily, and a particular 
clumsy event is the realization of the event-kind CLUMSY.  
Regarding state-kinds, they follow Cresswell (1976) in taking degrees as equivalence classes. 
Nevertheless, while for Cresswell degrees are equivalence classes of individuals (for instance, the 
degree SIX-FEET-TALL would consist of all individuals that are precisely that tall), for Anderson & 
Morzycki degrees are equivalence classes of states. For example, the degree-state-kind SIX-FEET-
TALL consists of all possible states of being that tall. Hence, as Anderson & Morzycki point out, 
measuring a state amounts to determining what degree-state-kind it realizes. In dispensing with 
degrees as ontological objects, the authors explain why there are many adjectival modifiers that 
prompt a manner rather than a degree reading: 
 
(108) a. Clyde is visibly happy. 
  b. Clyde is strangely beautiful.  
 
 Although there have been attempts to harmonize data such as (108) with degree-based 
theories (Morzycki 2008; Nouwen 2011), these analyses require an undesirable complexity that 
can be avoided by positing that degrees are derived from state-kinds. As the authors note, the 
most natural reading for the statements in (108) is ‘Clyde is happy in a visible way’ and ‘Clyde is 
beautiful in a strange way’, which cannot be explained under an account in which degrees are 
just points or intervals on a scale. In other words, as advanced in chapter 1, insofar as degrees 
are defined as numerical representations, their value cannot be visible or strange. In Anderson & 
Morzycki’s account, visibly and strangely are state-kinds, but they are not degree-state-kinds 
because they do not constitute equivalence classes, which are inherently ordered; in other 
words, the state-kind a height of two meters, unlike the state-kind an incredible height, occupies 
the same place on the scale of height in all circumstances. Thus, Anderson & Morzycki (2015) 
posit that gradable adjectives can combine with degree modifiers, which denote states that 
realize state-kinds that are inherently ordered, and with manner modifiers, which denote states 
that realize state-kinds that are not inherently ordered. In chapter 4, I provide an additional 
argument in favor of excluding degrees from the ontology of semantic objects, which is based 
on morphological considerations that I have not explained yet.  
 Going back to Anderson & Morzycki’s proposal, we can move on to the technical details. The 
authors claim that gradable adjectives denote relations between states and individuals of type 




of states that realizes the degree-state-kind SIX-FEET-TALL. The semantic composition for Floyd (is) 
six feet tall works as follows: 
 
(109) a. ⟦𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. tall(𝑠, 𝑥). 
  b. ⟦𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. tall(𝑠, Floyd). 
  c. ⟦𝑠𝑖𝑥 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡⟧ = 𝜆𝑠.  ∪SIX FEET(𝑠). 
  d. ⟦[𝑠𝑖𝑥 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡] [𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙]⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. tall(𝑠, Floyd) ∧  ∪SIX FEET(𝑠).                    by PM 
 
 Once the state argument is existentially bound, the statement is true iff Floyd is in the state 
of having a height that realizes the degree-state-kind SIX-FEET-TALL. Note that Floyd tall and six 
feet are composed intersectively by Predicate Modification (PM), and the up operator ∪ 
represents the realization relation (from Chierchia 1998a). 
 In cases where there are no explicit degree modifiers, as in Floyd is tall, Anderson & Morzycki 
assume that the null morpheme EVAL (from Rett 2008), reminiscent of POS (Cresswell 1976; von 
Stechow 1984; Kennedy 1997; a.o.),
27
 rescues the derivation from having the trivial meaning 
‘Floyd has some height’. The occurrence of this morpheme captures the intended meaning, 
namely, ‘Floyd has a certain degree of height that surpasses a contextual standard of 
comparison’:  
 
(110) a. ⟦𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. tall(𝑠, Floyd). 
  b. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑘 ∈ degree. state. kinds(s)[∪𝑘(𝑠) ∧ 𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐]. 
  c. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿 [𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙]⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑘 ∈ degree. state. kinds(s)[∪𝑘(𝑠) ∧ 𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ tall(𝑠, Floyd)].  
                                  by PM 
  
 Once the state argument is existentially bound, this statement is true iff Floyd is in the state 
of having a height that realizes a degree-state-kind k above the standard stc. In sum, Anderson 
& Morzycki’s (2015) approach is appealing because it captures gradability by making use of a 
system that includes degrees as units of representation that do not constitute ontological 
objects in our semantic ontology, but rather they are derived from state-kinds. In this sense, the 
model is placed on an intermediate position between degree-based and degree-less theories, 
since it makes use of degrees as derived notions. 
                                                          
27
 As Anderson & Morzycki (2015) themselves point out, it would also be possible to use the null morpheme POS instead 
of EVAL. In principle, the difference between the two null morphemes has more theoretical than empirical implications: 
POS is restricted to the positive construction, whereas EVAL is supposed to appear in evaluative contexts, since, otherwise, 
the structure would provide a trivial meaning, and can appear in other constructions rather than the positive one. For 
example, for Rett (2008) EVAL must appear in How short is John?, because that sentence entails, she argues, that John is 
short (cf. How tall is John?, which does not entail that John is tall). For the purposes of this dissertation, the choice of EVAL 




 Finally, it is important to note that, in principle, there are no theoretical reasons to exclude 
the possibility that degrees can be built out of event-kinds too. However, Anderson & Morzycki 
show that there is empirical evidence that this is not the case. The activity predicate to run, even 
assuming that it is associated with a scale of path that measures out the traversed distance, 
trigger a manner rather than a degree reading when combined with kind modifiers such as the 
similative as, see (111a); and the same holds for the degree achievement to cool in (111b) even 
assuming that it inherits a scale of coolness from its base adjective.  
 
(111) a. Floyd ran six miles/for two hours, and Clyde ran as Floyd did. 
  b. Floyd cooled his coffee 5 degrees, and Clyde cooled his coffee as Floyd did. 
(Anderson & Morzycki 2015: 810) 
 
 Ultimately, what this data illustrate is that events are not gradable or, at least, are not 
gradable in the same sense as states are.
28
 Recall from section 2.3 that activities, unlike 
(subinterval) states, license temporal readings in gradable constructions (what Fleischhauer 2016 
calls extent gradation versus degree gradation), which is in accordance with the fact that events 
are not gradable or are not gradable in the same sense as states. Note that the degree of 
distance that is associated with Floyd in (111a) or the degree of coolness that is associated with 
Floyd’s coffee in (111b) increases over the course of the events. In contrast, degrees remain 
stable when stative predicates are involved; for instance, stative verbs like to cost are associated 
with a scale of price in which there is a degree that does not change over the course of the 
state.  
 The comparison of the event predicate to run with the stative predicate to cost is telling: for 
example, in John run six miles yesterday, we cannot associate the degree six miles with the whole 
event of swimming, given that this degree is only reached at the end of the event (in fact, note 
that the occurrence of the measure phrase forces a telic and, therefore, heterogeneous 
interpretation: John swam six miles #for/in an hour). In contrast, in The book cost ten euros 
yesterday, we can actually associate the degree ten euros with the whole state of costing. In 
short, if events are not gradable in the relevant sense, that is, in what Fleischhauer (2016) calls 
degree gradation, there is no reason to posit that degrees can be built out of event-kinds.
29
  
                                                          
28
 In fact, Gehrke & Castroviejo (2016), based on the study of the English modifier well (and their counterparts in German 
and Catalan), provide empirical evidence that degree readings can only arise if a stative predicate or, in any case, a 
stative phase, typically a result state, is involved in the predication. In this dissertation, I do not deal with gradability in 
complex predicates that involve an event plus a result stative phase; the reader is referred to Gehrke & Castroviejo 
(2016) and references therein. 
29
 Exceptionally, the Spanish verb correr ‘to run’, unlike English to run, can also amount to a degree reading in similative 
contexts; for instance, Juan corre como María ‘Juan runs like María’, in addition to a manner reading, can also mean ‘Juan 




 In sum, Anderson & Morzycki capture the eventuality nature of gradable adjectives by 
including a state variable s in their denotation. On the one hand, they incorporate one of the 
main attractive points of degree-less theories in dispensing with degrees as ontological objects. 
On the other hand, as in degree-based theories, they make use of units of representations or 
degrees, but they are derived from equivalence classes of states. In the following section, I 
present the model of gradability on which my proposal is based, which includes one 
modification to Anderson & Morzycki’s (2015) model, namely, that gradable adjectives are 
rather predicates of state-kinds. 
 
2.4.2. Gradable adjectives as predicates of kinds 
In this section, I propose that gradable adjectives denote in the domain of state-kinds rather 
than the domain of state-tokens and express state-tokens when they are predicated of a specific 
individual. In that case, an aspectual node AspP attaches to the adjectival structure to realize a 
state-token.   
 Although Anderson & Morzycki’s (2015) model is appealing insofar as it allows us to account 
for the eventuality nature of gradable adjectives and their combination with manner modifiers, a 
model in which gradable adjectives denote in the domain of state-tokens predicts that their 
corresponding deadjectival nominalizations operate in the same domain. However, as we will 
see in chapter 4, deadjectival nominalizations can operate in the kind domain too (for example, 
in Honesty abounds), so it is necessary to modify the model slightly.  
 Above we have seen that the kind-token distinction has usually been applied to the domain 
of entities. Nonetheless, the distinction has also been applied to the domain of events. In this 
respect, Gehrke (2011, 2015, 2017) proposes an analysis in which German eventive verbs are not 
predicates of event-tokens, but rather predicates of event-kinds. This movement allows the 
author to account for the behavior of adjectival passives in German, which reject temporal and 
locative modifiers. According to Gehrke, if verbs denoted event-tokens and, therefore, adjectival 
participles expressed event-resulting states (cf. Kratzer 2000; cf. Koontz-Garboden 2010 for 
English), it would be expected that locative and temporal modification related to that event is 




                                                                                                                                                                          
display; for example, Juan nada / patina / camina / baila / gatea / vuela como María ‘Juan swims / skates / walks / 
dances / crawls / flies like María’ cannot amount to a degree reading. Given that the behavior of correr ‘to run’ is 
exceptional, there are no reasons to posit that events are gradable in the relevant sense, so we can maintain that 




(112) a. *Der Computer ist   vor    drei Tagen repariert. 
       the  computer  is  before three  days   repaired 
  ‘The computer is repaired three days ago.’ 
  b. #Die Reifen sind in der Garage aufgepumpt. 
        the   tires   are  in the  garage     inflated 
  ‘The tires are inflated in the garage.’ 
(From Gehrke 2015: 6) 
 
 In (112a) the temporal modifier vor drei Tagen ‘three days ago’ cannot access the underlying 
event of repairing the computer. Analogously, in (112b) the locative modifier in der Garage ‘in 
the garage’ cannot access the underlying event of inflating the tires; the symbol # indicates that 
there is a possible reading in which the locative modifier locates the state of being inflated. 
 Gehrke argues that the insertion of temporal and locative modification is not acceptable in 
adjectival passives because the state does not entail an event-token, but rather an event-kind. 
Thus, in (112a) repariert ‘repaired’ is the resulting state of the event-kind reparieren ‘to repair’, 
while in (112b) aufgepumpt ‘inflated’ is the resulting state of the event-kind aufpumpen ‘to 
inflate’. For example, for the adjectival passive Die Tür ist geschlossen ‘The door is closed’, 
Gehrke proposes the following denotation: 
 
(113)  ⟦𝐷𝑖𝑒 𝑇ü𝑟 𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑒𝑘, 𝑥𝑘[close(𝑒𝑘) ∧ become(𝑠)(𝑒𝑘) ∧ closed(the door, 𝑠) ∧
Initiator(𝑥𝑘 , 𝑒𝑘)]. 
(From Gehrke 2015: 23) 
 
 In positing that eventive verbs are predicates of event-kinds rather than event-tokens, the 
fact that the adjectival passive Die Tür ist geschlossen ‘The door is closed’ denotes the set of 
resultant states s of an event-kind ek is straightforwardly explained. As Gehrke claims, in case the 
verb triggers an event-token reading, an aspectual node attaches to the structure to associate 
an event-kind from the set of event-kinds with an event-token.
30
  
 In a parallel fashion as Gehrke’s analysis for eventive verbs, in this dissertation I argue that 
gradable adjectives are predicates of state-kinds rather than state-tokens. This movement allows 
us to capture the existence of state-kind deadjectival nominalizations, which will be analyzed in 
chapter 4. Specifically, what I propose is that gradable adjectives are predicates of state-kinds of 
type <sk,t>. If arguments are present, an aspectual node AspP attaches to the structure to 
                                                          
30
 Ramchand (2018) does not employ a technical apparatus that includes kinds, but in the same spirit the author 
implements a proposal in which eventualities are cognitive abstractions that cannot be located in time or space until an 




instantiate a state-kind from the set of state-kinds. For Marcos (es) alto ‘Marcos (is) tall’, I 
propose the following analysis: 
 
(114)    AspP 
   Asp
0
   PredP 
     Marcos  Pred’ 
       Pred
0
   DegP 
         EVAL   AP 
                alto 
(115) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  c. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 .                             
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).              by EI 
  f. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘, m). 
  g. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠). 
  h. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , m) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 The starting point of the derivation is the adjective, which denotes a set of state-kinds of 
type <sk,t> and projects AP. I propose that this set of state-kinds is totally preordered (see 
chapter 4 for a detailed explanation of total preorders and empirical argumentation), which 
means that all states-kinds denoted by the gradable adjective can be ordered with respect to 
one another; therefore, the distinction between degree-state-kinds k, which are inherently 
ordered, and state-kinds sk, which are not, need not be captured that way, so I do not make use 
of the variable k. Accordingly, I posit that the null morpheme EVAL is of type <<sk,t>,<sk,t>> and 
restricts the adjectival domain to those state-kinds that exceed a contextual standard of 
comparison state-kind stc.
31
 An alternative analysis more in line with Anderson & Morzycki 
(2015) in which EVAL is of type <sk,t> and combines intersectively with the adjective could have 
been easily implemented too; this is irrelevant for the purposes of this section.  
                                                          
31
 Zhang (2020) adopts an intermediate stance according to which our semantic ontology must include both degrees as 
state-kinds, as in Anderson & Morzycki (2015), and degrees as numerical representations, as in degree-based theories. 
According to Zhang (2020: 504), “comparatives typically encode comparisons resulting in differences and their semantics 
potentially involves measurable differences”, so they need to be based on scales with numbers. However, by positing 
that there are state-kinds that are inherently ordered, like the ones denoted by measure phrases, and other state-kinds 
that are not, like the ones denoted by manner adjectives like extraño ‘strange’, the existence of degrees as numerical 




 On the other hand, I assume with Wellwood (2014, 2015) that adjectives are a defective 
category that needs the assistance of a functional node, which we can call PredP (Bowers 1993; 
Baker 2003), to introduce its external argument. Alternatively, Anderson & Morzycki propose 
that the holder is introduced in the denotation of the adjective, which is of type <e,<s,t>>, but 
this means that the holder is an internal argument that is base-generated before the insertion of 
the degree modifier, which does not receive syntactic support. Semantically, we can posit that 
the external argument is introduced via the rule Eventuality Identification (EI, from Kratzer’s 1996 
and Wellwood’s 2014 Event Identification rule, see chapter 1), which introduces the individual 
variable x and demotes the state-kind variable sk to second position. The function holder simply 
associates the state-kind sk with the individual x. Subsequently, Spec-PredP saturates the 
individual.  
 So far, the adjectival structure operates in the state-kind domain. In order to express a state-
token, the aspectual node AspP attaches to the structure and introduces the realization function 
R (from Carlson 1977), which associates the state-kind sk with a state-token s. The movement 
from the state-kind to the state-token domain is not unrestricted, but it is rather triggered by 
the occurrence of the adjectival arguments. As shown in chapter 4, the state-kind interpretation 
only holds when the adjectival arguments are absent, as in La honestidad es hermosa ‘(lit.) The 
honesty is beautiful, Honesty is beautiful’), so there is a tight connection between the token 
interpretation and the presence of arguments. In other words, the functional node AspP can 
only operate when PredP, which is the functional node that introduces a subject, appears in the 
derivation. Once the state argument s is bound (presumably in TP), the statement is true iff there 
is a state(-token) of having a height s that is associated with a state-kind sk whose holder is 
Marcos, and that state-kind sk is above a contextual state-kind stc. 
 Finally, note that, unlike Chierchia (1998a), I do not take kinds to be functions from worlds 
into pluralities, but rather, like Carlson (1977, 2003), Gehrke (2011, 2015, 2017) and Espinal & 
Borik (2015), as undivided ontological objects with their own semantic type. Thus, although 
kinds are the result of generalizing over various instances, e.g. the kind rabbit consists in all 
rabbits in any given world, the result of this generalization is a segregated object, so we can take 
the kind rabbit as an integral object. Consequently, unlike Chierchia (1998a) and Anderson & 
Morzycki (2015), I do not employ the up operator ∪ to represent the realization relation; rather, 
my analysis includes the realization function R, from Carlson (1977), which associates a state-
kind from the set of the state-kinds denoted by the adjective with a state-token.  
 With respect to measure phrases, we can take them as predicates of state-kinds of type 
<sk,t>. Given that the co-occurrence of measure phrases with adjectives in Spanish is extremely 




(116)    AspP 
   Asp
0
   PredP 
     Marcos  Pred’ 
       Pred
0
   DegP 
        two meters  AP 
                 tall 
(117) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . two. meters(𝑠𝑘).   
  c. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ two. meters(𝑠𝑘).                     by PM 
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ two. meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).               by EI 
  f. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ two. meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , m). 
  g. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠). 
  h. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ two. meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , m) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 Once the state argument s is existentially bound, the statement is true iff there is a state(-
token) of having a height that is associated with a state-kind sk whose holder is Marcos and that 
state-kind is two meters. 
 Before closing this section, it is important to reflect on manner modifiers and the problem 
that they raise. Specifically, Anderson & Morzycki note that manner modifiers give rise to 
entailments to the positive: for example, Floyd is strangely tall entails that Floyd is tall, and the 
same holds for Spanish, hence the following contradiction:   
 
(118) #Floyd es extrañamente alto, pero no    es    alto. 
    Floyd  is     strangely     tall    but not is.3.SG  tall 
  ‘Floyd is strangely tall, but he is not tall.’ 
 
 Anderson & Morzycki (2015: 823) claim that the most natural way of accounting for the 
entailment is to insert the null morpheme EVAL, but the authors are not completely convinced of 
this movement because in that case “this couldn’t be driven by a need to avoid fatally weak 
truth conditions”. In other words, the null morpheme EVAL is supposed to rescue the derivation 
from having the trivial meaning ‘Floyd has some height’ only in the absence of an explicit 
modifier, but the manner modifier should prevent a trivial meaning if, like degree modifiers, it 
introduces state-kinds. Moreover, manner and degree modifiers are in complementary 




where the symbol # indicates that there is an acceptable reading in which extrañamente 
‘strangely’ functions as a propositional rather than a manner modifier, in which case it would 
mean ‘It is strange to me that Floyd is very tall / taller than Clyde’:  
 
(119) a. *Floyd is strangely six feet tall. 
  b. *Floyd is strangely very/really tall. 
  c. ??Floyd is strangely taller than Clyde. 
(Anderson & Morzycki 2015: 822) 
(120) a. #Floyd es extrañamente muy/poco alto. 
       Floyd  is      strangely     very  little  tall 
  b. #Floyd es extrañamente más  alto que Clyde.
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    Floyd  is     strangely    more  tall than Clyde 
 
 I cannot provide a satisfactory solution to this empirical problem, but I can point to two 
possible analyses. The first analysis consists in positing that adverbs like extrañamente 
‘strangely’, like degree modifiers, have a gradable semantics and introduce a contextual 
standard of comparison state-kind in their denotation; in prose, manner modifiers would be 
degree modifiers that entail the semantics of EVAL:  
 
(121) a. ⟦𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎ñ𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ strange(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 𝐺 . 
  b. ⟦𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎ñ𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ strange(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙 .         
 
 This analysis has the advantage of offering a unified treatment for degree and manner 
adverbs, but it cannot offer a unified account for both manner adverbs and adjectives, since the 
latter do not give rise to entailments to the positive. For instance, (122a) does not entail that the 
dunes are tall: the height of the dunes might be strange because it is extremely low or because 
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 In Spanish, open scale adjectives like alto ‘tall’ do not license measure phrases, so there is no adjectival structure 
equivalent to Floyd is six feet tall. According to Sawada & Grano (2011), only lower-closed scale adjectives are 
compatible with measure phrases, which must appear is post-adjectival position: 
 
(i)  Esta varilla está doblada noventa grados. 
   this    rod     is      bent        ninety  degrees 
  ‘This rod is ninety degrees bent.’ 
(From Sawada & Grano 2011: 196) 
 
 If adverbs like extrañamente ‘strangely’ co-appear with the measure phrase, as in (ii), the unique interpretation 
available is the one in which extrañamente ‘strangely’ functions as a propositional rather than a manner modifier, as 
correctly predicted if manner and degree modifiers are in complementary distribution: 
 
(ii)  #La varilla está extrañamente doblada noventa grados. 




it is variable (I will come back to this issue in chapter 3). In this case, we would have to articulate 
an analysis in which the adverbial morpheme -mente contributes a standard of comparison 
when attaching to adjectives to form adverbs. However, more problematic would be to account 
for the behavior of manner adverbs when modifying non-gradable predicates, as in (122b), 
where the eventive verb comportarse ‘to behave’ is not gradable (in the relevant sense). In this 
case, we would need to posit that the degree modifier extrañamente ‘strangely’ is formed out of 
its homonymous manner modifier, which would complicate the system in introducing additional 
complexity. 
 
(122) a. La  altura  de las dunas es extraña. 
     the height of  the  dunes  is strange  
  a. Floyd  se comportó extrañamente. 
     Floyd  REFL behaved      strangely 
  ‘Floyd behaved strangely.’ 
 
 The second possible analysis would be to insert the null morpheme EVAL in the computation, 
in line with what Anderson & Morzycki (2015) point out: 
  
(123) a. ⟦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  c. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿[𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜]⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐. 
  d. ⟦𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎ñ𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . strange(𝑠𝑘). 
  e. ⟦𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎ñ𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 [𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿[𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜]]⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ strange(𝑠𝑘).                    by PM 
 
 This analysis has the advantage of offering a unified treatment for manner adverbs and 
adjectives, but raises two problems: the former is syntactic, namely, that manner and degree 
modifiers are in complementary distribution, as shown above, so the presence of EVAL would be 
an annoying exception. The second problem is to find out a semantic justification for its 
occurrence, given that the equivalent nominal structure is acceptable: 
 
(124) Las dunas tienen una altura extraña. 
  the dunes  have    a   height strange 





 If the null morpheme EVAL has to appear when manner modifiers are involved to avoid fatally 
weak truth conditions, it would be predicted that (124), which does not entail that the dunes are 
tall, is ungrammatical, but this is not the case. Nonetheless, we can validate the insertion of EVAL 
in the adjectival structure by positing that, in contrast to the nominal structure, the adjectival 
structure demands a degree modifier that introduces a standard of comparison. Accordingly, 
Floyd is strangely tall demands the presence of EVAL for the same reason as Floyd is tall, that is, 
because both adjectival structures do not include an explicit degree modifier (like very, too, 
enough, etc.). In that case, what we would need to explain is why the adjectival structure must be 
evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison in all cases, especially taking into account 
that degree modifiers are adjuncts or unselected constituents. In conclusion, the two possible 
analyses present their own advantages and drawbacks.  
 I cannot add anything else in relation to this issue; I analyze manner adjectives in 
combination with deadjectival nominalizations in chapter 3 and with possessive structures that 
involve the verb tener ‘to have’, as the one in (124), in chapter 4, providing evidence that these 
contexts do not give rise to entailments to the positive or, applying the previous reasoning, that 
deadjectival nominalizations need not be evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison in 
the absence of an explicit mass quantifier or measure phrase. Thus, I will show that manner 
adjectives, unlike their corresponding manner adverbs, do not pose such a problem. 
 To sum up, in this chapter I have proposed one specific refinement to Anderson & Morzycki’s 
(2015) model of gradability, namely, that gradable adjectives denote in the domain of state-
kinds rather than state-tokens; gradable adjectives can express state-tokens when they are 
predicated of a specific individual, in which case the aspectual node AspP attaches to the 
syntactic structure to instantiate a state-kind from the set of state-kinds. In the following 
section, I summarize the main insights of the chapter.   
 
2.5. Summary of the chapter 
Given that ‘stativity’ is the fundamental notion that articulates the semantics of deadjectival 
nominalizations, this chapter is devoted to disentangling the intricacies of stative predicates. In 
section 2.1, I have provided evidence that gradable adjectives express states and have offered an 
exhaustive characterization of stativity: inspired by Vendler (1957) and Dowty (1979), states are 
defined as temporal objects that do not involve dynamism or change, in contrast to events, 
which do involve dynamism or change. The notion of ‘change’ is applicable to the participants of 
the eventualities: if any of the participants undergo a change, that eventuality is an event; by 




 In section 2.2, I have shown that the difference among individual-level, stage-level and 
stative causative predicates is not based on spatiotemporality, aspect or the relative-absolute 
distinction. Rather, I have argued that they differ as to how causation is manifested in each case: 
individual-level states express non-caused properties, and the adjectives that express them 
combine with the copula ser. Stage-level states introduce stages as external causes, where the 
cause must be taken as a direct cause in the sense of Maienborn & Herdtfelder (2017); stage-
level adjectives combine with the copula estar. Finally, stative causatives are not states endowed 
with event properties (cf. Maienborn 2005a, 2005b, 2007), but rather they are states that are 
internally caused (Leferman 2017). Stative causative adjectives can license the two copulas. In 
short, the notion of ‘causation’ is relevant to compose the typology of stative predicates. 
 In section 2.3 I have argued that, although many stative predicates are gradable, stativity 
does not entail gradability. There are gradable states like alto ‘alto’ and querer ‘to love’, while 
there are non-gradable states like pertenecer ‘to belong’ or poseer ‘to own’. On the other hand, 
certain stative causatives like esperar ‘to wait’ and dormir ‘to sleep’ are, like activities, divisible in 
intervals, while other stative causatives like valiente ‘brave’ and pure states like querer ‘to love’ 
are divisible in instants; accordingly, only the former yield temporal interpretations in gradable 
constructions. Both activities and states are homogenous insofar as they are cumulative and 
divisible either in intervals or instants, while accomplishments and achievements are 
heterogeneous insofar as they are neither cumulative nor divisible. In brief, the notions of 
‘gradability’ and ‘strict homogeneity’ are, like ‘causation’, relevant to configure the whole 
typology of stative predicates.  
 Finally, in section 2.4 I have presented Anderson & Morzycki’s (2015) model, according to 
which gradable adjectives encode a state argument s and degrees are built out of state-kinds. 
The most important advantage of this model is that it allows us to correctly capture the fact that 
gradable adjectives are subject to time. In addition, it assumes an intermediate stance between 
degree-based and degree-less theories, insofar as it includes units of measurement or degrees, 
but these are derived from state-kinds rather than constituting ontological objects, thus making 
the model simpler. This said, drawing on Gehrke’s (2011, 2015, 2017) insights, I have proposed a 
slight refinement according to which gradable adjectives are predicates of state-kinds rather 
than state-tokens; the state-token reading holds when the adjectival property is predicated of 
their arguments, in which case an aspectual node instantiates a state-kind from the set of state-
tokens.  
 Having offered a precise characterization of stativity and its interaction with causation, 
homogeneity and gradability, in the following chapter I tackle the analysis of deadjectival 




imperfective states and explaining their main morphosyntactic and semantic properties when 





































Deadjectival nominalizations in the state-token domain 
 
In the previous chapter, I have offered a precise characterization of states as non-dynamic 
properties that are subject to time, where the term non-dynamic means that the participants of 
states do not undergo any changes. In addition, I have argued that notions like ‘causation’, ‘strict 
homogeneity’ and ‘gradability’ do not constitute defining properties of states, but they play an 
essential role when classifying the different types of stative predicates. Designing a thorough 
model of gradability is of especial importance, since deadjectival nominalizations are derived 
from gradable predicates. Drawing on Anderson & Morzycki (2015) and Gehrke (2011, 2015, 
2017), I have designed a model of gradability in which gradable adjectives are predicates of 
state-kinds, but they can express state-tokens if they are predicated of a specific individual. 
 In this chapter, I address the first part of the analysis, where I delve into the morphology-
semantics interface of state(-token) deadjectival nominalizations, providing evidence that they 
express imperfective states, since they express non-dynamic properties that are subject to time 
and do not include their temporal boundaries. Following Fábregas (2016), in section 3.1 I show 
that Spanish deadjectival nominalizations can convey two readings in the absence of an explicit 
mass quantifier or measure phrase: a quality reading, which involves the semantics of the null 
morpheme EVAL, and a degree reading, which does not. However, contra Fábregas (2016), for 
whom deadjectival nominalizations express qualities in the quality reading and degrees in the 
degree reading, I argue that deadjectival nominalizations express states in both cases. 
Furthermore, the existence of degree readings is taken as evidence that deadjectival 
nominalizations, unlike their base adjectives, do not have to be assessed with respect to a 
standard of comparison. 
 In section 3.2 I examine the combination of state-token deadjectival nominalizations with 
event, temporal, frequency, aspectual, locative and manner modifiers. The fact that these 
nominalizations do not pass the standard tests that are used for identifying events is an 
indication that they do not express events. On the other hand, the fact that these 
nominalizations accept temporal, frequency and even locative and manner modifiers, but they 
reject aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’ even though they are atelic, reveals that they 
express imperfective eventualities.  
 In section 3.3, I focus on the individual-level, stage-level and stative causative distinction in 
the nominal domain and provide evidence that the readings that deadjectival nominalizations 




 In section 3.4, I show that deadjectival nominalizations inherit the scalar properties of the 
base adjective and invoke the same type of comparison classes (between or within comparison 
class).  
 In section 3.5 I discuss the semantic role of deadjectival nominalizers, providing evidence that 
they can take as their input either the whole domain of state-kinds denoted by the 
nominalization, which is the most common situation, or a proper subset thereof, which accounts 
for the phenomenon of semantic narrowing.   
 Finally, section 3.6 summarizes the main ideas of the chapter.  
 
3.1. Quality vs. degree readings 
Following Fábregas (2016), in this section I show that deadjectival nominalizations can express 
either a quality or a degree reading in the absence of an explicit mass quantifier, such as mucho 
‘a lot of, much’ or poco ‘little’, or a measure phrase.
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 I must say that I use the terms quality and 
degree readings as mere labels, but I do not assume the existence of qualities or degrees as 
ontological objects, unlike Fábregas. Instead, I argue that deadjectival nominalizations express 
states in both cases. The quality reading arises when EVAL is involved in the nominal structure, 
while the degree reading arises when this null morpheme is not involved. My contribution in this 
respect is twofold: on the one hand, I argue that deadjectival nominalizations express states in 
both the quality and degree readings. On the other hand, I take the existence of the degree 
reading, in which there is no element that provides a standard of comparison, as evidence that 
deadjectival nominalizations differ from their base adjectives in that the former do not have to 
be assessed with respect to a standard of comparison.  
 Let us first examine the two readings. According to Fábregas (2016), most Spanish 
deadjectival nominalizations can trigger either a quality or a degree reading (with very few 
exceptions, which will be analyzed in subsection 3.2.3.2 for expository purposes). In order to 
identify the two readings, the author proposes the use of no es suficiente ‘is not enough’ as a 
diagnostic. For example, imagine a context in which a committee interviews several candidates 
for a role for a movie and, after interviewing Juan, they utter (1) and decide not to hire him. 
 
(1)  La  belleza  de Juan no es suficiente para ese papel. 
  the beauty  of  Juan not is   enough    for  that  role 
  R1: ‘Juan’s degree of beauty is not enough for that role.’ 
  R2: ‘Juan’s quality of being beautiful is not enough for that role.’ 
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 Fábregas (2016) talks about scale rather than degree readings, but I prefer to use the latter term because it is more 
transparent insofar as it gives rise to paraphrases that involve the word degree, as will be shown below. The choice of 




 In uttering (1), we do not know whether the committee did not hire Juan because he is not 
beautiful enough or because the only relevant property that Juan has is actually that he is 
beautiful. In the degree reading, (1) expresses that Juan’s degree of beauty is not enough to get 
the role; in other words, for that role it is necessary to have a higher degree of beauty, i.e. to be 
more beautiful. In contrast, in the quality reading (1) expresses that Juan is beautiful, but that 
property is not enough to get the role (for example, it is also necessary to be a singer).  
 Let us examine the example of profundidad ‘depth, deepness’, for which the English 
translation is very useful, since the two readings are expressed by means of different words: 
 
(2)  La    profundidad   de esta piscina no es suficiente para nadar bien. 
  the depth/deepness of  this   pool   not is   enough     to   swim  well 
  R1: ‘The depth of this pool is not enough to swim well.’ 
  R2: ‘The deepness of this pool is not enough to swim well.’ 
 
 In the degree reading, where profundidad is translated as depth, (2) conveys that the pool is 
not deep enough to swim well or, in other words, that the pool’s degree of depth is not high 
enough to swim well. In contrast, in the quality reading, where profundidad is translated as 
deepness, (2) conveys that the pool is deep, but that property is not the only one required to 
swim well (for instance, we also need the pool to be completely clean). As shown in chapter 1, 
Moltmann (2009) and Baglini (2015) had already noted this contrast in English: DPs containing 
underived nouns like Mark’s height/weight do not entail the semantics of the corresponding 
adjectival structures Mark is tall/heavy; in contrast, Mark’s tallness/heaviness do entail that 
semantics. In contemporary Spanish, there are no contrasts like the ones in English (perhaps the 
pair peso ‘weight’ / gordura ‘fatness’ < gordo ‘fat’ is an exception): instead, deadjectival 
nominalizations can trigger both readings.   
 I will show next syntactic contexts in which only one reading is available. On the one hand, 
predicates like es una de sus propiedades/cualidades ‘is one of its properties/qualities’ induce a 
quality reading. The rationale behind this test is the following one: assuming that being in the 
state of having some height, hardness, beauty, etc. is trivial insofar as all entities are endowed 
with a certain degree of height, hardness, beauty, etc., the predicate es una de sus 
propiedades/cualidades ‘is one of its properties/qualities’ forces an interpretation whereby a 
standard of comparison is entailed. On the other hand, as shown by Fábregas (2016), predicates 
like es mínimo/máximo ‘is minimal/maximal’ and measure phrases in predicative position induce 





(3)  a. La   dureza  de este mineral es una de sus propiedades. 
     the hardness of  this  mineral is one  of   its    properties 
  b. La   dureza  de este mineral es mínima / máxima / de 7 (en la escala de Mohs).  
     the hardness of  this mineral  is minimal  maximal   of  7   in the scale  of  Mohs 
  ‘The hardness of this mineral is minimal / maximal / 7 in Mohs scale.’  
 
 (3a) has a quality reading according to which one of the properties of the mineral is that it is 
hard; the degree reading whereby one of its properties is that it has some hardness is extremely 
odd and trivial insofar as all physical objects are associated with some degree of hardness. In 
contrast, (3b) has a degree reading according to which the mineral’s degree of hardness is 
associated with a certain specific degree, and that the mineral is hard only follows if the modifier 
máxima ‘maximal’ occurs; the quality reading in which the mineral’s being hard is 
minimal/maximal/7 does not make any sense.  
 Deadjectival nominalizations show an interesting contrast with respect to their base 
adjectives, since they license degree readings, in which no standard of comparison is entailed. 
The reason why nominalizations license degree readings is that, in contrast to their base 
adjectives, the former do not have to be evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison in 
the absence of an explicit mass quantifier / measure phrase or, in other words, the former do 
not combine obligatorily with the null morpheme EVAL. In chapter 4, by analyzing possessive 
structures that involve the verb tener ‘to have’, I provide more empirical evidence that 
deadjectival nominalizations need not be assessed with respect to a standard of comparison.  
 We can conclude with Fábregas (2016) that Spanish deadjectival nominalizations can trigger 
either a quality or a degree reading in the absence of an explicit mass quantifier or measure 
phrase, where only the quality reading includes the semantics of EVAL. Unlike Fábregas, though, I 
do not assume the existence of degrees or qualities as ontological objects; rather, in both the 
quality and degree readings the DP containing a deadjectival nominalization denotes a state, 
but in the degree reading a standard of comparison is not entailed. The fact that deadjectival 
nominalizations allow for a degree reading is explained because the obligatory occurrence of 
EVAL does not hold.
34
 In the following subsection, I provide the technical details of the analysis. 
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 As advanced in chapter 2, I must admit that I cannot provide a thorough explanation as to why deadjectival 
nominalizations, in contrast to their base adjectives, are not necessarily evaluated with respect to a standard of 





3.1.1. Technical implementation 
In this section I offer a morphosyntactic and semantic composition of deadjectival 
nominalizations, showing how a model that includes kinds and tokens can account 
compositionally for their composition and for both the quality and degree readings. 
 The starting point is the derivation of an adjectival structure, which is the input for 
deadjectival nominalizations. Specifically, I offer an analysis of the individual-level predicate 
popular ‘popular’ in Rosa (es) popular ‘Rosa is popular’: 
  
(4)   AspP 
  Asp
0
  PredP 
    Rosa  Pred’ 
     Pred
0
   DegP 
       EVAL     AP 
           popular 
(5)  a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  c. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).           by EI 
  f. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , r).   
  g. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  h. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , r) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 The details of the adjectival structure are offered in chapter 2, so I only highlight two 
important aspects here: first, the adjectival structure invokes a standard of comparison in the 
absence of an explicit degree modifier or, in other words, the null morpheme EVAL must appear 
in the positive construction. Second, when the adjectival property is predicated of its subject, i.e. 
when PredP is included in the derivation, the adjectival structure acquires an episodic qua token 
interpretation, so the functional node AspP attaches to the structure to instantiate a state-kind 
from the set of state-kinds. Once the state-token argument s is bound, the result of the 
derivation is a proposition that is true iff there is a state that is associated with a state-kind of 
popularity whose holder is Rosa, and that state-kind exceeds a contextual state-kind stc.   
 Now let us examine the composition of deadjectival nominalizations. In order to capture the 
quality and degree readings, I propose that only the derivation of the former must include the 




Fábregas (2016), where only the quality reading includes DegP. The node PredP is present in 
both types of nominalizations, which accounts for their ability to take a subject/holder (Roy 
2010; Fábregas 2016). For the quality reading of la popularidad de Rosa ‘the popularity of Rosa’ 
(i.e. ‘the state in which Rosa is popular’), I propose the following composition: 
 
(6)     DP  
   la         AspP3 
          AspP2       PP 
   AspP1     i      
 Asp
0
   NP      
   -idad  PredP 
     ti   Pred’      de Rosai 
      Pred
0
   DegP   
        EVAL   AP 
            popular 
(7)  a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  c. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).           by EI 
  f. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  g. ⟦−𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  h. ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  i. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  j. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  k. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)].          by λ-A 
  l. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , r) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  m. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ = 𝜄𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , r) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 The starting point of the derivation is the adjective, which denotes a property of state-kinds 
and combines with EVAL, which introduces a contextual standard of comparison. I assume with 
von Stechow (2012) and references therein that the movement of arguments can be captured by 
means of lambda abstraction (λ-A), which accounts for argument structure inheritance. Thus, the 
holder Rosa is base-generated in Spec-PredP and, when the nominalizer attaches to the 




PP, in turn, will be assigned interpretation in its landing site. On the other hand, the preposition 
de ‘of’ is just required because of categorial reasons, but it does not play any role in the 
semantic computation. With respect to the incorporation of the adjective into NP, it can be 
considered head to head movement, which can be captured by reconstruction in the Logical 
Form according to von Stechow (2012) and references therein; for convenience sake, I leave the 
adjective in its base position.  
 The nominalizer, -idad, can be taken as an affix that simply changes the category to which it 
attaches, from an adjective to a noun in this case, so we can posit that it denotes an identity 
function (although see section 3.5 for discussion). Once the nominalization is formed, the 
aspectual node AspP operates over NP to associate a state-kind from the set of state-kinds with 
a state-token.
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 The holder of the state is bound at this point by Lambda Abstraction (λ-A); 
finally, the determiner attaches to AspP3 and introduces the iota operator ι, which picks up the 
unique relevant state from a set of states. The result of the derivation is the unique state that is 
associated with a state-kind of popularity whose holder is Rosa and that state-kind is above a 
contextual standard state-kind.  
 The composition for the degree reading is offered below. Specifically, the degree reading of 
la popularidad de Rosa ‘the popularity of Rosa’ must denote the state in which Rosa has some 
degree of popularity:   
 
(8)     DP  
   la         AspP3 
      AspP2       PP 
   AspP1     i      
 Asp
0
   NP      
   -idad  PredP 
     ti   Pred’     de Rosai 
      Pred
0
     AP   
             popular 
 (9) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  c. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).                by EI 
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  e. ⟦−𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  f. ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
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  g. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  h. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  i. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘, 𝑠)].            by λ-A 
  j. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , r) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  k. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ = 𝜄𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[popular(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , r) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 The sole difference with respect to the quality reading is that the null morpheme EVAL, which 
projects DegP, does not appear in the derivation. This analysis is in accordance with the 
syntactic analysis provided in Fábregas (2016), according to which the degree reading does not 
include DegP in the derivation. The result of the derivation is the unique state that is associated 
with a state-kind of popularity whose holder is Rosa. Note that, in contrast to the adjectival 
structure, which demands the presence of EVAL in the absence of an explicit degree modifier, the 
nominal structure allows for a degree reading that does not entail a standard of comparison. In 
other words, in the degree reading any degree on the scale can be associated with the holder of 
the state.  
 The analysis proposed here for both the quality and degree readings accounts 
compositionally for the fact that deadjectival nominalizations inherit stativity and argument 
structure from their base adjectives. The analysis also captures the fact that they express 
imperfective states; as will be shown in section 3.2.4 in detail, adjectives trigger an imperfective 
interpretation by default and, only when they combine with the copula, they can trigger a 
perfective interpretation. Deadjectival nominalizations do not include the copula in their 
derivation, so they cannot contain information related to perfective aspect; as a consequence, 
we can posit that the variable s actually stands for ‘imperfective state’ unless additional 
perfective information is involved.  
 In this section, I have taken for granted that deadjectival nominalizations express 
imperfective states. In the following section, I provide the corresponding empirical evidence that 
this is actually the case.  
 
3.2. Identifying states in the nominal domain 
In this section, I argue that deadjectival nominalizations express imperfective states: on the one 
hand, they express states because they reject event modifiers and accept temporal and 
frequency (and even locative and manner) modifiers, which reveals that they are subject to time 
and do not involve change in any of their participants. On the other hand, they are imperfective 
because they reject aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’ even though they are atelic, 




 As shown in chapter 1, the literature on deadjectival nominalizations has employed different 
semantic notions in order to explain their core semantics. In particular, it has been claimed that 
DPs containing deadjectival nominalizations denote states (Roy 2010; Villalba 2013; Borer 2013; 
Baglini 2015; Glass 2019); qualities (Levinson 1978, 1980; Nicolas 2004, 2010; Villalba 2009; 
Alexiadou 2011b; Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2015, 2017a, 2017b; Fábregas 2016 with respect 
to quality readings); states with respect to stage-level predicates and qualities with respect to 
individual-level ones (Martin 2013; Jaque & Martín 2019); degrees (Bochnak 2013; Baglini 2015 
with respect to English underived nouns like height; Fábregas 2016 with respect to degree 
readings); or tropes (Moltmann 2004, 2009, 2015; Richtarcikova 2017).  
 In this chapter, I provide empirical evidence that state-based accounts are superior to the 
other ones, since they capture the eventuality nature of deadjectival nominalizations. However, 
although this characterization seems to be adequate, it is also insufficient, insofar as there are 
principled reasons to posit that deadjectival nominalizations express imperfective states, where 
imperfective means that they do not include their temporal boundaries, as explained in 
subsection 3.2.4. By examining Spanish nominalizations carefully, I show that they accept 
temporal and frequency modification naturally, but they reject aspectual modifiers headed by 
durante ‘for’, which delimit the duration of atelic eventualities. The distinction between temporal 
and aspectual modifiers has gone almost unnoticed in the literature on deadjectival 
nominalizations, but it is crucial to reach a better understanding of their constitutive properties.  
 Thus, what I argue here is that, while the licensing of temporal modification reveals that a 
predicate is subject to time, i.e. it is an eventuality, the licensing of aspectual modifiers indicates 
that the predicate can trigger a perfective interpretation. Spanish is very illustrative in this 
respect, since verbs, including the copulas ser and estar, can bear either perfective or 
imperfective morphology in the past tense. Crucially, only perfective interpretations license 
aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’, for atelic predicates, and headed by en ‘in’, for telic 
predicates (García Fernández 1999, 2000). Given that deadjectival nominalizations do not include 
the copula in their morphological structure and that adjectives cannot bear perfective 
information without the assistance of the copula, deadjectival nominalizations cannot trigger 
perfective interpretations. As a consequence, they express imperfective eventualities.  
 In the following subsection, I start developing my analysis with the examination of 
deadjectival nominalizations that co-occur with event modifiers. 
 
3.2.1. Event modification 
In this subsection, I provide evidence that deadjectival nominalizations do not express events, 




domain (see Picallo 1991, 1999; Bosque 1999; RAE & ASALE 2009; Fábregas & Marín 2012; Marín 
2013; Jaque 2014; Arche & Marín 2015; Fábregas 2016 for Spanish). I am not aware of any 
proposals according to which deadjectival nominalizations express events, so we do not need to 
dwell on this.   
 First, deadjectival nominalizations do not co-occur with the predicate tener lugar ‘to take 
place’ regardless of whether they are derived from individual-level adjectives, as in (10a), stage-
level adjectives, as in (10b), or mental state adjectives, as in (10c). In contrast, simple event 
nouns like reunión ‘meeting’ and event nominalizations like construcción ‘building’ show an 
opposite behavior, see (11). 
 
(10) a. *La pureza  del   agua  tuvo lugar   ayer. 
       the purity of.the water took place yesterday 
  b. *La  tristeza   del   payaso tuvo lugar   ayer.  
       the sadness of.the  clown  took place yesterday 
  c. *La honestidad de María con  Juan tuvo lugar    ayer.  
       the  honesty    of  María with Juan took place yesterday 
  ‘María’s honesty to Juan took place yesterday.’ 
(11) a. La  reunión / construcción  del  puente tuvo lugar   ayer.  
     the meeting      building    of.the  bridge took place yesterday 
 
 Second, deadjectival nominalizations, unlike event nouns, do not accept celerative modifiers 
like rápido ‘fast’ and lento ‘slow’: 
 
(12) a. *la   rápida pureza   del  agua 
       the   fast    purity  of.the water 
  b. *la   lenta tristeza  de Juan 
       the slow  sadness  of  Juan 
  c. *la   rápida honestidad de Juan con María 
       the   fast      honesty    of Juan with María 
(13) la  rápida reunión / construcción  del  puente 





 In sum, deadjectival nominalizations do not pass the standard tests that are used for 
identifying events in the nominal domain.
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 We can conclude that deadjectival nominalizations 
do not express events. In the following subsection, I analyze the combination of deadjectival 
nominalizations with temporal modifiers.  
 
3.2.2. Temporal modification 
In this subsection, I show that deadjectival nominalizations can co-occur with temporal 
modifiers, which provides evidence that they can be located in time and, therefore, that they do 
not express atemporal properties or qualities. Before that, I will describe the general properties 
of temporal modifiers briefly in order to attain a better understanding of their syntax and 
semantics. 
 Syntactically, temporal modifiers are unselected constituents or adjuncts that mainly take the 
form of PPs, like en este momento ‘at this moment’; adverbs, like mañana ‘tomorrow’; DPs, like 
aquel día ‘that day’; verbal phrases headed by hacer ‘(lit.) to do, ago’, like hace muchos años ‘(lit.) 
it does many years, many years ago’; and adverbial clauses preceded by cuando ‘when’, like 
cuando Juan fue al cine ‘when Juan went to the movies’, antes ‘before’ or después ‘after’, etc. 
Semantically, temporal modifiers locate eventualities in the temporal line, informing about 
whether the eventuality holds in the past, the future or the present. Thus, time is a deictic 
category that locates eventualities in relation to the speech time (see García Fernández 1999, 
2000; Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria 2000, 2004, 2007, 2014).
37
 In (8) I illustrate some temporal 
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 Another test that is usually employed to identify events in the nominal domain is the predicate presenciar ‘to witness’, 
but it does not give rise to clear contrasts when nominalizations derived from mental state adjectives are involved. 
Consider the following data:   
 
(i)  a. *El hombre presenció  la honestidad de María con Juan. 
       the   guy     witnessed  the   honesty     of  María with Juan 
  b. Los  vecinos  presenciaron la violencia de los  manifestantes.  
      the neighbors    witnessed   the violence  of  the     protestors      
  ‘The neighbors witnessed the protestors’ violence’ 
 
 Both honestidad ‘honesty’ and violencia ‘violence’ are derived from mental state adjectives, which presuppose an 
event according to Martin (2006, 2008, 2015): for example, in order for the speaker to claim that someone was 
honest/violent, it is necessary that that the individual involved in the predication did something. However, the 
nominalization violencia ‘violence’ shows an unexpected behavior in accepting the predicate presenciar ‘to witness’, 
given that deadjectival nominalizations derived from mental state adjectives express internally caused states, as argued 
in chapter 2. The explanation of this contrast may be that the event presupposed by violencia ‘violence’ is more salient 
than the one presupposed by honestidad ‘honesty’, so it is more easily perceived by sight.   
37
 Temporal modifiers are usually classified into three categories as well depending on their referential nature: deictic 
modifiers are oriented to the speech time; anaphoric modifiers are oriented to a temporal point that is not the speech 
time; and variable modifiers are oriented to no matter what temporal point: 
 
(i)  a. Juan   llegará   mañana. 
     Juan arrive.FUT tomorrow 
  b. Juan   llegará       al    día  siguiente. 
      Juan arrive.FUT   at.the day  following 





modifiers that refer to a moment of the past, the present or the future with respect to the 
speech time:   
 
(14) a. El  profesor llegó      ayer /    el    mes  pasado   / hace unos   años / el    lunes. 
     the teacher arrived yesterday the  month   last         ago several years  the Monday 
  ‘The teacher arrived yesterday / last month / several years ago / on Monday.’  
  b. El  profesor está llegando ahora / en este momento. 
     the teacher    is    arriving   now      at  this  moment    
  c. El  profesor  llegará     mañana / después / el próximo viernes / el   lunes. 
     the teacher arrive.FUT  tomorrow     after      the   next     Friday    the Monday 
  ‘The teacher will arrive tomorrow / after / next Friday / on Monday.’ 
 
 The temporal modifiers that appear in (14a) locate the eventuality of arriving in some 
moment of the past; the ones that appear in (14b) locate the eventuality in the present; and the 
ones that appear in (14c) locate the eventuality in some moment of the future. Note that el lunes 
‘(lit.) the Monday, on Monday’ can refer to a day that is located either in the past or in the 
future, and only the context helps us determine its reference.  
 At this point, it is important to distinguish temporal modifiers headed by the prepositions 
durante ‘during’ and en ‘in’ from aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’ and en ‘in’, which 
are examined in subsection 3.2.4. The former establish a temporal frame within which the 
eventuality holds, while the latter inform about the duration of the eventuality. In addition, while 
aspectual modifiers like durante ‘for’ and en ‘in’ are reserved for atelic and telic interpretations, 
respectively, temporal modifiers do not show any analogous restrictions:  
 
(15) a. Los niños estuvieron tristes  durante/en el funeral. 
      the  kids      were        sad      during  in the funeral  
  ‘The kids were sad during/in the funeral.’ 
  b. Joni bebió agua durante/en la carrera. 
     Joni  drank water during  in  the  race      
  ‘Joni drank water during/in the race.’ 
                                                                                                                                                                          
  c. Juan   llegará  después. 
     Juan arrive.FUT   after 
 
In (ia), mañana ‘tomorrow’ has a deictic reference and refers to the day after the day in which (ia) is uttered; in (ib) al día 
siguiente ‘the following day’ has an anaphoric reference and refers to the day after a different day in which (ib) is uttered; 
and in (ic) después ‘after’ has either a deictic or an anaphoric reference and refers to a moment that is located either 
after (ic) is uttered or after a different moment in which (ic) is uttered. Given that this classification is not crucial for the 




(16) a. El  bebé   nació    durante/en la fiesta. 
    the baby was.born  during   in the party  
  ‘The baby was born during/in the party.’ 
  b. El estudiante leyó un libro  durante/en la reunión. 
     the  student    read  a  book  during   in the meeting   
  ‘The student read a book during/in the meeting.‘  
 
 On the one hand, (15) includes examples of atelic predicates. In (15a) the state (estar) triste 
‘(to be) sad’ and in (15b) the activity beber agua ‘to drink water’ are compatible with the 
temporal modifiers irrespective of whether these are headed by durante ‘during’ or en ‘in’. On 
the other hand, (16) includes examples of telic predicates. In (16a) the achievement nacer ‘to be 
born’ and in (16b) the accomplishment leer un libro ‘to read a book’ are also compatible with 
the temporal modifiers headed by durante and en.  
 The sole semantic difference that I observe between temporal durante-phrases and en-
phrases is that the latter also convey a locative component; accordingly, the verbal eventuality is 
temporally and spatially situated by the temporal adjunct. For example, in (15a) with durante 
‘during’ the kids were sad within the period of time that the funeral took place, but they did not 
necessarily attend the funeral (for instance, they might have been sad at home); in contrast, with 
en ‘in’ the kids were sad within the period of time that the funeral took place and they were 
necessarily present in the funeral. The same holds for the rest of examples mutatis mutandis. 
 Now let us examine how deadjectival nominalizations interact with temporal modifiers: if it is 
the case that deadjectival nominalizations express eventualities, it is expected that they can 
combine with temporal modifiers that situate the eventuality in the temporal line. The following 
data confirm this hypothesis:  
 
(17) a. Ahora  están  hablando de la belleza   del    jardín durante la tormenta de nieve. 
   now  are.3.PL  talking   of the beauty of.the garden during  the  storm    of   snow 
  ‘Now they are talking about the beauty of the garden during the snowstorm.’ 
  b. Ahora  están  hablando de la  amplitud   del  mar de Aral en 1970. 
       now  are.3.PL  talking    of the wideness of.the sea of  Aral  in 1970   
  ‘Now they are talking about the Aral Sea’s wideness in 1970.’ 
(18) a. La   tristeza  de Juan en  el  funeral  de María impresionó  a  todos    ayer. 
      the sadness  of Juan  in  the funeral  of  María  impressed  ACC  all   yesterday 





  b. La  perplejidad de Juan durante la  reunión  fue  tema de  debate    ayer. 
     the   perplexity  of  Juan  during the meeting was  topic of   debate yesterday 
    ‘Juan’s perplexity during the meeting was topic for discussion yesterday.’ 
(19) a. La amabilidad  de Álex con  Gabi aquel día es  inexplicable. 
     the   kindness    of  Álex with Gabi  that  day is  unexplainable 
  ‘Álex’s kindness to Gabi that day is unexplainable.’ 
  b. La  crueldad de Álex con  Gabi cuando   eran    amigos  es inexplicable. 
      the  cruelty   of  Álex with Gabi  when  were.3.PL friends   is unexplainable 
  ‘Álex’s cruelty to Gabi when they used to be friends is unexplainable.’ 
 
 In (17a) the beauty of the garden is temporally located during the snowstorm, in (17b) the 
wideness of the Aral Sea is temporally located in 1970, in (18a) Juan’s sadness is temporally 
located in María’s funeral, in (18b) Juan’s perplexity is temporally located during the meeting, in 
(19a) Álex’s kindness to Gabi is temporally located in some specific day and in (19b) Álex’s 
cruelty is temporally located when Gabi and he used to be friends. What all these data show is 
that deadjectival nominalizations do not express properties inherent in an individual or 
atemporal properties, but rather properties that are subject to time. Moreover, contra what is 
claimed by Fábregas (2016), the combination of deadjectival nominalizations with temporal 
modifiers is a regular rather than an exceptional phenomenon, as advanced in chapter 1. In this 
respect, the attentive reader may have noted that (17) includes nominalizations derived from 
individual-level predicates, (18) includes nominalizations derived from stage-level predicates 
and (19) includes nominalizations derived from mental state adjectives, which proves that this 
three-way distinction is irrelevant with respect to their eventuality properties. 
 In sum, deadjectival nominalizations are naturally compatible with temporal modifiers 
because they express eventualities or properties that are subject to time. In the following 
subsection, I provide evidence that deadjectival nominalizations also accept frequency 
modification. 
 
3.2.3. Frequency adjectives 
In this section, I show that deadjectival nominalizations are compatible with frequency modifiers, 
which provides additional evidence that they express eventualities. Specifically, I will show that 
frequency adjectives can trigger two readings: a temporal reading, in which they inform about 
the number of times a state holds, or a non-temporal reading, in which they inform about the 
number of times a certain degree holds. To capture the two readings, I adapt this insight to the 




operate over state-tokens in the temporal reading, while they operate over state-kinds in the 
non-temporal reading. In addition, I show that frequency modifiers can trigger a temporal 
reading in both prenominal and post-nominal position, while they can only trigger non-
temporal readings in post-nominal position. Thus, an analysis based on the kind-token 
distinction is appealing, since it can capture both the semantics and distribution of frequency 
modifiers when flanking deadjectival nominalizations.   
 In Spanish, like in English, adjectives can appear in attributive or in predicative position. 
However, unlike in English, in Spanish many adjectives in attributive position can appear either 
in prenominal or in post-nominal position. According to Demonte (1999, 2008), the prenominal 
position is the marked one and is usually related to non-restrictive and subjective meanings, 
while the post-nominal position is the unmarked one and is related to restrictive and objective 
meanings. In this respect, as Masià (2017) points out, the literature on this topic has noted that 
there is a myriad of factors that determine the position of adjectives in Spanish, including 
stylistic and rhetorical factors; rhythmic ones; syntactic ones, such as the occurrence of PPs or 
adverbs; the definiteness of the determiner; the nature of the noun, for example whether the 
adjective is a predicate of entities or events; and the type of adjective, for example whether it is 
an adjective of veracity or a modal adjective (see Masià 2017 and references therein for more 
details). In this section, I study the distribution and semantics of frequency adjectives, providing 
evidence that they trigger a temporal reading in prenominal, post-nominal and predicative 
position, while they can trigger a non-temporal reading only in post-nominal position.       
 The point of departure of the study on the combination of deadjectival nominalizations with 
frequency adjectives is Roy’s (2010) seminal work, where the author notes that there is a critical 
contrast between what she calls state and quality nominalizations (see Villalba 2013 for Spanish 
and Borer 2013 for English). Specifically, only the former are compatible with frequency 
adjectives. Roy’s observation is for French, but it is also applicable to Spanish: 
 
(20)  a. La popularité constante *(de ses chansons) m’impressionne. 
     the popularity constant     of   his    songs       me.impresses 
  b. La popularité (*constante) est une qualité  qui     lui     fait  défaut. 
     the popularity    constant     is    a   quality that  to.him does default 
(From Roy 2010: 146) 
(21) a. La (frecuente) honestidad de Leandro con sus padres me impresiona. 
     the  frequent      honesty    of  Leandro with his parents me  impresses 





  b. La (*frecuente) honestidad abunda. 
     the   frequent      honesty    abounds 
 
 According to Roy, in (20a) the DP la popularité constante de ses chansons ‘the constant 
popularity of his songs’ denotes a state, which is able to re-hold and, consequently, the DP can 
combine with the frequency modifier constante ‘constant’. In contrast, in (20b) the DP la 
popularité ‘(lit.) the popularity’ denotes a quality, which is atemporal by definition and, 
consequently, the DP cannot combine with the frequency modifier. Note that the contrast 
hinges on the presence or absence of the argument de ses chansons ‘of his songs’; thus, (20a) is 
unacceptable if the PP de ses chansons ‘of his songs’ does not appear. 
 Following an analogous reasoning, in (21a) the DP la honestidad de Leandro ‘Leandro’s 
honesty’ denotes a state, so it can combine with the frequency modifier; in contrast, in (21b) the 
DP la honestidad ‘(lit.) the honesty’ denotes a quality, so it does not accept the frequency 
modifier. In this dissertation, I claim that the contrast must be expressed in terms of the kind-
token dichotomy: in (21a) there is a state-token in which Leandro is honest to his parents that 
re-holds in time, while in (21b) there is a state-kind that cannot re-hold insofar as kinds do not 
occur in time. Let us leave state-kind nominalizations aside in this subsection, since they will be 
studied in chapter 4, where I also provide arguments in favor of expressing the contrasts in (20) 
and (21) in terms of state-tokens and state-kinds rather than states and qualities.   
 Going back to the data, Roy does not discriminate among nominalizations derived from 
individual-level, stage-level and mental state adjectives, so we have to find out whether this 
three-way distinction of stative predicates is relevant or not with respect to frequency. As 
concluded in chapter 2, individual-level predicates are not prone to re-hold in time; however, if 
an appropriate context is provided, nothing prevents them from co-occurring with frequency 
adjectives. For example, in a context in which the water of a certain lake is pure in winter many 
times, it is possible to utter (22a), which includes a nominalization derived from the individual-
level predicate puro ‘pure’. In (22b) I show an example of a nominalization derived from a stage-
level predicate and in (22c) an example of a nominalization derived from a mental state 
adjective: 
 
(22) a. la habitual pureza   del   lago 
     the usual    purity  of.the  lake 
  b. la  frecuente tristeza de ese cantante 





  c. la  constante amabilidad de Ángel (con sus primos) 
     the constant    kindness    of  Ángel  with his cousins 
  ‘Ángel’s constant kindness (to his cousins)’   
 
 Frequency adjectives can also appear in post-nominal and predicative position, conveying 
the same meaning: 
 
(23) a. la  pureza habitual del   lago 
     the purity    usual  of.the lake 
  b. La  pureza  del  lago es habitual. 
     the  purity of.the lake  is    usual 
(24) a. la  tristeza  frecuente del  cantante 
     the sadness frequent of.the  singer 
  b. La  tristeza   del  cantante es  frecuente. 
     the sadness of.the  singer    is   frequent 
(25) a. la amabilidad constante de Ángel (con sus primos) 
     the  kindness   constant   of  Ángel  with his cousins 
  ‘Ángel’s constant kindness (to his cousins)’ 
  b. La  amabilidad de Ángel (con sus primos) es constante.
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      the  kindness    of  Ángel  with his cousins  is   constant 
  ‘Ángel’s kindness to his cousins is constant.’ 
  
 We can conclude that deadjectival nominalizations accept frequency adjectives regardless of 
whether they are derived from individual-level, stage-level or mental state adjectives, which 
provides additional evidence that they express eventualities.  
 At this point, it is necessary to introduce Gehrke & McNally’s (2015) analysis on frequency 
modifiers according to which they can trigger temporal readings, in which case frequency 
modifiers operate in the token domain, and non-temporal readings, in which case these 
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(26)  a. a frequent downdraft 
  b. We attended a(n) ??frequent/??infrequent/??sporadic/??periodic/??daily party. 
  c. We attended frequent/infrequent/sporadic/periodic/daily parties. 
(Gehrke & McNally 2015: 854) 
 
 Gehrke & McNally (2015) claim (for English and German) that one single event only takes 
place once and, if it is the case that it takes place more times, that is because different events 
are involved. The authors also claim that some frequency modifiers can trigger either a temporal 
or a non-temporal interpretation depending on whether they modify either event-tokens or 
event-kinds, respectively. Putting the pieces together, when frequency modifiers are involved, 
the plural marking on the noun is linked to event-token and temporal interpretations, while the 
singular is linked to event-kind and non-temporal interpretations.
39
 
 As the authors note, assuming that one specific event-token takes place only once, the only 
interpretation for (26a), where the event noun appears in singular and is inserted in a DP headed 
by the indefinite determiner a, is the non-temporal one: there is a sub-kind of downdraft that is 
frequent. (26b) is not licensed because it would mean that we attended a sub-kind of party that 
is frequent/infrequent/etc., which is extremely odd; in other words, attended induces an event-
token reading, but the DP a frequent/infrequent/etc. party denotes in the kind domain, hence the 
semantic clash. Finally, in (26c) the event noun party appears in plural and can co-occur with 
frequency modifiers because there are different event-tokens involved. 
 In general, I assume Gehrke & McNally’s (2015) analysis. However, although morphological 
pluralization is useful in the event domain assuming that events can be counted, when states are 
at stake, the situation is different. In this dissertation, I put forth that state-token deadjectival 
nominalizations constitute mass nouns and, therefore, do not admit pluralization (although see 
chapter 4, where I describe certain factors that allow stative nominalizations to pluralize). 
Specifically, the deadjectival nominalizations that occur in (22)-(25) appear in singular, but the 
frequency adjectives that accompany them trigger a temporal interpretation. Accordingly, the 
only possible interpretation for (22a) is that the lake is usually in the state of purity, for (22b) 
that the singer is frequently in the state of sadness and for (22c) that Ángel is constantly in the 
state of kindness. The non-temporal interpretation whereby what is usual is a certain degree 
that is associated with an individual does not obtain.  
 However, the situation changes when frequency adjectives appear in post-nominal position, 
where they can also trigger non-temporal interpretations: 
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(27) a. la   densidad habitual de este metal   en invierno 
     the   density     usual    of  this  metal   in   winter 
  b. la  profundidad frecuente   del   lago en invierno  
     the     depth        frequent  of.the  lake  in   winter 
 
 The examples in (27) include nominalizations that are derived from dimensional adjectives, 
which are associated with conventionalized units of measurement (Bierwisch 1989; Kennedy 
2013; Bylinina 2014; McNally & Stojanovic 2017). For example, density can be measured in 
kg/m
3
 and depth can be measured in kilometers. On the other hand, note that the 
nominalizations involved express state-tokens rather than state-kinds, hence the occurrence of 
the temporal modifier en invierno ‘in winter’, the definite determiner la ‘the’ and the arguments 
de este metal ‘of this metal’ and del lago ‘of the lake’. However, the frequency modifier can 
contribute different meanings. 
 Both (27a) and (27b) are ambiguous: if the frequency modifier triggers a temporal 
interpretation, (27a) means that the metal is usually dense in winter; in contrast, if the frequency 
modifier triggers a non-temporal interpretation, (27a) means that the metal is usually associated 
with a certain degree of density in winter. Analogously, (27b) means that the lake is frequently 
deep in winter if the frequency modifier triggers a temporal interpretation, while it means that 
the lake is frequently associated with a certain degree of depth in winter if the frequency 
modifier triggers a non-temporal interpretation. The non-temporal interpretation is the only one 
available if we insert a measure phrase in predicative position, which provides a specific degree: 
 
(28) a. La densidad habitual de este metal  en invierno es de 8000 kg/m
3
.  
     the  density     usual    of  this metal   in   winter   is  of  8000 kg/m
3
 
  ‘The usual density of this metal in summer is 8000 kg/m
3
.’ 
  b. La  profundidad frecuente   del   lago en invierno es de veinte kilómetros.  
      the     depth        frequent  of.the  lake in    winter   is  of twenty kilometers 
  ‘The frequent depth of the lake in winter is twenty kilometers.’ 
 
 Thus, in (28a) there is a degree of density that is usual, while in (28b) there is a degree of 
depth that is frequent. In contrast, in prenominal position frequency modifiers cannot trigger 







(29) a. *La habitual densidad  de este metal en invierno es de 8000 kg/m
3
.  
       the  usual     density    of  this  metal  in   winter  is  of  8000 kg/m
3
 
  ‘The usual purity of this metal in summer is 8000 kg/m
3
.’ 
  b. *La  frecuente profundidad del   lago en invierno es de veinte kilómetros.  
       the  frequent       depth     of.the  lake in   winter   is  of twenty kilometers 
  ‘The frequent depth of the lake in winter is twenty kilometers.’ 
 
 The analysis whereby frequency modifiers can modify degrees in terms of kinds rather than 
tokens in post-nominal position is corroborated by the existence of state-kind nominalizations 
that can combine with frequency modifiers only in post-nominal position: 
 
(30) a. una profundidad (habitual) de veinte kilómetros 
       a        depth           usual    of  twenty kilometers 
  b. una (*habitual) profundidad de veinte kilómetros 
       a         usual         depth        of twenty kilometers 
 
 As will be argued extensively in chapter 4, the nominalizations in (30), which are inserted in 
DPs headed by the indefinite determiner una ‘a’ and are not accompanied by their arguments, 
denote in the kind rather than the token domain. If this is the case, frequency modifiers in post-
nominal position can only trigger a non-temporal reading, like in (30a), which means that there 
is a degree or state-kind of depth that is usual. (30b) is unacceptable: the temporal 
interpretation is blocked because the nominalization expresses state-kinds rather than state-
tokens, and the non-temporal interpretation is blocked because frequency modifiers cannot 
trigger that reading in prenominal position. 
 When nominalizations that are derived from evaluative adjectives are involved, the non-
temporal reading does not arise even in post-nominal position. According to Bierwisch (1989), 
Kennedy (2013), Bylinina (2014) and McNally & Stojanovic (2017), evaluative adjectives, unlike 
dimensional ones, are not associated with conventionalized units of measurement. Therefore, we 
cannot measure sadness or beauty in meters, kilograms, etc. Consider the following data: 
 
(31) a. #la  belleza habitual  del   jardín 
       the beauty   usual  of.the garden 
  b. #la  tristeza frecuente de este cantante 





(32) a. *una belleza habitual  
          a   beauty   usual  
  b. *una tristeza  frecuente 
          a  sadness  frequent 
 
 In (31) the only acceptable readings are the temporal ones according to which the garden is 
usually beautiful and the singer is frequently sad, hence the symbol #. (32) includes state-kind 
nominalizations, which in this case reject frequency modifiers in post-nominal position because 
they are derived from evaluative adjectives, which cannot trigger non-temporal readings; in 
other words, the sentences in (32) are not licensed because it is difficult to conceive the 
existence of a degree of beauty that is usual and a degree of sadness that is frequent if beauty 
and sadness are not associated with conventionalized units of measurement.  
 Exceptionally, the nominalization altura ‘height’, and other nouns that will be examined 
separately in subsection 3.2.3.2 due to their particular properties, admits frequency adjectives in 
post-nominal position, but it rejects them in prenominal and predicative position:  
 
(33) a. La  altura  frecuente de las dunas es de     mil           metros. 
     the height  frequent  of  the  dunes is  of one.thousand meters 
  ‘The frequent height of the dunes is one thousand meters.’ 
  b. *la  frecuente altura  de  las dunas 
       the frequent  height of   the dunes 
  c. *La  altura  de las dunas es frecuente. 
       the height of the dunes  is  frequent 
 
 On the one hand, in (33a) it is expected that the frequency adjective is licensed in post-
nominal position in a non-temporal interpretation; however, it is unexpected that it cannot 
trigger a temporal interpretation. On the other hand, in (33b, c) it is also unexpected that the 
frequency adjective cannot trigger a temporal interpretation either. In subsection 3.2.3.2 I will 
show that this behavior is not as exceptional as it appears to be and is related to the fact that 
nominalizations like altura ‘height’ cannot trigger quality readings in the absence of mass 
quantifiers or measure phrases and the fact that temporal interpretations require quality 
readings. 
 In sum, deadjectival nominalizations are compatible with frequency adjectives. In the domain 
of deadjectival nominalizations, frequency adjectives can trigger a temporal interpretation 




interpretation only in post-nominal position. Following Gehrke & McNally (2015), the temporal 
interpretation holds when the frequency adjective operates in the token domain, while the non-
temporal interpretation holds when the adjective operates in the kind domain. The importance 
of this analysis is twofold, since it accounts for both the semantics and syntactic distribution of 
frequency adjectives when accompanying deadjectival nominalizations without the introduction 
of any undesirable complexity. In the following subsection, I offer a technical implementation of 
the analysis. 
 
3.2.3.1. Technical implementation 
In this subsection, I offer a technical implementation for the analysis of frequency adjectives and 
the nominalizations that they accompany. For convenience sake and in order to show the 
contrast between temporal and non-temporal interpretations, I focus on frequency adjectives 
when functioning as adnominal modifiers. Recall that, following Gehrke & McNally (2015), the 
temporal reading is captured by positing that frequency modifiers operate at the token domain, 
while the non-temporal reading is captured by positing that frequency modifiers operate at the 
kind domain. And recall that I have argued that the non-temporal reading is only available when 
frequency modifiers appear in post-nominal position flanking nominalizations derived from 
dimensional adjectives.  
 Let us start with the analysis of frequency modifiers when they trigger temporal readings. For 
la frecuente belleza del paisaje ‘the frequent beauty of the landscape’, in which the adjective 
occurs in prenominal position, I propose the following composition: 
 
(34)    DP 
   la     AP3 
      AP2     PP 
    AP1     i    
 frecuente    AspP 
     AspP
0
   NP     del paisajei 
            … ti... 
          belleza     
(35) a. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . beautiful(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  b. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘, 𝑠)]. 
  c. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[beautiful(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)].   
  d. ⟦𝐴⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. frequent(𝑠).  




  f. ⟦𝐴𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[beautiful(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠) ∧ frequent(𝑠)]. by λ-A 
  g. ⟦𝐴𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[beautiful(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘, the landscape) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)   
  ∧ frequent(𝑠)].  
  h. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ = 𝜄𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[beautiful(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , the landscape) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)  
  ∧ frequent(𝑠)].  
 
 The starting point of the derivation depicted in (34) is the nominalization, whose denotation 
is taken from (7). Subsequently, the node AspP attaches to the structure in order to associate a 
state-kind from the set of state-kinds with a state-token. Based on Gehrke & McNally (2015), I 
propose that frequency adjectives can denote in the kind or the token domain, so I posit that 
they denote properties of either type <s,t> or type <sk,t>. In this case, I posit that they denote 
properties of state-tokens, which accounts for the occurrence of the temporal reading. 
Accordingly, the frequency modifier attaches to the nominal structure and combines with it 
intersectively. Afterwards, the individual variable x is bound by λ-A and saturated by the PP. 
Finally, the determiner introduces the iota operator ι. The result of the derivation is the unique 
state of beauty that is associated with a state-kind above a contextual standard and whose 
holder is the landscape, and that state is frequent.  
 The reader may wonder about the technical details of the syntax of adjectives. In this 
dissertation I assume that, when adjectives combine with nouns in attributive position, they are 
base-generated in the position in which they are phonologically realized. The fact that Romance 
languages accept adjectives in post-nominal position can be accounted for by means of the 
movement of the noun to a higher position, assuming that the basic structure is the one in 
which the adjective appears in prenominal position (Demonte 2008; Cinque 2010). However, to 
avoid complicated details that are irrelevant for the purposes of this dissertation, I propose that 
the adjective is base-generated where it is phonologically realized. The crucial phenomenon to 
which I want to draw attention is that there are two domains of modification that involve 
frequency adjectives, namely, the kind and the token domains.  
 On the other hand, the existing syntactic analyses of adjectives that appear in prenominal 
position differ predominantly on whether the adjective occupies the specifier position of an NP 
or rather projects an AP that selects for an NP as its complement (see Fábregas 2017 for a 
review of arguments for and against these and other proposals). In this dissertation, I do not 
bring the discussion to the syntactic point of view and, although I assume that adjectives 
occurring in prenominal position project APs for convenience sake, I do not justify the choice, 




 Now let us examine how frequency modifiers compose when triggering non-temporal 
readings in post-nominal position. For la anchura frecuente de la laguna ‘(lit.) the width frequent 
of the pond’, I propose the following composition: 
 
(36)   DP 
  la      AspP3 
      AspP2     PP 
    AspP1
        
  i     
  Asp
0
   NP    
    nP     AP     de la lagunai 
     … ti…  
   anchura   frecuente       
(37) a. ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . width(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  b. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . frequent(𝑠𝑘). 
  c. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . width(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ frequent(𝑠𝑘).               by PM 
  d. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  e. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[width(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ frequent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘, 𝑠)]. 
  f. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[width(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ frequent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)].         by λ-A 
  g. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃3⟧= 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[width(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , the pond) ∧ frequent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  h. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ = 𝜄𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[width(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , the pond) ∧ frequent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 As can be observed, the frequency modifier, which denotes in the kind domain, attaches to 
the nominalization before the attachment of AspP. Consequently, what is frequent in this case is 
the state-kind rather than the state-token. At the end of the derivation, we obtain the desired 
interpretation: the unique state of width that is associated with a state-kind of width whose 
holder is the pond, and that state-kind holds frequently. Note that, although the frequency 
modifier operates over state-kinds, the whole DP denotes a state-token, which correctly 
captures the fact that it accepts temporal modification, as shown in the previous subsection.  
 In the following subsection, I study nominalizations like altura ‘height’ and other non-
deadjectival nouns separately because of their particular properties. 
 
3.2.3.2. Exceptional nominalizations 
In this section, I study the semantics of certain deadjectival nominalizations and other non-
deadjectival nouns that are exceptional because they only trigger a degree reading in the 




deadjectival nominalizations in Spanish can trigger either a quality or a degree reading: in the 
quality reading, the nominalization entails the semantics of the positive form of the base 
adjective, which is captured by the inclusion of EVAL in the derivation; in contrast, in the degree 
reading, the nominalization expresses a property that holds to a certain degree, which is 
captured by not including EVAL in the derivation. In short, in this section I review certain 
exceptional deadjectival nominalizations whose derivation cannot include EVAL, which has 
decisive consequences with respect to their combination with frequency adjectives. In addition 
to their particular combinatorics with frequency adjectives, I argue that the analysis proposed 
here based on the kind-token dichotomy can explain the so-called temperature paradox. 
 To my knowledge, the only examples of exceptional deadjectival nominalizations are altura 
‘height’ (< alto ‘tall’), anchura ‘width’ (< ancho ‘wide’) and longitud ‘length’ (< (obs.) longo 
‘long’). Observe the following data: 
 
(38) a. La  altura/anchura  del   túnel  no es suficiente para que pase el camión.  
     the height  width  of.the tunnel not is   enough    for  that pass the  truck 
  ‘The height of the tunnel is not enough for the truck to get through.’ 
  b. *La  altura/anchura  del    túnel   es una de sus propiedades. 
       the height  width   of.the tunnel  is  one of   its    properties 
  c. La  altura/anchura  del   túnel es mínima / de cinco metros. 
     the height  width  of.the tunnel is minimal   of   five   meters 
 
 (38a) expresses that the tunnel’s degree of height/width is not high enough for the truck to 
get through; the quality reading according to which the tunnel is tall/wide but that property is 
not enough for the truck to get through the tunnel is unavailable. (38b) shows that the DPs 
including these nominalizations are incompatible with the predicate es una de sus propiedades 
‘is one of its properties’, which induces a quality reading. Finally, (38c) shows that these DPs are 
actually compatible with the predicate mínimo ‘minimal’ and measure phrases, which induce a 
degree reading. In accordance with what is argued in section 3.1, the degree reading is captured 
by positing that the null morpheme EVAL is not present in their syntactic structure, but the DPs 
containing these nominalizations denote a state: for example, la altura del túnel ‘the height of 
the tunnel’ denotes the state in which the tunnel has a certain degree of height. 
 Alternatively, we could think that DPs containing these exceptional nominalizations denote 
degrees rather than states (Bochnak 2013; Baglini 2015; Fábregas 2016), as shown in chapter 1. 
According to these analyses, la altura del túnel ‘the height of the tunnel’ denotes the degree of 




states or degrees, we need to examine them when predicated of entities whose height/width 
might change over time. Their combination with temporal modifiers reveals that they do denote 
states: 
 
(39) a. Ahora están    hablando de la   altura de Juan en su  infancia. 
           now  are.3.PL   talking   of  the height of Juan  in his childhood 
  ‘Now they are talking about Juan’s height in his childhood.’ 
  b. Ahora están    hablando de la anchura  del  mar de Aral durante  el estalinismo. 
    now  are.3.PL   talking   of the  width of.the sea  of  Aral  during  the  Stalinism  
  ‘Now they are talking about the Aral Sea’s width during Stalinism.’   
 
 Thus, in (39a) what is temporally located in Juan’s childhood is the state of John’s having 
some degree of height, not the degree itself; analogously, in (39b) what is temporally located 
during Stalinism is the state of the Aral Sea’s having some degree of width, and not the degree 
itself. As argued in chapters 1 and 2, degrees, either as numerical representations or as 
equivalence classes (of individuals or states), cannot be temporally located because they do not 
constitute eventualities or lack any temporal dimension. 
 Now let us go back to the combination of altura ‘height’ with frequency adjectives, which 
was postponed from subsection 3.2.3. Recall that we concluded that frequency adjectives trigger 
a temporal reading regardless of what position they appear in, while they can trigger a non-
temporal reading in post-nominal position. Apparently, nominalizations like altura ‘height’ show 
an exceptional behavior: 
 
(40) a. *la  frecuente altura de las dunas 
       the frequent height of  the dunes 
  b. la   altura frecuente de las dunas 
      the height frequent  of the dunes 
  c. *La   altura de las dunas es frecuente. 
       the height of the dunes  is  frequent 
 
 The only expected pattern is found in (40b), where the frequency modifier triggers a non-
temporal reading in post-nominal position according to which there is a degree of height that is 
frequent, for example a height of one hundred meters. However, neither of the examples in (40) 
can trigger a temporal interpretation, which is unexpected in principle assuming that 




fact that nominalizations like altura ‘height’ only have a degree reading in the absence of an 
explicit mass quantifier or measure phrase; accordingly, the temporal reading would mean that 
the dunes frequently have some height, which is odd because it implies that there are cases in 
which the dunes lack any degree of height.
40
 
 My analysis complies with Jaque’s (2014), who argues that DPs containing non-deadjectival 
nouns like coste ‘cost’, peso ‘weight’, etc. denote states rather than degrees because they accept 
temporal modifiers, which indicates that they are subject to time:  
 
(41) a. el (elevado) coste/valor/peso  de los libros durante esta temporada 
     the   high     cost value weight  of the books  during   this    season 
   b. la (elevada) estatura de Juan en su   infancia 
        the   high      height   of  Juan in  his childhood   
  c. el (elevado) precio de los libros esta temporada 
       the    high      price  of  the books  this    season    
  d. la (baja) temperatura   del   mar el   verano pasado  
        the low   temperature of.the  sea the summer  last  
 (From Jaque 2014: 464, 471. Parentheses and translations mine) 
 
 The reason why I have introduced parentheses in Jaque’s examples is that the absence of 
explicit modifiers does not affect the temporal properties of these nouns, which provides 
evidence that they express states regardless of whether or not they are accompanied by explicit 
modifiers. Crucially, these nouns do not trigger a quality reading in the absence of an explicit 
mass quantifier or measure phrase either and reproduce the same pattern as nominalizations 
like altura ‘height’ with respect to their combination with frequency adjectives: 
 
(42) a. *El  coste/peso    del   libro es una de sus propiedades. 
       the cost weight of.the book is  one  of  its    properties 
                                                          
40
 As a curiosity, altura ‘height’ can trigger a quality reading when used in a figurative sense in (semi-)lexicalized 
expressions such as altura de miras ‘high-mindedness’ or altura política/moral ‘(lit.) political/moral height’: 
 
(i)  a. Su    altura de miras es una de sus cualidades. 
      their height of sights  is  one of  their  qualities 
  ‘Their high-mindedness is one of their qualities’   
  b. Su    altura política / moral es una de sus cualidades. 
      their height political  moral  is  one of  their  qualities 
  ‘Their political vision / morality is one of their qualities’ 
(ii)  a. su   frecuente altura de miras. 
     their frequent  height of  sights 
  b. su    frecuente altura política / moral. 




  b. El coste  del   libro es de diez  euros. 
     the cost of.the book is  of  ten   euros 
  c. El    peso    del   libro es de dos kilos. 
     the weight of.the book is  of  two  kilos 
(43) a. *el  frecuente coste/peso de los libros 
       the frequent  cost weight of the books 
  b. el  coste/peso frecuente de los libros 
     the  cost weight frequent  of  the books 
(44) a. *La  temperatura de Vitoria  es una de sus propiedades. 
       the temperature of Vitoria   is  one  of  its    properties 
  b. La  temperatura de Vitoria es de quince grados. 
      the temperature of  Vitoria is  of  fifteen degrees 
  c. *la   frecuente temperatura de Vitoria 
       the  frequent  temperature of Vitoria 
  d. la  temperatura  frecuente de Vitoria 
     the temperature  frequent   of  Vitoria 
 
 In (42a) the nouns peso ‘weight’ and coste ‘cost’ do not accept the predicate es una de sus 
propiedades ‘is one of its properties’ because this predicate induces a quality reading, which is 
unavailable for this type of nouns. (42b, c) show that they admit measure phrases in predicative 
position and (43) shows that they only accept frequency modification in post-nominal position 
in a non-temporal reading. Finally, (44) shows that the noun temperatura ‘temperature’ 
reproduces the same pattern.  
 If the DPs containing the noun temperatura ‘temperature’ denote a state rather than a 





(45) a. La  temperatura de Tres Cantos es la misma que  la   temperatura de Colmenar Viejo. 
      the temperature of Tres Cantos  is the same  that the temperature  of  Colmenar Viejo 
  ‘The temperature of Tres Cantos is the same as the temperature of Colmenar Viejo’ 
  b. La  temperatura de Colmenar Viejo está aumentando. 
     the temperature  of  Colmenar Viejo   is     increasing 
  ‘The temperature of Colmenar Viejo is increasing.’ 
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  c. La  temperatura de Tres Cantos está aumentando. 
     the temperatura of  Tres Cantos    is     increasing 
  ‘The temperature of Tres Cantos is increasing.’ 
 
 From (45a) and (45b), (45c) does not necessarily follows. However, if DPs like the ones 
appearing in (45) denoted degrees, (45c) should follow from (45a) and (45b), since two degrees 
that occupy the same position on the scale are identical. My explanation for this apparent 
paradox resides in the fact that both DPs la temperatura de Tres Cantos ‘the temperature of Tres 
Cantos’ and la temperatura de Colmenar Viejo ‘the temperature of Colmenar Viejo’ denote states 
that are associated with the same degree of temperature according to (45a), but the states 
themselves are different because they involve different holders.  
 The phenomenon called temperature paradox is equivalent to what Francez & Koontz-
Garboden call identity conditions. Recall from chapter 1 the examples provided by Lucas 
Champollion in Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2017a) in personal communication: in a context in 
which Kim and Sandy have the same weight and Kim’s weight broke a chair, it is false to affirm 
Sandy’s weight broke the chair, as incorrectly predicted if we posit that the DPs involved denote 
degrees. The authors claim that these DPs have different identity conditions even though the 
individuals are associated with the same degree of weight. Again, under the analysis defended 
here, these data receive a natural explanation: Kim’s weight and Sandy’s weight denote states 
that are associated with the same degree, but the states themselves are different because they 
involve different holders (see Moltmann 2009 for an analogous reasoning in terms of tropes). 
 We can conclude that deadjectival nominalizations like altura ‘height’, and other non-
deadjectival nouns like coste ‘cost’ and temperatura ‘temperature’, express states that can only 
trigger a degree reading in the absence of an explicit mass quantifier or measure phrase, which 
accounts for their apparent peculiar behavior with respect to their combination with frequency 
adjectives and for the so-called temperature paradox. The fact that they can only express a 
degree reading does not mean that they do not express states (cf. Bochnak 2013; Baglini 2015), 
since, in light of the empirical evidence provided in this section, they also express properties that 
are subject to time. In the following subsection, I study the combination of deadjectival 
nominalizations with aspectual modifiers. 
 
3.2.4. Aspectual modification 
In this subsection, I provide evidence that the fact that deadjectival nominalizations do not 
accept aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’ even though they are atelic does not mean 




this really suggests is that they cannot express perfective eventualities. This proposal provides 
empirical evidence, against Fábregas & Marín (2012), that Spanish nominalizations can encode 
certain viewpoint aspect-related information. The analysis defended here has important 
consequences for our understanding of lexical/inner and viewpoint/outer aspect and their 
relation to time, the precise delimitation of these concepts and their interaction with eventuality 
predicates. In order to understand the proposal, a little bit of background on lexical/inner and 
viewpoint/outer aspect is necessary. 
 In chapter 2, I illustrated the difference between atelic and telic eventualities, which is a 
matter of lexical or inner aspect insofar as (a)telicity is a property that characterizes predicates. 
An eventuality is atelic if it is homogeneous (at least to certain level of granularity), while it is 
telic if it is heterogeneous (McNally 2017). The former eventualities combine with aspectual PPs 
headed by durante ‘for’, while the latter combine with aspectual PPs headed by en ‘in’: 
 
(46) a. El  perrito estuvo asustado durante/*en varias horas. 
     the puppy   was      scared       for       in several hours 
  b. El    pastor   caminó durante/*en varios días. 
     the shepherd walked     for       in several days 
(47) a. La bomba explotó *durante/en varios segundos. 
     the bomb exploded       for    in  several  seconds  
  b. El  tornado  destruyó  la ciudad #durante/en una hora. 
     the tornado destroyed the town        for      in  one hour  
 
 Atelic predicates, like the state (estar) asustado ‘(to be) scared’ and the activity caminar ‘to 
walk’ can only combine with aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’, see (46). In contrast, 
telic predicates, like the achievement explotar ‘to explode’ and the accomplishment destruir la 
ciudad ‘to destroy the town’, accept aspectual modifiers headed by en ‘in’, see (47). Note that in 
(47b) the durante-phrase is also licensed because accomplishments are durative, but, when this 
phrase occurs, it is entailed that the tornado does not destroy the whole town.   
 If lexical or inner aspect is related to the internal properties of eventualities, viewpoint or 
outer aspect is related to how the eventuality is presented, mainly, in progress, concluded or 
repeated in time. Viewpoint aspect allows us to differentiate between two types of eventualities: 
perfective and imperfective (Verkuyl 1972, 1993, 2012; Comrie 1976; Smith 1991; Klein 1994; 
Kratzer 1998; Carrasco 1999, 2017; Borik 2006; Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria 2000, 2004, 2007, 
2014; de Swart 2012; Arregui et al. 2014; Deo 2015; a.o.). Before offering the formal details, we 




as finished, while imperfective eventualities do not include their boundaries or are shown as 
unfinished. It is important to take into consideration that viewpoint aspect operates over lexical 
aspect, so both telic and atelic predicates can enter into perfective or imperfective 
interpretations. For example, Lois cleaned the car expresses a telic event that is presented as 
finished, that is, the event of Lois’ cleaning the car concluded in the past. In contrast, Lois was 
cleaning the car expresses a telic event that is shown as unfinished, so it did not have to 
conclude in the past; in fact, we can add a continuation that denies the completion of the event, 
as in Lois was cleaning the car when she got tired and stopped cleaning it. Analogously, Peter had 
a good time expresses a state (which is, therefore, atelic) that is presented as finished, while Peter 
was having a good time expresses a state that is presented as unfinished.  
 Note that viewpoint aspect does not inform about whether an eventuality holds in the past, 
in the present or in the future, which is the task of time; as shown in section 3.2.2, time is a 
deictic category that locates an eventuality in the past, the present or the future with respect to 
the speech time. An eventuality can be either perfective or imperfective in both the past and the 
future: for example, Peter was walking yesterday expresses an imperfective eventuality that holds 
in the past, while Peter will be walking tomorrow expresses an imperfective eventuality that holds 
in the future. In contrast, Lois walked two kilometers yesterday expresses a perfective eventuality 
that holds in the past, whereas Lois will have walked two kilometers tomorrow expresses a 
perfective eventuality that holds in the future. 
 In order to account for perfective and imperfective interpretations, the literature has 
traditionally based their analyses on Reichenbach (1947). According to the author, temporal and 
aspectual relations include three fundamental elements: the utterance time or the time at which 
the statement is uttered, the eventuality time or the time at which the eventuality is supposed to 
hold and the reference time, which establishes a relevant reference point. For example, in Lois 
had arrived, there is a time at which the sentence is uttered, let’s say the present; a time at which 
the eventuality holds, namely, when Lois arrived; and there is a reference time that is situated 
after Lois arrived. For example, if we say Lois had arrived when Peter entered the house, the event 
of Lois’ arriving holds before the event of Peter entering the house, which is the reference time, 
and both events hold before the utterance time. Building on Smith (1991), Klein (1994) and 
Kratzer (1998), and García Fernández (2000) and Carrasco (2017) for Spanish, I assume that in 
perfective eventualities the eventuality time E is included in the reference time R (E ⊂ R), while in 
imperfective eventualities the reference time R is included in the eventuality time E (R ⊂ E). The 






Figure 1: Perfective and imperfective aspect 
          
Perfective: [      ] R 
        
Imperfective: [      ] E 
 
 In figure 1, the perfective interpretation is represented as a segment R that includes an 
interval E, that is, the eventuality time is included in the reference time. In contrast, the 
imperfective interpretation is represented as a segment E that includes an interval R, that is, the 
reference time is an interval of the eventuality time. The goal of this section is not to elaborate a 
meticulous analysis of the perfective-imperfective distinction, but rather to explain why 
aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’ and en ‘in’ are only licensed when a perfective 
interpretation is available. For other more exhaustive analyses of the perfective/imperfective 
opposition in Spanish, the reader is referred to García Fernández (1999, 2000), Carrasco (1999, 
2017), Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria (2000, 2004, 2007, 2014), Arregui et al. (2014) and 
references therein.  
 Let us illustrate how aspectual modifiers interact with viewpoint aspect. In Spanish, there are 
two past tenses: the perfective and the imperfective one.
42
 Spanish verbs, including the copulas 
ser and estar, can bear either perfective or imperfective morphology, but only perfective 
interpretations license aspectual modification (García Fernández 1999, 2000): 
 
(48) a. El  perrito  *estaba / estuvo  asustado durante varias  horas. 
     the puppy   was.IPFV  was.PFV   scared       for     several hours 
  b. El    pastor    *caminaba  /  caminó   durante  varias   horas. 
     the shepherd walked.IPFV  walked.PFV    for      several  hours 
(49) a. La bomba   *explotaba  /  explotó    en una hora. 
     the bomb exploded.IPFV exploded.PFV  in one hour  
  b. El  tornado   *destruía    /   destruyó      la  ciudad en una hora. 
     the tornado destroyed.IPFV destroyed.PFV the  town   in  one hour  
 
 In (48) the atelic predicates estar asustado ‘to be scared’ and caminar ‘to walk’ can combine 
with the aspectual modifier durante varias horas ‘for several hours’ only when the verb bears 
perfective morphology. Analogously, in (49) the telic predicates explotar ‘to explode’ and 
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 The Spanish imperfective past tense is not always characterized as an imperfective tense. Some authors consider that 
its fundamental property is that it is relative or referentially dependent on another past tense (see for instance Rojo & 
Veiga 1999 based on Bello 1847). This is not the place to discuss the different analyses for the imperfective tense; the 




destruir la ciudad ‘to destroy the town’ can combine with the aspectual modifier en una hora ‘in 
one hour’ only when the verb bears perfective morphology. The explanation of why imperfective 
interpretations do not license aspectual modifiers follows from the analysis sketched above: in 
imperfective interpretations the eventuality time is presented without their boundaries; in other 
words, the reference time is an interval taken from the eventuality time. Accordingly, if the 
eventuality is presented as unfinished, aspectual modifiers, which delimit the duration of 
eventualities, cannot occur. In contrast, in perfective interpretations the eventuality time is 
presented completed or with its boundaries; in other words, the eventuality time is an interval 
taken from the reference time. If the eventuality is presented as finished, then aspectual 
modifiers can occur to inform about its duration.   
 It must be noted that imperfective morphology is also compatible with aspectual 
modification in certain contexts: 
 
(50) a. Cuando Lidia  era  joven,    bailaba   durante varias  horas  antes  de dormir. 
        when   Lidia was young danced.IPFV    for    several hours  before  of   sleep 
  ‘When Lidia was young, he used to dance for several hours before sleeping’ 
  b. El    mes pasado, Lidia  limpiaba   la   casa   en una hora gracias   al   robot. 
     the month  last     Lidia cleant.IPFV the house  in one  hour thanks to.the robot 
  ‘Last month, Lidia used to clean the house in one hour thanks to the robot’ 
 
 As García Fernández (2000) points out for other similar examples, the co-occurrence of 
aspectual modification and imperfective morphology is licensed in habitual contexts, which 
include many instantiations of perfective events. Accordingly, the habit of dancing in (50a) and 
the habit of cleaning the house in (50b) constitute macro-eventualities that are imperfective, 
since we do not know whether the habit extends in the future. In addition, each macro-
eventuality is composed of different micro-eventualities of dancing and cleaning the house, 
which are perfective. Crucially, the aspectual modifier measures out each of these micro-
eventualities, and not the whole macro-eventuality. Thus, we can maintain the hypothesis 
according to which the licensing of aspectual modifiers is due to the existence of a perfective 
interpretation.  
 With this in mind, we can explore the semantics of deadjectival nominalizations in relation to 
viewpoint aspect. When combined with aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’, they give 






(51) a. *La pureza   del   lago durante muchos   siglos   es sorprendente. 
       the purity of.the lake      for       many  centuries  is    surprising 
  b. *La  tristeza   del     preso  durante muchos años es sorprendente. 
       the sadness of.the prisoner    for       many   years is    surprising 
  c. ?La honestidad de Pepe con  Pepa durante varios   años  es sorprendente. 
       the  honesty     of  Pepe with Pepa     for     several years   is    surprising 
  ‘Pepe’s honesty to Pepa for several years is surprising.’ 
 
 Deadjectival nominalizations are incompatible with aspectual modifiers regardless of whether 
they are derived from individual-level predicates, as in (51a), stage-level predicates, as in (51b), 
or mental state adjectives, as in (51c), although the latter are marginally acceptable for some 
speakers (I will come back to this issue below). The fact that deadjectival nominalizations are 
incompatible with aspectual modifiers has gone inexplicably unnoticed in the literature of 
deadjectival nominalizations, with the exception of Fábregas (2016). For this author, for whom 
the combination of deadjectival nominalizations with temporal modifiers is not systematic, 
contra what was shown in section 3.2.2, data like the ones in (51) prove that deadjectival 
nominalizations are not subject to time and, consequently, express a more impoverished object, 
namely, qualities. However, as shown in chapter 1 and section 3.2.2, this analysis could not 
explain why deadjectival nominalizations can combine with temporal and frequency modifiers if 
we posit that they are not subject to time. Moreover, an extension of this analysis would 
incorrectly predict that the predicates occurring in (48) and (49) do not express eventualities 
when they bear imperfective morphology, since aspectual modifiers are unlicensed in that case. 
 If deadjectival nominalizations accept temporal and frequency modifiers, but they do not 
accept aspectual ones, the most natural explanation is that they express imperfective states. 
Adjectives constitute a defective category that cannot bear tense, viewpoint aspect or mood 
information without the assistance of the copula. Given that deadjectival nominalizations do not 
include the copula in the derivation, they cannot bear perfective information and, therefore, 
cannot express perfective states (actually, I argue that their base adjectives trigger imperfective 
interpretations by default in the absence of the copula, as will be shown below). Now the 
parallelism between deadjectival nominalizations and imperfective states becomes clear: 
 
(52) a. El estudiante *estaba / estuvo  triste durante varios años. 
     the  student    was.IPFV  was.PFV   sad      for    several years 
  b. *la    tristeza   del  estudiante durante varios años 




 In (52a), the aspectual modifier is licensed only when the copula carries perfective 
morphology; that the copula carries perfective morphology indicates that the state in which the 
student was sad is already finished, so we can measure its duration. If the copula carries 
imperfective morphology, the state is presented as unfinished, so we cannot measure its 
duration and, consequently, the aspectual modifier cannot appear. Regarding (52b), it shows 
that the corresponding deadjectival nominalization patterns with the imperfective reading in 
being incompatible with aspectual modifiers. The conclusion that can be drawn is that 
deadjectival nominalizations express imperfective states. 
 Now let us go back to (51c), where we saw that deadjectival nominalizations that are derived 
from mental state adjectives like honestidad ‘honesty’ do not prompt as clear ungrammatical 
results as the other types of nominalizations. In fact, Villalba (2013) provides an example that he 
considers acceptable: 
 
(53) la  brutalidad de al-Assad durante meses 
  the  brutality  of  al-Assad     for     months 
  ‘Al-Assad’s brutality for months’  
(From Villalba 2013: 247) 
  
 It must be noted that Villalba does not differentiate among temporal, frequency and 
aspectual modifiers, but rather he gathers them in a macro-category of temporal modifiers, as 
most authors do. Moreover, Villalba does not distinguish the nominalizations derived from 
mental state adjectives from the others. Regardless, although I do not consider this type of data 
to be fully acceptable, it is necessary to provide an explanation as to why they are more easily 
interpretable than the ones that include deadjectival nominalizations that are not derived from 
mental state adjectives, such as (51a, b). Recall that mental state adjectives like honesto ‘honest’ 
and brutal ‘brutal’ presuppose an event (Martin 2006, 2008, 2015). In other words, Mark fue 
honesto con David ‘Mark was honest to David’ presupposes that Mark did something in order 
for the speaker to evaluate Mark as honest. Assuming this, we can postulate that, for those 
speakers for whom (51c) and (53) are acceptable, there is an identification of the state expressed 
by the nominalization with the presupposed event. Hence, the temporal delimitation of the state 
of honesty/brutality holds, in any case, via the temporal delimitation of the presupposed event. 
In other words, for those speakers for whom (51c) and (53) are acceptable, the presupposed 
event is salient enough to license aspectual modifiers. 
 The analysis presented here according to which deadjectival nominalizations express 




interpretation by default in the absence of the copula. I provide empirical evidence that this is 
the case. First, in small clauses (SC), in which the copula does not appear, aspectual modification 
is not admitted even if the verb of the main clause bears perfective morphology. Observe the 
following examples, where the aspectual modifiers cannot take narrow scope: 
 
(54) a. *María  se    imaginó    [al     monstruo desnudo durante varias  horas]SC. 
       María REFL imagined ACC.the  monster    naked        for    several hours 
  ‘María imagined the monster naked for several hours.’ 
  b. *María encontró [a   su hermano dormido durante varias  horas]SC. 
          María    found   ACC her brother    asleep       for     several hours 
  ‘María found her brother asleep for several hours.’ 
 
 In (54a) an interpretation in which the monster was naked for several hours is impossible and 
in (54b) an interpretation in which María’s brother was asleep for several hours is impossible too. 
This phenomenon holds because adjectives trigger an imperfective interpretation by default 
when additional morphology is not involved, which explains why deadjectival nominalizations, 
which do not include the copula in their derivation, express imperfective states. 
 In contrast, temporal modifiers can actually take narrow scope in the same contexts, which 
shows that gradable adjectives are subject to time in the absence of the copula, that is, they 
express eventualities: 
 
(55) a. María  se    imaginó    [al      monstruo  desnudo durante/en la reunión]SC. 
      María REFL imagined ACC.the  monster     naked     during   in the meeting 
  ‘María imagined the monster naked during/in the meeting.’ 
  b. María encontró [a   su  hermano  dormido durante/en el  funeral]SC. 
            María    found  ACC her  brother      asleep    during   in the funeral  
  ‘María found her brother asleep during/in the funeral.’ 
 
 Another piece of evidence that adjectives display an imperfective interpretation by default in 
the absence of the copula is provided by depictives, which introduce a secondary predication 
that is simultaneous with the main predication (what McNally 1994 calls the simultaneity 
condition; see also Rothstein 2011 for English and Demonte 1999 and Demonte & Masullo 1999 






(56) a. El  actor      llegó   cansado. 
     the actor arrived.PFV  tired  
  b. El  sonámbulo     caminó  dormido. 
     the sleepwalker walked.PFV  asleep  
   
 Following Vlach (1981a, 1981b), two different eventualities, one of which is perfective, occur 
simultaneously only if the other eventuality is imperfective. Otherwise, there should be a 
sequential reading in which one eventuality follows the other one or the structure should be 
ungrammatical. Vlach (1981a, 1981b) bases his analysis on when-clauses, which I adapt to 
Spanish here for convenience sake (see also Carrasco 1999, 2017): 
 
(57) a. Cuando el  actor  llegó,  los periodistas  cruzaban  /  cruzaron     la   calle. 
       when  the  actor arrived the journalists   crossed.IPFV  crossed.PFV the street 
  ‘When the actor arrived, the journalists were crossing / crossed the street.’  
  b. Cuando la       abuela       llegó   a   casa, sonaba  /  sonó    el  teléfono. 
       when   the grandmother arrived to home  rang.IPFV  rang.PFV the  phone  
  ‘When the grandmother arrived home, the phone was ringing / rang.’ 
(58) a. Cuando el  actor   llegó,   estaba / *estuvo cansado. 
        when  the actor arrived was.IPFV   was.PFV   tired  
  b. Cuando el  sonámbulo caminó, estaba / *estuvo dormido. 
       when  the sleepwalker walked was.IPFV   was.PFV   asleep  
 
 On the one hand, in (57a) the occurrence of the imperfective induces an interpretation in 
which the actor arrived at the same time as the journalists crossed the street; in contrast, the 
occurrence of the perfective induces an interpretation in which the journalists crossed the street 
after the actor arrived. Analogously, in (57b) the occurrence of the imperfective induces an 
interpretation in which the phone was ringing at the same time as the grandmother arrived 
home, while the occurrence of the perfective induces an interpretation in which the phone rang 
after the grandmother arrived home. On the other hand, the situation changes partially when 
atelic predicates are involved. In both (58a) and (58b) the imperfective induces a simultaneous 
reading again, according to which the actor was tired at the same time as he arrived and the 
sleepwalker was asleep at the same time as he walked. However, the perfective does not license, 
unlike in (57), a sequential reading in which the actor was tired after arriving and the sleepwalker 




estar dormido ‘to be asleep’ are unable to do that because they do not include initial boundaries 
that are able to separate the two eventualities involved. 
 Taking this into consideration, we can establish the analysis of depictives in (56). The reason 
why the actor arrived and was tired simultaneously in (56a) and the sleepwalker walked and was 
asleep simultaneously in (56b) is that the adjectives express imperfective states; given that they 
do not include their boundaries, the eventualities involved can overlap. If it were the case that 
the adjectives expressed perfective eventualities, either there should be an interpretation in 
which the actor was tired after arriving and the sleepwalker was asleep after walking or the 
sentences would be ungrammatical, but neither of them is the case. We can conclude that there 
is enough empirical evidence that adjectives express imperfective eventualities by default when 
the copula does not appear, which is in accordance with the analysis defended here whereby 
deadjectival nominalizations, which do not include the copula in their derivation, express 
imperfective eventualities as well.  
 Based on Kratzer (1998), García Fernández (2000), Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria (2000, 
2004, 2007, 2014), Jaque (2014), among others, we can postulate a syntactic functional node 
(AspPviewpoint) with viewpoint aspect information. The idea that I put forth here is that this node 
only attaches to verbal structures. If the copula is present, the aspectual node appears; if the 
copula is absent, as in deadjectival nominalizations, the aspectual node does not appear: 
 
(59)    AspPviewpoint 
  Asp
0
viewpoint   VP 
      Cop   AP 
(60)    *AspPviewpoint 
  Asp
0
viewpoint   AP 
 
 If it is the case that deadjectival nominalizations cannot express perfective states because 
they do not include the copula in their morphological structure, the analysis predicts that 
deverbal nominalizations, which do include verbal morphology, can actually express perfective 
states. The prediction is borne out: deverbal nominalizations like pertenencia ‘belonging’, 
abundancia ‘abundance’, confianza ‘trust’, permanencia ‘stay’, posesión ‘possession’, etc. can co-
occur with aspectual modifiers, as shown in (61).  
 
(61) a. la pertenencia de Juan   al    club durante cuatro años 
     the belonging   of Juan to.the club     for      four   years 




  b. la abundancia de agua durante varias décadas 
     the abundance of water     for    several decades 
 
 Certainly, other stative nominalizations that are, presumably, morphologically related to 
verbs do not naturally combine with aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’, like 
moderación ‘moderation’, abnegación ‘selflessness’, ofuscación ‘bewilderment’, atrevimiento 
‘boldness’, etc.:  
 
(62) a. ?la   moderación   del    político durante varios años.  
       the moderation of.the  politician   for    several years  
  b. ?la  abnegación de Jenny durante varios meses. 
       the selflessness  of Jenny     for     several months 
 
 Nonetheless, bear in mind that, as noted in the literature, their semantics correlate with the 
adjectival rather than with the verbal structure (see Pena 2006, among others). For example, la 
moderación del político ‘the politician’s moderation’ correlates with El político es/era moderado 
‘The politician is / used to be moderate’ and la abnegación de Jenny ‘Jenny’s selflessness’ 
correlates with Jenny es/era abnegada ‘Jenny is / used to be selfless’. In short, their formal 
properties do not correspond with their semantic interpretation. Although it is not the goal of 
this dissertation to provide an exhaustive characterization of these nominalizations, it is 
important to note that there are two possible analyses that can account for their behavior: either 
(a) they are actually derived from an adjectival base or (b) they are formed out of an 
impoverished verbal structure that cannot encode perfective information.  
 Leaving these nominalizations aside, which deserve an independent treatment, we can 
conclude that deverbal nominalizations can trigger perfective interpretations, whereas 
deadjectival nominalizations are always imperfective. In this respect, Fábregas & Marín (2012) 
claim that there is parametric variation between languages whose nominalizations can only 
encode lexical aspect-related information, like Spanish, and languages whose nominalizations 
can encode both lexical and viewpoint aspect-related information, like Slovenian. Specifically, 
Fábregas & Marín formulate the Aspect Preservation Hypothesis, which states that Spanish 
(French, Catalan, English and German) nominalizations do not modify the aspectual information 
of the verbal base. Their claim is based on the observation that certain Spanish verbs like 
decorar ‘to decorate’ can express either an eventive or a stative reading, but their respective 




reading of the verb decorar ‘to decorate’ is obtained by means of viewpoint aspect and that the 
nominalization decoración ‘decoration’ cannot inherit that information: 
 
(63)  a. Juan   decoró    el  árbol de navidad.                   EVENT READING 
     Juan decorated the  tree   of Christmas 
  ‘Juan decorated the Christmas tree.’ 
  b. Las   velas  decoraban la  tarta.                STATIVE READING 
      the candles  decorated the cake 
  ‘The candles decorated the cake.’ 
(64)  a. la  decoración  del  árbol de  navidad durante unas  horas 
     the decoration of.the tree  of  Christmas   for     some hours 
  ‘the decoration of the Christmas tree for some hours’ 
  b. #una decoración de la tarta  de varias horas. 
      a   decoration of the cake  of several hours 
  ‘a decoration for several hours’ 
(Fábregas & Marín 2012: 59) 
 
 According to Fábregas & Marín, the stative reading of the verb decorar ‘to decorate’ is 
obtained via viewpoint aspect, but this information is not encoded in the nominalization. For 
that reason, the unique possible reading for (64b) is an event reading in which somebody 
decorated the cake for some hours. However, if we assumed the authors’ proposal, we could not 
account for the systematic contrasts that deverbal and deadjectival nominalizations show with 
respect to their combination with aspectual modifiers. Arguably, the Aspect Preservation 
Hypothesis can correctly account for the fact that deadjectival nominalizations encode 
imperfective states, since their imperfective character results from the properties of the 
adjectival base; however, it incorrectly predicts that deverbal nominalizations cannot express 
perfective eventualities, since verbal bases are not lexically perfective. Thus, the Aspect 
Preservation Hypothesis should be slightly refined in order to incorporate certain viewpoint 
aspect-related information.  
 To sum up, in this section I have shown that deadjectival nominalizations cannot co-occur 
with aspectual modifiers headed by durante ‘for’ even though they constitute atelic 
eventualities. The reason behind this apparent mismatch is that they express imperfective states; 
specifically, given that adjectives trigger an imperfective interpretation by default in the absence 
of the copula and that deadjectival nominalizations do not include the copula in their derivation, 




Spanish nominalizations can encode some viewpoint aspect-related information in addition to 
lexical aspect-related information. The analysis defended here does not only offer a precise 
characterization of deadjectival nominalizations as imperfective states, but it also ensures a 
better understanding of the information conveyed by temporal and aspectual modifiers and 
their interaction with the verbal and nominal domains.  
 
Interim summary 
Recall from chapter 2 that stative predicates are defined as temporal objects (which do not 
involve change in any of their participants). As such, they are supposed to accept time-related 
modification, namely, temporal, frequency and aspectual modifiers. As we have seen so far, this 
is the case with respect to temporal and frequency modification, and there are independent 
reasons that explain why the nominalizations in question disallow aspectual modifiers. The 
following table summarizes how deadjectival nominalizations parallel imperfective eventualities: 
 









Perfective states + + + 
Imperfective states + + − 
Deadjectival 
nominalizations 
+ + − 
 
 
 In the following subsections, I explore locative and manner modification. In relation to this 
question, since Davidson (1967) it has often been assumed that, while events accept locative and 
manner modifiers, states do not accept them, given that states cannot be located in space and 
do not hold in a particular manner. In this respect, two specific remarks must be made: first, as 
shown by Ernst (2016) for English, following the Neo-Davidsonian tradition, in the verbal and 
adjectival domains states accept locative and manner modification more naturally than is often 
assumed. Second, by virtue of the definition of states provided in this dissertation, whether or 
not states can combine with locative or manner modification is not as relevant as traditionally 
considered, since states are not defined on the basis of their capability to be spatially located or 




spatially located and of whether they hold in a particular way. In the following subsections, I 
show, nevertheless, that deadjectival nominalizations can accept locative and manner modifiers, 
which constitutes the final piece of evidence that they express eventualities.  
 
3.2.5. Locative modification 
In this subsection, I analyze the combination of deadjectival nominalizations with locative 
modifiers, which I have already advanced in chapter 2. Locative modifiers are adjuncts that 
locate eventualities at a particular place. The most influential classification of adjuncts with a 
locative meaning is due to Maienborn (2001, 2005a, 2005b), who claims that there exist two 
types thereof: frame-setting modifiers and locative modifiers, which in turn can be internal and 
external. The author applies her proposal to German, but it is also applicable to Spanish or 
English. For argumentative reasons, I illustrate the phenomenon in English: 
 
(65) In Madrid, the mum kissed the kid on his cheek in the kitchen.   
 
 In (65) the adjuncts on his cheek and in the kitchen are locative modifiers: the former is an 
internal locative modifier, since it adds spatial information about some internal aspect of the 
eventuality, while the latter is an external locative modifier, since it locates the whole eventuality 
at a particular place. Finally, in Madrid is a frame-setting modifier, since it provides a 
spatiotemporal frame for the whole sentence or a topic time in the sense of Klein (1994). Thus, 
while locative modifiers provide spatial information, frame-setting modifiers provide 
spatiotemporal information. Another aspect in which locative modifiers and frame-setting 
modifiers differ according to Maienborn is with respect to entailment patterns: only when 
locative modifiers are omitted, does the semantics of the rest of the sentence remain true. 
Maienborn shows that events (and Davidsonian states) accept locative modifiers, but states do 
not accept them and, in any case, accept frame-setting modifiers: 
 
(66) a. John washed the dishes in the kitchen. 
  b. Mary is quiet in the library. 
 
 In (66a), if we omit the adjunct in the kitchen, it is also true that John washed the dishes, so 
this adjunct is a locative modifier that informs about the spatial location at which the event took 
place. In contrast, in (66b), if we omit the adjunct in the library, it is not necessarily true that 
Mary is quiet in general or at another place, so this adjunct is a frame-setting modifier that 




 However, as advanced in chapter 2, Ernst (2016) shows that this argumentation is not well 
substantiated: first, in (66a) the adjunct in the kitchen can be paraphrased with a temporal clause 
too: ‘John washed the dishes when he was in the kitchen’, so we could mistakenly consider it a 
frame-setting rather than a locative modifier. Second, (66b) does not reproduce the same 
entailment pattern as (66a) because the sentence acquires a generic interpretation in the 
present tense; alternatively, if the past tense is used, the entailment pattern is fulfilled: Mary was 
quiet in the library does entail ‘Mary was quiet’. Ernst concludes that there are solid reasons to 
treat locative adjuncts that appear in post-verbal position as true locative modifiers; thus, states 
can accept locative modification (in certain semantic and pragmatic conditions that are 
irrelevant here) and the fact that they do not accept locative modification so easily as events is 
explained because states hold irrespective of their location.  
 In relation to Spanish deadjectival nominalizations, if they express states, it is predicted that 
there are at least some cases in which they accept locative modification. This seems to be the 
case: 
 
(67) a. La popularidad  del   futbolista en Barcelona sorprendió  a   todo  el mundo. 
     the  popularity  of.the footballer in  Barcelona   surprised  ACC every the world  
  ‘The footballer’s popularity in Barcelona surprised everybody.’ 
  b. La  tristeza   del  estudiante en Madrid sorprendió  a   todo  el mundo. 
     the sadness of.the  student     in Madrid    surprised ACC every the world 
  ‘Juan’s sadness in Madrid surprised everybody.’ 
  c. La amabilidad de Jenny con Melania en la oficina sorprendió a   todo  el mundo. 
     the  kindness    of Jenny with Melania in the office   surprised ACC every the world 
  ‘Jenny’s kindness to Melania in the office surprised everybody.’ 
 
 In (67a) the DP la popularidad del futbolista ‘the footballer’s popularity’ denotes a state that 
holds in Barcelona; in (67b) the DP la tristeza de Juan ‘Juan’s sadness’ denotes a state that holds 
in Madrid; and in (67c) la DP la amabilidad de Jenny con Melania ‘Jenny’s kindness to Melania’ 
denotes a state that holds in the office. Note that popularidad ‘popularity’ is derived from the 
individual-level adjective popular ‘popular’, tristeza ‘sadness’ is derived from the stage-level 
adjective triste ‘sad’ and amabilidad ‘kindness’ is derived from the mental state adjective amable 
‘kind’, so this three-way distinction is irrelevant again.   
 We can conclude that the adjuncts that appear in (67) are locative modifiers and, as a 
consequence, that deadjectival nominalizations accept locative modification, which provides 




subsection, I study the combination of deadjectival nominalizations with manner modifiers, 
which requires a bit more of elaboration. 
 
3.2.6. Manner adjectives 
In this section, I show that deadjectival nominalizations can combine with manner adjectives, 
where manner is derived from state-kinds. The combination of stative predicates with manner 
modifiers has been a controversial issue for semanticists, which is specially accentuated by the 
difficulty of defining the concept ‘manner’ in precise terms. As Gehrke & Castroviejo (2015) 
point out, manner is closely linked to events, so the discussion has traditionally boiled down to 
positing that either manner modifiers are predicates of events (Parsons 1990; Eckardt 1998; 
Wyner 1998; Geuder 2000, among others) or manner constitutes an independent object in the 
semantic ontology (Schäfer 2003, 2008; Piñón 2008; Alexeyenko 2012).   
 In this dissertation, I opt for a third strategy, namely, to postulate that manner modifiers are 
predicates of event-kinds but also predicates of state-kinds, given that states in general, and 
state-token deadjectival nominalizations in particular, can combine with manner modifiers. 
Although in chapter 2 I showed that other authors (Landman and Morzycki 2003; Landman 
2006; Gehrke 2011, 2015, 2017; Anderson & Morzycki 2015) had already derived manner from 
event-kinds and state-kinds, they analyze manner modifiers as predicates of event-tokens or 
state-tokens that realize their corresponding kinds. Alternatively, in this dissertation I posit that 
manner modifiers are predicates of eventuality-kinds. On the one hand, the movement from 
eventuality-tokens to eventuality-kinds is the consequence of positing that verbs and adjectives 
are predicates of eventuality-kinds rather than eventuality-tokens. On the other hand, there is 
empirical evidence that manner modifiers must be derived from a more basic notion like 
eventuality-kinds, since there are some modifiers that can operate over entities and 
eventualities, but they only trigger a manner reading in the latter case.   
 Since the development of Neo-Davidsonian semantics, it has been noted that states are not 
incompatible with manner modifiers (cf. Davidson 1967). Ernst (2016) provides enough empirical 
evidence for English that the co-occurrence of stative predicates with manner modifiers is not 
only an exceptional phenomenon, but rather it is more common than is usually assumed. Data 
like pleasantly archaic, obnoxiously idiosyncratic, eerily reminiscent, confusingly different, etc. are 
some of the abundant examples provided by Ernst.  
 Of course, the different properties of the various types of stative predicates are relevant to 
account for their possible combinations. For example, individual-level predicates like tall have a 
subject that does not cause the state, so they do not accept manner modifiers that are 




tall (see Geuder 2000 for a similar explanation). In contrast, mental state adjectives like modest 
have a subject that is also a causer that may have agency properties, so John was intelligently 
modest is acceptable. Thus, we can conclude with Ernst that the ability of stative predicates to 
combine with manner modifiers is semantically constrained and the fact that they are simpler 
than events with respect to their agency/causal and aspectual properties explains why they do 
not combine with manner modifiers as easily as events do.  
 In Spanish, states can also accept manner adjectives and, in fact, many of the examples 
provided by Ernst for English are valid for Spanish as well. Below I illustrate their combination 
with individual-level, stage-level and mental state adjectives and with their corresponding 
nominalizations in attributive position: 
 
(68) a. extravagantemente alto, extraordinariamente normal, siniestramente hermoso  
  ‘extravagantly tall, extraordinarily normal, eerily beautiful’  
  b. extrañamente perplejo, sorprendentemente triste, armoniosamente limpio 
  ‘strangely perplexed, surprisingly sad, harmoniously clean’ 
  c. francamente amable, bruscamente sincero, tercamente valiente 
  ‘honestly kind, roughly sincere, stubbornly brave’ 
(69) a. extravagante altura, extraordinaria normalidad, siniestra hermosura 
  ‘extravagant height, extraordinary normality, eerie beauty’ 
  b. extraña perplejidad, sorprendente tristeza, armoniosa limpieza 
  ‘strange perplexity, surprising sadness, harmonious cleanness’ 
  c. franca amabilidad, brusca sinceridad, terca valentía 




 Recall from chapter 2 that the combination of gradable adjectives and manner adverbs gives 
rise to entailments to the positive; for example, Ángela es extrañamente alta ‘Ángela is strangely 
tall’ entails that Ángela is tall. Concerning deadjectival nominalizations, the situation is 
substantially different and depends on whether the nominalization to which manner adjectives 
accompany is derived from a dimensional or an evaluative adjective. Observe the following 
examples:  
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 Insofar as manner modifiers are used for making an evaluation, and therefore they involve subjectivity, their natural 
and most frequent position is the prenominal one. Nevertheless, the post-nominal position is not forbidden, in which 
case I do not appreciate any relevant semantic differences with respect to the prenominal position: 
 
(i)  a. la   paciencia extraordinaria de la profesora. 
      the  patience   extraordinary  of the professor 
  b. la   altura impresionante de la torre. 




(70) a. La   altura de las dunas es extraña. 
     the  height of the dunes  is strange 
  b. La  densidad   del  mineral es sorprendente. 
      the  density  of.the mineral is     surprising 
(71) a. La  amabilidad  del   forastero es extraña. 
     the   kindness  of.the  foreigner  is strange  
  b. La  belleza de este   paisaje  es sorprendente. 
     the  beauty of  this landscape is    surprising   
 
 (70) presents examples of deadjectival nominalizations derived from dimensional adjectives, 
which can be associated with conventionalized units of measurement; in contrast, (71) shows 
examples of deadjectival nominalizations derived from evaluative adjectives, which are not 
associated with those units. From (70a) it does not necessarily follow that the dunes are tall: 
perhaps the height of the dunes is strange because it is variable or because it is abnormally low. 
Analogously, from (70b) it does not follow that the mineral is dense: it might be the case that 
the density of the mineral is surprising because it is extremely low, because it has an uncommon 
value or because it increases rather than decreases with temperature. In contrast, from (71a) it 
does follow that the foreigner is kind and from (71b) that the garden is beautiful.  
 Two conclusions can be drawn from these data: first, the adjectives extraña ‘strange’ and 
sorprendente ‘surprising’ do not lexically introduce a standard of comparison (see chapter 2 for 
discussion on their adverbial counterparts extrañamente ‘strangely’ and sorprendentemente 
‘surprisingly’). Second, when evaluative adjectives are involved, what counts as a strange or 
surprising state-kind normally exceeds a (contextual) standard of comparison because evaluative 
predicates invoke between comparison classes (in the sense of Sassoon & Toledo 2011). Recall 
from chapter 2, that, while within comparison classes involve comparisons between different 
situations in which the same individual might be, between comparison classes involve 
comparisons between different individuals. The evaluative predicates in (71) are not associated 
with conventionalized units of measurement (like meters or kilos), so in principle what counts as 
a strange kindness or a surprising beauty is evaluated by comparing them to other strange 
kindnesses and surprising beauties, which gives rise to a contextual interpretation.    
 Nonetheless, the question of whether the examples in (71) are evaluated with respect to a 
contextual standard of comparison in terms of entailments or cancelable inferences is difficult to 
clarify. In principle, we should treat them as entailments, but it is not impossible to provide a 
context in which an evaluative predicate can invoke a within comparison class according to 




(72) La belleza de este  paisaje   es sorprendente: en invierno el     paisaje   es   bello, 
  the beauty of this landscape is    surprising      in   winter the landscape  is beautiful 
  pero en verano es horroroso. 
   but  in summer is   hideous 
  ‘The beauty of this landscape is surprising: in winter the landscape is beautiful, but in  
  summer it is hideous.’ 
 
 In (72), we utter that the beauty of the garden is surprising because it is variable: in winter 
the garden is beautiful, but in summer the garden is not beautiful. Thus, (72) invokes a within 
rather than a between comparison class: the beauty of the garden is evaluated with respect to 
other situations in which the garden is. The question of whether evaluative nominalizations give 
rise to either entailments or cancelable inferences to the positive when combined with manner 
adjectives requires a deeper investigation and will not be solved here. For the purposes of this 
subsection, what is important to take into consideration is that the interaction of manner 
adjectives with dimensional nominalizations provides evidence that the former do not give rise 
to entailments to the positive; thus, if we concluded that evaluative nominalizations give rise to 
entailments rather than cancelable inferences to the positive, we would have to ascribe this 
phenomenon to the involvement of the null morpheme EVAL.  
 To close this subsection, it is interesting to verify whether modifiers like and extraño ‘strange’ 
and sorprendente ‘surprising’ must be treated as predicates of state-kinds or rather we can 
derive them from another less specific notion. A strong argument in favor of deriving these 
modifiers from kinds that are underspecified as to whether the relevant object is an entity or an 
eventuality is that they can also modify entities and events: 
 
(73) a. La   casa  es extraña/sorprendente. 
     the house is  strange    surprising 
  b. La construcción del  puente fue  extraña/sorprendente. 
     the   building   of.the bridge  was strange   surprising 
 
 In (73a), the adjectives in question do not encode state-kinds; rather, they encode entity-
kinds assuming that casa ‘house’ is a predicate of entity-kinds (which can express an entity-
token if functional material is added). On the other hand, in (73b) the adjectives do not encode 
state-kinds, but rather event-kinds. Crucially, a manner reading holds in (73b), where an event is 
involved, but not in (73a), where an entity is involved, so the manner reading only arises when 




 We conclude that deadjectival nominalizations accept manner modifiers in terms of state-
kinds. Manner is not a basic object of our semantic ontology, but rather the manner reading is 
derived from a more basic object, namely, eventuality-kinds. Finally, manner adjectives do not 
give rise to entailments to the positive when combined with deadjectival nominalizations.  In the 
following subsection, I propose a basic technical implementation for the analysis of manner 
adjectives. 
 
3.2.6.1. Technical implementation 
Recall from the previous subsection that manner modifiers do not make reference to any degree 
on the scale associated with a nominalization; rather, they denote sets of state-kinds that 
intersect with the set of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization to form subsets of state-
kinds. For example, a strange height is the subset of totally preordered sets of state-kinds of 
having some height that can be considered strange due to whatever relevant reason. For the 
purposes of this section, what is important to take into consideration is that the kind-token 
distinction is useful to account for manner modification. 
 Let us observe the technical details. For la extraña altura del desierto ‘the strange height of 
the desert’, I propose the following composition: 
 
(74)   DP 
  la           AspP3 
       AspP2     PP 




   
   Asp
0
   AP        del desiertoi 
    extraña   NP       
           … ti…  
                   altura 
(75) a. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  b. ⟦𝐴⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘. strange(𝑠𝑘). 
  c. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ strange(𝑠𝑘).                       by PM 
  d. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  e. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ strange(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  f. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ strange(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)].         by λ-A 
  g. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , the desert) ∧ strange(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 





 The derivation does not include any deep novelties with respect to other derivations 
developed in this chapter. The important points to which I want to draw the reader’s attention 
are the following: (a) the manner modifier attaches to the nominalization before the node AspP, 
which guarantees that what is strange is not the state of the desert’s having some height, but 
rather the degree associated with the desert’s height; and (b) the manner modifier composes 
intersectively with the nominalization, which creates a subset of state-kinds of height, that is, all 
the state-kinds of height that are strange. The result of the derivation is the unique state that is 
associated with a state-kind of height that is strange and whose holder is the desert. 
 On the other hand, manner adjectives can appear in predicative position as well, as in La 
altura de la torre es impresionante ‘The height of the tower is impressive’, which automatically 
makes us think about the composition of the same structure when a measure phrase occupies 
the place of the manner adjective, as in La altura de la torre es de diez metros ‘The height of the 
tower is ten meters’. Let us proceed step by step. For La altura de la torre es impresionante ‘The 
height of the tower is impressive’, where the manner adjective occurs in predicative positon, I 
propose the following composition: 
 
(76)   AspP  
  AspP    PredP 
     DP     Pred’         
        Pred
0
   AP 
  la altura de la torre    impresionante 
(77) a. ⟦𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . impressive(𝜆𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠). 
  c. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝜆𝑠𝑘 . impressive(𝑠𝑘)  ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠).              by EI 
  d. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ =  𝑠′. 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . impressive(𝑠𝑘)  ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠′). 
  f. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  g. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[impressive(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠
′) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 The manner adjective denotes (the characteristic function of) a set of state-kinds and projects 
AP. Given that the adjective appears in predictive position, it projects PredP, which is the 
functional node that allows the adjective to select for a subject, which will be a state in this case. 
The subject la altura de la torre ‘the height of the tower’ denotes a state of type s, specifically 
the state in which the tower has some height, which I call s’. Above PredP, an aspectual node 




Once the state argument is existentially bound, the statement is true iff there is a state that is 
associated with a state-kind that is impressive whose holder is the state in which the tower has 
some height.  
 Now let us show how measure phrases, which appear in predicative position, modify DPs 
containing deadjectival nominalizations. Before showing the details of the computation, it is 
necessary to point out two important empirical facts. First, although measure phrases can be 
analyzed as predicate of state-kinds because degrees are derived from state-kinds, as shown in 
chapter 1, there is empirical evidence that they express state-tokens when appearing in 
predicative position, since they accept temporal modification: 
 
(78) La anchura   del  lago fue  de 1000 km hasta 1950. 
  the  width  of.the lake was of  1000 km  until 1950 
  ‘The width of the lake was 1000 km until 1950.’ 
 
 Second, in Spanish measure phrases can be preceded by the preposition de ‘of’ only in 
predicative position, as shown in (79a). In attributive position, measure phrases are accepted 
only when the adjective is dimensional and lexicalizes a lower-closed scale (Sawada & Grano 
2011), as in (79b), but crucially the preposition is not admitted:  
 
(79) a. La  altura   del    lago es de 20 metros. 
     the height of.the  lake is  of  20 meters 
  ‘The height of the lake is 20 meters.’
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  b. La  torre  de Pisa está inclinada (*de) 4 grados. 
     the tower of  Pisa   is    inclined     of   4 degrees 
  ‘The Tower of Pisa is (of) 4 degrees inclined.’  
 
 On the one hand, the fact that measure phrases license temporal modification in predicative 
position is taken as evidence that they express states, so they project the functional node AspP 
over the structure. On the other hand, the fact that they are preceded by the preposition de ‘of’ 
                                                          
44
 Spanish has available another construction in which the copular verb appears in plural, in which case the preposition 
cannot be inserted: 
 
(i)  La   altura   del   lago son (*de) veinte metros. 
  the height  of.the  lake  are    of  twenty meters 
  ‘The height of the lake is twenty meters.’ 
 
 The plural agreement of the measure phrase with the verb raises the question of whether there is a different 




only in predicative position is taken as evidence that the preposition is the spell-out of a 
functional node that allows the measure phrase to be predicated of a subject, namely, PredP. 
Similar phenomena are observed in Den Dikken (2006) and adapted to Spanish by Eguren & 
Pastor (2014, 2015), who claim that certain prepositions, especially de ‘of’, are the spell-out of a 
relational node. For La altura de la torre es de diez metros ‘(lit.) The height of the tower is of ten 
meters’ I propose the following composition: 
 
(80)   AspP 
  Asp
0
    PP 
    DP     P’ 
       de    DegP 
      
   la altura de la torre       diez metros
 
(81) a. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ten meters(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑑𝑒⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝜆𝑠𝑘. 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠). 
  c. ⟦𝑃′⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ten meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠).                                                                by EI 
  d. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ =  𝑠′. 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ten meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠′). 
  f. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  g. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[ten meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠′) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 The measure phrase denotes a set of state-kinds and projects DegP. The PP attaches to DegP 
introducing the function holder, which enables the measure phrase to select for a subject. The 
subject la altura de la torre ‘the height of the tower’ denotes a state of type s, specifically the 
state in which the tower has some height, which I call s’. At the uppermost layer of the structure, 
an aspectual node associates a state-kind from the set of state-kinds denoted by the measure 
phrase with a state-token. Once the state argument is existentially bound, the statement is true 
iff there is a state that is associated with the state-kind two meters whose holder is the state in 
which the tower has some height. Thus, the analysis of measure phrases and manner adjectives 
when appearing in predicative position is basically the same. The only visible difference is the 
occurrence of the preposition de ‘of’ in the former case, which I take as the spell-out of PredP. 
Semantically, the difference between manner adjectives and measure phrases is that the former 
denote sets of state-kinds that are not inherently ordered, while the latter denote state-kinds 




 This analysis presents the great advantage of straightforwardly explaining the occurrence of 
measure phrases and manner adjectives in predicative position. Degree-based theories rely on 
the assumption that degree adverbs/adjectives and measure phrases must be adjacent to the 
adjective or noun that they modify in order to bind the degree variable d, so they cannot 
account for their occurrence in predicative position. In contrast, the state-kind system does not 
have this problem: by deriving degrees from state-kinds, the degree variable d is not 
incorporated into the denotation of gradable predicates, so these have more flexibility to 
combine with measure phrases and manner adjectives regardless of whether they appear in 
attributive or predicative position.  
 In conclusion, the analysis defended here in which manner adjectives are taken as predicates 
of state-kinds can account for their combination with deadjectival nominalizations in both the 
attributive and predicative positions. In addition, an analogous analysis can be applied to the 
occurrence of measure phrases.  
 
3.2.7. Remaining diagnostics 
In the previous subsections, we have seen that deadjectival nominalizations are compatible with 
temporal, frequency and even locative and manner modifiers, which provides enough empirical 
evidence that they express eventualities. In this section, I briefly examine other diagnostics that 
are used in the literature to support or refute the eventuality character of deadjectival 
nominalizations and argue that they do not lead to conclusive results. 
 First, the verb durar ‘to last’ (and occasionally perdurar ‘to endure, to perpetuate’) is often 
used as a test for identifying events and sometimes for identifying eventualities more generally. 
The literature in this respect is heterogeneous and vast, so I will only mention the proposals that 
focus on deadjectival nominalizations. Regarding Spanish (see also Alexiadou 2013b for Greek), 
Jaque & Martín (2019) claim that deadjectival nominalizations that are derived from stage-level 
predicates are compatible with durar ‘to last’, while the ones that are derived from individual-
level predicates are not. Based on Martin (2013) for French, the authors argue that the former 
express states, while the latter express qualities, as shown in chapter 1. However, there are many 
examples of deadjectival nominalizations that are derived from individual-level predicates that 
can combine with durar ‘to last’ and even perdurar ‘to endure, to perpetuate’:  
 
(82) a. Su    popularidad  duró  poco,  hasta que tuvieron  el accidente. 
     their   popularity  lasted shortly   until  that had.3.PL the accident 





  b. Su juventud durará eternamente gracias a  la  poción mágica. 
    their youth    last.FUT    eternally     thanks to the potion  magic 
  ‘Their youth will last eternally thanks to the magic potion.’ 
  c. La belleza   del  palacio  perduró durante siglos,   hasta que  se incendió. 
    the beauty of.the palace   endured     for   centuries  until  that REFL  burnt 
  ‘The beauty of the palace endured for centuries, until it burnt.’  
 
 The examples in (82) are associated with contexts in which the state expressed by each 
nominalization can vary over time. Hence, they can combine with the predicates durar ‘to last’ 
and perdurar ‘to endure, to perpetuate’. However, using the verb durar ‘to last’ as a test for 
identifying eventualities is not entirely reliable, since this verb does not impose any semantic 
restrictions on its subjects. For example, even an entity-denoting noun like silla ‘chair’ can co-
occur with durar ‘to last’, as in La silla duró dos años ‘The chair lasted two years’. We can 
conclude that deadjectival nominalizations can combine with the predicates durar ‘to last’ and 
perdurar ‘to endure, to perpetuate’, but this cannot be taken as a strong piece of evidence that 
they express eventualities. 
 Second, Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2017b) argue for English that deadjectival 
nominalizations cannot express states because they do not trigger temporal readings in certain 
partitive contexts. For example, sentences like My room has half the width of yours induces a 
degree rather than a temporal reading; in other words, this sentence does not mean ‘My room 
has its width for half the time your room has its width’. However, the authors overlook that 
clear-cut examples of stative verbs and stative nominalizations do not prompt temporal 
readings in these contexts either: 
 
(83) a. Mario quiere/respeta   a   María  la mitad que  su hermano. 
         Mario  loves  respects ACC  María  the  half  than his  brother  
  ‘Mario loves/respects María half as much as his brother does.’  
  b. Juan tiene la mitad de preocupación/confianza que María. 
     Juan  has  the half    of     worrying         trust     than María  
  ‘Juan has half María’s worrying/trust.’ 
 
 The sentences in (83) include clear-cut cases of stative predicates that can only trigger a 
degree rather than a temporal reading. The reason why this is the case is that these states are 
strictly homogeneous or divisible in instants (as we saw in chapter 2 in relation to extent vs. 




 Another piece of evidence that the lack of temporal readings in partitive contexts does not 
demonstrate that the predicates in question are not eventualities is that, in combining partitive 
modifiers with interval states, which are not strictly homogeneous or are rather divisible in 
intervals, we can obtain a temporal reading: 
 
(84) Juan durmió/esperó la  mitad que María. 
  Juan   slept   waited  the half  than María 
  ‘Juan slept/waited half as much as María.’ 
 
 In (84) the partitive modifier can prompt a temporal reading whereby Juan slept/waited for 
half the time than María. This is possible because the states in question, unlike subinterval 
states, are divisible in intervals, which provides additional evidence that the lack of temporal 
readings in partitive contexts is related to homogeneity/divisibility and not to their eventuality 
character. We can conclude that the alleged counterexamples provided by Francez & Koontz-
Garboden (2017b) are explained on the basis of the strict homogeneity condition that 
characterizes subinterval states.  
 Finally, I would like to examine the combination of deadjectival nominalizations with phrases 
introduced by the preposition de ‘of’ that are supposed to provide temporal information, such 
as de varias horas ‘of several hours’ or alike. Fábregas (2016) argues that deadjectival 
nominalizations do not express eventualities because they do not accept this type of modifiers. 
Masià (2017) refines Fábregas’ observation positing that there are two groups: the ones that 
accept them and the ones that do not (see also Sanromán 2012 and Jaque & Martín 2019 for 
Spanish and Martin 2013 for French): 
 
(85) a. ??una libertad/sabiduría de varias horas 
           a  freedom  wisdom   of several hours 
  b. una soledad/oscuridad de varias horas 
       a  loneliness darkness  of several hours 
(Masià 2017: 159) 
 
 Although Masià (2017) does not mention it explicitly, what phrases like de varias horas ‘of 
several hours’ seem to tell apart is nominalizations derived from individual-level predicates, see 
(85a), from nominalizations derived from stage-level predicates, see (85b). However, the test 




individual-level predicates, like popularidad ‘popularity’, and even entity-denoting nouns, like 
vino ‘wine’, that are compatible with this type of phrases: 
 
(86) a. una popularidad de  varias semanas 
       a    popularity    of  several  weeks 
  b. un vino de varios / siete años   
       a  wine of several  seven years   
 
 As concluded by Picallo (1999), what this type of data indicate is that phrases introduced by 
the preposition de ‘of’ are not true temporal modifiers that locate eventualities (like the ones 
examined in subsection 3.2.2), but rather they are another type of modifiers that provide a 
different temporal information that is used for classifying the noun that they modify into distinct 
sub-kinds.  
 In sum, in this subsection we have reviewed three tests that have been used to support or 
refute the eventuality nature of deadjectival nominalizations and resolved that they do not lead 
to conclusive results. Therefore, they do not pose any important empirical problems to treat 
these nominalizations as states. In the following section, I examine the individual-level, stage-
level and stative causative distinction in the nominal domain. 
 
3.3. Causation 
Having provided enough empirical evidence that deadjectival nominalizations express states, we 
are in conditions to find out whether the individual-level, stage-level and stative causative 
distinction is also applicable to them. In chapter 2, we concluded that the three-way distinction 
among individual-level, stage-level and mental state adjectives relies on causation: specifically, 
individual-level adjectives express non-caused states, stage-level adjectives express externally 
caused states and, following Leferman (2017), mental state adjectives express internally caused 
states. In this section, I provide evidence that their corresponding nominalizations can also 
trigger those readings depending on the readings that their adjectival bases allow for. 
 For the sake of convenience, let us leave stative causatives aside for the moment. In principle, 
it is expected that predicates that can only trigger an individual-level reading form 
nominalizations that express individual-level readings and that predicates that can only trigger a 
stage-level reading form nominalizations that express stage-level readings: 
 
(87) a. Víctor   es  /  *está   popular.  




  b. la  popularidad de Víctor 
     the  popularity   of  Víctor  
  ‘Víctor’s popularity’ 
(88) a. El monstruo *es  /  está   desnudo. 
    the monster  is.SER  is.ESTAR  naked 
  b. la   desnudez   del  monstruo 
     the nakedness of.the monster 
 
 In (87a) the predicate popular ‘popular’ only accepts the copula ser, which is taken as 
evidence that it expresses an individual-level state, so we can claim that the nominalization 
popularidad ‘popularity’ in (87b) also expresses an individual-level state. Analogously, in (88a) 
the stage-level predicate desnudo ‘naked’ only accepts the copula estar, so we can claim that the 
nominalization desnudez ‘nakedness’ also expresses a stage-level state in (88b).  
 Nevertheless, in Spanish there are many other predicates of variable behavior that can 
express either an individual-level or a stage-level reading depending on whether they co-occur 
with the copula ser or estar, respectively. For those cases, we need a different way of checking 
whether the two readings are maintained. According to Fábregas (2016), if stage-level 
deadjectival nominalizations hold because of an external factor, they must accept the modifier 
resultante ‘resulting’. This modifier, he argues, necessarily establishes an anaphoric reference 
with a previous utterance that might be explicitly realized by its complement, which is 
introduced by the preposition de ‘from’, as in resultante de ello ‘resulting from that’. Other 
modifiers that also establish an anaphoric reference according to Fábregas, although they do 
not take any complements, are subsiguiente ‘subsequent’ and consecuente ‘consequent’. 
However, the test proposed by Fábregas does not show clear contrasts of acceptability:  
 
(89) a. Juan tuvo una crisis   y     ya      no es creyente. Su ateísmo resultante le   hizo   feliz.  
     Juan had    a   crisis and already not is  believer  his atheism  resulting him made happy 
  ‘Juan had a crisis and is not a believer anymore. His resulting atheism made him happy.’ 
  b. María compuso una canción famosa. Su popularidad resultante la   hizo  millonaria. 
      María composed  a     song   famous  her  popularity    resulting her made millionaire 
  ‘María composed a famous song. Her resulting popularity made her a millionaire.’ 
(90) a. El monstruo se    quitó    la  ropa. Su  desnudez resultante nos dejó   sin   palabras. 
     the monster REFL take.off the clothe its  nakedness  resulting  us   left  without words 





  b. El conductor no   paró   de beber alcohol. Su   ebriedad   resultante causó un accidente. 
     the   driver   not stopped of   drink  alcohol  his drunkenness resulting caused an accident 
  ‘The driver did not stop drinking alcohol. His resulting drunkenness caused an accident.’  
 
 According to Fábregas (2016), it is expected that in (90a) the nominalization desnudez 
‘nakedness’, which comes from the stage-level predicate desnudo ‘naked’, can co-occur with 
resultante ‘resulting’ and the same holds for ebriedad ‘drunkenness’ in (90b), which comes from 
the stage-level predicate ebrio ‘drunken’. However, the nominalization ateísmo ‘atheism’, which 
comes from the individual-level predicate ateo ‘atheistic’, and popularidad ‘popularity’, which 
comes from the individual-level predicate popular ‘popular’, can also combine with resultante 
‘resulting’ in (89a) and (89b), respectively. Thus, we need to look for a different test that allows 
us to distinguish individual-level readings from stage-level readings.  
 Recall from chapter 2 that stage-level predicates, unlike individual-level ones, are naturally 
compatible with agentive adverbs, so one way of verifying whether deadjectival nominalizations 
trigger individual-level or stage-level readings is to examine their behavior with the adjectival 
agentive counterparts. Look at the following examples: 
 
(91) a. *El  visitante es voluntariamente  ateo  /  popular. 
        the visitor   is      voluntarily    atheistic   popular 
  b. *el   voluntario ateísmo   del  visitante. 
       the  voluntary atheism of.the  visitor 
  c. *la  voluntaria popularidad  del visitante. 
      the voluntary  popularity  of.the visitor 
(92) a. El  monstruo está deliberadamente desnudo / ebrio. 
     the  monster    is       deliberately       naked    drunken 
  b. la  deliberada desnudez   del monstruo. 
     the deliberate nakedness of.the monster 
   c. la  deliberada   ebriedad    del   monstruo. 
    the deliberate drunkenness of.the  monster 
 
 In (91a) the individual-level predicates ateo ‘atheistic’ and popular ‘popular’ are incompatible 
with the agentive modifier voluntariamente ‘voluntarily’. Analogously, their corresponding 
nominalizations ateísmo ‘atheism’ and popularidad ‘popularity’ are also incompatible with the 
agentive modifier voluntario ‘voluntary’, see (91b) and (91c). In contrast, in (92a) the stage-level 




‘deliberately’; analogously, their corresponding nominalizations desnudez ‘nakedness’ and 
ebriedad ‘drunkenness’ are compatible with deliberado ‘deliberate’, see (92b) and (92c). 
 In relation to nominalizations that come from predicates of variable behavior, Fábregas 
(2016) claims that there are two groups: the ones that can maintain the individual-level or stage-
level readings expressed by their bases and the ones that can only maintain the individual-level 
reading: 
 
(93) a. A Irene  se   le   enfrió  la  nariz.  La     rojez  resultante la   hacía  parecer un payaso. 
     to Irene REFL her cooled the nose   the  redness  resulting her made resemble a   clown 
  ‘Irene’s nose cooled. Its resulting redness made her resemble a clown.’ 
  b. Pablo bebió  y   bebió toda la noche. Su subsiguiente embriaguez/borrachez/ebriedad  
     Pablo drank and drank  all  the night   his  subsequent          inebriation drunkenness  
  lo   dejó KO durante todo el  día. 
  him left  KO     for      all   the day 
  ‘Pablo drank and drank all the night. His subsequent inebriation/drunkenness knocked  
  him out for all the day.’ 
  c. El  sol  cubrió   los  viñedos, produciendo la consecuente madurez de las uvas. 
    the sun covered the vineyards  producing    the consequent  ripeness of the grapes 
(94) a. Vistieron a   la  novia con los mejores ropajes. *Su hermosura/belleza resultante dejó al   
      dressed ACC the bride with the   best     robes     her           beauty           resulting  left  the  
  novio anonadado. 
  groom astonished 
  ‘They dressed the bride with their best robes. Her resulting beauty astonished the groom.’ 
  b. Luisito había comido mucho ese  verano.  *La  gordura  /  el   grosor  /  la graseza  / 
      Luisito  had    eaten    much  that summer   the  fatness     the thickness  the fatness 
  la obesidad subsiguiente le    impedía ponerse los pantalones que  le  habían servido  
  the obesity   subsequent him prevented put.on   the      pants    that him  had    suited 
  durante todo el  año.  
      for       all  the year 
  ‘Luisito had eaten too much that summer. His subsequent fatness/thickness/obesity  
  prevented him from wearing the pants that used to suit him well the rest of the year.’  
  c. Silvia había crecido mucho ese verano. ??La  gran altura resultante   ya       le permitía




  llegar    al   tercer estante.
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  reach to.the third    shelf 
  ‘Silvia had grown a lot that summer. Her resulting great height let her reach the third  
  shelf.’ 
(From Fábregas 2016: 236, translation mine) 
 
 Fábregas claims that the nominalizations in (93), which come from adjectives of variable 
behavior, can express both individual-level and stage-level readings, so they can combine with 
the anaphoric predicates resultante ‘resulting’, subsiguiente ‘subsequent’ and consecuente 
‘consequent’. In contrast, although the nominalizations in (94) are also formed out of adjectives 
of variable behavior, they can only express individual-level readings, so they reject the anaphoric 
predicates in question. 
 However, I would like to make a qualification regarding the data that the author considers 
unacceptable. First, I believe that (94a) is fully acceptable and provide in (95a, b) two examples 
from the Internet in which belleza ‘beauty’ and resultante ‘resulting’ co-occur, either with or 
without an explicit complement. Second, in (94b) the nominalization grosor ‘thickness’ is 
infrequently used when applied to people, while graseza ‘fatness’ is almost obsolete. With 
respect to gordura ‘fatness’ and obesidad ‘obesity’, (94b) is likely to be unacceptable because of 
subsiguiente ‘subsequent’, which means ‘that follows something immediately’, and maybe this 
component of immediacy or any other that escapes my knowledge gives rise to an odd 
utterance. As shown in (95c), the modifier resultante ‘resulting’ does give rise to acceptable 
combinations. Finally, I also find (94c) acceptable and, to dispel any doubts, I provide additional 
data in which only a stage-level reading is licensed. In the adjectival domain, the occurrence of 
the causal adjunct con esos tacones ‘with those heels’ is only compatible with the copula estar, 
see (96a), which indicates that the only interpretation available is the stage-level one. 
Importantly for our purposes, the corresponding nominalization is compatible with that adjunct, 
see (96b), so we can posit that the stage-level reading is maintained. 
 
(95) a. … la iglesia de Santa Ana  exhibe su belleza resultante  de  la  mezcla de estilos gótico,  
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 Note that I have translated the determiner la ‘the’ as su ‘his/her’ in (95b) and (95c) because the absence of argument 
structure induces a kind reading, something that Fábregas (2016) does not note. In Fábregas’ examples, we have to 




  renacentista   y     neoclásico…
46
 
  Renaissance and Neoclassical 
  ‘The church of Santa Ana exhibits its beauty, resulting from the mixture of Gothic,  
   Renaissance and Neoclassical styles.’ 
  b. Las dificultades constructivas que hubo que superar    y  su belleza resultante hacen de  
      the  difficulties   constructive   that had   to overcome and its beauty   resulting  made  of  
  esta obra un sorprendente caso singular…
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  this  work  a     surprising    case peculiar 
  ‘The construction difficulties that we had to overcome and its resulting beauty turn this 
  work into a surprising peculiar case.’  
  c. Juan engordó sobremanera en verano. Su gordura/obesidad resultante le    causó  
     Juan fattened   very.much     in summer his  fatness    obesity    resulting him caused  
  problemas de salud. 
  problems   of  health 
  ‘Juan fattened very much in summer. His resulting fatness/obesity caused him health  
  problems.’ 
(96) a. Silvia  *es  /  está  increíblemente alta con esos tacones. 
     Silvia is.SER  is.ESTAR   incredibly      tall with those  heels 
  b. la   increíble  altura de Silvia con  esos tacones 
     the incredible height of Silvia with those  heels    
 
 A similar argument can be adduced with respect to hermosura ‘beauty’, gordura ‘fatness’ and 
obesidad ‘obesity’. If, as Fábregas claims, these nominalizations cannot maintain a stage-level 
reading, we could not explain the following contrasts: 
 
(97) a. La modelo *es   /   está    hermosa con  ese vestido. 
     the model  is.SER   is.ESTAR beautiful  with that  dress 
  b. la  hermosura de la modelo con  ese vestido 
     the    beauty    of the model  with that  dress 
(98) a. El  actor  *es   /   está   voluntariamente gordo/obeso.  
     the actor is.SER  is.ESTAR      voluntarily        fat    obese  
  b. la voluntaria gordura/obesidad del  actor 
     the voluntary  fatness   obesity of.the actor 
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 We can conclude that deadjectival nominalizations can express individual-level, stage-level 
or both readings depending on the properties of their bases, and there are no bases that can 
express both readings whose corresponding nominalizations cannot express stage-level 
readings. 
 In relation to mental state adjectives, recall from chapter 2 that they select for internal 
arguments headed by the preposition con ‘with’, see (99a) and (100a). Crucially, their 
nominalizations reproduce the same pattern, see (99b) and (100b). 
 
(99) a. Popeye     es  /  está  amable con Olivia. 
      Popeye is.SER  is.ESTAR   kind   with Olivia 
  ‘Popeye is kind to Olivia.’ 
  b. la amabilidad de Popeye con Olivia 
     the kindness    of  Popeye with Olivia 
  ‘Popeye’s kindness to Olivia’ 
(100) a. Macario     fue   /   estuvo   sincero con Marina. 
     Macario was.SER  was.ESTAR  honest  with Marina 
  ‘Macario was honest to Marina.’ 
  b. la sinceridad de Macario con Marina 
     the  honesty   of  Macario with Marina 
  ‘Macarios’s honesty to Marina’ 
 
 In (99a) and (100a) the mental state adjectives can combine with the two copulas and select 
for an internal argument introduced by con ‘with’, which indicates that they prompt a stative 
causative reading. Their corresponding nominalizations also introduce the internal argument, so 
we can posit that the stative causative reading is maintained.  
 Another piece of evidence that the stative causative reading is available in nominalizations 
derived from mental state adjectives is that the former, like the latter, can combine with agentive 
modifiers: 
 
(101) a. Popeye fue voluntariamente amable con Olivia. 
      Popeye was     voluntarily        kind   with Olivia 
  b. Macario fue intencionadamente sincero con Marina. 
      Macario was     intentionally        honest with Marina 
(102) a. la  voluntaria amabilidad de Popeye con Olivia 




  b. la  intencionada sinceridad de Macario con  Marina 
     the  intentional     honesty    of  Macario with Marina 
 
 We conclude that deadjectival nominalizations inherit the causal properties associated with 
their base adjectives. As a corollary, adjectival bases that can trigger either individual-level or 
stage-level readings form nominalizations that can express both readings too; the ones that are 
derived from mental state adjectives, which express a stative causative reading, can also trigger 
this reading. In the following subsection, I present a technical implementation of the analysis. 
 
3.3.1 Technical implementation 
So far, and for convenience sake, I have exemplified the composition of nominalizations that 
express individual-level states to put the focus on the modifiers that accompany them. 
Nonetheless, we have to explain how nominalizations that are derived from stage-level states 
and stative causatives are formed. Recall from chapter 2 that stage-level predicates express 
properties that are externally caused, while stative causatives express properties that are 
internally caused. In this sense, their derivation must be more complex than the one of 
individual-level predicates, which express non-caused properties. On the other hand, 
deadjectival nominalizations that are derived from stage-level states and stative causatives can 
trigger quality and degree readings. In order not to complicate the derivation, I show their 
composition only in the degree reading, which does not include the null morpheme EVAL. For the 
stage-level (and degree) reading of la tristeza del nene ‘the sadness of the kid’, I propose the 
following composition: 
 
(103)    DP  
   la      AspP3 
      AspP2 
   AspP1     i        PP 
 Asp
0
   NP      
   -eza  StageP 
      ∃C  Stage’ 
      Stage
0
  PredP 
         ti   Pred’   del nenei 
          Pred
0
     AP  
                      trist(e) 




  b. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  c. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).                  by EI 
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).    
  e. ⟦𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒0⟧= 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑐𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ stage(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑐). 
  f. ⟦𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒′⟧= 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝑠𝑘 . sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ stage(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑐).                by EI 
  g. ⟦𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑃⟧= 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝑐[sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ stage(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑐)].         by ∃C 
  h. ⟦−𝑒𝑧𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  i. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝑐[sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ stage(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑐)].   
  j. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  k. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘∃𝑐[sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ stage(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑐) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  l. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘∃𝑐[sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ stage(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑐) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)].           by λ-A 
  m. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘∃𝑐[sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , the kid) ∧ stage(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑐) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  n. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ = 𝜄𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘∃𝑐[sad(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , the kid) ∧ stage(𝑠𝑘, 𝑐) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 What we need to take into consideration here is the influence of the functional node StageP. 
This node introduces the function stage, which associates the base state-kind sk with an external 
cause c, which is existentially bound in Spec-StageP via ∃C. This way we can derive why stage-
level states are predicates that express properties that are externally caused. The result of the 
derivation is the unique state that is associated with a state-kind of sadness whose holder is the 
kid, and that state-kind has an external causer. This analysis is in accordance with other syntactic 
analyses in which stage-level predicates are syntactically more complex than individual-level 
ones (Zagona 2009, 2015; Gallego & Uriagereka 2009, 2016; Brucart 2012; Camacho 2012; 
Fábregas 2016); however, instead of positing a functional node with aspectual information, as in 
these analyses, the stage is considered here an external cause. My analysis correctly predicts 
that individual-level and stage-level predicates do not differ with respect to aspect, since both 
types of predicates express states, but rather they differ in their causal properties.   
 Finally, for the stative causative (and degree) interpretation of la honestidad de Juan con 











(105)     DP  
   la       AspP5 
        AspP4          
      AspP3   i        PP   
    AspP2          
  AspP1   j           PP   
 Asp
0
  NP              
  -idad  CauseP 
    tj   Cause’    de Juanj  con Maríai 
     Cause
0
  PredP 
        tj   Pred’   
         Pred
0
     AP 
           honest-  ti         
(106) a. ⟦𝐴⟧ = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑠𝑘 . honest(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑦). 
  b. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . honest(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑦). 
  c. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . honest(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).                by EI 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . honest(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘, 𝑥).    
  f. ⟦𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒0⟧= 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  g. ⟦𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒′⟧= 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . honest(𝑠𝑘, 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘, 𝑥).          by EI 
  h. ⟦𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑃⟧= 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . honest(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).          
  i. ⟦−𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  j. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . honest(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).   
  k. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  l. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[honest(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  m. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[honest(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)].      by λ-A 
  n. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[honest(𝑠𝑘, 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , j) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , j) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  o. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃4⟧ = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[honest(𝑠𝑘, 𝑦) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , j) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , j) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)].       by λ-A 
  p. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃5⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[honest(𝑠𝑘 , m) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , j) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , j) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)].  
  q. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ = 𝜄𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[honest(𝑠𝑘 , m) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , j) ∧ causer(𝑠𝑘 , j) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  
 The starting point is the gradable adjective honesto ‘honest’, which includes another position 
y for the internal argument that experiences the honesty caused by the subject, which 
corresponds to the PP con María ‘(lit.) with María’. Alternatively, it could have been posited that 




relevance to our analysis, I propose the former for the sake of simplicity. The functional node 
PredP introduces the holder x of the state, as in the case of individual-level and stage-level 
states. However, in this case the node CauseP attaches to the structure above PredP. This node 
introduces the function causer, which associates the holder x with the state-kind sk; what this 
indicates is that the holder of the state is also its causer or the participant that is responsible for 
bringing the state about, which accounts for the fact that stative causatives express internally 
caused properties. The functional node CauseP is taken from Fábregas (2016); according to this 
author, this node is the counterpart of InitP in the verbal domain (from Ramchand 2008) and is 
projected by adjectives whose subjects have a causative semantics (see Leferman 2017 for an 
alternative implementation that makes use of two state variables instead of the node CauseP). 
The result of the derivation is the unique state that is associated with a state-kind of honesty 
whose holder and causer is Juan and whose experiencer is María.  
 In sum, in this subsection I have offered a syntactic and semantic implementation for 
deadjectival nominalizations that express stage-level states and stative causatives that captures 
their differences in terms of causation, in accordance with the empirical evidence provided in 
the previous subsection. In the following section, I delve into the analysis of scalar properties 
and comparison classes in the nominal domain. 
 
3.4. The comparison class 
I have previously shown that the most salient contrast between gradable adjectives and their 
nominalizations is that only the former are obligatorily assessed with respect to a standard of 
comparison. Automatically, this asymmetry leads us to wonder whether gradable adjectives and 
their nominalizations show any other contrasts in relation to their scalar properties and the 
comparison classes invoked. In this section, I argue that deadjectival nominalizations inherit the 
scalar properties and the comparison class from their corresponding base adjectives.  
 The point of departure of this investigation is Masià (2017): in the author’s study of Spanish 
adverbial and adjectival maximizers, like completamente ‘completely’ and completo ‘complete’, 
respectively, Masià provides evidence that gradable adjectives parallel their corresponding 
nominalizations:  
 
(107) a. ??completamente alto 
           completely       tall 
  b. ??completa altura 





(108) a. completamente árido 
         completely      arid 
  b. completa aridez 
      complete aridity 
(Masià 2017: 156) 
  
 (107a) shows that gradable adjectives like alto ‘tall’, whose scales do not include maximal 
points (or maximal state-kinds in my proposal), do not accept the maximizer completamente 
‘completely’, whereas (108a) shows that gradable adjectives like árido ‘arid’, whose scales do 
include a maximal point, can combine with that maximizer. (107b) and (108b) reproduce an 
analogous pattern with respect to the corresponding nominalizations and the maximizer 
completo ‘complete’.  
 However, as pointed out in chapter 2, there are gradable adjectives whose interpretation as 
relative or absolute varies depending on whether they invoke a between or a within comparison 
class: 
 
(109) a. El  suelo  está  completamente seco. 
     the floor is.ESTAR   completely      dry 
  b. la  completa sequedad del  suelo 
     the complete   dryness of.the floor 
(110) a. Este  clima     es (*completamente) seco. 
     this climate  is.SER     completely       dry 
  b. la (*completa) sequedad de este clima 
     the   complete    dryness   of  this climate 
 
 In (109a) the adjective seco ‘dry’ invokes a comparison within the same individual and is 
compatible with the maximizer completamente ‘completely’; in other words, in order to know 
whether the floor is dry or not, we do not have to compare it to other similar floors, but rather 
to other situations in which the same floor might be. In contrast, in (110a) the adjective seco ‘dry’ 
invokes a comparison between individuals and does not combine with the maximizer in 
question; accordingly, in order to know whether the climate is dry or not, we have to compare it 
to other similar climates. In other words, in (109a) the adjective has an absolute interpretation 
because the standard of comparison is one of the endpoints of the scale, while in (110a) the 




determined degree. Crucially, their corresponding nominalizations do not alter the 
interpretations and show an analogous behavior, see (109b) and (110b). 
 Recall the case of the adjective limpio ‘clean’ from chapter 2, which allows for an individual-
level reading in which it rejects the maximizer completamente ‘completely’, see (111a), but also 
an individual-level reading in which it accepts it, see (112a).  
 
(111) a. Este suelo  es (*completamente) limpio. 
      this floor is.SER      completely       clean 
  b. El  suelo  está (completamente) limpio. 
     the floor is.ESTAR    completely      clean 
  c. la  completa  limpieza    del  suelo
48
 
     the complete cleanness of.the floor 
(112) a. Las elecciones fueron (completamente) limpias. 
      the  elections were.SER     completely       clean 
  b. la  completa  limpieza de las elecciones 
     the complete cleanness of the elections 
 
 In (111a) the adjective limpio ‘clean’ has an individual-level interpretation and rejects the 
maximizer completamente ‘completely’; in contrast, in (111b) the adjective has a stage-level 
interpretation and accepts the maximizer. Therefore, the nominalization in (111c) can only have 
a stage-level interpretation in the presence of completa ‘complete’. Regarding (112a), the 
adjective has an individual-level interpretation. Observe that, in this case, it can combine with 
the maximizer completamente ‘completely’, and its corresponding nominalization with the 
maximizer completa ‘complete’, see (112b). If the maximizer appears, (111a) is unacceptable 
because the adjective invokes a comparison between individuals, while (112a) is acceptable 
because the adjective invokes a comparison within the same individual. In other words, while we 
need to compare the floor to other similar floors in order to utter (111a), we do not need to 
compare the elections to other elections to utter (112a).  
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 The nominalization limpieza ‘cleanness’ is exceptional in Spanish insofar as it can also express an event in other 
contexts, as revealed by its combination with the predicate tener lugar ‘take place’: 
 
(i)  La  limpieza  de las  calles  tuvo lugar   ayer. 
  the cleanness of  the streets  took place yesterday 
  ‘The cleaning of the streets took place yesterday.’  
  
 In order to explain this case, we could posit that the base is the verb limpiar ‘clean’ or that the event reading of the 




 Regarding minimizers, the situation is different, since their occurrence does not ensure an 
absolute interpretation. Recall that we concluded in chapter 2 that minimizers are licensed not 
only when the adjective invokes a within comparison class, but also when it invokes a between 
comparison class; however, in the latter case an implicit standard of comparison must be 
entailed (see Sassoon 2012a for English): 
 
(113) a. Las  gafas    están   ligeramente húmedas. 
     the glasses are.ESTAR    slightly      humid 
  b. la  ligera humedad de las  gafas 
     the slight  humidity of  the glasses 
(114) a. #Este  clima    es   ligeramente húmedo. 
        this climate is.SER     slightly     humid 
  b. #la  ligera humedad  de este   clima 
        the slight humidity   of  this  climate 
 
 In (113a) the adjective invokes a within comparison class, so we do not need to compare the 
glasses to other similar glasses to determine whether (113a) is true or false; in addition, the 
minimizer ligeramente ‘slightly’ is licensed naturally and triggers an absolute interpretation, so 
any degree of humidity above zero is enough to utter (113a). In contrast, in (114a) the adjective 
invokes a between comparison class, so we need to compare the climate to other climates to 
determine whether the climate is humid or not; unlike in (113a), the minimizer is only licensed in 
a reading in which an external standard of comparison is implicitly understood (e.g. slightly 
humid for inland inhabitants), which is signaled by the symbol #. In order for (114a) to be true, it 
is necessary that the degree of humidity associated with the climate is above a contextually 
determined degree of humidity. Finally, what is important to take into consideration for the 
purposes of this section is that the nominalizations do not alter the properties of their 
corresponding bases, so they reproduce an analogous pattern; see (113b) and (114b). 
 In sum, in this section I have shown that deadjectival nominalizations do not change either 
the scalar properties or the comparison classes that are associated with their base adjectives. 
Thus, the only relevant contrast that the two domains show with respect to their gradable 
properties is that nominalizations need not be evaluated with respect to a standard of 
comparison, as concluded in section 3.1 and subsection 3.2.6. In chapter 4, by exploring the 
semantics of bare state-kind nominalizations that participate in possessive structures with the 




empirical evidence that deadjectival nominalizations do not have to be assessed with respect to 
a standard of comparison. 
 Having examined deadjectival nominalizations with respect to the modifiers that accompany 
them, their causal properties, their scale endpoints and the comparison classes that they invoke, 
the following section focuses on the semantic contribution of deadjectival suffixes.   
  
3.5 The semantics of deadjectival nominalizers 
So far, I have taken for granted that deadjectival nominalizers are mere transposers or suffixes 
whose sole function is to the change the category of their bases from adjectives to nouns. 
However, in this section I will show that the existence of certain deadjectival nominalizations 
that express a more specialized meaning than their corresponding bases requires a more fine-
grained analysis. In this section, I show that nominalizers can either take as their input the whole 
domain of state-kinds denoted by adjectival bases, which is the most common situation, or can 
restrict that domain, but they cannot broaden it to introduce a new meaning that is not encoded 
in adjectival bases. Before describing my proposal, let us start by showing that the nominalizer 
does not contribute any other meanings that we can consider systematic.  
 For example, nominalizations containing the suffix -ura usually express physical properties 
when the affix attaches to adjectival bases (RAE & ASALE 2009), as in altura ‘height’ and 
hermosura ‘beauty’, but it is not always the case, as in travesura ‘prank’, which expresses an 
event. In fact, despite some exceptions (like the pairs fresc-or ~ fresc-ura ‘freshness’ and dulz-or 
~ dulz-ura ‘sweetness’, which will be analyzed below), there are no suffix alternations derived 
from the same base. With respect to the fact that a certain base attaches to a certain suffix and 
not to another one (e.g. triste ‘sad’, which only attaches to -eza to form tristeza ‘sadness’), it 
depends on historical, phonological and productivity factors, while semantic factors are much 
less influential or even irrelevant. 
 From a functionalist perspective, Lieber (2004, 2016) proposes for English that all suffixes 
contribute semantic content in terms of features. In the case of deadjectival nominalizers, they 
would bear the feature [−material], which would be responsible for the abstract character of 
deadjectival nominalizations. In this dissertation, I do not apply this analysis for two reasons: 
first, the abstract character of deadjectival nominalizations results from the eventuality nature of 
their bases, and positing that the nominalizer contributes the feature [−material] would be 
redundant. And, second, as shown in chapter 1 based on Bosque (1999), I have serious doubts 
that the abstract-concrete distinction is lexically relevant; rather, it is derived from other more 




senses, etc. For the meaning of deadjectival nominalizers, see also RAE & ASALE (2009: chapter 
6) and Arche & Marín (2015) for Spanish and Alexiadou & Martin (2012) for French. 
 Now observe some exceptional cases in which the same base gives rise to two different 
nominalizations that have different meanings: fresco ‘fresh’ > frescor ‘freshness’ ~ frescura 
‘vividness’; simple ‘simple, foolish’ > simplicidad ‘simplicity’ ~ simpleza ‘foolishness’; laico ‘laic’ > 
laicidad ‘laicity’ ~ laicismo ‘laicism’, etc. As mention above, in order to account for these cases, it 
is necessary to refine the analysis performed so far according to which deadjectival suffixes are 
mere transposers, but, before that, I will review a proposal that addresses this phenomenon on 
the basis of the existence of acategorial roots. 
 Fábregas (2016) posits that the contrast between the pair frescor ‘freshness’ ~ frescura 
‘vividness’ (and others like amargor ‘bitterness’ ~ amargura ‘grief, sorrow’ and dulzor ‘sweatness’ 
~ dulzura ‘tenderness’) is due to a difference between the syntactic structures that underlie 
them.
49
 While the suffix -ura can attach to adjectival bases, the suffix -or merges with acategorial 
roots. According to the standard assumptions in Distributed Morphology (Marantz 1997, 2000; 
Arad 2003; Acquaviva 2009, 2014; Alexiadou & Martin 2012; Borer 2013; Harley 2014: a.o.), roots 
are acategorial elements that are devoid of meaning and are only associated with a numerical 
index. When a certain root with an index n is selected by a syntactic node, for example A (or aP), 
which stands for an adjective, an adjective with a particular meaning is formed. Accordingly, 
Fábregas (2016) posits that, in the pair fresc-ura ‘freshness’ ~ fresc-or ‘vividness’, the latter 
nominalization is derived directly from the acategorial root √
n
 with no intermediate adjectival 
step, where the index n might have the value 765, for example. Fábregas notes that both 
frescura and frescor are gradable, so the author posits that in the former case its gradability 
comes from the base adjective, while in the latter its gradability comes from the suffix. Fábregas’ 
morphosyntactic analysis is the following: 
 
(115) a.   NP 
   -ura  PredP 
        DegP 
          AP 
  b.    NP 
   -or   √
765
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 As pointed out in RAE & ASALE (2009: 6.2q), in European Spanish there is a tendency to use the word ending in -or in 
the literal sense, so frescor ‘freshness’, amargor ‘bitterness’ and dulzor ‘sweetness’ are mostly used when the property 
can be perceived by one of the five senses. In contrast, there is a tendency to use the word ending in -ura in a figurative 
sense, so frescura ‘vividness’, amargura ‘grief, sorrow’ and dulzura ‘tenderness’ are mostly used when the five senses are 
not involved in the perception of the property. I nonetheless warn the reader that the contrasts are not applicable to 
American Spanish and even in European Spanish we do not find unanimous crisp judgments. In this dissertation, I 




 According to Fábregas (2016), in (115a) frescura ‘vividness’ is composed in the same fashion 
as regular deadjectival nominalizations. In contrast, in (115b) frescor ‘freshness’ is formed when 
the nominalizer -or, to which the author attributes the source of gradability, attaches to a certain 
acategorial root. The analysis correctly predicts that both frescura and frescor are gradable (or 
constitute mass nouns), since they come from a gradable base or affix, and also that frescura 
and frescor have different meanings. However, it runs into three problems.  
 The first problem is that, in the absence of AP, Fábregas’ (2016) analysis predicts that PredP 
and DegP are not present in the derivation of frescor ‘freshness’. The former is the functional 
node that captures argument structure inheritance, while the latter hosts degree modifiers like 
the null morpheme EVAL. In assuming that frescor does not include PredP, there is no way of 
accounting for argument structure inheritance: 
 
(116) a. La noche es fresca. 
     the night  is   fresh 
  b. el    frescor  de la noche 
      the freshness of the night 
 
 Fábregas’ analysis predicts that the PP de la noche ‘of the night’ is not the argument 
inherited from the adjectival structure, so his analysis does not explain why the DP la noche ‘the 
night’ in (116a) and the PP de la noche ‘of the night’ in (116b) maintain the same semantic 
relation with the adjective and the nominalization, respectively, or in other words are assigned 
the same thematic role. Moreover, this analysis does not explain why the adjective and its 
corresponding nominalization select for the same number of arguments. Regarding the absence 
of DegP, Fábregas’ analysis predicts that a DP containing the nominalization frescor, like el 
frescor de la noche ‘the freshness of the night’, cannot acquire a quality reading, given that 
DegP, which is the functional node projected by EVAL, is not present in the derivation. To solve 
the problem, the author, who bases his analysis on a degree-based theory, posits that the 
degree variable d introduced by -or can be bound contextually, but this would imply that the 
nominalization can acquire a quality reading without the presence of EVAL, which could not be 
easily implemented in a formal semantic apparatus. The only possible semantic operation that 
could occur in the absence of EVAL would be an existential closure ∃C of the degree variable, but 
in that case the quality reading, which is necessarily linked to the presence of EVAL, would not 
arise either. 
 The second problem of Fábregas’ analysis is that it attributes the source of gradability of the 




given that this suffix gives rise to gradable or mass nominalizations even when it attaches to 
verbal bases (e.g. dol-or ‘pain’, tem-or ‘fear’, cal-or ‘heat’, etc.). Rather, the problem is that it does 
not enable a unified treatment for all deadjectival nominalizers. Moreover, an extension of this 
analysis would force us to assume that one of the member of the pairs laicidad ‘laicity’ ~ 
laicismo ‘laicism’ and simplicidad ‘simplicity’ ~ simpleza ‘foolishness’, for instance, is formed out 
of an acategorial root and that some of the suffixes involved (-idad, -ismo or -eza) are also the 
nominalization’s source of gradability. However, under this analysis it is impossible to predict in 
which cases the same suffix attaches to an adjectival structure or to a root or why it should 
introduce gradability in some cases and not in others. Moreover, this analysis would miss the 
generalization that the main properties of deadjectival nominalizations are inherited from their 
bases.  
 Finally, the third problem is that it does not explain why the nominalizations frescor 
‘freshsness’, amargor ‘bitterness’ and dulzor ‘sweetness’ give rise to a meaning that is 
predictable from the adjectival bases. In other words, given that roots are devoid of meaning, 
they are generally used in Distributed Morphology to account for the formation of 
nominalizations that are associated with an idiosyncratic and unpredictable meaning; however, 
nominalizations like frescor seem to follow a regular pattern (namely, they are mass nouns, 
select for a subject, can have either a degree or a quality reading and are usually employed in 
the literal sense), which would get blurred if we derived them from roots. We can conclude that 
the hypothesis of roots defended by Fábregas presents several problems when trying to account 
for the meaning of the relatively exceptional deadjectival nominalizations under scrutiny. 
 Alternatively, we could be tempted to embrace a lexicalist device of word formation and to 
postulate that there are special lexical rules that account for the different meanings that the 
nominalizations derived from the same base can acquire. However, a closer inspection of the 
data indicates that the meaning of the resulting nominalizations under examination is not as 
unpredictable as it appears to be. As pointed out in RAE & ASALE (2009), what these 
nominalizations have in common is that they express a more specific meaning that their bases 
or, in other words, some nominalizations only take as their basic meaning a specific sense that 
the adjective can trigger. Consider the following data: 
 
(117) a. La noche / este estilo es fresco/a. 
     the night    this  style   is    fresh 
  b. ?el    frescor  /  la  frescura  de este estilo 





  c. el   frescor  /  ?la frescura  de  la noche 
    the freshness   the vividness of  the night 
 
 Certainly, from (117) we cannot draw any categorical conclusions, since we deal with 
tendencies rather than with clear contrasts: nevertheless, in European Spanish the 
nominalization frescor ‘freshness’ is preferably used in the literal sense, while the nominalization 
frescura ‘vividness’ is preferably used in the figurative sense. In contrast, their base adjective 
fresco ‘fresh, vivid’ encompasses both senses. An analogous situation holds with respect to 
amargor ‘bitterness’ ~ amargura ‘grief, sorrow’ and dulzor ‘sweatness’ ~ dulzura ‘tenderness’ 
and their corresponding bases. In other cases, the contrasts are clearer, as in simplicidad 
‘simplicity’ ~ simpleza ‘foolishness’, flacura ‘thinness’ ~ flaqueza ‘weakness’, laicidad ‘laicity’ ~ 
laicismo ‘laicism’, where at least one of the members of the pair takes a unique sense from the 
base adjective.  
 To sum up, certain nominalizations only pick up one of the senses of their base adjectives, so 
their meaning is not as unpredictable as, for instance, the meaning of idioms like kick the bucket 
‘to die’, but rather we deal with a process of semantic narrowing or specialization, which 
constitutes a relevant factor of semantic change (Traugott & Dasher 2001). The study of this 
phenomenon, which dates back to Bréal (1964 [1900]) at least, comes from historical grammar 
and holds when a word acquires a more specific or restricted meaning so that it can be applied 
to a fewer number of individuals. For example, in Old English the word hund meant ‘dog’ (hound 
refers now to a particular hunting breed of dogs) and the word mete (> meat) meant ‘food’ 
(Luján 2010). Semantic narrowing is opposed to semantic broadening, in which case a word 
acquires a more general meaning so that it can be applied to a larger number of individuals. For 
instance, in Old English bridd (> bird) meant ‘young bird’ (Luján 2010).     
 What is important to take into consideration here is that the formation of deadjectival 
nominalizations may involve semantic narrowing but not semantic broadening, although in 
most cases the base meaning remains stable. The way of accounting for that is to posit that the 
nominalizer can either take the whole domain of the function associated with the adjective or 
restrict it, see (118), and derive two denotations from the main one. If the nominalizer takes the 
whole domain of the function, we can propose that it denotes an identity function (from Barker 
1995), see (119a), as I have assumed hitherto. In contrast, in order to account for semantic 
narrowing, the nominalizer restricts the domain of the function, so we can propose the 
denotation offered in (119b): 
 
(118) ⟦𝑁𝑀𝐿𝑍⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝐺
′




(119) a. ⟦𝑁𝑀𝐿𝑍⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺.  
  b. ⟦𝑁𝑀𝐿𝑍⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝐺
′
<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>[𝐺′(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺′ ⊂ 𝐺]. 
 
 The adjectival base that undergoes semantic narrowing, the particular suffix and the subset 
of state-kinds that the suffix takes as its input is idiosyncratic and unpredictable, but the 
phenomenon of narrowing occurs regularly. With this in mind, we can explain the formation of 
pairs like frescor ’freshness’ ~ frescura ‘vividness’, in which case both nominalizations express a 
more specific meaning than their base adjective. The composition proposed for the degree 
reading of the nominalizations involved is the following one: 
 
(120) a. ⟦𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . fresh(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
  c. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠𝑘 . fresh(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥).                    by EI 
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . fresh(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥). 
(121) a. ⟦−𝑜𝑟⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝐺
′
<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>[𝐺′(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺′ ⊂ 𝐺)]. 
  b. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝐺
′
<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>[𝐺′(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺′ ⊂ fresh ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥)]. 
  c. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  d. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘∃𝐺
′
<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>[𝐺′(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺′ ⊂ fresh ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
(122) a. ⟦−𝑢𝑟𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝐺
′′
<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>[𝐺′′(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺′′ ⊂ 𝐺)]. 
  b. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝐺
′′
<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>[𝐺′′(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺′′ ⊂ fresh ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥)]. 
  c. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
  d. ⟦𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘∃𝐺
′′
<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>[𝐺′′(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺′′ ⊂ fresh ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑅(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠)]. 
 
 Up to (120) the composition is the same for the two nominalizations in question: the 
adjective alto ‘tall’ introduces the function tall, which denotes in the state-kind domain, and 
PredP introduces a holder, as usual. These nominalizations can also express a quality reading, in 
which case the null morpheme EVAL would be included in the derivation; here I illustrate the 
composition of the degree reading, which does not include EVAL. Above PredP, a suffix attaches 
to the structure to form a nominalization. In (121) the suffix -or restricts the domain of the state-
kinds G denoted by the adjective, picking up only a proper subset G’ thereof; of course, this 
subset of state-kinds must be defined in such a way that it can only be applied to individuals in 
the literal sense, but I have not provided the details for convenience sake. In contrast, in (122) 
the suffix -ura picks up a different proper subset of state-kinds G’’ from the set of state-kinds G 




individuals in a figurative sense. In both cases, the functional node AspP attaches to the 
structure to instantiate a state-kind from the subset of state-kinds picked up by the nominalizer. 
 The analysis correctly predicts that the meaning of the two nominalizations is more specific 
than the meaning of the base adjective, since the domain of the nominalizations is a proper 
subset of the domain of the adjective. In addition, in deriving the nominalizations from the base 
adjective instead of an acategorial root, the analysis also correctly predicts that PredP is present 
in the derivation and DegP may be present to account for the quality reading.
50 Finally, to 
capture the fact that the two nominalizations involved have a different meaning, a more fine-
grained analysis should define G’ in (121) and G’’ in (122) in such a way that their intersection is 
empty. 
 We can conclude that deadjectival nominalizers are affixes that play two roles: first, they 
change the category of the adjective to which they attach into a noun; second, they take as their 
input either the whole domain of the adjectival function or a proper subset thereof. The former 
case is the most common one and does not impact on the meaning of the base adjective. The 
latter case, in which semantic narrowing or specialization is involved, is less common and 
restricts the domain of the base adjective by taking a proper subset of the set of state-kinds 
denoted by it. The phenomenon of semantic narrowing must be explained as a regular process, 
while the adjectival bases to which it applies, the choice of the suffix and the proper subset of 
state-kinds that are taken by the nominalizer are subject to idiosyncratic constraints of Spanish. 
Deadjectival suffixes do not lexicalize any other semantic information that can be considered 
systematic. 
 
3.6. Summary of the chapter 
In this chapter, I have offered a detailed analysis of deadjectival nominalizations that express 
state-tokens. In section 3.1, following Fábregas (2016), I have shown that deadjectival 
nominalizations can trigger either a degree or a quality reading, where only the latter reading 
involves the null morpheme EVAL; the existence of the degree reading is possible because 
deadjectival nominalizations, unlike their adjectival bases, are not necessarily evaluated with 
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 I do not rule out an analysis based à la Fábregas (2016) on the existence of acategorial roots in order to account for 
the formation of other deadjectival nominalizations that are employed in a technical sense, like latitud ‘latitude’ (?< lato 
‘wide’), longitud ‘longitude’ (?< (obs.) longo ‘long’), fuerza ‘force’ (?< fuerte ‘strong’), etc. Note that the semantic 
connection with their base adjectives is very weak and in English some of these nominalizations involve suppletive bases.  
 On the one hand, an analysis according to which the nominalizer attaches to an acategorial root without an 
intermediate adjectival step correctly predicts that DegP cannot be included in the derivation and, therefore, that these 
nominalizations do not have a quality reading in the absence of an explicit quantifier or measure phrase: for instance, 
*La latitud de Madrid es una de sus propiedades ‘The latitude of Madrid is one of their properties’ is unacceptable. On the 
other hand, an analysis based on acategorial roots poses the challenge of positing a denotation for roots out of which 
the meaning of the nominalizations in question is composed. Thus, the analysis of these nominalizations on the basis of 





respect to a standard of comparison. However, in contrast to Fábregas, who argues for the 
existence of qualities and degrees as ontological objects, I have argued that deadjectival 
nominalizations express states in both the degree and quality readings. Nominalizations like 
altura ‘height’ and non-deadjectival nouns like temperatura ‘temperature’ are special, since they 
can only trigger a degree reading in the absence of an explicit mass quantifier or measure 
phrase, but they also express states. 
 In section 3.2, I have developed the most striking novelty of my proposal, namely, that it 
takes as basic that gradable adjectives are predicates of state-kinds. Endowed with a 
constructionist device of word formation, I have proposed a technical implementation for the 
syntax and semantics of deadjectival nominalizations. Positing that adjectives denote in the 
domain of state-kinds instead of state-tokens is an innovative contribution of this dissertation, 
but it is also an extension of Gehrke’s (2011, 2015, 2017) analysis of German adjectival passives, 
in which eventive verbs are taken as predicates of event-kinds and express event-tokens only 
when functional material is added. Following an analogous reasoning, in order to account for 
the state-token reading of deadjectival nominalizations, an aspectual node AspP attaches to the 
nominal structure introducing the realization function R (from Carlson 1977), which associates a 
state-kind with a state-token. 
 In addition, I have argued in line with Zato (2020) that deadjectival nominalizations express 
imperfective states, since they express properties that are subject to time but they do not include 
their boundaries. As such, they accept temporal, frequency and even manner and locative 
modification, but they do not admit aspectual PPs headed by durante ‘for’ even though they are 
atelic, since aspectual modifiers are only licensed in perfective interpretations. Against what is 
suggested in Fábregas & Marín (2012), I conclude that nominalizations can encode some 
viewpoint aspect-related information, which explains why deadjectival nominalizations, unlike 
deverbal nominalizations, show a clear contrast with respect to their combinatorics with 
aspectual modifiers.  
 In line with Gehrke & McNally (2015), I have explained the semantics and distribution of 
frequency adjectives by virtue of the kind-token dichotomy: frequency adjectives can trigger a 
temporal reading regardless of which position they appear in, in which case they denote in the 
token domain; in contrast, they trigger a non-temporal reading when occurring in post-nominal 
position, in which case they denote in the kind domain. With respect to manner modifiers, which 
I have analyzed as predicates of state-kinds, they do not give rise to entailments to the positive 
when combined with deadjectival nominalizations, which is in accordance with the fact that 
deadjectival nominalizations are not necessarily assessed with respect to a standard of 




or cancelable inferences to the positive is not solved here, but I concluded that it is not the 
manner adjective that would introduce the standard of comparison if the former were the case.   
 In sections 3.3 and 3.4 I have shown that deadjectival nominalizations can trigger an 
individual-level, stage-level or stative causative reading depending on the properties of the 
adjectival base and invoke the same comparison class as their base adjectives.  
 In section 3.5, I have offered an inspection of deadjectival nominalizers according to which 
they are affixes that change the category of the adjective to which they attach. In addition, the 
nominalizer can either take as its input the whole domain of the function introduced by the 
adjective or restrict its domain by taking a proper subset from the set of state-kinds, which 
accounts for the phenomenon of semantic narrowing. The former case explains the formation of 
most deadjectival nominalizations, while the latter explains the formation of pairs like frescor 
‘freshness’ ~ frescura ‘vividness’, which are derived from the same base. 
 Before closing the chapter, I would like to retrieve some insights presented in chapter 1 and 
make a brief reflection on the semantic ontology that is employed here and the abstract 
character of deadjectival nominalizations. Postulating that gradable adjectives are predicates of 
state-kinds and that deadjectival nominalizations express imperfective states allows us to make 
use of a reduced ontology of semantic objects, which does not include degrees, qualities or 
tropes. Degrees, whose existence as ontological semantic objects is accepted in the vast majority 
of proposals on gradability, are derived from state-kinds (see chapter 4 for additional 
argumentation); what other authors have treated as qualities can be viewed as imperfective 
states or individual-level states; and I side with Jaque (2014) and Anderson & Morzycki (2015) in 
claiming that tropes are unnecessary in our ontology because they do not contribute any 
relevant semantic differences with regard to states. In this respect, an analysis that makes use of 
a simpler ontology of semantic objects is preferable over other analyses that resort to a larger 
inventory of semantic objects.  
 Finally, deriving the abstractness of deadjectival nominalizations from their eventuality nature 
also allows us to dispense with the abstract-concrete distinction as a lexical opposition, in line 
with what was argued in chapter 1 based on Bosque (1999). Certainly, one can maintain that 
deadjectival nominalizations express abstract concepts; however, this property is not encoded in 
their lexical-semantics, but rather it is a natural consequence of their stative nature.  
 In the following chapter, I deal with the mass nature of deadjectival nominalizations and 
analyze the rest of types of deadjectival nominalizations that can be formed in Spanish, namely, 












































The mass and count distinction and the state-kind domain 
 
In the previous chapter, I have addressed the analysis of state-token deadjectival 
nominalizations, whose most salient properties are the presence of their arguments and the fact 
that they express imperfective states. This chapter constitutes the second part of the analysis, in 
which I examine their mass nature as well as the rest of types of deadjectival nominalizations, 
namely, state-kind, participant and event nominalizations. Particularly, I focus on the mass-count 
distinction and the factors that regulate it, delineating the specific role of gradability and 
atelicity. I also show that the kind-token hypothesis plays a crucial role not only in explaining the 
interaction of deadjectival nominalizations with the mass and count domains, but also in 
configuring their complete typology.  
 In section 4.1, I study the similarities and differences between canonical mass nouns like agua 
‘water’ and deadjectival nominalizations. On the one hand, I propose that both canonical mass 
nouns and deadjectival nominalizations are similar in that they are associated with a set of 
elements that are ordered with respect to each other; on the other, building on Francez & 
Koontz-Garboden (2017a), I posit that the difference between them is that canonical mass 
nouns are partially ordered in join semi-lattices in the sense of Link (1983), while deadjectival 
nominalizations are totally preordered in scales. Nonetheless, my proposal differs crucially from 
Francez & Koontz-Garboden’s in that I argue that scales are composed of state-kinds rather 
than portions of a substance. 
 In section 4.2, I examine the factors that regulate the mass-count distinction in the domain of 
nominalizations, specifically determining the role of gradability and atelicity. Contra the standard 
analysis (from Mourelatos 1978), which states that there is a mapping from atelicity onto the 
mass domain, I provide evidence that there is mapping from gradability onto the mass domain, 
which captures the fact that gradable adjectives form mass nominalizations in normal 
circumstances. Thus, only gradable predicates, which, like mass nouns, can be taken as sets of 
elements that are ordered with respect to one another, can form mass nominalizations. 
Furthermore, I disassociate countability from morphological pluralization and argue that the 
latter entails the former, but the converse is not the case. Pluralization is possible when 
heterogeneity is involved. Accordingly, state-token deadjectival nominalizations cannot pluralize 
because they are atelic and, therefore, homogeneous; however, they can form plural count 




 In section 4.3 I study what I call here state-kind nominalizations, which are characterized by 
the fact that their arguments are not present and by having a generic reading. In particular I 
examine the four main syntactic contexts in which they appear: first, I analyze definite state-kind 
nominalizations like la tristeza ‘(lit.) the sadness’ in La tristeza es un sentimiento doloroso ‘(lit.) 
The sadness is a painful feeling’, which are preceded by the definite determiner; second, I study 
quantified state-kind nominalizations, which are preceded by a mass quantifier or a measure 
phrase functioning as a mass quantifier, as in mucha / dos metros de altura ‘(lit.) a lot of / two 
meters of height’; third, I study indefinite state-kind nominalizations, which are flanked by the 
indefinite determiner and a measure phrase or a manner modifier, as in una altura de dos metros 
/ increíble ‘(lit.) a height of two meters / incredible’; fourth, I study bare state-kind 
nominalizations, which are not accompanied by any determiner or modifier, as in Los electrones 
tienen altura ‘(lit.) Electrons have height’. Evidence that state-kind deadjectival nominalizations 
do not express eventualities comes from the fact that they do not admit temporal, frequency 
modification with a temporal reading or aspectual modification, although they accept frequency 
modifiers with a non-temporal reading.  
  In section 4.4 I briefly analyze participant nominalizations like durezas ‘(lit.) hardnesses, 
calluses’, which express entities, and event nominalizations like imprudencias ‘(lit.) imprudences, 
imprudent acts’ and show how an analysis based on the kind-token distinction can explain their 
semantics and morphosyntactic formation. In addition, I recapitulate all types of deadjectival 
nominalizations that can be constructed out of gradable adjectives and frame the discussion in a 
more general perspective in the morphology field, especially in comparison with deverbal 
nominalizations. I conclude that the phenomenon of nominalization is semantically constrained: 
specifically, I posit that the domain of the arguments of predicative bases constitutes the 
domain of the resulting nominalizations. Finally, I argue that the fact that deadjectival 
nominalizations do not denote in the domain of degrees reveals that degrees cannot be 
considered arguments of gradable adjectives, which constitutes an additional argument that 
they must be dispensed with from our semantic ontology.    
 Section 4.5 summarizes the main ideas of the chapter. 
 
4.1. The internal ordering of deadjectival nominalizations 
In this section, I explore the semantic structure of deadjectival nominalizations and show their 
similarities and differences with respect to canonical mass nouns. I propose that, on the one 
hand, both types of nouns are internally structured as sets of elements that are ordered with 
respect to each other, which accounts for their mass nature. On the other hand, canonical mass 




lattices in the sense of Link (1983), while the latter are associated with scales; following Francez 
& Koontz-Garboden (2017a), I posit that scales are totally preordered, which means that all 
elements of the scale can be ordered by pairs, but two different elements can occupy the same 
place on the scale. My proposal differs from Francez & Koontz-Garboden’s in that I claim that 
scales are composed of state-kinds rather than portions of a substance.
51
 
 The first question that we have to elucidate is why deadjectival nominalizations constitute 
mass nouns. As shown in chapter 1, deadjectival nominalizations combine naturally with mass 
quantifiers: 
 
(1)  mucha agua / arena / harina / altura / belleza / honestidad 
  much  water    sand     flour     height   beauty      honesty 
  ‘a lot of water / sand/ flour / height/ beauty / honesty’ 
 
 (1) shows that the mass quantifier mucha ‘much, a lot of’ can combine with both regular 
mass nouns, such as agua ‘water’, arena ‘sand’ and harina ‘flour’, and with deadjectival 
nominalizations, such as altura ‘height’, belleza ‘beauty’ and honestidad ‘honesty’. Thus, one 
striking property of deadjectival nominalizations is that they constitute mass nouns in normal 
circumstances, and our model of nominalizations must capture that property.  
 Among the different treatments of mass nouns in the literature (see Lasersohn 2011 for a 
brief review), the most widely accepted proposal is the one by Link (1983), who claims that mass 
nouns are mereologically structured by the part-whole relation; specifically, they can be 
constructed as sums of portions of a substance that form a join semi-lattice, a structure I will 
come back to below. Hence, we could claim that deadjectival nominalizations can be taken, like 
regular mass nouns, as substances composed of sums of portions; for instance, the 
nominalization belleza ‘beauty’ would consist in a substance composed of sums of portions of 
beauty. However, in this chapter I show that there is empirical evidence that deadjectival 
nominalizations are associated with scales as total preorders of degrees rather than partial 
orders of portions. As will be sketched below, the fact that deadjectival nominalizations 
constitute mass nouns can also be captured in my view if we posit that mass nouns are 
construed as sets of elements that are ordered with respect to each other. My proposal must 
not be taken in the sense of Chierchia (1998b), in which mass nouns are lexically encoded as 
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 My proposal also differs from Francez & Koontz-Garboden’s (2015, 2017a) in how they capture the mass nature of 
deadjectival nominalizations. In addition to a total preorder by size, these authors claim that nominalizations, like 
canonical mass nouns, are associated with a mereological ordering, to which they attribute their mass character, as 
shown in chapter 1. By contrast, to account for the mass nature of deadjectival nominalizations, I appeal to their 
semantic characterization as sets of elements that are ordered with respect to each other, which makes it unnecessary to 




plural count nouns, given that mass nouns and plural count nouns do not show the same 
syntactic distribution (Lasersohn 2011). Rather, I construe mass nouns as sets of elements that 
are ordered with respect to one another, where the ordering can be either a partial order or a 
total preorder. Since deadjectival nominalizations are associated with scales as sets of degrees, 
which I derive from state-kinds, they can be conceived as sets of state-kinds that are ordered 
with respect to each other. Before fleshing out my claims, let me go over the properties that are 
associated with join semi-lattices and scales. Let us start by considering the join semi-lattice 
structure depicted in figure 2:  
 
Figure 2: Join semi-lattice        
          {a, b, c} 
    
     {a, b}    {a, c}    {b, c} 
 
     {a}      {b}    {c} 
 
(2)  a. Axiom of reflexivity: ∀x: x ≼ x. 
  b. Axiom of transitivity: ∀x∀y∀z: x ≼ y ∧ y ≼ z → x ≼ z. 
  c. Axiom of antisymmetry: ∀x∀y: x ≼ y ∧ y ≼ x → x = y. 
(From Champollion & Krifka 2016: 515, 516) 
  
 Let A be a non-empty set of portions A of a substance, for instance water, where {a}, {b} and 
{c} represent portions of this substance. Substances are subsets of A that form a join semi-lattice 
with the join operation ⊔ (commutative, idempotent, and associative), where ⊔ induces an 
ordering relation ≼ on A, that can be thought of as a part-whole relation (Francez & Koontz-
Garboden 2017a). The part-whole relation captures the intuition that a part of water is water (i.e. 
divisibility) and that two portions of water together are also water (i.e. cumulativity). In addition, 
according to Champollion & Krifka (2016), join semi-lattices are also defined by the axioms in 
(2): the axiom of reflexivity in (2a) asserts that every portion is part of itself; the axiom of 
transitivity in (2b) states that any portion x of another portion y of a portion z is also a portion x 
of the portion z; finally, the axiom of antisymmetry in (2c) conveys that two portions that are 
part of each other are the same portions.  
 On the other hand, join semi-lattices are partially ordered because their domain contains 
other elements that cannot be ordered by the mereological relation ≼. As Francez & Koontz-




two portions of the same substance need not be part of each other. For example, if Brian has a 
portion of water in a bottle and Stewie has another portion of water in a different bottle, these 
portions cannot be ordered with respect to each other because neither of them is part of the 
other one. At the lowest level of the diagram, the portion {a} cannot be ordered with respect to 
the portions {b} and {c}, while, for example, the portion {a} can actually be ordered with respect 
to {a, b} because {a} is part of {a, b}. As will be argued below, positing that canonical mass nouns 
are partially ordered is crucial to account for certain empirical phenomena. 
 Now let us examine my conception of scales. Scales are sets of state-kinds that are ordered 
by a total preorder ≤, which means that it is reflexive, transitive, total (or connected), but not 
antisymmetric. A total preorder is an ordering in which all elements can be ordered with respect 
to each other: for example, the state-kind two meters tall can be ordered with respect to the 
state-kind 1.5 meters tall. The following diagram represents the total preorder associated with 
scales: 
 
Figure 3: Scale 
        sk
n 
        … 
        sk’’’’ 
        sk’’, sk’’’ 
        sk’       
 
 
(3)  a. Axiom of monotonicity: ∀G<sk,t>∀sk∀s’k[G(sk) = 1 ∧ s’k ≤ sk → G(s’k) = 1]. 
  b. Axiom of reflexivity: ∀sk: sk ≤ sk. 
  c. Axiom of transitivity: ∀sk∀sk’∀sk’’: sk ≤ sk’ ∧ sk’ ≤ sk’’ → sk ≤ sk’’. 
  
 The axiom of monotonicity in (3a), adapted from Heim (2000) to the state-kind system, 
captures the intuition that a person that is two meters tall is also 1.99 meters tall, 1.98 meters 
tall, etc. Thus, the total preorder ≤ proposed here is similar to the mereological order ≼, but it is 
different insofar as a state-kind is not defined as part of another state-kind. In other words, 
while a portion of water can be taken to be part of another portion of water or, put it differently, 
they can overlap,
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 state-kinds are discrete or atomic units, so a state-kind is not a part of 
another state-kind. However, the axiom of monotonicity ensures that holding a state-kind of 
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 The overlap relation ∘ can be formally expressed as  x ∘ y =def ∃z(z ≼ x ∧ z ≼ y), which means that two things, x and y, 




being two meters tall entails holding a state-kind of being 1.5 meters tall. (Think about natural 
numbers: a book with 200 pages is also a book with 199 pages, although the number 199 is not 
part of 200).  
 Note that positing that scales are totally preordered rather than totally ordered means that 
they are not subject to antisymmetry. This means that two different state-kinds, such as sk’’ and 
sk’’’ in figure 3, can occupy the same place in the ordering. This property allows us to explain why 
two different state-kinds of beauty, like Spanish beauty and Nordic beauty, can occupy the same 
place in the ordering, that is, they can refer to the same degree of beauty, as we will see below. 
 Finally, join semi-lattices and scales also differ with respect to their endpoints. While the 
former are taken as non-empty sets, i.e. there are no portions whose value is zero, scales can 
include maximal and/or minimal endpoints, which allows us to capture the distribution of 
maximizers and minimizers and entailment patterns (as explained in chapter 2). For example, the 
adjective limpio ‘clean’ and its corresponding nominalization limpieza ‘cleanness’ encode a 
maximal endpoint on their scale, construed as a state-kind that is placed over the rest of state-
kinds in the ordering; in contrast, sucio ‘dirty’ and suciedad ‘dirtiness’ encode a minimal endpoint 
on the scale, which is construed as a zero or, in other words, as the absence of any state-kinds 
(more details in subsection 4.3.3).     
 Let us focus now on the empirical consequences of positing that scales are totally rather than 
partially (pre)ordered, which allows us to account for the differences between canonical mass 
nouns and deadjectival nominalizations. The first group of data shows that deadjectival 
nominalizations and regular mass nouns show systematic semantic contrasts when co-occurring 
with certain determiners. As pointed out in chapter 1, the phenomenon was observed by Tovena 
(2001), for Italian and French, and by Brucart & Rigau (2002), for Catalan; see also Baglini (2015) 
for Wolof and Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2017a) for English and Hebrew. I will comment first 
on Tovena’s main data and afterwards illustrate the phenomenon in Spanish: 
 
(4)  a. quanto coraggio! = che coraggio! 
                what   courage 
  b. quanto   burro! ≠ che  burro! 
      what a lot of  butter  what (good) butter  
(From Tovena 2001: 573) 
 
 Tovena observes that what she calls abstract nouns like coraggio ‘courage’, which we can 
equate to deadjectival nominalizations, give rise to a quantity qua degree reading when 




determiner che ‘what (a)’. In contrast, when canonical mass nouns like burro ‘butter’ are involved, 
the former determiner triggers a quantity reading: ‘a lot of butter’, while the latter triggers a 
quality reading: ‘a butter that is typically very good, but also bad, weird, original, etc.’. A similar 
contrast can be offered in Spanish: 
 
(5)  a. ¡cuánta   amabilidad! = ¡qué    amabilidad! 
     how.much  kindness       what.a   kindness 
  b. ¡cuánto   vino! ≠ ¡qué     vino! 
      how.much wine     what.a  wine 
 
 While in (5b) the exclamative determiner cuánto ‘how much’ induces a quantity reading, the 
exclamative determiner qué ‘what (a)’ induces a quality reading; in contrast, in (5a) both readings 
are neutralized and the phrases involved are felicitous in the same contexts. What Tovena calls 
quality reading can be possible because qué vino ‘what a wine’ can refer to a kind of wine. The 
kind reading is more apprehensible when questions are involved: 
 
(6)  a. ¿Cuánto  vino quieres? 
     how.much wine want.2.SG 
  ‘How much wine do you want? 
  b. ¿Qué vino quieres? 
      what wine want.2.SG 
  ‘What wine do you want? 
(7)  a. ¿Cuánta  altura  tiene? 
     how.much height have.3.SG 
   ‘How tall are they?’ 
  b. ¿Qué  altura  tiene? 
       what height have.3.SG 
  ‘How tall are they?’ 
 
 (6a) asks how much wine somebody wants, that is, the quantity of wine, whereas (6b) asks 
what kind of wine somebody wants, for example red wine, white wine, etc. (7) shows that the 
quantity and kind readings become equivalent regardless of the interrogative determiner that is 
used, as expected because deadjectival nominalizations are involved.
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 Having clarified that canonical mass nouns can trigger two readings depending on which 
exclamative (or interrogative) determiner they are combined with, while deadjectival 
nominalizations express only one reading, it is time to explain how the contrasts emerge. On the 
one hand, canonical mass nouns are associated with a partial order that consists of portions that 
can be mereologically ordered with respect to each other as well as other portions that are not 
part of other portions and, therefore, cannot be ordered with respect to one another. Assuming 
that the exclamative determiner qué ‘what (a)’ induces a kind reading when combined with mass 
nouns, this reading is different from the quantity reading because two different kinds of a 
substance are not part of each other: for example, a portion of white wine cannot be part of a 
portion of red wine. In contrast, assuming that the exclamative determiner cuánto ‘how much’ 
requires an ordering, the quantity reading arises as a consequence of the part-whole relation, 
that is, the existence of portions that can be taken as parts of other portions: for instance, if 
Mark has two liters of wine in a bottle, the portion one liter of Mark’s wine is part of the portion 
two liters of Mark’s wine. 
 On the other hand, deadjectival nominalizations are associated with scales, which consist 
exclusively of state-kinds that are ordered with respect to each other, so the kind and degree 
readings are neutralized. The exclamative determiner cuánto ‘how much’ requires an ordering, 
which is provided by the total preorder, while qué ‘what (a)’ requires the existence of kinds, 
which are totally preordered in this case: for instance, the state-kind height of two meters is 
necessarily ordered with respect to the state-kind height of one meter. In short, two 
interpretations can emerge when canonical mass nouns are involved because their domain 
includes portions that are mereologically ordered and other portions that are not ordered with 
respect to one another; in contrast, only one interpretation can emerge when deadjectival 
nominalizations are involved because their domain only includes state-kinds that are totally 
preordered. 
 Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2017a, 2017b) claim that both canonical mass nouns and 
nominalizations are associated with portions, but, while the former are associated with a 
mereological order, the latter are rather associated with a total preorder, which is total, but not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(i)  a. *¿Cuánta     amabilidad tiene? 
        how.much     kindness     has  
  b. *¿Qué amabilidad tiene?  
        what    kindness     has 
 
 The reason of this contrast with respect to deadjectival nominalizations derived from dimensional adjectives, like 
altura ‘height’ in (7), is that interrogative determiners require a precise degree on the scale as an answer, but 
nominalizations derived from evaluative adjectives are not associated with conventionalized units of measurement, so 




antisymmetric. According to the authors, their lack of antisymmetry explains that the following 
statement is not contradictory: 
 
(8)  The Taj Mahal has as much beauty as the Stata Center, though their beauties are very  
  different. 
(Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2017a) 
 
 According to Francez & Koontz-Garboden, deadjectival nominalizations do not have an 
antisymmetric ordering, which explains that the two buildings can have different portions of 
beauty that nevertheless occupy the same position in the preorder, that is, two different 
portions with the same amount of beauty. For instance, the two buildings have the same degree 
of beauty, but the Taj Mahal has an Oriental beauty and the Stata Center has an extravagant 
beauty. 
 Regarding canonical mass nouns, which meet the axiom of antisymmetry, they do not give 
rise to a contradiction either in analogous contexts, a phenomenon that Francez & Koontz-
Garboden do not mention (although it could be properly captured by their proposal):  
 
(9)  Rosa tiene    tanto      vino como Bea, pero sus  vinos son diferentes. 
  Rosa  has as.much.as  wine   as    Bea   but their wines are  different 
    
 Canonical mass nouns like vino ‘wine’ are associated with join semi-lattices, whose ordering 
is antisymmetric by definition, so the fact that (9) is acceptable cannot be attributed to their lack 
of antisymmetry. What I propose is that (9) is acceptable because the domain of regular mass 
nouns is partially ordered. Accordingly, the first sentence states that Rosa and Bea have the 
same amount of wine, while the second sentence states that the portions of wine are different 
because they are not part of each other, for instance if Rosa has one liter of red wine and Bea 
has one liter of white wine.    
 Going back to (8) and adapting Francez & Koontz-Garboden’s insights to the state-kind 
system, (8) is acceptable because two different state-kinds of beauty can occupy the same place 
on the scale. As claimed above, the Taj Mahal may have an Oriental beauty, while the Stata 
Center may have an extravagant beauty, and these two state-kinds of beauty are associated with 
the same degree on the scale. In other words, two state-kinds of beauty that occupy the same 
place on the scale can be different because they result from the intersection of the different sets 
of state-kinds denoted by Oriental and extravagant. These are relational adjectives in the sense 




Adapting McNally & Boleda’s (2004) influential analysis of relational adjectives as predicates of 
entity-kinds to the state-kind system, we can posit that they denote properties of state-kinds, 
like the manner adjectives analyzed in chapter 3. Accordingly, Oriental beauty and extravagant 
beauty denote different subsets of state-kinds that can occupy the same place on the scale of 
beauty. I will come back to this question in section 4.2. 
 An alternative proposal would be to posit that certain deadjectival nominalizations, like 
belleza ‘beauty’ or inteligencia ‘intelligence’, are rather partially ordered because their domains 
also include state-kinds that cannot be ordered with respect to each other: for example, we 
cannot order Latin beauty with respect to a lot of beauty or spatial intelligence with respect to a 
lot of intelligence. However, when co-occurring with exclamative determiners, only one natural 
interpretation arises: 
 
(10) a. ¡qué     belleza! = ¡cuánta   belleza! 
      what.a beauty   how.much  beauty 
  b. ¡qué     inteligencia! = ¡cuánta     inteligencia! 
      what.an  intelligence how.much  intelligence  
 
 If we posited that these predicates are instead associated with a partial order, it would be 
mistakenly predicted that the determiners qué ‘what (a)’ and cuánta ‘how much’ induce two 
different readings, as in the case of canonical mass nouns, but it is not the natural case.
54
 
Regardless, even accepting that the kind reading is naturally possible, the contrast with 
canonical mass nouns would persist, since the latter do not prompt a quantity reading when 
preceded by the exclamative determiner qué ‘what (a)’, as illustrated in (6b).  
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 The kind reading is marginally possible in a context in which we talk about different types of beauty/intelligence, 
according to which a certain person has, for instance, an exotic beauty or an inquisitive intelligence. To account for the 
emergence of that reading, we could posit, in the spirit of Sassoon (2013) and McNally & Stojanovic (2014), that belleza 
‘beauty’ and inteligencia ‘intelligence’ can invoke different dimensions of beauty and intelligence, respectively, or are, in 
other words, multidimensional. Nonetheless, note that this reading is not exclusive of these nominalizations, see (i), 
which would force us to posit that all deadjectival nominalizations are multidimensional, hence undermining the 
usefulness of the notion of ‘multidimensionality’ for this case. 
 
(i) a. ¡qué      amabilidad (tan invasiva)! 
     what.a     kindness      so  invasive  
 ‘What a(n) (invasive) kindness’ 
 b. ¡qué      tristeza (tan dulce)! 
     what.a   sadness   so  sweet 
 ‘What a (sweet) sadness’  
 c. ¡qué      altura   (tan irregular)! 
     what.a  height     so  irregular 
 ‘What a(n) (irregular) height’ 
 
 A thorough explanation of why deadjectival nominalizations can marginally trigger kind readings even though they 




 In addition to the semantic interpretation of exclamative (and interrogative) determiners, the 
fact that mass nouns are associated with a partial order, while deadjectival nominalizations are 
associated with a total preorder, explains the behavior of the determiner ningún ‘no, any’ in 
Spanish when combined with count nouns, canonical mass nouns and deadjectival 
nominalizations (see again Tovena 2001 for Italian and French; Baglini 2015 for Wolof; Francez & 
Koontz-Garboden 2017a for English and Hebrew): 
 
(11) a. Claudio no  tiene ninguna percha. 
      Claudio not have    no       hanger 
  ‘Claudio does not have any hangers.’ 
  b. #Claudio no tiene ningún vino. 
        Claudio not has      no     wine 
  ‘Claudio does not have any wines.’   
  c. Claudio  no tiene ninguna amabilidad. 
      Claudio not have     no         kindness 
  ‘Claudio does not have any kindness.’ 
 
 Under the assumption that ningún ‘no, any’ denies discrete or atomic units (see Francez & 
Koontz-Garboden 2017a for Italian nessun), (11a) means that the number of hangers that 
Claudio has is zero. The symbol # in (11b) means that the sentence is acceptable in the kind 
reading whereby Claudio does not have any kind of wine (red wine, white wine, etc.), but it is 
unacceptable in the quantity interpretation whereby Claudio does not have any portions of 
wine, since portions overlap or can be taken as part of another one, hence ningún ‘no, any’ 
cannot pick up discrete units. Finally, in deriving degrees from state-kinds, (11c) receives a 
natural explanation: Claudio does not have any state-kind of kindness, where state-kinds 
constitute discrete objects or do not overlap. Again canonical mass nouns and deadjectival 
nominalizations show a relevant contrast: the determiner ningún ‘no, any’ induces a kind 
reading, and the kind reading is construed as a degree reading when deadjectival 
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 Based on Morzycki’s (2009) analysis of size adjectives, such as big and enormous, Masià (2017) notes that canonical 
mass nouns and deadjectival nominalizations also show a relevant contrast. Observe the following examples:  
 
(i)  gran casa / parque enorme. 
   big house      park      huge 
(ii)  a. *gran agua / #arroz enorme. 





 Having provided enough empirical evidence that the domain of regular mass nouns is 
partially ordered, while the domain of deadjectival nominalizations is totally preordered, it is 
necessary to comment on the following data, which may pose problems to this proposal: 
 
(12) a. una altura extraña 
       a  height strange 
  ‘a strange height’ 
  b. una altura de dos metros 
        a  height of  two meters 
 
 The fact that deadjectival nominalizations are totally preordered does not straightforwardly 
account for (12a); for instance, we cannot order a strange height with respect to a height of two 
meters. However, note that the adjective extraña ‘strange’ functions as a manner modifier, so it 
denotes a different set of state-kinds that are not inherently ordered, and that set intersects with 
the set of totally preordered state-kinds denoted by the nominalization. Thus, what these data 
show is that the domain of deadjectival nominalizations can intersect with a different domain of 
state-kinds, resulting in one state-kind that cannot be ordered with respect to the state-kinds 
denoted by the nominalization (i.e. the scale). (12b) shows that the intersection is also possible 
between the set of totally preordered state-kinds denoted by the nominalization and the set of 
inherently ordered state-kinds denoted by the measure phrase, resulting in one state-kind that 
can be ordered with respect to the state-kinds denoted by the nominalization. I will come back 
to this question in section 4.3, where I analyze indefinite state-kind nominalizations and posit 
that they constitute count rather than mass nouns. What is relevant to take into consideration 
up to now is that the existence of data like (12a) does not provide evidence against the claim 
that the domain of deadjectival nominalizations is totally preordered.     
 Before concluding this section, I would like to recapitulate the main ideas. Deadjectival 
nominalizations constitute mass nouns because they are conceived as sets of elements that are 
ordered with respect to each other. However, canonical mass nouns and deadjectival 
                                                                                                                                                                          
  b. gran belleza / felicidad enorme. 
       big  beauty   happiness   huge 
(From Masià 2017: 166) 
 
 On the one hand, (i) illustrates that size adjectives like gran ‘big’ and enorme ‘huge’ combine with count nouns, like 
casa ‘house’ and parque ‘park’, in which case the former have their literal meanings. On the other, (ii) shows the contrast 
between canonical mass nouns and deadjectival nominalizations: while the former do not co-occur with size adjectives, 
as shown in (iia), the latter are compatible with them and acquire a degree reading, see (iib). For instance, gran belleza 
‘big beauty’ corresponds to a beauty that holds to a high degree. These data reinforces the analysis that canonical mass 
nouns and deadjectival nominalizations must have a different semantic structure even though they are similar in that 




nominalizations are associated with different domains: on the one hand, canonical mass nouns 
are associated with join semi-lattices, which are partially ordered by the mereological part-whole 
relation ≼, which is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. On the other hand, deadjectival 
nominalizations are associated with scales, which consist of state-kinds that are ordered by the 
total preorder ≤, which is monotone, reflexive and transitive. Join semi-lattices include portions 
that are part of each other and other portions that cannot be ordered with respect to each 
other, which explains why join semi-lattices are partially ordered. In contrast, scales consist of a 
totally preordered set of state-kinds, which means that all the state-kinds of the domain can be 
ordered with respect to each other; given that scales are not subject to antisymmetry, two 
different state-kinds can occupy the same place on the scale. In the following section, I provide 
the specific constraints that regulate the mass-count distinction in the domain of 
nominalizations, focusing on the impact of gradability and atelicity.  
 
4.2. The role of gradability and atelicity in the mass domain       
In this section, I deal with the mass and count distinction with regard to state-token deadjectival 
nominalizations and argue there is a mapping from gradability onto the mass domain. The 
mapping is possible because both gradable adjectives and mass nouns can be taken as sets of 
state-kinds that are ordered with respect to one another. In addition, I argue that state denoting 
nominalizations, in being these atelic or homogeneous, do not pluralize under normal 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it is possible to find them with the plural marking if the states 
involve some kind of heterogeneity. The analysis defended here, whereby only gradable bases 
form mass nominalizations, poses a serious challenge for what we can call the standard analysis, 
according to which there is a mapping from atelicity onto the mass domain.  
 Since Mourelatos (1978; see also Bach 1986, Krifka 1989, Borer 2005, Fábregas & Marín 2012, 
Wellwood 2014, Husić 2020; cf. Rothstein 2004, 2010, 2017 and Grimm 2014), it has been 
claimed that there is a correlation between atelicity and the mass domain. For example, 
Mourelatos notes that the construction John hates liars, which includes the stative, and therefore 
atelic, predicate to hate, corresponds to There is hate by John of liars, where hate is a mass noun 
because it is not preceded by any determiner. In contrast, the construction Mary capsized the 
boat, which includes the accomplishment, and therefore telic, predicate to capsize the boat, 
corresponds to There was a capsizing of the boat by Mary, where capsizing is a count noun 
because it is preceded by the indefinite determiner.  
 The problem with the standard analysis is that it takes for granted that all stative predicates 




recall from chapter 2 that we concluded that stativity does not entail gradability, since there are 
states that are not gradable. Consider the following data: 
 
(13) a. *El   futbolista pertenece mucho   al   club. 
       the footballer  belongs    much to.the club 
  b. *mucha pertenencia  (al   club) 
        much   belonging  to.the club 
(14) a. *El   nadador   posee  mucho el  récord. 
       the swimmer   owns    much  the record 
  b. *mucha posesión  (del  récord) 
       much    owning   of.the record 
(15) a. #El estudiante permaneció mucho en casa. 
       the  student       stayed       much  at home 
  b. *mucha permanencia (en casa) 
        much       staying       at home 
 
 Under the assumption that mucho ‘a lot of, much’ is compatible with gradable predicates and 
mass nouns (see Fleischhauer 2016 for a cross-linguistic study), neither the non-gradable 
predicates pertenecer ‘to belong’, poseer ‘to own’ and permanecer ‘to stay’ in (13a), (14a) and 
(15a) nor their corresponding nominalizations pertenencia ‘belonging’, posesión ‘owning’ and 
permanencia ‘stay’ in (13b), (14b) and (15b) accept it, which suggests that non-gradable states 
cannot form mass nouns. The symbol # in (15a) indicates that permanecer ‘to stay’ allows for a 
temporal rather than a degree reading, which is irrelevant here; recall from chapter 2 that the 
temporal reading is possible because permanecer ‘to stay’ is an interval state, which, like 
activities, is divisible in intervals. Thus, permanecer ‘to stay’ is not gradable in the relevant sense 
and, therefore, (15a) does not constitute a true counterexample. 
 Consequently, we have to reformulate the standard hypothesis: there is a mapping from 
gradability onto the mass domain. All stative predicates are atelic insofar as they are 
homogeneous, as concluded in chapter 2 following McNally (2017), but only gradable states 
form mass nominalizations. This mapping holds because gradable predicates constitute sets of 
elements, state-kinds in this case, that are ordered with respect to each other, which is the 
requirement to form mass nouns. However, the situation becomes more complicated when 
attempting to account for morphological pluralization of count nouns. Although pluralization 
has been unavoidably linked to countability in the literature, in the sense that being a count 




In particular, I argue that morphological pluralization entails countability, but the converse is not 
the case.  
 As claimed above, the predicates in (13a), (14a) and (15a) do not form mass nominalizations, 
which leads us to posit that they form count nominalizations. However, the nominalizations in 
question are reluctant to appear with the plural marking in normal circumstances: 
 
(16) a. *las pertenencias   del   futbolista    al   club 
       the  belongings  of.the footballer to.the club 
  b. *las posesiones   del  récord por parte  del  nadador 
       the   ownings   of.the record by   part of.the swimmer 
  c. *las permanencias del  estudiante en casa  
       the       stays      of.the   student    at home 
 
 My claim is that the reason why these nominalizations reject the morphological plural in 
normal circumstances is that they are derived from atelic predicates. Atelic predicates, unlike 
telic ones, are homogenous, hence their reluctance to pluralize even though they constitute 
count nouns. Thus, the class of nouns derived from non-gradable stative predicates, like 
pertenencia ‘belonging’, remains in a dim field in which they constitute count nouns that cannot 
pluralize in normal circumstances. The role of gradability and atelicity with respect to the mass 
and count distinction becomes clear now: gradable predicates form mass nouns and non-
gradable predicates form count nouns, and atelic or homogeneous predicates do not pluralize 
in normal circumstances because morphological pluralization requires heterogeneity. 
 So far, I have described what happens in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, there are 
exceptional cases in which count nominalizations derived from non-gradable stative predicates 
can pluralize: 
 
(17) a. Las disputas por la copa entre los cántabros y los godos y las sucesivas posesiones [de 
  la misma] [por unos y otros] centran la acción de sucesos en la historia de España.
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  ‘The fights for the cup between Cantabrians and Goths and the successive ownerships (lit. 
  ownings) by one another are the focus of historical events in Spain’ 
 
 






  b. Se puede encontrar y descubrir sin deformación alguna el hecho jurídico original de la 
  historia de la Villa de San Bernardo de Tarija a través de sus sucesivas pertenencias a los 
  Virreinatos de Lima y Río de La Plata.
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  ‘We can find and find out without distortion the original juridical fact of the history of  
  Villa de San Bernardo de Tarija through its successive belongings to the viceroyalties of 
  Lima and Río de la Plata’ 
  c. La NASA sigue acariciando la idea de volver a enviar astronautas a la Luna (…) a través 
  de sucesivas permanencias [en una base lunar].
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  ‘NASA still entertains the idea of sending astronauts again to the Moon by means of  
  successive stays (lit. stayings) in a lunar base’ 
 
 There is no doubt that the sentences in (17) express states: they all include their arguments, 
signaled between the square parentheses, and accept the frequency modifier sucesivas 
‘successive’. Certainly, both pertenencia ‘belonging’ and posesión ‘owning’ can also constitute 
participant nominalizations (which will be analyzed in subsection 4.4.1) when appearing in plural, 
in which case they express entities: 
 
(18) El  caballero perdió sus (*sucesivas) pertenencias/posesiones. 
  the  knight     lost    his    successive   belongings    ownings  
 
 However, note that the arguments of the nominalizations are absent in (18) and the 
frequency modifier sucesivas ‘successive’ cannot appear. We can conclude that, while the 
nominalizations that appear in (18) express plural entities, for instance they refer to the knight’s 
sword and shield, the nominalizations occurring in (17) express plural states. Under the 
hypothesis defended here that plural count nouns demand heterogeneity, and given that states 
are homogeneous, we must explain the licensing of (17) based on the fact that they involve 
some kind of heterogeneity because they hold at different times. In (17a) the cup is owned 
sometimes by the Cantabrians and sometimes by the Goths, which involves different states of 
owning the cup. Analogously, in (17b) the Villa de San Bernardo sometimes belongs to Lima and 
sometimes to Río de la Plata, which again involves different states of belonging to one 
viceroyalty. Finally, (17c) is heterogeneous because it involves different states of astronauts’ 
staying in a lunar base. Thus, the heterogeneity that exceptionally licenses the pluralization of 
stative count nominalizations is due to the fact that these hold at different times. 








 Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conclude from this analysis that the conditions that 
allow the nominalizations in (17) to behave as plural count nouns are exclusive of the ones that 
are derived from non-gradable bases. Even nominalizations that are derived from gradable 
bases can form plural count nouns under certain circumstances. The phenomenon whereby 
gradable bases can also form count nominalizations was observed by Grimm (2014: 198) for 
English, who claims that the standard analysis according to which there is a mapping from 
atelicity onto the mass domain is incorrect, as I do in this dissertation. Before showing examples 
in Spanish, let us examine Grimm’s data: 
 
(19)  a. Please, let’s not insult both our intelligences by pretending this is open to question. The 
  desire to provoke a reaction, preferably an over reaction, is glaringly obvious. Seeing this 
  does not require being [Osama Bin Laden]’s secret pen pal. (Google) 
  b. A young deaf boy is discovered dead. Warrick, Sara, and Grissom handle this case,  
  dealing with their ignorances about the deaf community. (Google) 
  c. We are a mother and daughter team that have decided to put our creativities together 
  and make a business that is 100% made in the USA. (Google) 
 (Grimm 2014: 194, 195)  
  
 According to Grimm (2014: 194), the nominalizations occurring in (19) express the properties 
that have an entity anchoring. For example, intelligences “designates intelligence with respect to 
different individuals”. Thus, these nominalizations do not express entities, but rather properties 
that can be counted because they are associated with different individuals. Although this 
proposal goes in the correct direction, it lacks specificity, since it does not explain why 
deadjectival nominalizations can be counted when different holders are involved. Under my 
view, these data receive a natural interpretation. First, we know that the nominalizations in (19) 
express state-tokens because they have arguments, where the holders are manifested by means 
of possessives: our intelligences, their ignorances and our creativities. There are no reasons to 
posit that the states involved hold at different times: for example, in (19a) one individual’s 
intelligence appears to hold at the same time as another individual’s intelligence; and the same 
holds for their ignorances in (19b) and our creativities in (19c).  
 However, the states can be considered heterogeneous due to two reasons: either they hold 
to different degrees on the scale, for example in (19a) one individual is more/less intelligent 
than another individual, or maybe one individual has a spatial intelligence and the other has an 
emotional intelligence, in which case heterogeneity is derived from different kinds of 




morphological pluralization requires heterogeneity and this can be achieved by state-token 
deadjectival nominalizations if they hold to different degrees on the scale or are associated with 
different domains of state-kinds. I flesh out this insight below. 
 Having described the English data, at this point I would like to introduce Spanish data, which 
corroborate that state-token nominalizations can pluralize if they are heterogeneous in some 
respect:   
 
(20) a. *las  desnudeces de las ramas 
       the nakednesses of the branches 
  b. Los árboles llevan muy bien ―en sus anillos internos― la cuenta de sus años y de las 
  sucesivas desnudeces de sus ramas.
59
 
  ‘Trees keep track ―in their internal rings― of their age and the successive nakednesses of 
  their branches.’ 
(21) a. *las   tristezas  de Vivianne. 
       the sadnesses of  Vivianne 
  b. El rostro de Vivianne se ha descompuesto meticulosamente, la precisión de sus   
  sucesivas tristezas ha sido un espectáculo penoso.
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  ‘Vivianne’s face decomposed meticulously, the precision of her successive sadnesses has 
  been a piteous show.’ 
 
 (20a) and (21a) show that state-token deadjectival nominalizations cannot form plural count 
nouns in normal circumstances. However, (20b) and (21b) show that they can appear with the 
plural marking in a special context in which the state-tokens hold at different times, as in (17), 
which is indicated by the occurrence of the frequency modifier sucesivas ‘successive’. Thus, we 
can count distinct states of being naked and being sad because they are heterogeneous insofar 
as they hold at different moments. As I noted with respect to (17), this situation, although 
possible, is exceptional in Spanish. 
 A second situation in which state-token nominalizations can be heterogeneous, which is 
analogous to the cases analyzed by Grimm (2014) for English, holds when they hold to different 
degrees on the scale or are associated with different domains of state-kinds, which necessarily 
involves nominalizations that are derived from gradable predicates, unlike the ones in (17). This 
second situation is far from being exceptional. Observe the following data:  
 








(22) a. la  altura de  Raúl    y   Alberto 
     the height of  Raúl  and Alberto 
  ‘Raúl and Alberto’s height’ 
  b. las (respectivas) alturas  de Raúl    y   Alberto 
      the   respective  heights  of  Raúl  and Alberto 
  ‘Raúl and Alberto’s (respective) heights’ 
(23) a. la   inteligencia de Laura    y   María 
     the intelligence  of Laura  and María 
  ‘Laura and María’s intelligence’ 
  b. las (respectivas) inteligencias de Laura   y   María 
      the   respective  intelligences  of  Laura and María 
  ‘Laura and María’s (respective) intelligences’ 
 
 In (22a) altura ‘height’ appears in singular because there is only one homogeneous state-
token: hence, Raúl and Alberto are equally tall, so the state is associated with the same degree 
of height. In contrast, in (22b) altura ‘height’ appears in plural, so there are two heterogeneous 
state-tokens: for example, Raúl is taller than Alberto, so each state-token is associated with a 
different degree of height (note that the modifier respectivas ‘respective’ can be inserted 
because the two heights involved are different).  
 Regarding (23a), inteligencia ‘intelligence’ appears in singular because there is only one 
homogeneous state-token: we can thus suppose that Laura and María are equally intelligent. In 
contrast, in (23b) inteligencia ‘intelligence’ appears in plural, so there are two heterogeneous 
state-tokens: for example, Laura is more intelligent than María, so each state-token is associated 
with a different degree of intelligence. Moreover, the plural can also be licensed if, for example, 
Laura has a spatial intelligence and María has an emotional intelligence. Recall from section 4.1 
that relational adjectives, like spatial and emotional, can be treated as predicates of state-kinds 
too in the spirit of McNally & Boleda’s (2004) analysis. Accordingly, (23b) can be licit in a context 
in which María is as intelligent as Laura, but each individual has a different type of intelligence 
because the set of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization intersects with the different sets of 
state-kinds denoted by the relational adjectives implicitly involved.  
 Thus, on the one hand, we have stative predicates like pertenecer ‘to belong’ that are not 
gradable, so they form count nominalizations. On the other, we have predicates like triste ‘sad’ 
that are gradable, so they form mass nominalizations, as shown in section 4.1. However, both 
types of predicates are usually reluctant to appear with the plural marking, which means that 




requires heterogeneity; states are homogeneous regardless of whether they are gradable or not, 
hence its usual incompatibility with the plural.
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 Nonetheless, we can count states if they are 
heterogeneous in some respect: because they hold at different times and because they hold to 
different degrees or are associated with different domains of state-kinds if the predicates are 
gradable. My proposal is in line with Grimm (2014), who claims that the mapping from atelicity 
onto the mass domain is untenable. Nevertheless, my proposal is more specific than Grimm’s, 
because it provides an alternative mapping, from gradability onto the mass domain, and 




 Before closing this section, it is interesting to note that my proposal accounts for the count 
nature of nominalizations derived from activity predicates, which are non-gradable in the 
relevant sense and atelic by definition in light of the empirical evidence provided in chapter 2. 
The activity predicates conducir el carrito ‘to drive the cart’ and buscar el tesoro ‘to search for the 
treasure’ form count nominalizations that can pluralize if they refer to events that take place at 
different times: 
 
(24) a. *mucha conducción del  carrito 
       much      driving   of.the  cart 
  b. *mucha búsqueda del    tesoro 
        much    search   of.the treasure 
(25) a. las sucesivas conducciones del   carrito 
     the successive    drivings    of.the   cart  
  b. las sucesivas búsquedas del   tesoro 
     the successive searches  of.the treasure 
 
 On the one hand, (24) shows that the activity nominalizations conducción ‘driving’ and 
búsqueda ‘search’ cannot combine with the mass quantifier mucha ‘a lot of, much’, which reveals 
that they constitute count nouns. On the other hand, (25) shows that these nominalizations can 
pluralize if they express events that take place at different times. Thus, my analysis correctly 
                                                          
61
 The existence of data like The actor’s frequent sadness and Last week, the actor was sad many times, which also occur in 
Spanish, does not constitute a counterargument to my claim that stative predicates cannot appear in the plural in 
normal circumstances, since in these cases we deal with plural (or iterative) readings rather than with morphological 
pluralization. Thus, although these data convey that there are several states in which the actor is sad, this plural reading 
is not obtained by means of morphological pluralization. In this dissertation, I do not explore the licensing of this type of 
plural readings; see Rothstein (2017) and references therein for discussion. 
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 Rothstein (2004, 2010, 2017) also argues against the mapping from atelicity onto the mass domain; nevertheless, 




predicts that activity predicates behave as non-gradable stative predicates like pertenecer ‘to 
belong’, since both types are atelic and not gradable. 
 In sum, in this section I have provided evidence that state-token deadjectival nominalizations 
constitute mass nouns because they are derived from gradable bases, where both domains are 
characterized by including sets of elements that are ordered with respect to each other. 
Furthermore, deadjectival nominalizations reject the plural in normal circumstances because 
they are atelic/homogeneous. Nevertheless, they can pluralize if they involve some kind of 
heterogeneity, in which case they hold at different times, they hold to different degrees on the 
scale or are associated with different domains of state-kinds that result in different subsets of 
state-kinds. In the following section, I address the study of state-kind nominalizations. 
 
4.3. State-kind nominalizations 
Having provided an analysis of the semantic structure of state-token nominalizations and its 
interaction with the mass and count domains, in this section I study state-kind nominalizations, 
which are syntactically characterized by the absence of their arguments and semantically 
characterized by triggering generic interpretations. The section is divided into three subsections 
depending on the syntactic and morphosemantic properties that these nominalizations exhibit: 
in subsection 4.3.1, I study definite state-kind nominalizations, which are preceded by the 
definite determiner, see (26a). In subsection 4.3.2, focusing on the double distribution of 
measure phrases in Spanish, I study both quantified and indefinite state-kind nominalizations, 
where the former are preceded by a mass quantifier and the latter by the indefinite determiner. 
An example of a quantified state-kind nominalization is offered in (26b), while (26c) shows an 
example of an indefinite nominalization. Finally, in subsection 4.3.3 I study bare nominalizations, 
which appear in isolation, like the one in (26d). In every subsection, I also include an analysis for 
the occurrence of quantified, indefinite and bare nominalizations when occurring as the internal 
argument of the possessive verb tener ‘to have’, as in (26b), (26c) and (26d).  
 
(26) a. La honestidad abunda. 
     the   honesty   abounds 
  ‘Honesty abounds’ 
  b. El   puente tiene {mucha / dos metros de} altura. 
      the bridge   has    much     two meters  of   height 
  c. El  puente tiene una altura {de dos metros / extraña}. 
     the bridge   has    a   height  of two  meters   strange 




  d. Los objetos tridimensionales tienen profundidad. 
      the  objects   tridimensional    have       depth 
  ‘Tridimensional objects have some depth’ 
 
4.3.1 Definite state-kind nominalizations 
4.3.1.1 Kind-referring DPs 
In chapter 3, we have studied DPs containing nominalizations that express state-tokens, that is, 
nominalizations that express properties that are subject to time. These nominalizations are 
formally characterized by the presence of the definite determiner and their arguments, usually a 
PP introducing the holder of the state. In this subsection, I deal with definite state-kind 
nominalizations, that is, deadjectival nominalizations that have a generic interpretation and are 
preceded by the definite determiner. The nominalizations under examination are like the 
following, whose most salient property is that they are preceded by the definite determiner and 
not accompanied by PPs introducing arguments:  
 
(27) a. La honestidad abunda. 
     the   honesty   abounds 
  ‘Honesty abounds.’ 
  b. La belleza está en el interior. 
     the beauty   is   in the interior 
  ‘Beauty is inside.’ 
  c. La  tristeza  invadió  sus corazones. 
     the sadness invaded their  hearts 
  ‘Sadness filled their hearts.’ 
  d. Aquí la inteligencia  brilla por su ausencia. 
     here the intelligence shines by  its absence 
  ‘Here intelligence is conspicuous by its absence.’ 
 
 In (27) we do not deal with someone’s honesty, beauty, sadness or intelligence, but rather we 
take honesty, beauty, sadness and intelligence as generic properties. I will come back to the 
semantic issue later on, where I argue that the generic reading comes from the DP or that the 
DP is a kind-referring DP in the sense of Krifka et al. (1995). Before that, it is necessary to present 
the starting point of the investigation. As shown in chapter 1, in Roy’s (2010) seminal work on 





(28) a. La  popularité (constante) de ses chansons m’impressionne. 
     the popularity    constant   of  his    songs      me.impresses 
  b. La  popularité (*constante) est une qualité  qui      lui     fait  défaut. 
      the popularity     constant    is    a   quality  that  to.him does default 
(From Roy 2010: 146) 
 
 According to Roy, in (28a) the nominalization popularité ‘popularity’ expresses a state, 
accepts modification by a frequency adjective (constante ‘constant’) and is followed by the 
argument PP de ses chansons ‘of his songs’. In contrast, in (28b) popularité ‘popularity’ expresses 
a quality, frequency modification is banned and the nominalization has no arguments. Roy 
claims that the stative reading is the basic one, while the quality reading arises when the 
nominalization receives a generic interpretation in the absence of their arguments. The 
morphosyntactic analysis proposed by this author is the following: 
 
(29)  DP/NP 
      N’ 
    -ité   PredP 
      spec    Pred’ 
         <-ité>   AP  
(From Roy 2010: 149) 
(30)  DP/NP 
  N’ 
    N    PredP 
      Proarb    Pred’ 
         Pred    AP  
(From Roy 2010: 151) 
 
 (29) offers the analysis for state nominalizations, while (30) presents the analysis for quality 
nominalizations. Roy (2010) attributes the source of stativity to the adjectival base, so the state 
reading holds without additional stipulation. Regarding quality nominalizations, Roy claims that 
they express states inserted in generic contexts when an arbitrary Proarb is bound by a generic 
operator GEN: the specific place for this operator is not provided by the author, but we can 
presume that it must be placed inside the domain of the DP for the reasons that will be 
explained below. As claimed in chapter 3, although I agree with Roy that the quality reading 




reading is the generic reading (i.e. the kind reading), while the stative reading is the derived 
reading (i.e. the token reading).  
 The reason why I do not follow Roy’s analysis is precisely that, in what the author calls the 
quality reading, she attributes the source of genericity to a generic operator. Indeed, although 
Roy does not mention it, there are two possible options, namely, the generic operator can be 
placed either outside or inside the DP. The data reveal that genericity comes from the DP, since 
the predicates that are placed out of the DP do not impact its generic reading regardless of 
whether they have a generic or an episodic interpretation. Observe the following data: 
 
(31) a. La (*habitual) tristeza es un sentimiento doloroso. 
     the     usual    sadness is   a      feeling      painful 
  ‘(Usual) sadness is a painful feeling.’ 
  b. La (*habitual) tristeza  invadió  sus corazones.  
     the     usual    sadness invaded their   hearts 
  ‘(Usual) sadness filled their hearts.’    
 
 In (31a) the predicate es un sentimiento doloroso ‘is a painful feeling’ has a generic reading or 
cannot be located at a particular time; in contrast, in (31b) the predicate invadió sus corazones 
‘filled their hearts’ has an episodic reading, that is, it can be located at a particular time. 
Crucially, in both cases the insertion of the frequency modifier habitual ‘usual’, which can only 
trigger a temporal reading in prenominal position, is blocked (I will come back to frequency 
modifiers in subsection 4.3.1.4). More specifically, recall from chapter 3 that frequency modifiers 
in prenominal position only trigger a temporal reading in the sense of Gehrke & McNally (2015), 
in which case they denote in the state-token domain; however, in both (31a) and (31b) 
frequency modifiers are unlicensed. What this means is that the source of genericity comes from 
the DP, that is, we deal with a kind-referring DP in the sense of Krifka et al. (1995), hence the 
type clash between the nominalization, which denotes in the kind domain, and the modifier, 
which denotes in the token domain. In order to understand better what a kind-referring DP is, 
consider the following data: 
 
(32) a. The potato was first cultivated in South America. 
  b. Potatoes were introduced into Ireland by the end of the 17th century. 
(33) a. John smokes a cigar after dinner. 
  b. A potato contains vitamin C, amino acids, protein and thiamine.  




 According to Krifka et al., the source of genericity in (32) comes from the DPs, since they do 
not designate a particular potato in (32a) or a particular group of potatoes in (32b), but rather 
the natural kind potato itself; note that the predicates was cultivated in South America and were 
introduced into Ireland trigger an episodic interpretation of the entire sentence, but they do not 
alter the generic reading of the DPs. In contrast, in (33) the source of genericity comes from the 
predicates involved (smokes a cigar and contains vitamin C, etc.), which do not trigger an 
episodic interpretation that can be located at a particular time. In this case, Krifka et al. talk 
about characterizing or generic sentences. Finally, there are cases in which the two types of 
genericity co-occur: 
 
(34) a. Potatoes are served whole or mashed as a cooked vegetable. 
  b. The potato is highly digestible. 
(Krifka et al. 1995: 3) 
 
 According to the authors, the subjects of the sentences in (34) can refer to kinds and the 
sentences themselves can trigger a generic interpretation. Thus, if we go back to (31), we will 
understand the proposal more clearly: in both (31a) and (31b) the DP refers to a state-kind 
irrespective of whether the verbal predicate triggers a generic interpretation, like es un 
sentimiento doloroso ‘is a painful feeling’ in (31a), or whether the verbal predicate triggers an 
episodic interpretation, like invadió sus corazones ‘filled their hearts’ in (31b). Thus, in (31a) we 
deal with a kind-referring DP inserted in a generic sentence, while in (31b) we deal with a kind-
referring DP inserted in an episodic sentence. 
 Having clarified that the source of genericity in the case of definite nominalizations comes 
from the DP, we can go back to Roy’s (2010) analysis. Specifically, Roy claims that the generic 
interpretation holds due to the absence of the arguments of nominalizations, in which case an 
arbitrary Proarb is bound by a generic operator. Given that genericity comes from the DP, the 
only possibility for this analysis is to place the generic operator above the NP projection. 
However, although in English it could be possible to place it in a covert DP that dominates NP, 
given that there are no explicit definite determiners in this type of structures (e.g. Sadness is a 
painful feeling), in Romance languages like Spanish that position is occupied by the definite 
determiner. Thus, the only possibility would be to posit that the determiner does not introduce 
the iota operator ι when deadjectival nominalizations that have a generic reading are involved, 
but rather that it introduces a generic operator GEN. However, that would force us to posit two 
different denotations for the definite determiner, which is an undesirable option, as Espinal & 




‘(lit.) The dodo was exterminated, Dodos were exterminated). Specifically, Espinal & Borik claim 
that the noun dodo denotes a property of entity-kinds of type ek and the definite determiner 
introduces the iota operator ι, as usual, which captures the kind reading: 
 
(35) a. ⟦𝑑𝑜𝑑𝑜⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝑘 . dodo(𝑥𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑑𝑜⟧ = 𝜄𝑥𝑘[dodo(𝑥𝑘)]. 
 
 The result of the derivation is the unique entity-kind of dodos. In case the noun dodo refers 
to a particular individual instead of the natural kind of dodos, as in El dodo fue disecado en el 
museo Ashmolean ‘The dodo was dissected in the Ashmolean museum’, the functional node 
Num attaches to the derivation to instantiate an entity-kind from the set of entity-kinds. The 
composition proposed by Espinal & Borik (2015) is as follows: 
 
(36) a. ⟦dodo⟧= 𝜆𝑥𝑘 . dodo(𝑥𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑁𝑢𝑚−𝑝𝑙⟧= 𝜆𝑃<𝑒𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥. ∃𝑥𝑘[𝑃(𝑥𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑥𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴𝑡]. 
  c. ⟦𝑁𝑢𝑚−𝑝𝑙⟧(⟦𝑑𝑜𝑑𝑜⟧) = 𝜆𝑥. ∃𝑥𝑘[dodo(𝑥𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑥𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴𝑡]. 
  c. ⟦𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑑𝑜⟧ = 𝜄𝑥. ∃𝑥𝑘[dodo(𝑥𝑘) ∧ 𝑅(𝑥𝑘 , 𝑥) ∧ 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴𝑡]. 
 
 The functional node Num
-pl
, which attaches to singular count nouns according to the 
authors, takes a predicate of entity-kinds and existentially binds the entity-kind variable 
introducing a set of entity-tokens; the expression x ∊ At, where At stands for ‘atomic’, captures 
the fact that dodo is an atomic entity, that is, a singular countable entity. Finally, the iota 
operator ι takes the unique entity-token from the set of entity-tokens.  
 Going back to deadjectival nominalizations, the alternative analysis that I propose, more in 
line with Espinal & Borik (2015) in particular and with the kind-token tradition in general, is that 
the basic reading is the state-kind reading, while the state-token reading holds when the 
arguments of the nominalizations are present (see also Moltmann 2004, 2009 for a similar 
insight in term of tropes and kinds of tropes). If this is the case, the aspectual node AspP attaches 
to the structure introducing a function that instantiates a state-kind from the set of state-kinds, 
as I showed in chapter 3. Thus, the DP la tristeza del actor (durante la película) ‘the actor’s 
sadness (during the movie)’ denotes a state-token, whereas the DP la tristeza ‘sadness’ in La 
tristeza es un sentimiento doloroso ‘Sadness is a painful feeling’ denotes a state-kind.  
 Before introducing the technical details of the analysis for definite state-kind nominalizations, 
it is necessary to show that they can also trigger either degree or quality readings, so they can 




4.3.1.2 Quality and degree readings 
In this subsection, I provide evidence that state-kind nominalizations can trigger either quality or 
degree readings. Recall from chapter 3 that state-token nominalizations can trigger a quality 
reading, in which the nominalization is used for referring to the adjectival property, or a degree 
reading, in which the nominalization is used for referring to some degree on the scale:  
 
(37) la   belleza   del  actor 
  the beauty of.the actor 
  R1: ‘The actor’s quality of being beautiful’ 
  R2: ‘The actor’s degree of beauty’ 
 
 In chapter 3, the contrast is technically captured by including the null morpheme EVAL in the 
derivation of the quality reading. With this in mind, in this section I argue that state-kind 
nominalizations can also trigger degree and quality readings. The problem with state-kind 
nominalizations is that we cannot insert them in some of the contexts that were examined in 
chapter 3 in order to identify the quality and the degree readings, since they only work properly 
when the nominalizations are predicated of their arguments. For example, the predicate no es 
suficiente ‘is not enough’ gives rise to anomalous sentences: 
 
(38) a. *La velocidad no es suficiente para ganar la carrera. 
       the   speed   not  is   enough    to     win   the race 
   ‘Speed is not enough to win the race.’ 
  b. *La  belleza no es suficiente para ser feliz. 
       the beauty not is   enough     to   be happy 
  ‘Beauty is not enough to be happy.’ 
 
 Nevertheless, we can provide other contexts that induce each different reading. Observe the 
following data: 
 
(39) a. La velocidad aumenta con  la  aceleración. 
     the   speed    increases with the acceleration 
  ‘Speed increases with acceleration.’ 
  b. La  belleza disminuye con  la edad. 
     the  beauty  decreases with the age 




(40) a. La velocidad es una de las cualidades de este coche. 
     the   speed     is  one of  the  qualities   of   this   car 
  ‘Speed is one of the qualities of this car.’ 
  b. La belleza es una de las cualidades de este paisaje. 
     the beauty is  one of  the  qualities    of this landscape 
  ‘Beauty is one of the qualities of this landscape.’ 
 
 In (39a), which includes the predicate aumentar ‘to increase’, we deal with speed in general, 
which comprises all degrees of speed, that is, low and high speeds. In other words, (39a) means 
‘In general, the degree of speed increases with acceleration’. The same holds for (39b), where 
the predicate disminuir ‘to decrease’ informs us that the degree of beauty becomes lower as the 
time goes on, but we do not know if it is high or low. The quality readings according to which 
what increases with acceleration is the quality of being fast or what decreases with age is the 
quality of being beautiful do not make any sense. In contrast, (40a) conveys that one of the 
qualities of the car is that it is fast, and (40b) conveys that one of the qualities of the landscape 
is that it is beautiful. The degree readings according to which one of the qualities of the car is 
that it has some speed and one of the qualities of the landscape is that it has some beauty are 
excluded because they are trivial. Recall from chapter 3 that degree readings are possible 
because deadjectival nominalizations, unlike their base adjectives, are not necessarily evaluated 
with respect to a standard of comparison.  
 Nominalizations like altura ‘height’ and anchura ‘width’, which can only trigger a degree 
reading, as shown in chapter 3 in relation to state-token nominalizations, show the expected 
pattern: 
 
(41) a. La  altura  disminuye  con  la edad. 
     the height  decreases  with the age 
  ‘Height decreases with age.’ 
  b. *La anchura es una de las cualidades de este coche. 
       the  width    is  one of the   qualities  of   this   car 
  ‘Width is one of the qualities of this car.’ 
 
 (41a) expresses that the degree of height decreases with age, but we do not know whether 
that degree is high or low. In contrast, in (41b) the predicate es una de las cualidades de este 




entities are endowed with a certain degree of width, but this reading is unavailable, hence the 
sentence’s ungrammaticality. 
 Finally, it must be noted that non-deadjectival nouns like coste ‘cost’, peso ‘weight’ and 
temperatura ‘temperature’ behave as nominalizations like altura ‘height’ in that they can only 
trigger a degree reading, as concluded in chapter 3 with respect to state-token nominalizations: 
 
(42) a. El    peso  aumenta  con   la masa. 
     the weight increases with the mass 
  ‘Weight increases with mass.’ 
  b. La  temperatura disminuye con  la  altitud.  
     the  temperature decreases with the altitude 
  ‘Temperature decreases with altitude.’ 
  c. *El    peso/coste es  una de las cualidades de este coche. 
      the weight cost   is   one of  the  qualities   of   this   car 
  ‘Weight/cost is one of the qualities of this car.’ 
  
 In (42a) and in (42b) the nouns peso ‘weight’ and temperatura ‘temperature’ are compatible 
with the predicates aumentar ‘to increase’ and disminuir ‘to decrease’, triggering a degree 
reading: what increases with mass is the degree of weight and what decreases with altitude is 
the degree of temperature. In contrast, in (42c) these nouns give rise to unacceptable utterances 
because the predicate es una de la cualidades de este coche ‘is one of the qualities of this car’ 
induces a quality reading, but this is unavailable; the degree readings whereby one of the 
qualities of the car is that it has some weight or some cost are excluded because they are trivial. 
 We can conclude that state-kind nominalizations, like state-token ones, can amount to either 
quality or degree readings. Exceptional nominalizations like altura ‘height’ and non-deadjectival 
nouns like temperatura ‘temperature’ can only trigger degree readings. In the following 
subsection, I present a syntactic and semantic analysis for definite state-kind nominalizations. 
 
4.3.1.3 Technical implementation 
In this subsection, I offer a morphosyntactic and semantic analysis for state-kind definite 
nominalizations, which must account for the fact that they trigger a generic reading whose 
source is the DP. The morphosyntactic composition that I propose for the quality reading of la 
velocidad ‘the speed’ in La velocidad es una de las cualidades de este coche ‘Speed is one of the 





(43)   DP 
  la    NP 
   -idad   DegP  
      EVAL  AP 
           veloz 
(44) a. ⟦𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑧⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . fast(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  c. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . fast(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 .                                   
  d. ⟦−𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  e. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . fast(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  f. ⟦𝐷𝑃⟧ = 𝜄𝑠𝑘[fast(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐]. 
 
 The starting point of the derivation is the gradable adjective veloz ‘fast’, which denotes a 
property of state-kinds. The null morpheme EVAL, whose presence captures the quality reading, 
introduces a contextual standard of comparison stc. Recall from chapter 3 that the node PredP 
merges with the structure at this point of the derivation in the case of state-token 
nominalizations, which enables them to select for a subject. Regarding state-kind 
nominalizations, what I propose here to capture the fact that they have a generic reading is that 
the nominalizer attaches to DegP, which blocks the insertion of PredP. As a consequence, the 
state-kind is not predicated of a specific individual, so the node AspP, which associates a state-
kind with a state-token, does not intercede either. Subsequently, the nominalizer attaches to the 
structure and, finally, the determiner picks up the unique state-kind from the set of state-kinds 
denoted by the NP. The result of the derivation is the unique state-kind of having a speed that 
surpasses a contextual standard of comparison.  
 For the degree reading of la velocidad ‘the speed’ in La velocidad aumenta con la aceleración 
‘Speed increases with acceleration’, I propose the following composition: 
 
(45)   DP 
  la    NP 
    -idad   AP  
          veloz 
(46) a. ⟦𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑧⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . fast(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦−𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  c. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . fast(𝑠𝑘). 




 The only difference with respect to the quality reading is that the null morpheme EVAL does 
not appear in the derivation. The output of the expression in question is the unique state-kind 
of having a speed. The analysis proposed here for both the quality and degree readings of state-
kind nominalizations capture their generic character appropriately: in the absence of the 
functional node AspP, the state-kind expressed by the base adjective is not associated with a 
state-token.  
 Note that the fact that the nominalizer attaches to the structure over DegP in the quality 
reading and over AP in the degree reading excludes the possibility of inserting PredP, StageP 
and CauseP, which are the functional nodes that capture individual-level, stage-level and stative 
causative readings, as argued for in chapters 2 and 3. The consequence of the exclusion of these 
nodes is that this three-way distinction is irrelevant when the state-kind interpretation is 
involved, which is consistent with the analysis defended in this dissertation according to which 
even individual-level predicates express properties that are subject to time. In other words, it 
does not make any sense to apply this three-way distinction to generic interpretations, in which 
there are no arguments involved and, therefore, there are no eventualities that hold at a 
particular time. Recall that the distinction is based on how a state-token is caused, but that 
distinction does not apply if there are no state-tokens involved.   
 In sum, in this section, building on the kind-token dichotomy, particularly on Espinal & Borik 
(2015), I have offered a morphosyntactic and semantic analysis for definite state-kind 
nominalizations that captures their generic character and the quality and degree readings. In the 
following subsection, I provide empirical evidence that definite nominalizations are incompatible 
with time-related modification, that is, temporal, frequency and aspectual modifiers, but there 
are some possible counterexamples that are worth being mentioned.  
 
4.3.1.4 Time-related modification  
In this subsection, I provide evidence that definite state-kind nominalizations disallow temporal 
modifiers, frequency modifiers with a temporal interpretation and aspectual modifiers, which is 
in agreement with the fact that they express generic properties. In addition, I show that the 
apparent cases of temporal modifiers that are licensed operate over the kind rather than the 
token domain, which reveals that they do not constitute true counterexamples.  








(47) a. La  belleza (*en aquella época) está en el interior. 
     the beauty     at   that     time      is   in the interior 
  ‘Beauty (at that time) is inside.’ 
  b. La  tristeza (*durante  el  funeral    del   actor) es un sentimiento doloroso. 
     the  sadness    during  the funeral of.the  actor  is   a      feeling       painful 
  ‘Sadness (during the actor’s funeral) is a painful feeling.’ 
 
 In (47), the temporal modifiers en aquella época ‘at that time’ and durante el funeral del actor 
‘during the actor’s funeral’ cannot locate the DPs at a particular time. As shown in the previous 
subsection with respect to the technical details, the reason of this incompatibility is that the DPs 
involved denote in the state-kind domain, but temporal modifiers locate eventualities, that is, 
event-tokens or state-tokens.  
 Nonetheless, there are cases in which apparent temporal modifiers are licensed, see (48), but 
note that in these cases the alleged temporal modifiers do not provide information about a 
particular temporal frame within which an eventuality holds, as in (47), but rather about a 
generic temporal frame: 
 
(48) a. La   felicidad durante la    vejez  es posible. 
     the happiness during the old.age is  possible 
  ‘Happiness during old age is possible.’ 
  b. La  tristeza durante el  embarazo es habitual. 
     the sadness  during the pregnancy is    usual 
  ‘Sadness during pregnancy is usual.’ 
 
 While in (47) the temporal modifiers en aquella época ‘at that time’ and durante el funeral del 
actor ‘during the actor’s funeral’ inform about specific periods of time, in (48) durante la vejez 
‘during old age’ and durante el embarazo ‘during pregnancy’ inform about generic periods of 
time. In the latter case, the alleged temporal modifiers are not true temporal modifiers; rather, 
they specify a sub-kind of happiness and sadness, respectively. 
 Regarding frequency modifiers, they do not combine with state-kind nominalizations when 
appearing in prenominal position, which indicates that they cannot trigger a temporal 







(49) a. La (*frecuente) oscuridad se   cernió sobre nosotros. 
     the    frequent   darkness REFL loomed  over       us 
  ‘(Frequent) darkness loomed over us.’ 
  b. La (*habitual) honestidad abunda. 
     the     usual       honesty   abounds 
  ‘(Usual) honesty abounds.’  
 
 On the one hand, recall from chapter 3 that frequency modifiers can trigger a temporal 
interpretation in prenominal position, in which case they operate in the token domain. The data 
in (49) show that this interpretation is unlicensed, which is in accordance with the fact that the 
absence of the arguments of the nominalization triggers a kind reading, as advanced in 
subsection 4.3.1.1. On the other, recall also that frequency modifiers can trigger a non-temporal 
reading in post-nominal position when accompanying state-token nominalizations derived from 
dimensional adjectives, which are associated with conventionalized units of measurement. In the 
case of state-kind nominalizations, they are unlicensed when modifying definite nominalizations, 
but they are valid if they modify indefinite nominalizations: 
 
(50) a. La densidad (*habitual) es de 1000 kg/m
3
. 
     the  density       usual      is  of 1000 kg/m
3
 
  ‘(Usual) density is 1000 kg/m
3
.’ 
  b. Esta sustancia tiene una densidad habitual de 1000 kg/m
3
. 
      this substance  has    a     density      usual   of 1000 kg/m
3 
  




 (50b), in which the frequency modifier can be inserted, does not pose any problems, since 
the modifier triggers a non-temporal rather than a temporal interpretation in the sense of 
Gehrke & McNally (2015) and, given that both the nominalization and the modifier denote in 
the domain of state-kinds, their compatibility is straightforwardly explained. Accordingly, what is 
usual in (50b) is the degree of density that is associated with the substance (I analyze indefinite 
state-kind nominalizations in section 4.3.2). In contrast, (50a) poses a particular problem, since 
its unacceptability cannot be attributed to a type clash, given that both the nominalization and 
the modifier are supposed to denote in the state-kind domain too. The reason why (50a) is 
unacceptable is that it does not make any sense to say that there is a degree of density that is 





(51) la densidad habitual de esa sustancia 
  the density    usual   of  that substance 
 
 In (51) the frequency modifier occurring in post-nominal position is licensed because the 
nominal property is predicated of a specific individual, namely, esa sustancia ‘that substance’. 
Accordingly, in (51) there is a usual degree of density that is associated with the substance. Thus, 
the frequency modifier with a non-temporal reading is licensed if the degree that is considered 
usual is associated with a specific individual, as in (51), but it is illicit if the degree that is 
considered usual is taken as generic, as in (50a).  
 Finally, if state-token nominalizations do not license aspectual modification because they 
express imperfective eventualities, as shown in chapter 3, it is expected that state-kind 
nominalizations, which trigger a generic reading and, therefore, do not have a perfective 
interpretation, do not license them either. The prediction is borne out: 
 
(52) a. La  belleza (*durante varios días) está en el interior. 
     the beauty        for    several days   is    in the interior 
  ‘Beauty (for several days) is inside.’ 
  b. La tristeza (*durante varios meses)  invadió  sus  corazones. 
     the sadness     for    several months invaded their   hearts 
  ‘Sadness (for several months) filled their hearts’ 
 
 To recapitulate, definite state-kind nominalizations do not combine with time-related 
modification, that is, temporal, frequency (with a temporal interpretation) or aspectual modifiers. 
Putative acceptable examples of temporal modifiers do not constitute true cases of eventuality 
modifiers and rather they serve for specifying a sub-kind for the kind expressed by the 
nominalization. In relation to frequency modifiers, they are not licensed in prenominal position 
because these denote in the state-token domain in that position, but definite nominalizations 
denote in the state-kind domain. Furthermore, frequency modifiers are not licensed in post-
nominal position either, but in this case there is no type clash, since both the nominalization and 
the modifier operate in the state-kind domain; rather, their incompatibility comes from the fact 
that it is semantically anomalous to say that there exist a usual degree on a certain scale if this is 
not associated with a specific individual.   
 In the following subsection, I study quantified and indefinite state-kind nominalizations, with 





4.3.2. Quantified and indefinite nominalizations 
In this section, I study state-kind nominalizations that are preceded by a mass quantifier or the 
indefinite determiner, which I call quantified and indefinite nominalizations, respectively. These 
nominalizations have not been examined in the literature, with a few exceptions. I focus on the 
double behavior of measure phrases in Spanish, which according to Eguren & Pastor (2014, 
2015) can function as either quantifiers or as adnominal modifiers. In addition, following 
Schwarzschild’s (2002) insights on mass and count nouns, I posit that quantified nominalizations 
constitute mass nouns, while indefinite ones constitute count nouns. In the end, I provide an 
analysis for the possessive structures involving the verb tener ‘to have’ in which these 
nominalizations usually appear as internal arguments.  
 The two types of constructions that are examined in this subsection are the following: first, 
indefinite nominalizations are preceded by the indefinite determiner un(a) ‘a’, followed by a 
measure phrase headed by de ‘of’, as in (53), or an adjective, as in (54), and usually co-occur with 
the verb tener ‘to have’: 
 
(53) a. El   puente tiene una altura de veinte metros. 
     the  bridge  has     a   height of twenty meters 
  b. Este lago tiene una profundidad de un kilómetro. 
      this  lake  has     a        depth       of one kilometer 
(54) a. Este puente tiene una altura impresionante. 
      this  bridge   has    a   height     striking 
  ‘This bridge has a striking height.’ 
  b. Este     tenista     tiene una destreza increíble. 
      this tennis.player  has    a     ability  incredible 
  ‘This tennis player has an incredible ability.’ 
 
 Second, as noted by Eguren & Pastor (2014, 2015) with respect to measure phrases, Spanish 
has available another construction in which the measure phrase is followed by a PP headed by 
de ‘of’, whose complement is the nominalization; in addition, no determiner appears. This is the 
case of quantified nominalizations: 
 
(55) a. El  puente tiene veinte metros de altura. 
     the bridge  has   twenty meters  of  height 
  b. Este lago tiene un  kilómetro de profundidad. 




 The existence of the two types of constructions raises many questions, some of which will be 
addressed here. With respect to measure phrases, we have to explain why Spanish has available 
two different configurations and whether a different semantics underlies them. With respect to 
both measure phrases and adjectives, we have to explain why and how they can license these 
structures. Ultimately, I will show that the solution to the questions that the previous data pose 
is possible by appealing to a model that includes kinds, and specifically state-kinds, in our 
semantic ontology, which is the guiding thread of this dissertation.  
 Before examining the data carefully and providing a detailed analysis, it is necessary to 
explain Eguren & Pastor’s (2014, 2015) analysis of measure phrases in Spanish, which establishes 
the starting point of this investigation.  
 
4.3.2.1 The double behavior of measure phrases   
The goal of Eguren & Pastor (2014, 2015) is to provide a syntactic analysis of Spanish measure 
phrases that accounts for their syntactic properties. Nevertheless, they also incorporate certain 
semantic considerations that are worth reflecting on. In this section, I will explain the most 
important syntactic and semantic aspects of their analysis.  
 Eguren & Pastor base their proposal on Den Dikken’s (2006) theory on predication. 
According to Den Dikken, all types of predicative structures state a relation between a subject 
and a predicate, which are mediated by a functional head that projects a Relator Phrase (RP): 
 
(56)   RP 
  XP    R’ 
    R    YP 
 
 Depending on where the subject and the predicate are base-generated, either in the specifier 
XP or in the complement YP, we obtain the first two predicative structures. In the straight 
predication, the subject occupies the specifier position, while the predicate is the complement, 
and these are considered their canonical positions. For example, in copular sentences, like 
Imogen is beautiful, Imogen, which is the subject, is base-generated in the specifier position, 
while beautiful, which is the predicate, is base-generated as the complement. This relation is 
mediated by the copula is, which occupies the head of RP: 
 
(57)   RP 
 Imogen   R’ 




 In this case, the authors claim that straight predication triggers a predicative interpretation, 
because the subject has the property expressed by the predicate. In contrast, in the reverse 
predication, the subject is base-generated in the complement position, while the predicate 
occupies the subject position, like big for a butterfly in This butterfly is big for a butterfly: 
 
(58)   RP 
  big   R’ 
    for   a butterfly  
 
 In this case, the structure does not trigger a predicative interpretation, as in the case of 
straight predication, but an attributive interpretation. In other words, (58) does not convey that 
a butterfly is big, but rather that this butterfly is big with respect to (the size of) butterflies, where 
the for-phrase “restricts the adjective’s denotation” (Eguren & Pastor 2015: 292).  
 Finally, inverse predication holds when the subject is base-generated in Spec-RP and the 
predicate is base-generated in the complement position, but it then moves up in order to be 
hierarchically above the subject. For example, a jewel of a village is an example of inverse 
predication: 
 
(59)    FP 
  a jewelj   F’ 
     ofi    RP 
      a village   R’ 
         ti    tj  
 
 Thus, a straight predication configuration underlies the inverse predication structure. 
According to the authors, this analysis captures the predicative interpretation, whereby a jewel 
of a village is equivalent to ‘a village that is a jewel’.  
 On the basis of this theory, Eguren & Pastor (2014, 2015) develop an analysis of Spanish 
measure phrases that involve straight and reverse predication. The two structures involved are 
repeated here: 
 
(60) a. tres  metros de altura. 




  b. una altura de  tres metros.
63
 
       a   height of  three meters  
 
 Assuming with Schwarzschild (2005) and Corver (2009) that measure phrases are predicates, 
Eguren & Pastor propose that a reverse predication underlies (60a), where the subject altura 
‘height’ is base-generated in the complement position, whereas a straight predication underlies 
(60b), where the subject altura is base-generated in Spec-RP: 
 
(61)   RP 
 tres metros  R’ 
    de   altura 
(62)   RP 
 altura    R’ 
    de   tres metros  
 
 The two RPs involved also differ with respect to their syntactic distribution: the one that is 
associated with the reverse predication shows the distribution of a quantifier phrase (QP), while 
the one that is associated with the straight predication shows the distribution of an NP. Let us 
review the former first. Observe the following data: 
 
(63) a. La  valla tiene muchos/tres/*los metros de altura. 
     the fence has    many  three  the meters  of  height 
  b. La  valla     mide     tres  metros de altura. 
     the fence measures three meters  of height 
  c. Esta valla tiene [un metro de altura]  más  que  esa. 
      this fence  has  one meter of  height more than that 
(Eguren & Pastor 2015: 298) 
 
                                                          
63
 The authors also note that Spanish offers is a third structure that involves measures phrases: 
 
(i)  La   torre   tiene  tres  metros de  alta  / alto. 
  the tower.F  has   three  meters  of  tall.F   tall.M 
 
 The structure is the same as the one in (60a), with the difference that the nominalization is replaced by its 
corresponding base adjective, which can agree or not in gender with the noun of which the property is predicated. The 





 (63a) shows that the measure phrase can be preceded by a quantifier, but not by a definite 
determiner. In (63b) the measure phrase can combine with the verb medir ‘to measure’ and in 
(63c) the measure phrase can function as a differential measure phrase, which must “denote a 
quantity” according to the authors. All these data indicate that the phrase that appears in the 
reverse predication configuration must project a QP.  
 In contrast, the phrase that appears in the straight predication configuration is preceded by 
the indefinite determiner una ‘a’, see (64a), and cannot combine with the verb medir ‘to 
measure’, see (64b). Moreover, although the authors do not mention it, the measure phrase 
cannot function as a differential measure phrase, as shown in (64c).   
 
(64) a. una altura de tres  metros. 
        a  height of three meters   
  b. *La  valla     mide  una altura de tres metros. 
          the fence measures a   height of three meters 
(Eguren & Pastor 2015: 299) 
  c. *Esta valla tiene [una altura de  un  metro] más  que  esa.  
       this fence  has     a   height of  one meter more than that 
 
 In this case, the conclusion is that the phrase that is associated with the straight predication 
must project an NP. In order to account for the fact that both structures project an RP, but they 
must also project a QP and an NP, respectively, the authors resort to the Project Both labeling 
algorithm (Chomsky 2008; Citko 2008). In the overt syntax, two structures can be projected and 
after filtered out in the interfaces: at the Phonological Form, only the one with the RP survives, 
while the two can survive at the Logical Form. This analysis accounts, they claim, for the fact that 
the structures under study comprise a predication relationship, but also have the interpretation 
of QPs and NPs, respectively.  
 Finally, with respect to the meaning of each structure, according to the authors, their analysis 
correctly predicts that the QP/RP structure, the one associated with the reverse predication, can 
have two interpretations: in the predicative interpretation, tres metros de altura ‘(lit.) three 
meters of height’ means ‘a height that is three meters’. In contrast, in the attributive 
interpretation, the same phrase means ‘three meters as for height’. Regarding the structure with 
the NP/RP, the one associated with the straight predication, the only interpretation that is 
activated is the predicative one, since the subject and the predicate occur in their canonical 
positions. In the following subsection, I review Eguren & Pastor’s analysis and examine the 




4.3.2.2 Quantified and indefinite nominalizations and the mass-count distinction 
In this subsection, I assume Eguren & Pastor’s analysis in which measure phrases in Spanish can 
act as either quantifiers or as adnominal modifiers. In addition, I elaborate on their proposal by 
incorporating Schwarzschild’s (2002) insights on mass and count nouns; in particular, I posit that 
quantified nominalizations constitute mass nouns, while indefinite nominalizations constitute 
count nouns. Deadjectival nominalizations can also constitute count nouns because the scales 
associated with them are composed of state-kinds, which are discrete or atomic objects, as 
argued in section 4.1 when examining the determiner ningún ‘no, any’.  
 The major contribution of the proposal on Spanish measure phrases developed by Eguren & 
Pastor (2014, 2015) is that they provide empirical evidence that the structures under scrutiny, 
repeated in (65), differ with respect to their syntactic properties: (65a) constitutes an NP, while 
(65b) constitutes a QP.  
 
(65) a. altura de dos metros 
     height of  two meters 
  b. dos metros de altura 
      two meters of  height  
 
 However, resorting to the Project Both labeling algorithm to incorporate their RP status is 
unnecessary on the basis of the formal apparatus assumed here (Heim & Kratzer 1998), since 
predicate-argument relations do not rely on the existence of a functional node that mediates 
between predicates and arguments. Consequently, we can dispense with the RP label and take 
the constituents analyzed as simple NPs and QPs.  
 In relation to the semantic considerations, recall that Eguren & Pastor’s analysis predicts that 
both structures can have the same interpretation, namely, the predicative one (‘a height that is 
two meters’), but only (65b) can trigger what they call an attributive interpretation (‘two meters 
as for height’). In addition to the fact that it is not clear why two different syntactic structures 
can be associated with the same interpretation without further argumentation, the paraphrase 
provided by the authors with respect to the attributive interpretation is imprecise. In other 
words, they do not explain what “two meters as for height” means in precise terms and, 
consequently, it is difficult to apprehend its difference with respect to the predicative 
interpretation.  
 In what follows, I provide a more precise semantic characterization, which is based on an 
important aspect that the authors overlook: the syntax of (65a) is typically the one for count 




structures involved differ in this respect. My analysis is based on Schwarzschild’s (2002) cross-
linguistic study on (English, Spanish, Dutch, Swiss German and Russian) mass and count nouns, 
according to which the two types differ with respect to the structures in which they participate. 
Observe the following examples in English: 
 
(66) a. 2 liters of oil 
  b. *2 liter oil 
  c. 90 degree oil 
(67) a. *2 pages of story 
  b. a 2 page story  
(From Schwarzschild 2002: 227, 229) 
 
 The mass noun oil can appear in the pseudopartitive construction in (66a), where the 
measure phrase is followed by the preposition of; in contrast, it cannot form a compound in 
(66b), but it can in (66c). The count noun page cannot participate in the pseudopartitive 
construction in (67a), but it licenses a compound, see (67b). According to Schwarzschild (2002: 
288), pseudopartitive constructions require part-whole relations, while compounds do not 
accept them, either because the noun does not comprise a part-whole relation or because the 
property that is predicated of the noun “is not monotonic within the universe of the substantive 
with respect to the part-whole relation”. The author explains that a property is monotonic if it 
tracks part-whole relations, like volume: the more volume of oil we have, the more amount of oil 
we have; in contrast, more temperature of oil does not entail more amount of oil.  
 Based on that, we can now explain the data in (66) and (67): pseudopartitive constructions 
require part-whole relations, so mass nouns like oil, unlike count nouns like story, can participate 
in them, see (66a) and compare it to (67a). By contrast, compounds do not admit part-whole 
relations: (66b) is not acceptable because volume is a monotonic property, so it comprises part-
whole relations; in contrast, (66c) is actually acceptable, because temperature is a non-
monotonic property, so it does not comprise part-whole relations. Finally, (67b) is acceptable 
because count nouns do not comprise part-whole relations. 
 This analysis correctly predicts that nouns that can be either mass or count nouns depending 
on the context are able to appear in both types of constructions. For example, the noun chicken 
fulfills the prediction: 
 
(68) a. two kilos of chicken 




 In (68a) chicken is a mass noun, where chicken can be considered food, and can participate in 
the pseudopartitive construction. In contrast, in (68b) chicken is a count noun, where the chicken 
can be considered an animal. With this in mind, we can move on to Spanish data, which show a 
parallel behavior: Spanish has available pseudopartitive constructions for monotonic uses of 
measure phrases, but it does not make use of compounds for non-monotonic uses; instead, 
Spanish makes use of NPs and measure phrases function as adnominal complements: 
 
(69) a. 2 litros de gasolina 
     2 liters  of     gas 
  b. *gasolina de 2 litros 
           gas     of  2 liters 
  c. gasolina de 95 octanos 
         gas     of  95 octanes 
  ’95 octane gas’  
(70) a. *300 páginas de libro 
       300  pages   of  book 
  b. un libro de 300 páginas 
       a  book of 300   pages 
  ‘a 300 page book’ 
(71) a. 2 kilos de pollo 
     2 kilos  of chicken 
  b. un  pollo  de 2 kilos 
      a  chicken of 2 kilos 
  ‘a 2 kilo chicken’    
 
 The mass noun gasolina ‘gas(oline)’ can participate in the pseudopartitive construction in 
(69a) and licenses the NP construction when a non-monotonic property like octane number is 
involved, see (69c); in (69b) the same construction is not licensed because volume is a 
monotonic property: more volume of gas entails more amount of gas. In contrast, the count 
noun libro ‘book’ cannot enter into the pseudopartitive construction in (70a), but it can 
participate in the NP construction, see (70b). Finally, the noun pollo ‘chicken’ participates in the 
pseudopartitive construction in (71a), where it is a mass noun, and also licenses the NP 




 Going back to our central discussion on measure phrases and deadjectival nominalizations, 
nominalizations like altura ‘height’ can participate in both types of constructions, which reveals 
that they behave as variable nouns like pollo ‘chicken’: 
 
(72) a. dos metros de altura 
      two meters of  height 
  b. una  altura de dos metros 
        a   height of  two  meters  
 
 In (72a) altura ‘height’ participates in the pseudopartitive construction, which indicates that it 
is a mass noun, whereas in (72b) it licenses an NP, which indicates that it is a count noun. At this 
point it is important to relate these data to the internal ordering of deadjectival nominalizations 
proposed in section 4.1 and the analysis developed in section 4.2 according to which gradable 
adjectives form mass nominalizations because both domains consist in sets of state-kinds that 
are ordered with respect to each other. In (72a) the measure phrase functioning as a mass 
quantifier operates over the set of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization: given that this set 
is composed of state-kinds that are ordered with respect to each other, by the total preorder ≤, 
the nominalization constitutes a mass noun.  
 In contrast, in (72b) there is a state-kind that results from the intersection of the set of state-
kinds denoted by the nominalization, i.e. the scale, and the set of state-kinds denoted by the 
measure phrase, which functions as an adnominal modifier. Given that state-kinds are discrete 
units, as argued in section 4.1, the nominalization can also behave as a count noun and, 
therefore, can be selected for by a determiner that combines with count nouns, like the 
indefinite determiner. I will come back to this issue in subsection 4.3.2.4, where I offer a technical 
implementation that helps us clarify this reasoning.   
 To conclude, in this subsection I have analyzed quantified and indefinite state-kind 
nominalizations on the basis of Eguren & Pastor’s (2014, 2015) analysis on Spanish measure 
phrases and Schwarzschild’s (2002) insights on mass and count nouns. Quantified 
nominalizations constitute mass nouns that are preceded by a measure phrase functioning as a 
mass quantifier, while indefinite nominalizations constitute count nouns that are followed by a 
measure phrase functioning as an adnominal modifier and preceded by the indefinite 
determiner. Before providing a formal analysis of the two constructions under examination, in 
the following subsection I offer empirical evidence that the nominalizations involved denote in 





4.3.2.3 Time-related modification 
In the previous subsection, I have shown that deadjectival nominalizations can constitute mass 
or count nouns, which is revealed by the syntactic structure in which they appear. In this 
subsection, I provide empirical evidence that in both cases the nominalizations denote in the 
kind rather than the token domain. The two structures under examination are repeated below: 
 
(73) a. dos metros de altura 
      two meters of  height 
  b. una altura de dos metros 
        a  height of  two  meters 
  
 First, neither of the two constructions accepts temporal modification: 
 
(74) a. *dos metros de  altura  durante el  verano 
       two meters  of  height   during the summer 
  b. *una  altura de dos  metros durante el   verano 
         a    height of  two  meters  during  the summer 
 
 Second, the distribution of these nominalizations and frequency modifiers shows the 
expected pattern. Recall from chapter 3 that in Spanish frequency modifiers can operate in both 
the token and the kind domains: in the former case, they can appear in prenominal or post-
nominal position and trigger a temporal interpretation (in the sense of Gehrke & McNally 2015), 
while in the latter they appear in post-nominal position and trigger a non-temporal 
interpretation. When state-kind nominalizations are involved, they cannot appear in prenominal 
position and, if they can appear in post-nominal position, they only trigger a non-temporal 
interpretation. Consider the following data:  
 
(75) a. *dos metros de frecuente altura 
       two meters  of  frequent  height 
  b. *dos metros de altura frecuente 
       two meters  of  height frequent 
(76) a. *una frecuente tristeza 
         a    frequent  sadness 
  b. *una frecuente densidad de 20 kg/m
3
 





(77) a. una altura frecuente de veinte metros 
        a  height frequent   of twenty meters 
  b. una densidad frecuente de 20 kg/m
3
 
        a    density    frequent  of  20 kg/m
3
     
 
 (75) shows that quantified state-kind nominalizations reject frequency modifiers in both 
prenominal and post-nominal position.
64
 (76) shows that frequency modifiers cannot trigger a 
temporal reading in prenominal position when indefinite nominalizations are involved, so they 
give rise to unacceptable phrases; finally, (77) shows that they can trigger a non-temporal 
reading in post-nominal position when accompanying indefinite nominalizations, according to 
which what is frequent is a certain degree on the scale.   
 Third, state-kind nominalizations do not accept aspectual modifiers either, as expected due 
to their generic character: 
 
(78) a. *dos metros de altura durante varios años 
       two meters  of  height    for    several years 
  b. *una altura de dos metros durante varios años 
         a  height  of two  meters     for    several years 
 
 The fact that the two structures that involve measure phrases denote in the domain of state-
kinds is consistent with the hypothesis defended in this dissertation, according to which state-
token and state-kind interpretations are not unrestricted; rather, the state-token reading arises 
when the arguments of the nominalizations are present (see chapter 3), while the state-reading 
holds when the arguments are absent, as in the examples above, where there is no PP 
introducing the holder of the state.  
 The situation varies drastically when the verb tener ‘to have’ is introduced, in which case 
temporal modification, frequency modification with a temporal interpretation and aspectual 
modification when tener ‘to have’ bears perfective morphology are licensed. I contend that, in 
this case, the modifiers in question operate at the VP level rather than at the domain of the 
nominalization.  Consider the following data:  
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 The reason why the frequency modifier cannot trigger a non-temporal reading in post-nominal position in (75b) 
cannot be attributed to a type clash, since both the nominalization and the modifier operate in the kind domain. Rather, 
the reason of their incompatibility is that the nominalization is a count noun in this case, so it is incompatible with a 




(79) a. Las dunas tienen dos kilómetros de altura en verano. 
      the dunes  have   two kilometers  of height in  summer 
  b. Las dunas tienen una altura de dos kilómetros en verano. 
      the dunes  have     a   height of  two kilometers in  summer 
(80) a. Las dunas frecuentemente tienen dos kilómetros  de altura en verano. 
      the dunes      frequently      have   two  kilometers  of  height in summer 
  b. Las dunas frecuentemente tienen una altura de dos  kilómetros en verano. 
      the dunes      frequently       have     a  height of  two  kilometers  in summer 
(81) a. Las dunas  *tenían  /  tuvieron dos kilómetros de altura durante un   mes. 
      the dunes  have.IPFV  have.PFV  two kilometers of  height     for    one month 
  b. Las dunas *tenían  /  tuvieron una altura de dos kilómetros durante un  mes.  
      the dunes have.IPFV   have.PFV   a   height of  two kilometers      for    one month 
 
 Under the hypothesis defended in this dissertation, the stative verb tener ‘to have’ denotes in 
the state-kind domain, but, given that their arguments are present (i.e. the subject and the direct 
object), we can assume that the node AspP attaches to the structure to instantiate a state-kind 
from the set of state-kinds denoted by the predicate. Consequently, time-related modifiers are 
accepted, but these operate at the domain of the VP containing the verb tener ‘to have’ rather 
than the domain of the nominalization. (79) shows that the temporal modifier en verano ‘in 
summer’ is compatible with state-kind nominalizations if the verb tener ‘to have’ is present. In 
(80) the frequency modifier frecuentemente ‘frequently’ takes the form of an adverb rather than 
an adjective, which confirms that it operates at the VP level. Finally, the data in (81) show that 
aspectual modification is licit if the verb bears perfective morphology, which again is in 
accordance with the fact that in this case aspectual modifiers operate at the VP level. 
 In sum, in this subsection I have shown that neither quantified nor indefinite state-kind 
deadjectival nominalizations accept temporal, frequency (with a temporal reading) or aspectual 
modifiers, which proves that they do not denote in the token domain. These modifiers are 
licensed if the nominalizations occur as internal arguments of the verb tener ‘to have’, in which 
case the modifiers operate at the VP level. In the following subsection, I provide the technical 
details of the analysis. 
 
4.3.2.4 Technical implementation 
In this subsection, I provide a basic morphosyntactic and semantic analysis for quantified and 
indefinite state-kind nominalizations and the structures that involve the verb tener ‘to have’ and 




quantifier mucha ‘a lot of, much’ and to indefinite nominalizations that are followed by a 
manner modifier. 
 As shown in chapter 1, the literature on property concepts (in the sense of Dixon 1982) has 
pointed out that adjectival and possessive structures are tightly connected semantically. For 
example, Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2015, 2017a), for Ulwa, and Baglini (2015), for Wolof, 
develop an analysis of property concept nouns, which we can equate to deadjectival 
nominalizations, as predicates that must combine with a possessive morpheme or a possessive 
verb in order to be predicated of a subject. While Ulwa usually makes use of the possessive 
morpheme -ka, see (82), Wolof makes use of the verb am ‘to have’ in normal circumstances, see 
(83).   
 
(82) a. Alas pan-ka 
     3.SG stick-3.SG 
  ‘His/her stick’ 
  b. Yang as-ki-na  minisih-ka. 
      1.SG shirt-1.SG   dirty-ka 
  ‘My shirt is dirty.’ 
 (Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2017a: 31, 32) 
(83) a. Aïda  am  na-∅       ceeb. 
     Aïda have FIN-3.SG  rice 
  ‘Aïda has rice.’ 
  b. Aïda   am   na-∅     xel  
      Aïda have FIN.3.SG mind 
  ‘Aïda is smart.’ 
 (Baglini 2015: 133) 
  
 On the one hand, according to Francez & Koontz-Garboden, in (82a) -ka is a possessive 
morpheme that can be used for expressing alienable possession, while (82b) shows that the 
same morpheme is involved in the syntax of property concepts. On the other, according to 
Baglini (2015), am ‘to have’ is the verb that is used for alienable possession in (83a), while it can 
also be used to express property concepts, see (83b). The fact that there are languages in which 
possession plays a central role when property concepts are involved is far from surprising. In 
Spanish, the existence of possessive structures involving quantified and indefinite state-kind 




 At this point, the question of which denotation the verb tener ‘to have’ must have arises. The 
meaning of this verb, or its equivalent verb in other languages, especially in English, has been 
the locus of a long debate and the literature on its syntax and semantics is enormously vast (see 
Myler 2014 and Bassaganyas 2017 for a state of the art). Given the assumptions of this 
dissertation, tener ‘to have’ should denote a set of state-kinds that select for an internal 
argument that is not defined by a specific semantic type; furthermore, a functional node should 
introduce its external argument à la Marantz (1984) and Kratzer (1996), whose semantic type is 
not specified either. If the arguments of the verb are present, i.e. the subject and the direct 
object, then the node AspP associates a state-kind from the set of state-kinds denoted by the 
verb with a state-token. However, for convenience sake and in order not to address the technical 
details with a complexity that is irrelevant for the purposes of this subsection, I will posit that 
tener ‘to have’ expresses a state-token and selects for an internal argument of type sk and an 
external argument of type e: 
 
(84) ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
 
 For the sentence El puente tiene cien metros de altura ‘(lit.) The bridge has one hundred 
meters of height’, where the measure phrase projects a QP, the composition proposed is as 
follows: 
 
(85)    TP 
 El puente   VP 
    tiene   QP 
     diez metros   PP 
         de    NP 
           -ura   AP 
                 alt(o) 
(Not final) 
(86) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦−𝑢𝑟𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  c. ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  d. ⟦𝑑𝑒⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  f. ⟦𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑧 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠⟧ = 𝜆𝑃<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑄<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝑃(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑄(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 = ten. meters]. 




  h. ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
(Not final) 
  
 The domain of the nominalization is very simple: the adjective alto ‘tall’ denotes a property of 
state-kinds, and the absence of their arguments is captured by the exclusion of PredP. The 
nominalizer denotes an identity function (from Barker 1995) and the resulting nominalization 
projects NP. Next, the preposition is taken as a functional element devoid of meaning, so it 
denotes another identity function. Given that the measure phrase functions as a mass quantifier 
in this structure, I posit that it has the semantic type <<sk,t>,<<sk,t>,t>>. Mass quantifiers 
operate over the set of totally preordered state-kinds denoted by nominalizations, as explained 
in section 4.1.  
 Eguren & Pastor (2015), following Longobardi (1994), claim that the QP is dominated by a DP 
headed by a null definite determiner. Their analysis is based on the observation that that null 
determiner can appear in certain contexts: 
 
(87) Los dos metros de longitud de esta mesa no son suficientes. 
  the two  meters  of   length   of  this  table are not   enough 
(Eguren & Pastor 2015: 299) 
  
 However, although the empirical observation is correct, measure phrases preceded by the 
definite determiner are not equivalent to the ones that are not: 
 
(88) a. La  atleta  corrió los  doce kilómetros de la carrera de San Silvestre. 
     the runner  ran   the twelve kilometers of the  race   of  San Silvestre 
  b. La  atleta  corrió doce kilómetros de la carrera de San Silvestre. 
      the runner  ran  twelve kilometers of  the  race  of  San Silvestre 
 
 (88a) means that the San Silvestre race has twelve kilometers and the runner ran the whole 
race. On the contrary, (88b) means that the runner ran twelve kilometers, but the race has more 
kilometers. The conclusion is that measure phrases preceded by the definite determiner have 
different truth conditions from the ones that appear without determiner, so Eguren & Pastor’s 
analysis in which the QP is embedded by a DP is not desirable.    
 Thus, at this point of the derivation there is a QP of type <<sk,t>,t>, but the verb tener ‘to 
have’ selects for an internal argument of type sk, which results in a type clash. In the formal 




object position can be alternatively solved by the movement of the QP to the top of the 
structure in the Logical Form, thus creating a lambda abstract. This covert movement that has 
been called Quantifier Raising (see May 1977, 1985): 
 
(89)     TP4 
  QPi       TP3 
diez metros de alturai  i    TP2 
         ∃C    TP 
          El puente   VP 
             tiene   ti         
(Final)  
(90) a. ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑉𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
  c. ⟦𝑇𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘). 
  d. ⟦𝑇𝑃2⟧ = ∃𝑠[have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)].                by ∃C 
  e. ⟦𝑇𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝑠[have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)].                  by λ-A 
  f. ⟦𝑄𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑄<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑄(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 = ten. meters]. 
  g. ⟦𝑇𝑃4⟧ = ∃𝑠∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 = ten. meters]. 
(Final) 
  
 The QP raises over the whole structure, leaving a trace ti that saturates the variable sk. 
Subsequently, the subject el puente ‘the bridge’ saturates the individual variable x in Spec-VP. 
Afterwards, we need to assume an existential closure ∃C of the state-token variable s. At this 
point of the derivation, the lambda abstraction λ-A has place, introducing the variable sk that 
was abstracted away before. Now the QP and TP3 can compose by Functional Application, giving 
rise to the end of the derivation, according to which the proposition is true iff there is a state in 
which the bridge, which is the holder of the state, is associated with a state-kind of height of ten 
meters.  
 This analysis according to which the measure phrase functions as a mass quantifier can be 
naturally adapted to the structure El puente tiene mucha altura ‘The bridge has a lot of height’, 
in which mucha ‘much, a lot of’ is a mass quantifier. The difference with respect to the measure 
phrase resides in the fact that the expression including mucha ‘much, a lot of’ involves 
vagueness rather than a specific degree on the scale. Taking Morzycki’s (2015) analysis of very as 
a degree modifier that sets the degree on a high place on the scale, we can propose an 




correspondence between muy ‘very’ and mucho ‘much, a lot of’ in muy alto ‘very tall’ and mucha 




(91) a. ⟦𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑑,<𝑒,𝑡≫𝜆𝑥. ∃𝑑[𝐺(𝑥, 𝑑) ∧ 𝑑 ≫ 𝑠𝑡𝐺]. 
(From Morzycki 2015: 115) 
  b. ⟦𝑚𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝑃<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑄<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝑃(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑄(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 ≫ 𝑠𝑡𝐺]. 
 
 Adapting Morzycki’s analysis for the degree modifier very to the state-kind system, the mass 
quantifier mucha ‘much, a lot of’ takes a state-kind sk from the scale of height that exceeds a 
contextual standard state-kind stG by a large amount. Thus, like the measure phrase dos metros 
de ‘(lit.) two meters of’, the mass quantifier mucha ‘much, a lot of’ operates over the totally 
preordered set of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization, with the difference that this 
quantifier is vague. 
 With respect to the syntax, note that I do not follow the current minimalist assumptions 
according to which the subject moves from Spec-VP to Spec-TP. I do not represent the move of 
the verb from the head of VP to the head of TP either, which is supposed to hold in Romance 
languages like Spanish (see Emonds 1978 and Pollock 1989). Again, all these considerations 
would require a complexity that does not contribute anything relevant in relation to the 
characterization of measure phrases.    
 Now we must look back to indefinite nominalizations, in which the measure phrase functions 
as an adnominal modifier. For El puente tiene una altura de cien metros ‘(lit.) The bridge has a 
height of one hundred meters’, I propose the following composition:  
 
(92)    TP 
 El puente   VP 
    tiene   QP 
      una    NP 
         nP     PP 
       -ura  AP  de    DegP 
             alt(o)         diez metros 
      (Not final) 
(93) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
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 In fact, both words have the same Latin origin (mucha < (NOM) multus; muy < (ACC) multum), but they underwent 
different phonetic changes according to Lapesa (1980). In addition, in other Romance languages, like Catalan, the same 
word (with different gender suffixation if necessary) is used as both a degree modifier and a mass quantifier: molt alt 
‘very tall’ / molta alçada ‘a lot of height’, which highlights the correlation between them. See Doetjes et al. (2011) for 




  b. ⟦−𝑢𝑟𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  c. ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  d. ⟦𝑑𝑒⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  e. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ten. meters(𝑠𝑘). 
  f. ⟦𝑃𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ten. meters(𝑠𝑘). 
  g. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ ten. meters(𝑠𝑘).                       by PM 
  h. ⟦𝑢𝑛𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝑃<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑄<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝑃(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑄(𝑠𝑘)]. 
  i. ⟦𝑄𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑄<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ ten. meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑄(𝑠𝑘)]. 
  j. ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
(Not final) 
 
 The arguments of the nominalization are absent again, so the node PredP is excluded from 
the derivation. In this case, the measure phrase is not a mass quantifier, but a predicate of state-
kinds of type <sk,t> that is selected by a PP in order to combine with the noun. The 
nominalization and the PP compose intersectively by means of Predicate Modification, resulting 
in a subset of state-kinds. The NP is selected by the indefinite determiner una ‘a’, which can be 
taken as an existential quantifier in line with Heim & Kratzer (1998). Again the derivation faces a 
mismatch: the verb tener ‘have’ selects for an internal argument of type sk, but the QP is of type 
<<sk,t>,t>. To repair the mismatch, the QP must ascend over the whole structure in the Logical 
Form: 
 
(94)      TP4 
  QPi         TP3 
una altura de diez metrosi  i    TP2 
           ∃C    TP 
            El puente   VP 
               tiene   ti  
(Final) 
(95) a. ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝑉𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
  c. ⟦𝑇𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘). 
  d. ⟦𝑇𝑃2⟧ = ∃𝑠[have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)].                by ∃C 
  e. ⟦𝑇𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝑠[have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)].                  by λ-A 





  g. ⟦𝑇𝑃4⟧ = ∃𝑠∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ ten. meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)]. 
(Final) 
 
 The resulting proposition is true iff there is a state in which a holder, the bridge, is associated 
with a state-kind of height that is ten meters. In order to understand the details of the semantics 
of the two structures involved better, let us compare their respective denotations:  
 
(96) a. El puente tiene diez metros de altura. 
  b. ∃𝑠∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 = ten. meters]. 
(97) a. El puente tiene una altura de diez metros. 
  b. ∃𝑠∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ ten. meters(𝑠𝑘) ∧ have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)]. 
 
 In (96) there is a state-kind from the set of totally preordered state-kinds of height that is ten 
meters, while in (97) there is a state-kind that results from the intersection of the set of state-
kinds denoted by the nominalization and the set of state-kinds denoted by the measure phrase. 
The reason behind this contrast is that in (97) the measure phrase is a predicate of state-kinds of 
type <sk,t>, while in (96) the measure phrase is a mass quantifier of type <<sk,t>,<<sk,t>,t>> 
that quantifies over the totally preordered state-kinds denoted by the nominalization. Certainly, 
at the end of the derivation we obtain two denotations than can be considered semantically 
equivalent, although their technical details actually reveal that they are not. Recall from 
subsection 4.3.2.2 that in (96a) the nominalization is a mass noun, while in (97a) the 
nominalization is a count noun. The reason why deadjectival nominalizations can also constitute 
count nouns is that they denote sets of state-kinds, which are discrete units.    
 Thus, the analysis defended here relies on the assumption that the type and denotation of 
measure phrases can vary depending on whether they function either as mass quantifiers or as 
predicates. For example, we can posit, following Partee’s (1987) insights, that the quantifying 
denotation is derived from the predicate one by type shift. Alternatively, building on a degree-
based theory, Solt (2015) treats quantifiers as predicates, which allows the author to account, 
among other data, for the fact that quantifiers can also appear in predicative position, as in 
John’s students are many. Adapting the spirit of her proposal to the state-kind system, we could 
posit that measure phrases that function as quantifiers have the same type (and denotation) as 
when functioning as nominal predicates, that is, <sk,t>. Certainly, that option would simplify the 
analysis greatly, since it would not require Quantifier Raising in the Logical Form.  
 However, such an analysis incorrectly predicts that the two structures under scrutiny have 




predicate of state-kinds in (96a), it would be mistakenly predicted that the phrases altura de dos 
metros ‘(lit) height of two meters’ and dos metros de altura ‘(lit.) two meters of height’ are 
synonymous, denoting the intersection of the set of state-kinds denoted by altura ‘height’ and 
the set of state-kinds denoted by dos metros ‘two meters’. However, in light of the empirical 
evidence provided here, we can conclude that the structures in question are not synonymous, so 
an analysis in which measure phrases are treated as predicates of state-kinds in both structures 
is undesirable.  
 In the last part of this subsection, I would like to conclude by extending the analysis of 
indefinite nominalizations that are followed by measure phrases to indefinite nominalizations 
that are followed by manner adjectives, as illustrated below: 
 
(98) a. El  puente tiene  una altura  increíble. 
     the bridge   has     a   height incredible 
  ‘The bridge has an incredible height.’ 
  b. El  futbolista tiene una habilidad extraña. 
     the footballer has     a      ability   strange 
  ‘The footballer has a strange ability.’ 
 
 In principle, the indefinite determiner cannot be elided regardless of whether the manner 
adjective occurs either in prenominal or in post-nominal position. This is in accordance with the 
fact that these nominalizations constitute count nouns, hence the obligatoriness of the 
determiner:  
 
(99) a. El  puente   tiene *(una) increíble  altura. 
      the bridge    has       a   incredible height 
  b. El  puente tiene *(una) altura  increíble. 
      the bridge  has       a    height incredible 
 
 However, there are other cases in which the absence of the indefinite determiner is licit if the 
manner modifier appears in prenominal position:  
 
(100) a. Es por ello que   la  interpretación  del   texto constitucional tiene  extraordinaria   







  relevance 
  ‘That is why the interpretation of the constitutional text has extraordinary relevance.’ 
  b. El coche circula a extraordinaria velocidad. 
     the  car   moves at extraordinary    speed 
  c. Los obreros limpiaron las ventanas con   increíble habilidad. 
      the workers   cleaned  the windows with incredible   ability  
 
  The absence of the indefinite determiner automatically leads us to think that deadjectival 
nominalizations can function in these exceptional cases as mass rather than count nouns, which 
is also possible because the intersection of the two sets of state-kinds involved results in a 
subset of state-kinds that preserves the scalar ordering.  
 In fact, canonical mass nouns allow for the presence or absence of the indefinite determiner 
in normal circumstances when accompanied by a modifier: 
 
(101) Juan tiene (un) excelente vino. 
  Juan  has     a   excellent  wine 
  ‘Juan has (an) excellent wine.’ 
 
 The question of what are the constraints that regulate the elision of the indefinite determiner 
falls out of the scope of this dissertation. The reader is referred to Kupferman (2004), Beauseroy 
(2010) and Beauseroy & Knittel (2012) for discussion, who noted that this phenomenon also 
occurs in French (where the indefinite determiner can be replaced by a partitive determiner in 
exceptional cases involving deadjectival nominalizations, where the partitive determiner 
precedes canonical mass nouns in this language). In this dissertation, I focus my attention on the 
structures in (98), which do include the indefinite determiner.
67
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 The definite determiner is illicit regardless of whether the nominalization is modified by a manner adjective or a 
measure phrase: 
 
(i)  *Juan tiene  la  altura increíble / de dos metros. 
    Juan  has  the height incredible   of  two meters 
 
 The occurrence of the definite determiner presupposes that the state-kinds incredible height and height of two 
meters are unique, but this is not the case. Although this question requires further elaboration, in principle it can be 
captured by the fact that scales are not subject to antisymmetry, so two state-kinds that occupy the same place on the 
scale do not have to be identical: for example, two given state-kinds height of two meters are not necessarily the same 
state-kind. This phenomenon could not be accounted for by a model in which degrees are numerical representations, 
since two degrees that occupy the same place in a total order, which is antisymmetric, must be the same degree, hence 
the occurrence of the definite determiner when numbers are involved: El futbolista tiene el/*un número 9 ‘The footballer 




 In an account in which manner can also be derived from state-kinds, this type of structures 
does not pose any particular problems for the analysis, insofar as we can propose a composition 
in which the sets of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization and the set of state-kinds 
denoted by the adjective compose intersectively, as we did with respect to measure phrases 
functioning as adnominal modifiers. For El puente tiene una altura increíble ‘The bridge has an 
incredible height’, I propose the following composition:  
 
(102)      TP4 
  QPi         TP3 
 una  NP      i    TP2 
  nP    AP2    ∃C    TP 
 -ura  AP1 increíble     El puente   VP 
      alt(o)          tiene   ti  
(103) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃1⟧= 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦−𝑢𝑟𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  c. ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  d. ⟦𝐴𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . incredible(𝑠𝑘). 
  e. ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ incredible(𝑠𝑘).                     by PM 
  f. ⟦𝑢𝑛𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝑃<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑄<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝑃(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑄(𝑠𝑘)]. 
  g. ⟦𝑄𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑄<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ incredible(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑄(𝑠𝑘)]. 
  h. ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
  i. ⟦𝑉𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
  j. ⟦𝑇𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘). 
  k. ⟦𝑇𝑃2⟧ = ∃𝑠[have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)].                by ∃C 
  l. ⟦𝑇𝑃3⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . ∃𝑠[have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)].                  by λ-A 
  m. ⟦𝑄𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑄<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>. ∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ incredible(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑄(𝑠𝑘)]. 
  n. ⟦𝑇𝑃4⟧ = ∃𝑠∃𝑠𝑘[tall(𝑠𝑘) ∧ incredible(𝑠𝑘) ∧ have(𝑠, the bridge, 𝑠𝑘)]. 
 
  The adjective alto ‘tall’ projects an AP and is selected by the nominalizer -ura, forming the 
nominalization altura ‘height’. Given that there are no adjectival arguments, the node PredP 
does not occur. Subsequently, the adjective increíble ‘incredible’ attaches to nP; the resulting 
denotation is the intersection of the set of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization and the 
set of state-kinds denoted by the manner modifier. Afterwards, the indefinite determiner una ‘a’ 
picks up the NP, projecting a QP. Again the rising of the QP over the whole structure in the 




steps are the same as in the previous cases. The result of the derivation is a proposition that is 
true iff there is a state in which the holder, the bridge, is associated with a state-kind of height 
that is incredible. Thus, the composition is analogous to the one in which measure phrases 
function as modifiers, with the difference that the state-kinds denoted by the manner modifier 
are not inherently ordered: for example, the state-kind an incredible height, unlike the state-kind 
a height of two meters, does not occupy the same position on the scale of height in all 
circumstances.  
 To close this section, let us recapitulate the conclusions. Spanish has available two structures 
that include measure phrases: on the one hand, altura de dos metros ‘(lit.) height of two meters’ 
constitutes an NP, altura ‘height’ is a count noun, the NP can be selected for by the indefinite 
determiner una ‘a’ and its denotation includes a subset that results from the intersection of the 
set of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization and the state-kinds denoted by the measure 
phrase. This analysis can be extended to manner modifiers like increíble ‘incredible’, which 
denote sets of state-kinds too, but these are not inherently ordered. In contrast, dos metros de 
altura ‘(lit.) two meters of height’ constitutes a QP, altura ‘height’ is a mass noun and the 
denotation of the NP includes a state-kind of height whose value on the scale is two meters. 
This analysis can be naturally extended to other mass quantifiers like mucha ‘a lot of, much’. In 
the following subsection, I close the study of state-kind nominalizations by examining bare 
nominalizations. 
 
4.3.3 Bare nominalizations 
In this subsection, I study the nominalizations that appear as the internal argument of the verb 
tener ‘to have’ in isolation, such as the following ones: 
 
(104) a. Los electrones tienen altura. 
      the  electrons   have  height 
  ‘Electrons have some height.’ 
  b. El  suelo tiene suciedad. 
     the floor  have  dirtiness 
  ‘The floor have some dirtiness.’ 
 
 I propose that this construction requires that there be another context of evaluation of the 
sentence
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 that imposes a zero on the scale of the nominalization or, in other words, a context in 
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which there are individuals who are not associated with any degree on the scale (recall from 
section 4.1 that lower closed scales encode a zero, which is not a state-kind whose value is zero, 
but rather it must be taken as the absence of any state-kind). For example, uttering (104a) 
implies that it could be possible that electrons are not associated with any degree of height and 
(104b) implies that it could be possible that the floor is not associated with any degree of 
dirtiness. The consequence of the imposition of a zero on the scale is an interpretation 
according to which no standard of comparison is entailed, which is in accordance with the fact 
that deadjectival nominalizations are not necessarily evaluated with respect to a standard of 
comparison. Nevertheless, we will see that nominalizations that are derived from open scale 
evaluative adjectives behave exceptionally insofar as they are evaluated with respect to a 
contextual standard of comparison. Let me develop my arguments in more detail. 
 Bare nominalizations have been overlooked in the literature on gradability or, in any case, the 
authors simply point out that these constructions are awkward in languages like English or 
Spanish. For example, Francez & Koontz-Garboden (2017a: 2, 38) claim that constructions 
involving bare nominalizations in English are “limited” and “more marked” than their 
corresponding adjectival constructions. In this dissertation, although I do not develop an 
exhaustive analysis of bare nominalizations, I present empirical evidence that the reason why 
these constructions are infrequent in languages like Spanish is that they are licensed in strongly 
constrained contexts. Particularly, if we compare adjectival constructions with their 
corresponding possessive constructions involving bare nominalizations, the latter seem to be 
more restricted:  
 
(105) a. María es  bella.  
     María  is beautiful 
  b. *María tiene belleza. 
        María has   beauty 
(106) a. En este lugar,  todas las cosas  son  bellas. 
          at  this place   every the things  are  beautiful   
  ‘In this place, everything is beautiful.’ 
  b. En este lugar, todas las  cosas  tienen belleza. 
      at  this place   every the things  have   beauty   
  ‘In this place, everything has a beauty.’ 
 
 The adjectival structure in (105a) and (106a) constitutes the most natural way to express 




circumstances, as in (105b), although it can be licensed in contexts in which it is possible to find 
individuals who are not associated with any degree on the scale. For example, (106b) is licit 
because it is inserted in a context in which it is possible to conceive that there are individuals 
that are not associated with any degree of beauty. The specific factors that favor this type of 
contexts are not examined in this dissertation; in this subsection, I limit my analysis to those 
contexts in which the construction is valid and compare it to the adjectival construction. The 
empirical data show that bare nominalizations, unlike their base adjectives, need not be 
evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison (although the ones that are derived from 
open scale evaluative adjectives are actually assessed with respect to a contextual standard of 
comparison). Thus, what my analysis predicts is that the adjectival and nominal constructions are 
not equivalent semantically. Consider the following data:   
 
(107) a. Ángela es alta. 
      Ángela is  tall 
  b. *Ángela tiene altura. 
       Ángela  has   height 
(108) a. Los científicos han descubierto que  los electrones son altos. 
      the  scientists have  discovered  that  the  electrons  are  tall 
  ‘Scientists have discovered that electrons are tall.’ 
  b. Los científicos han descubierto que los electrones tienen altura. 
              the  scientists have  discovered  that the  electrons   have   height 
  ‘Scientists have discovered that electrons have a height.’ 
 
 In the context of people, as in (107), it is absurd to conceive that a person is associated with 
no degree of height because this is an inherent property of humans, so (107b) is unacceptable. 
In contrast, in scientific contexts, as in (108), in which microscopic particles like electrons are 
involved, it is possible to conceive that electrons may not have any degree of height, so (108b) is 
acceptable. The difference with respect to the adjectival structure is that the latter is always 
licensed because it is obligatorily evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison in the 
absence of an explicit degree modifier. In contrast, the nominal structure does not demand a 
standard in the absence of an explicit mass quantifier or measure phrase, as explained in chapter 
3 to account for the licensing of degree readings and the semantics of manner adjectives. In 
short, (108a) and (108b) are not synonymous: (108a) means that electrons have a height that 




degree of height, and the latter structure is licensed because it is possible to conceive that 
electrons could not have any degree of height.  
 Now let us study bare nominalizations depending on the scale they lexicalize. In particular, 
let us compare the nominal structures to their corresponding adjectival structures in relation to 
entailment patterns. First, when nominalizations that encode a minimal endpoint or zero on the 
scale are involved, they do not give rise to entailments to the positive:  
 
(109) a. El  suelo tiene  suciedad, pero no está sucio. 
     the floor   has    dirtiness   but  not  is    dirty 
  ‘The floor has some dirtiness, but it is not dirty.’  
  b. La habitación tiene humedad, pero no está húmeda. 
      the   room       has   humidity    but  not  is     humid 
  ‘The room has some humidity, but it is not humid.’ 
  c. Esta madera  tiene   rugosidad,  pero no está rugosa. 
      this   wood    has  wrinkledness   but  not   is  wrinkled 
  ‘This wood has some roughness, but it is not wrinkled.’  
 
 (109a) conveys that that the floor has some dirtiness, but it does not reach a contextual 
standard that is enough to be considered dirty; analogously, (109b) conveys that the room has 
some humidity, but it does not reach a contextual standard that is enough to be considered 
humid; and the same holds for (109c) mutatis mutandis. What these data show is that the 




 When nominalizations that encode a maximal endpoint on the scale are involved, the 
situation is similar: 
 
(110) a. Este lingote tiene pureza, pero no  es puro. 
      this   ingot    has   purity    but  not  is  pure 
  ‘This ingot has some purity, but it is not pure.’ 
  b. El terreno tiene sequedad, pero no está seco. 
     the  field     has    dryness     but  not  is    dry 
  ‘The field has some dryness, but it is not dry.’ 
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  c. Los niños tienen libertad, pero no son libres. 
      the  kids   have  freedom   but  not are  free 
  ‘Kids have some freedom, but they are not free.’   
 
 (110a) expresses that the ingot has some purity, but it does not reach the maximal degree on 
the scale to be considered pure; analogously, (110b) expresses that the field has some dryness, 
but it does not reach the maximal degree on the scale to be considered dry; and the same holds 
for (110c) mutatis mutandis. Again these contrasts are possible because the nominalization is 
not evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison. 
 The situation becomes slightly more complex when nominalizations that lexicalize open 
scales are involved. The ones that are derived from dimensional adjectives do not give rise to 
entailments to the positive:  
 
(111) a. Los objetos tridimensionales tienen profundidad, pero no  todos son profundos. 
      the  objects   tridimensional    have       depth          but  not   all    are     deep 
  ‘Tridimensional objects have a depth, but not all of them are deep.’ 
  b. Los electrones tienen densidad, pero no son densos. 
      the  electrons    have     density   but   not are  dense 
  ‘Electrons have a density, but they are not dense.’ 
 
 (111a) conveys that tridimensional objects have some degree of depth, but they do not have 
to reach a contextual standard of depth to be considered deep; analogously, (111b) conveys 
that electrons have some degree of density, but they do not have to have enough density to be 
considered dense. In contrast, when nominalizations derived from evaluative adjectives are 
involved, entailments to the positive arise, which accounts for the following contradictions: 
 
(112) a. #En este lugar, todas las cosas tienen belleza,  pero no son bellas. 
        at  this place  every the things  have  beauty    but  not are beautiful 
  ‘At this place, everything has a beauty, but not everything is beautiful.’ 
  b. #En mi pueblo, los    ancianos   tienen amabilidad, pero no son amables. 
        in my village  the  elderly.men  have    kindness      but  are not    kind 





 Certainly, there are sentences in which the same nominalizations do not give rise to 
entailments to the positive, but in these cases we presume that the nominalizations are used as 
dimensional rather than evaluative predicates:  
 
(113) En los juegos de rol, los personajes tienen belleza, pero no tienen por qué ser bellos. 
       in the games  of role the  characters  have   beauty  but  not  have     why     be beautiful 
  ‘In roleplaying games, characters have some beauty, but they do not have to be beautiful.’   
 
 For example, in roleplaying games characters are associated with a scale of beauty that 
ranges from 0 to 100, so we assume objective units of measurement for beauty. The conclusion 
is that bare nominalizations are not evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison in 
general, but the ones that are derived from evaluative adjectives actually are. In this respect, the 
phenomenon raises two questions: why do bare nominalizations derived from evaluative 
adjectives show an exceptional behavior and what semantic difference do they display with 
respect to the adjectival structure in this particular case? Although I do not have a perfectly clear 
answer to these questions, I can provide some insights.  
 Regarding the former question, nominalizations derived from open scale evaluative 
adjectives, in not lexicalizing scalar endpoints or being associated with objective units of 
measurement, invoke between-individual comparison classes in the sense of Sassoon & Toledo 
(2011; see chapter 2): for example, in order to evaluate whether (106b) is true or false, we need 
to compare the beauty of the things in that place to the beauty of other similar individuals, 
hence the emergence of the contextual interpretation. In other words, in the lack of scalar 
endpoints and a conventionalized system of measurement, the only way of measuring 
someone’s beauty, kindness, ability, etc. is to compare them to other individuals’. In contrast, 
dimensional nominalizations, in being associated with objective units of measurement, invoke 
within-individual comparison classes: in order to utter (108a), we do not have to compare the 
height of electrons to the height of other similar particles: just one objective value for the 
degree of height means that electrons have some height. 
 As for the second question, certainly (106a) and (106b) are semantically equivalent insofar as 
both structures entail a contextual standard of comparison. However, they differ in that only the 
possessive structure imposes a zero on the scale of beauty, so only the latter structure requires a 
context in which there might be individuals without any degree of beauty. The factors that favor 
this type of contexts and the consequent theoretical implications fall out of the scope of this 
dissertation; the important aspect to which I want to draw my attention is the empirical fact that 




that bare nominalizations derived from open scale evaluative adjectives give rise to entailments 
to the positive.    
 Now let us move on to the technical details of the analysis. Recall from subsection 4.3.2.4 
that I have posited the following denotation for the verb tener ‘to have’: 
 
(114) ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘). 
 
 However, this denotation cannot be applied here straightforwardly to bare nominalizations, 
which denote properties of type <sk,t>, since the verb tener ‘to have’ selects for an internal 
argument of type sk. This is not a particular problem of our formal semantic apparatus when 
accounting for bare nominalizations, but rather when accounting for predicates that can select 
for, in addition to DPs, NPs projected by bare mass nouns or bare plurals, like tener ‘to have’ 
itself or robar ‘to steal’: 
 
(115) a. Jones tiene la llave. 
     Jones   has  the key 
  b. Jones tiene oro. 
      Jones  has  gold 
  c. Jones tiene joyas. 
      Jones  has  jewels  
(116) a. Sparrow robó la llave. 
      Sparrow stole the key 
  b. Sparrow robó oro. 
      Sparrow stole gold 
  c. Sparrow robó joyas. 
     Sparrow  stole jewels   
 
 For example, la llave ‘the key’ denotes an entity of type e, so it can saturate the internal 
argument in both (115a) and (116b), assuming that the verbs involved include an entity variable 
of type e. However, to account for bare mass nouns, as the ones in (115b) and (116b), and bare 
plurals, as in (115c) and (116c), which presumably denote properties of type <e,t>, additional 
stipulation becomes necessary. Based on van Geenhoven (1996), Dobrovie-Sorin (1997), McNally 
(1998), Dobrovie-Sorin & Laca (2003) and Dobrovie-Sorin & Beyssade (2012), I assume that 
predicates can also be represented as existential predicates, which have an existential quantifier 




the range of their argument variables. In other words, if a predicate selects for an internal 
argument of type α, but the internal argument is of type <α,t>, the predicate has available 
another denotation in which it selects for a property of type <α,t> and the internal argument of 
type α is existentially bound. Accordingly, we can posit the following denotation for the verb 
tener ‘to have’, which I call tener2, in case that it combines with bare nominalizations:  
 
(117) ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟2⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺(𝑠𝑘)]. 
 
 For the sentence La partícula tiene altura ‘(lit.) The particle has height’, I propose the 
following composition: 
 
(118)    TP2 
   ∃C    TP1 
     DP    VP 
          tiene  NP 
         -ura   AP 
                    alt(o) 
     La partícula      
 (119) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦−𝑢𝑟𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝐺. 𝐺. 
  c. ⟦𝑛𝑃⟧ = ⟦𝑁𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . tall(𝑠𝑘). 
  d. ⟦𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟2⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝐺(𝑠𝑘)]. 
  e. ⟦𝑉𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝜆𝑠. ∃𝑠𝑘[have(𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑠𝑘) ∧ tall(𝑠𝑘)].                      
  f. ⟦𝑇𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑠∃𝑠𝑘[have(𝑠, the particle, 𝑠𝑘) ∧ tall(𝑠𝑘)].           
  g. ⟦𝑇𝑃2⟧ = ∃𝑠∃𝑠𝑘[have(𝑠, the particle, 𝑠𝑘) ∧ tall(𝑠𝑘)].                by ∃C 
 
 The composition proceeds as follows: the nominalizer -ura attaches to the base adjective alto 
‘tall’ to form the nominalization altura ‘height’. The nominalization does not include EVAL in its 
derivation, since it is derived from an open scale dimensional adjective, which captures the lack 
of entailments to the positive (if the nominalization were derived from an open scale evaluative 
adjective, EVAL would be inserted in the structure). The arguments of the nominalization are not 
present, so it is correctly captured the fact that the nominalization denotes in the domain of 
state-kinds. Subsequently, the verb tener ‘to have’ composes with its internal argument by 
Functional Application, the DP la partícula ‘the particle’ saturates the individual argument and 




expression is a proposition that is true iff there is a state of having a state-kind of height whose 
holder is the particle. 
 To wrap up, in this section I have analyzed possessive constructions including bare state-kind 
deadjectival nominalizations, which are infrequent in Spanish. I have posited that these 
constructions impose a zero on the scale of the nominalization, to which I attribute the cause of 
their infrequency. By comparing these constructions to their corresponding adjectival structures, 
I have shown that they are not assessed with respect to a standard of comparison; however, the 
ones that are derived from open scale evaluative adjectives are actually evaluated with respect 
to a (contextual) standard of comparison, so they do give rise to entailments to the positive.  
 
Interim summary and a look ahead 
This section summarizes the main types of deadjectival nominalizations that are analyzed so far 
and the remaining ones. In chapter 3, I have examined state-token nominalizations, which have 
arguments and express episodic properties, as belleza ‘beauty’ in (120). In chapter 4, I have 
studied state-kind nominalizations, which do not have arguments and express generic 
properties. There are fourth types of state-kind nominalizations depending on their syntactic 
distribution and their morphosemantic properties: definite nominalizations, such as honestidad 
‘honesty’ in (121a); quantified nominalizations, such as altura ‘height’ in (121b); indefinite 
nominalizations, such as altura ‘height’ in (121c); and bare nominalizations, such as profundidad 
‘depth’ in (121d).   
 
(120) La  belleza   del    jardín me impresiona. 
  the beauty of.the garden me  impresses 
  ‘The beauty of the garden impresses me.’ 
(121) a. La honestidad abunda. 
     the   honesty   abounds 
  ‘Honesty abounds.’ 
   b. Este puente tiene una altura de diez metros. 
      this  bridge   has    a   height of  ten  meters    
  ‘This bridge has a height of ten meters.’ 
  c. Este puente tiene diez metros de altura. 
      this  bridge   has   ten  meters  of  height 
  d. Los objetos tridimensionales tienen profundidad. 
      the  objects    tridimensional   have       depth 




 In the following section, I briefly explore the morphosyntax and semantics of the last two 
types of deadjectival nominalizations that can be formed in Spanish, namely, participant and 
event nominalizations, which are exemplified in (122) and (123), respectively. In addition, I frame 
the typology of deadjectival nominalizations presented in this dissertation within a more general 
perspective in morphological theory.  
 
(122) El   médico tiene varias   durezas   en la mano. 
  the  doctor  has several hardnesses at the hand 
  ‘The doctor has several calluses on his hand.’ 
(123) El    rey    cometió  muchas injusticias. 
  the king committed  many   injustices 
  ‘The king committed many acts of injustice.’ 
 
4.4 Zooming out: deadjectival nominalizations in morphological theory  
In this section, I examine the two remaining types of deadjectival nominalizations that can be 
formed in Spanish, namely, participant and event nominalizations, and study the phenomenon 
of nominalization from a general perspective, particularly comparing the types of 
nominalizations that adjectival bases and event verbal bases are able to form. In addition, I posit 
that nominalization is a morphological process semantically constrained: specifically, the domain 
of the arguments of predicative bases constitutes the domain of the resulting nominalizations. 
To conclude, given that there are no nominalizations that denote in the domain of degrees, 
either these are defined as numerical representations or as equivalence classes, I provide an 
additional argument that degrees must not be treated as true arguments with its own semantic 
type. In the following subsection, I study participant nominalizations.   
 
4.4.1. Participant nominalizations 
In this subsection, I briefly analyze deadjectival nominalizations that express entities like bellezas 
‘beautiful people, beautiful objects, (lit.) beauties)’, antigüedades ‘antiques, (lit.) oldnesses)’, 
durezas ‘calluses, (lit.) hardnesses’, rojeces ‘blotches, (lit.) rednesses’, calenturas ‘cold sores, (lit.) 
hotnesses’, etc. Following the morphosyntactic analysis proposed by Fábregas (2016), I provide a 
semantic analysis on the basis of the kind-token distinction.  
 Arguably, the study on participant nominalizations that are derived from verbs dates back to 
Lebeaux (1986) and Grimshaw (1990) and has grown an increasing interest since then (Picallo 
1991, 1999; Rappaport Hovav & Levin 1992; van Hout & Roeper 1998; Alexiadou 2001; Borer 




2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Ignjatović 2016; Fábregas 2012b, 2016; a.o.). In this section, I show 
that the kind-token distinction also plays a crucial role to account for the formation and 
meaning of these nominalizations. 
 The most influential study on deverbal nominalizations is Grimshaw (1990), who identifies 
two types of nominalizations, which she calls complex-event nominals and result nominals. The 
former express what dictionaries usually define as ‘acts, actions’ and the latter express what 
dictionaries define as ‘results’. Importantly, most nominalizations can express the two readings: 
for example, construction can express either the ‘act of constructing’ or the ‘result of 
constructing’. Grimshaw collects a number of properties of each type of nominal, among which 




  (i) Accept modifiers like took an X time: John’s examination of the patients took a long  
  time. 
  (ii) Arguments are obligatory realized: the assignment *(of unsolvable problems) by the  
  instructor. 
  (iii) Accept aspectual modifiers: the total destruction of the city in only two days. 
  (iv) Accept frequency modifiers: the constant assignment of unsolvable problems.  
  (v) Cannot appear in plural: *The assignments of the problems took a long time. 
  (vi) Accept agent-oriented modifiers: the instructor’s deliberate examination of the   
  papers.  
 
Result nominals: 
  (i) Do not accept modifiers like took an X time: *The instructor’s examination took a long 
  time. 
  (ii) Arguments are not realized: The assignment is to be avoided. 
  (iii) Do not accept aspectual modifiers: *the examination in two hours.  
  (iv) Do not accept frequency modifiers: *The constant assignment is to be avoided. 
  (v) Can appear in plural: The assignments were long. 
  (vi) Do not accept agent-oriented modifiers: *the instructor’s deliberate examination.  
  
 Grimshaw (1990) concludes that complex-event nominals express events, while result 
nominals express entities. The author adds a third class of nouns called simple event nominals 




properties, but they accept modifiers like took an X time, as in The race/trip took a long time. 
Grimshaw claims that the reason why they express events, but they show similar restrictions with 
respect to result nominals (e.g. *Jack’s trip in five hours, *The frequent trip was a nuisance), is that 
the event nature of simple event nominals is encyclopedic, while the event nature of complex-
event nominals stems from the fact that they include verbal structure. 
 On the one hand, this tripartite classification has been very influential and is still considered 
valid, but, certainly, the literature has cast doubts on some of the properties ascribed by the 
author to the three types of nominals, especially the claim that complex-event nominals need 
their arguments to be explicitly realized or that they cannot pluralize (Alexiadou 2001, 2011a; 
Borer 2013; Grimm & McNally 2013; Grimm 2014; Fábregas 2016; among others).  
 On the other hand, Grimshaw’s typology, although valid, does not show a whole picture of all 
types of nominalizations that a given verbal base is able to form. Specifically, result 
nominalizations are just one type of so-called participant nominalizations; in other words, there 
are deverbal nominalizations that express entities, but these are not the result of the event 
expressed by the base verb. For example, there are other nominalizations expressing entities 
that designate an agent (constructor ‘builder’ < construir ‘to build’), an experiencer (pensador 
‘thinker’ < pensar ‘to think’), an instrument (taladradora ‘drill’ < taladrar ‘to drill’), a location 
(dormitorio ‘bedroom’ < dormir ‘to sleep’), a recipient (prestatario ‘borrower’ < prestar ‘to lend’) 
and there could be other types. Accordingly, constructor ‘builder’ refers to the set of people who 
build, pensador ‘thinker’ refers to the set of people who think, taladradora ‘drill’ refers to the set 
of instruments with which somebody drills, dormitorio ‘bedroom’ refers to the set of places in 
which somebody sleeps and prestatario ‘borrower’ refers to the set of people to whom 
somebody lends money. In order to account for the formation of these nominalizations within 
the frame of a constructionist theory, it is necessary to posit that nominalizations can designate 
the different arguments (and even adjuncts) that the verbal base selects for. I will come back to 
this issue in subsection 4.4.3.  
 The existence of participant nominalizations is not privative of verbal bases. In what follows, I 
illustrate that adjectival bases can also form participant nominalizations. Particularly, I address 
the analysis of deadjectival nominalizations that name the holder of the state expressed by the 
adjectival base. My analysis is based on the study of participant deadjectival nominalizations 
devised by Fábregas (2016), who provides the following examples: 
 
(125) a. Juan tiene algunas rojeces  en  la  piel. 
     Juan   has    some rednesses on the skin 




  b. Me     dio     algunas dulzuras. 
     me gave.3.SG   some sweetnesses 
  ‘I was given some sweets.’   
  c. No me molestes con pequeñeces. 
     not me   bother  with  smallnesses  
  ‘Don’t bother me with trivialities.’ 
(From Fábregas 2016: 218, translation mine) 
  
 According to the author, these nominalizations express the entity of which the property of 
the base adjective is predicated. For example, rojez ‘blotch’ refers to an entity that is red, dulzura 
‘sweet’ refers to an entity that is sweet and pequeñez ‘triviality’ refers to an entity that is small. 
The most salient properties of participant nominalizations are that they accept the plural in 
normal circumstances, as shown in (125), and that they do not accept mass quantifiers, which 
Fábregas takes as evidence that they constitute count nouns.  
 In order to account for the fact that participant nominalizations refer to the participant of 
which the property is predicated, Fábregas proposes that the nominalizer does not attach to the 
whole adjectival structure, which would account for the formation of state-token 
nominalizations (quality nominalizations in his analysis), but rather the nominalizer is base-
generated in Spec-PredP and raises to project an nP or re-projects in the sense of Gärtner (2002) 
and Citko (2008, 2011): 
 
(126)      NP 
     PredP 
       Pred’ 
         DegP 
           AP 
 (Fábregas 2016: 219) 
  
 By virtue of this morphosyntactic composition, I provide a semantic analysis based on the 
hypothesis defended in this dissertation that adjectival bases are predicates of state-kinds. In 
order not to complicate the derivation, my analysis does not capture semantic narrowing. Recall 
from chapter 3 that there are cases in which a nominalization restricts the meaning of their base 
adjective: for example, while the adjective simple can mean either ‘simple’ or ‘foolish’, the 
nominalization simplicidad means ‘simplicity’ and the nominalization simpleza means 




adjective in many cases: for example, angüedades ‘antiques’ and rugosidades ‘wrinkles’ do not 
designate people; rojeces ‘blotches’ does not designate people and even not all red entities are 
blotches; in contrast, celebridades ‘celebrities’ and amistades ‘(lit.) friendships, friends’ only 
designate people. Dispensing with the machinery that would capture semantic narrowing, I 
propose the following composition for dureza ‘(lit.) hardness, callus’: 
 
(127)   nP2 
  -ezai   nP1 
     i   PredP 
       ti   Pred’ 
        Pred
0
   DegP 
          EVAL   AP 
                dur(o)  
(128) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . hard(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  c. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . hard(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 .                         
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑥𝑘𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘). 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝑘𝜆𝑠𝑘 . hard(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘).              by EI 
  f. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . hard(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘). 
  g. ⟦𝑛𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝑘𝜆𝑠𝑘 . hard(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘, 𝑥𝑘).                  by λ-A 
  h. ⟦−𝑒𝑧𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝐹<𝑒𝑘,<𝑠𝑘,𝑡≫𝜆𝑥𝑘 . ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐹(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘)]. 
  i. ⟦𝑛𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑥𝑘 . ∃𝑠𝑘[hard(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘)]. 
 
  The derivation up to Pred’ does not display any novelties, with the exception that the head of 
PredP introduces a subject that denotes in the domain of entity-kinds xk. Recall from chapter 1 
that PredP is just a functional node that enables the adjective to select for a subject, but this 
subject does not have to be an entity-token, although we typically think of entity-tokens as 
canonical subjects; for example, in La jirafa es común ‘(lit.) The giraffe is common; Giraffes are 
common’, the subject of común ‘common’ is the DP la jirafa ‘the giraffe’, which denotes an 
entity-kind. Next, the nominalizer is introduced in Spec-PredP and raises to project an nP. Given 
that the nominalizer does not attach to the whole structure, but rather it is base-generated in 
Spec-PredP, we can posit a different denotation from the one used hitherto, whose specific role 
is to existentially bind the variable sk. The result of the derivation is a predicate of entity-kinds xk 




comparison stc. If necessary, a functional node, presumably NumberP following Espinal & Borik 
(2015), associates an entity-kind from the set of entity-kinds with an entity-token.  
 In positing that the nominalizer is base-generated in Spec-PredP, the adjective does not take 
a subject, so the node AspP does not appear in the derivation. Consequently, a state-kind from 
the set of state-kinds of hardness is not associated with a state-token, which explains why 
participant nominalizations are not subject to time, so they disallow temporal modifiers:  
 
(129) a. *las    rojeces   durante  el  verano 
       the  rednesses  during  the summer 
  ‘the blotches during the summer’ 
  b. *las    durezas   en invierno 
       the hardnesses  in   winter 
  ‘the calluses in winter’ 
 
 Thus, participant nominalizations behave as regular count nouns like mesa ‘table’ insofar as 
they lack a temporal dimension, and this is possible by implementing an analysis in which 
adjectives denote in the kind rather than the token domain. Before concluding this section, it is 
important to reflect on the fact that the existence of participant nominalizations is not a regular 
phenomenon: for example, in Spanish we can form rojeces ‘blotches, (lit.) rednesses’, but not 
*azuleces ‘(lit.) bluenesses’ and we can form antigüedades ‘antiques, (lit.) antiquities’, but not 
*vejeces ‘(lit.) oldnesses’. Thus, although the formation of participant nominalizations can be 
captured as a regular morphosyntactic process, the system only forms participant 
nominalizations when certain base adjectives are involved, which forces us to posit that 
idiosyncratic factors of Spanish are also involved.   
 In conclusion, as Fábregas has pointed out, participant nominalizations express entities of 
which the adjectival property is predicated. The main contribution of my analysis is that the 
existence of participant deadjectival nominalizations provides additional evidence that the base 
adjective cannot be a predicate of state-tokens, but rather a predicate of state-kinds, because 
there is no access to the underlying state. In the following subsection, I examine event 
nominalizations. 
  
4.4.2. Event nominalizations   
In this section, I address the morphosyntax and semantics of the last type of nominalizations 
that adjectives can form in Spanish, namely, event nominalizations, such as travesuras ‘pranks, 




sillinesses’. The most prominent challenge that these nominalizations pose is that they express 
events even though they are derived from gradable adjectives, which are supposed to express 
states. I show that my hypothesis according to which gradable adjectives denote state-kinds 
rather than state-tokens can account for the fact that they express events, although we need 
further elaboration that justifies the occurrence of the event reading. In addition, my analysis 
developed in chapter 3 according to which only deverbal nominalizations, which include verbal 
structure, can license a perfective interpretation explains why event deadjectival nominalizations, 
which do not include verbal structure, are incompatible with aspectual modifiers.  
 My analysis is based on the morphosyntactic analysis developed by Arche & Marín (2015) 
and Arche et al. (to appear), who show that the nominalizations under examination pass the 
usual tests that are employed to identify events: 
 
(130) dos imprudencias / varias injusticias 
  two imprudencies   several injustices 
  ‘two imprudent acts / several injustices’ 
(131) a. Juan   cometió  dos imprudencias / varias crueldades. 
        Juan committed two imprudencies   several   cruelties 
  ‘Juan carried out two imprudent acts / several cruel acts.’ 
  b. Esta mañana han  tenido lugar varias imprudencias/injusticias. 
          this morning have taken place several imprudencies  injustices 
  ‘This morning several imprudent acts / injustices have taken place.’ 
  c. He  presenciado las imprudencias/injusticias  del  presidente. 
       have  witnessed   the imprudencies injusticies of.the president 
  ‘I have witnessed the president’s imprudent acts / injustices.’ 
(Arche & Marín 2015: 264, 265) 
 
 Nominalizations like imprudencia ‘imprudence’ and injusticia ‘injustice’ can pluralize, see 
(130), and can function as the complement of the verb cometer ‘to commit’, see (131a), the verb 
tener lugar ‘to take place’, see (131b), and the verb presenciar ‘to witness’, see (131c). The 
authors also note that, unlike event nominalizations that are derived from verbs, these 








(132) a. *la imprudencia/crueldad de Juan durante una hora 
       the imprudence  cruelty    of  Juan     for      an  hour 
  ‘Juan’s imprudent/cruel act for an hour’ 
  b. la  deliberada imprudencia de Juan  
     the deliberate  imprudence  of  Juan 
   
 According to the authors, the formation of event deadjectival nominalizations is not 
unconstrained, but rather they are derived from what they call evaluative adjectives, i.e. mental 
state adjectives in this dissertation following Stowell’s (1991) terminology, with a negative or 
pejorative meaning. Empirical evidence that these adjectives can be used for evaluating an event 
is provided by their combination with infinitival sentences:  
 
(133)  a. Juan fue cruel/imprudente   al    hacer esa pregunta. 
        Juan was cruel  imprudent to.the make that question 
  ‘Juan was cruel/imprudent to make that question.’ 
  b. Hacer esa pregunta fue cruel/imprudente. 
         make that question was cruel  imprudent 
  ‘Making that question was cruel/imprudent.’ 
  c. Fue cruel/imprudente por parte de Juan hacer esa pregunta. 
        was cruel  imprudent   by   part   of  Juan make that question 
  ‘It was cruel/imprudent of Juan to make that question.’ 
(Arche & Marín 2015: 266) 
  
 Nonetheless, Arche & Marín note that there are mental state adjectives with a pejorative 
meaning, such as arrogante ‘arrogant’ (> arrogancia ‘arrogance’), that cannot form event 
nominalizations. The authors conclude that these cases constitute lexical gaps: 
 
(134)  a. Juan fue arrogante al hacer  esa pregunta. 
     Juan was arrogant  to make that question 
  b. Hacer    esa pregunta fue arrogante. 
     to.make that question was arrogant 
  c. Fue    arrogante por parte de Juan   hacer   esa  pregunta. 
     it.was arrogant    by   part  of  Juan to.make that question 
(135)  a. *dos arrogancias 




  b. *Juan  ha  cometido dos arrogancias. 
       Juan has committed two arrogancies 
  c. *Esta mañana  han tenido lugar varias  arrogancias. 
       this morning have taken place several arrogancies 
  d. *Las arrogancias  de Juan   hacia   su  tío. 
        the arrogancies  of Juan towards his uncle 
(Arche & Marín 2015: 268) 
  
 Thus, although arrogancia ‘arrogance’ is derived from a mental state adjective with a 
pejorative meaning, which can be applied to events, as shown in (134), it cannot form an event 
deadjectival nominalization, so it does not pass regular tests used for identifying events, as 
shown in (135). Below I reproduce the morphosyntactic analysis proposed by the authors: 
 
(136)  DP 
 D    NumP 
        ClassP 
      Class    nP 
         -n   PredP 
         EventP    PredP 
       Subj   Event  Pred  A 
(Arche & Marín 2015: 270) 
  
 In order to account for the event reading of deadjectival nominalizations, Arche & Marín 
posit that mental state adjectives have a covert event in the structure; specifically, they place 
that event in PredP to represent that the adjectival property is predicated of an event. Arche & 
Marín (2015: 270) propose a simple predication syntax for the event that is placed in PredP, 
which is supposed to project EventP and is “the essential structure to license purpose clauses 
but maybe not fully-fledged in the sense that it does not seem to be able to be modified by 
aspectual adverbials”.
70
 In a nutshell, what the authors want to capture with that structure is the 
fact that event nominalizations derived from evaluative adjectives, unlike deverbal 
nominalizations, are impoverished enough to be incompatible with aspectual modifiers 
(although they accept agentive modification), and we presume that the perfective-imperfective 
                                                          
70
 In Arche et al. (to appear), the authors replace EventP with Init(iator)P, Subj(ect) with Init(iator) and Event with 
Proc(ess), following Ramchand’s (2008) labels. For the purposes of this dissertation, these replacements do not have 




distinction is not applicable to deadjectival nominalizations because the event expressed cannot 
encode viewpoint aspect-related information.  
 In sum, Arche & Marín (2015) and Arche et. al (to appear) claim that certain mental state 
adjectives with a pejorative meaning are able to form event nominalizations; the event reading 
arises because the adjectival property is predicated of a covert event, which is placed in PredP. 
Specifically, event deadjectival nominalizations express some kind of impoverished event that 
makes them incompatible with aspectual modifiers, which is captured by positing that EventP is 
associated with a simple predication structure. 
 In this section, I limit myself to adopting the morphosyntactic analysis proposed by Arche & 
Marín (2015) and Arche et al. (to appear) and to contributing a semantic analysis based on the 
kind-token dichotomy. Nonetheless, in order to capture the fact that event deadjectival 
nominalizations do not combine with aspectual modifiers, instead of assuming that the 
perfective-imperfective distinction is not applicable to them, I propose that they express 
imperfective events. My proposal is based on Grimshaw’s (1990) observation that what she calls 
simple-event nominals (e.g. trip), unlike complex-event nominals (e.g. examination), reject 
aspectual modifiers, as in *Jack’s trip in five hours. As mentioned in subsection 4.4.1, Grimshaw 
claims that simple-event nouns do not license aspectual modifiers because they do not include 
verbal structure. Of course, this claim that does not explain, in turn, why verbal structure must 
license aspectual modifiers, so we need a more refined explanation. As we have seen in chapter 
3, aspectual modifiers inform about the duration of eventualities and are only licensed when a 
perfective interpretation is available; adjectives do not contain verbal morphology and, 
consequently, trigger an imperfective interpretation by default. This is the reason why state-
token deadjectival nominalizations do not accept aspectual modifiers, as shown in chapter 3. 
Analogously, event deadjectival nominalizations do not contain verbal structure, so they cannot 
trigger perfective interpretations either, which explains their reluctance to aspectual modifiers. 
Observe the following data: 
 
(137) a. *la   reunión durante/en varias horas 
       the meeting    for      in several hours 
  b. *la   imprudencia durante/en varias horas 
       the imprudence      for      in several hours  
(138) a. La  reunión tuvo lugar   ayer. 
     the meeting took place yesterday 
  b. La  imprudencia tuvo lugar   ayer. 




(139) a. La  reunión  duró  varias horas. 
     the meeting lasted several hours 
  b. La  imprudencia duró  varias  horas. 
     the imprudence  lasted several hours 
  
 The data in (137) and (138) show that event deadjectival nominalizations and simple-event 
nouns behave analogously, since they do not accept aspectual modification, but they can 
function as complements of the verb tener lugar ‘to take place’. Certainly, (139) shows that both 
types of nouns can combine with the verb durar ‘to last’, which may indicate that the events 
denoted can be presented as finished and, consequently, can have a perfective interpretation. 
However, as we have seen in chapter 3, the verb durar ‘to last’ does not only pick up 
eventualities (e.g. La silla duró varios años ‘The chair lasted several years’); thus, although we can 
conceptualize a meeting or an imprudent act as events that have an end, this must be attributed 
to our encyclopedic knowledge rather than to the structural properties of the noun in question. 
 The analysis that I propose for event deadjectival nominalizations is the following: 
 
(140)   nP2 
  -nciai   nP1 
     i   PredP 
       ti   Pred’ 
        Pred
0
   DegP 
          EVAL   AP 
               imprude(nte)  
(141) a. ⟦𝐴𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . imprudent(𝑠𝑘). 
  b. ⟦𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐿⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 . 
  c. ⟦𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . imprudent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 .                   
  d. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑0⟧ = 𝜆𝐺<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>𝜆𝑒𝑘𝜆𝑠𝑘 . 𝐺(𝑠𝑘) ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑒𝑘). 
  e. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑′⟧ = 𝜆𝑒𝑘𝜆𝑠𝑘 . imprudent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘, 𝑒𝑘).                by EI 
  f. ⟦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑃⟧ = 𝜆𝑠𝑘 . imprudent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑒𝑘).  
  g. ⟦𝑛𝑃1⟧ = 𝜆𝑒𝑘𝜆𝑠𝑘 . imprudent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑒𝑘).                by λ-A 
  h. ⟦−𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎⟧ = 𝜆𝐹<𝑣𝑘,<𝑠𝑘,𝑡>>𝜆𝑒𝑘. ∃𝑠𝑘[𝐹(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑒𝑘)]. 
  i. ⟦𝑛𝑃2⟧ = 𝜆𝑒𝑘. ∃𝑠𝑘[imprudent(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 𝑠𝑘 > 𝑠𝑡𝑐 ∧ holder(𝑠𝑘 , 𝑒𝑘)]. 
 
 According to this analysis, event nominalizations are like participant nominalizations insofar 




introduces a subject that denotes in the event-kind domain vk. Like in participant 
nominalizations, the nominalizer is base-generated in Spec-PredP, raises to project an nP and 
existentially binds the state-kind variable sk. (Note that the fact that the nominalizer is base-
generated in Spec-PredP blocks the merging of CauseP, although it does not have important 
implications here). If necessary, an aspectual node would be responsible for instantiating an 
event-kind from the set of event-kinds. The result of the derivation is a predicate of event-kinds 
that is associated with a state-kind of imprudence that exceeds a contextual standard of 
comparison.  
 In sum, the analysis proposed here correctly captures the fact that event deadjectival 
nominalizations are incompatible with aspectual modifiers, since adjectives cannot express 
perfective eventualities in the absence of verbal structure. Event deadjectival nominalizations are 
formed out of mental state adjectives with a pejorative meaning, although idiosyncratic factors 
are also involved. In the following subsection, I examine the phenomenon of nominalization 
from a more general perspective, focusing on the types of nominalizations that adjectival and 
verbal bases can form. 
 
4.4.3. The role of arguments at the morphology-semantics interface 
This subsection discusses the role of the arguments of predicative bases in the morphology-
semantics interface, particularly in relation to verbal and adjectival bases. In light of the empirical 
data provided in this section with respect to deadjectival and deverbal nominalizations, I offer 
an additional argument in favor of excluding degrees from our semantic ontology. In particular, I 
show that the phenomenon of nominalization is semantically constrained, since there is 
empirical evidence that the domain of the arguments of predicative bases, that is, the domain of 
events, states and entities, constitutes the domain of the resulting nominalizations; thus, if 
degrees constituted true arguments, it would be expected that there were nominalizations 
denoting in the degree domain. However, I will show that this is not the case. 
 In this dissertation, we have seen that gradable adjectives can form nominalizations that 
denote in the state, entity and event domains. The straightforward follow-up question is 
whether it is possible to predict the number and the semantic characterization of the 
nominalizations that predicative bases can form or rather we should take nominalization as an 
unconstrained or arbitrary phenomenon. I anticipate that there is empirical evidence that 
nominalization is, to a great extent, a semantically constrained morphological process. In 
particular, I propose that the domain of the arguments of predicative bases constitutes the 
domain of the resulting nominalizations. Let us review the phenomenon of nominalization with 




chapter 2, gradable adjectives express states, so the existence of stative nominalizations is 
straightforwardly explained. In addition, gradable adjectives select for a subject that typically 
denotes in the domain of entities, hence the existence of participant nominalizations. Certainly, 
the existence of event deadjectival nominalizations is subject to idiosyncratic factors: when 
certain mental state adjectives are involved, it is assumed that the subject of these predicates 
can also denote in the domain of events. In other words, to predict the formation of event 
deadjectival nominalizations, it is necessary to take additional stipulations into account.    
 As for deverbal nominalizations, we can also find nominalizations that denote in different 
domains. Take for example the verbal base construir ‘to build’, out of which we can form various 
types of nominalizations: 
 
(142) a. La construcción del  puente tuvo lugar en el    siglo  I. 
     the    building   of.the bridge  took place in the century I 
   b. El constructor  del  puente era romano. 
     the   builder   of.the  bridge was Roman 
  c. La construcción de madera es inestable. 
     the    building     of    wood   is  unstable 
  ‘The wooden building is unstable.’ 
 
 On the one hand, in (142a) the DP la construcción del puente ‘the building of the bridge’ 
denotes an event, as revealed by its combination with the predicate tener lugar ‘to take place’. 
On the other, both el constructor ‘the builder’ in (142c) and la construcción de piedra ‘the 
wooden building’ in (142d), which are participant nominalizations, denote entities: the former 
refers to the agent of the event of building, while the latter refers to the theme. What all these 
data illustrate is that the domain of the arguments of the verbal base construir ‘to build’, namely, 
the event, the entity associated with the agent and the entity associated with the theme, 
constitutes the domain of the resulting nominalizations.
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 To be more precise, both event and participant nominalizations can denote in the domain of kinds too:  
 
(i)  a. La construcción es  el   motor de la economía española. 
     the    building      is  the motor  of the economy   Spanish 
  ‘Building is the driven force of Spanish economy.’ 
  b. Un constructor gana  mucho  dinero. 
       a       builder    earns  a.lot.of  money 
  ‘Builders earn a lot of money.’ 
  c. Una construcción de  piedra es muy resistente. 
        a       building     of    stone   is  very     tough 





 Although participant nominalizations usually designate agents and themes, in Spanish there 
are other nominalizations that designate, for instance, recipient arguments and even locative 
adjuncts: 
 
(143) a. El  prestatario  llegó  tarde. 
     the  lend.SUF   arrived  late 
  ‘The borrower arrived late.’ 
  b. El  destinatario de  la carta es Guillermo. 
     the    send.SUF    of the letter is  Guillermo 
  ‘The addressee of the letter is Guillermo.’  
(144) a. El  dormitorio es grande. 
     the  sleep.SUF    is    big 
  ‘The bedroom is big.’   
  b. El   mirador está sobre la  colina. 
      the look.SUF   is     on    the   hill 
  ‘The lookout is on the hill.’ 
   
 (143) includes examples of nominalizations that name the recipient argument. For example, 
in (143a) the DP el prestatario ‘the borrower’ refers to the participant to whom somebody lends 
something and in (143b) the DP el destinatario ‘the addressee’ refers to the participant to whom 
somebody sends something. Regarding (144), it includes nominalizations that designate a 
locative adjunct: in (144a) el dormitorio ‘the bedroom’ refers to the place in which somebody 
sleeps and in (144b) el mirador ‘the lookout’ refers to the place from which somebody looks at 
something. The goal of this section is not to provide a complete examination of all types of 
nominalizations that can be formed in Spanish; rather, I intend to illustrate that the 
phenomenon of nominalizing is regulated by semantic constraints, and the arguments of 
predicative bases play a critical role. Certainly, the hypothesis needs to be refined in future 
investigations, since it turns out that there are nominalizations that designate locative adjuncts, 
as shown in (144). Nevertheless, what we can undoubtedly conclude is that the domain of the 
arguments of predictive bases constitutes the domain of the resulting nominalizations, which 
gives rise to interesting consequences.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
 In (ia) the DP la construcción ‘(lit.) the building’ has a generic interpretation, so it does not refer to any particular 
event; by an extension of the analysis defended in this dissertation, we can posit that the DP denotes an event-kind (see 
chapter 5 for more details). Analogously, in (ib) and (ic) the nominalizations constructor ‘builder’ and construcción 
‘building’ denote in the domain of entity-kinds because they have a generic interpretation too. By incorporating kinds 
into our semantic ontology, we can easily refine our hypothesis to make the correct prediction: the domain of the 





 The first consequence is that eventualities must be considered arguments; this is consistent 
with the Neo-Davidsonian view adopted here, in which eventualities are represented as 
arguments. The second consequence, on which I want to focus here, is that degrees must not be 
considered arguments. By virtue of the empirical evidence provided in this dissertation building 
on Fábregas (2016), deadjectival nominalizations can trigger either a quality or a degree reading, 
but in both cases they denote in the domain of states. As shown in chapter 3, nouns like altura 
‘height’ and coste ‘cost’, which can only trigger a degree reading in the absence of an explicit 
mass quantifier or measure phrase, can combine with temporal modifiers, which demonstrates 
that they are subject to time and, therefore, express eventualities: 
 
(145) a. la   altura de las dunas en invierno 
     the height of the dunes  in   winter 
  b. el  coste de los libros durante la crisis  
     the  cost  of the books  during the crisis 
  
 Degrees, either defined as numerical representations, as in most degree-based theories, or as 
equivalence classes, are not subject to time. Thus, the DP la altura de las dunas ‘the height of the 
dunes’ in (145a) does not denote a degree on the scale of height, but rather the state of having 
some height; analogously, the DP el coste de los libros ‘the cost of the books’ in (145b) denotes 
the state of having some cost rather than a degree on the scale of cost. We can conclude that 
the fact that there are no nominalizations denoting in the degree domain corroborates that 
degrees are not basic objects of our semantic ontology and must be derived from a more basic 
notion: in this dissertation, building on Anderson & Morzycki (2015), I have argued that they are 
derived from state-kinds.  
 This conclusion challenges the influential analysis by Beck et al. (2009) according to which 
there are three parameters of cross-linguistic variation, the first of which I want to bring up here. 
This parameter is called the Degree Semantics Parameter and basically states that there are 
languages that have available degrees of type d, like English or Spanish, while there are other 
languages that do not, like Motu (in Papua New Guinea). The claim is based on the fact that 
Motu, unlike the other languages, lacks degree morphemes: for example, the comparative 
sentence Ann is taller than Frank is expressed by means of a conjunctive structure, e.g. Ann is 
tall, but Frank is short. However, on the basis of the analysis defended in this dissertation, 
Spanish does not include degrees in their ontology (nor does English by extension), so whatever 
the empirical differences between languages of the Motu type and of the Spanish type are, they 




course, further investigation is necessary in order to draw relevant conclusions as to how 
gradability is manifested in each language.   
 
4.5. Summary of the chapter 
In this chapter, I have described the internal structure of deadjectival nominalizations to account 
for their mass nature. Furthermore, I have provided evidence that the existence of kinds is crucial 
in order to account for the formation of state-kind, participant and event nominalizations.  
 In section 4.1, I have provided evidence that deadjectival nominalizations constitute mass 
nouns because they are associated with sets of elements that are ordered with respect to each 
other. However, canonical mass nouns like agua ‘water’ and deadjectival nominalizations are 
associated with different domains. On the one hand, canonical mass nouns are associated with 
join semi-lattices, which are partially ordered because its domain includes portions that are 
mereologically ordered and other portions that cannot be ordered with respect to each other. 
On the other hand, deadjectival nominalizations are associated with scales, which are defined as 
sets of totally preordered state-kinds: all elements of the scale can be ordered by pairs, but two 
different state-kinds can occupy the same place on the scale, since total preorders are not 
subject to the axiom of antisymmetry (Francez & Koontz-Garboden 2017a).  
 In section 4.2, I have argued against the standard analysis (since Mourelatos 1978) according 
to which there is a mapping from atelicity onto the mass domain. Based on the study of Spanish 
deverbal and deadjectival nominalizations, I have provided evidence that there is actually a 
mapping from gradability onto the mass domain, which holds because gradable predicates can 
also be taken as sets of elements that are ordered with respect to one another. Accordingly, 
gradable bases like alto ‘tall’ form mass nouns, while non-gradable bases like pertenecer ‘to 
belong’ form count nouns. Regarding morphological pluralization, this property entails 
countability, but the converse is not the case. The plural marking requires heterogeneity, but 
states are homogeneous by definition due to their atelic nature. However, heterogeneity can be 
achieved by different means: in the case of nominalizations derived from non-gradable 
predicates, these can exceptionally occur with the plural marking if they hold at different times, 
while, in the case of nominalizations derived from gradable predicates, these can appear in the 
plural if they hold at different times, if they hold to a different degree or if they are associated 
with different domains of state-kinds, where only the first case is exceptional. 
 In section 4.3, I have examined state-kind nominalizations, which differ from state-token 
nominalizations, analyzed in chapter 3, in that they are not predicated of a specific individual 
and trigger a generic reading. They do not accept either temporal or frequency modifiers with a 




(in the sense of Gehrke & McNally 2015) and manner adjectives. With respect to definite 
nominalizations, conversely to what is argued by Roy (2010), I have proposed that the kind qua 
generic reading is the basic one and holds because AspP does not appear in the structure in the 
absence of the arguments of the nominalization.  
 Concerning quantified and indefinite nominalizations, based on Eguren & Pastor’s (2014, 
2015) syntactic analysis, I have assumed that quantified nominalizations project QPs, while 
indefinite nominalizations project NPs. In addition, following Schwarzschild’s (2002) insights on 
count and mass nouns, I have argued that quantified nominalizations constitute mass nouns, 
while indefinite ones constitute count nouns. In the former, a mass quantifier or a measure 
phrase functioning as a mass quantifier operates over the totally preordered set of state-kinds 
denoted by the nominalization. In contrast, in the latter, there is a state-kind that results from 
the intersection of the set of state-kinds denoted by the nominalization and the set of state-
kinds denoted by a manner adjective or a measure phrase functioning as a modifier; given that 
state-kinds are discrete objects, deadjectival nominalizations can also constitute count nouns.  
 The section concludes with an analysis of bare nominalizations, which are infrequent in 
Spanish because they demand a context that imposes a zero on the scale. In general, bare 
nominalizations are not assessed with respect to a standard of comparison and, therefore, do 
not give rise to entailments to the positive, but the ones that are derived from open scale 
evaluative adjectives do amount to entailments to the positive.  
 In section 4.4, I have examined participant and event nominalizations briefly. On the one 
hand, based on Fábregas’ (2016) morphosyntactic analysis, I have assumed that in participant 
nominalizations the nominalizer does not attach to the adjectival structure, but rather it is base-
generated in Spec-PredP; in addition, I have provided a semantic analysis on the basis of the 
kind-token distinction. On the other hand, based on Arche & Marín (2015) and Arche et al. (to 
appear), I have argued that event nominalizations can be derived from gradable adjectives by 
positing a covert event in Spec-PredP. In addition, I have proposed that the fact that event 
nominalizations do not accept aspectual modification is due to their lack of verbal structure, 
which prevents them from triggering a perfective interpretation and allows us to treat them in a 
parallel fashion as simple event nouns.  
 Finally, building on the fact that gradable adjectives can form state, participant and event 
nominalizations, on the one hand, and that eventive verbs can form event and participant 
nominalizations, on the other, I have defended that the phenomenon of nominalization is 
semantically constrained, according to which the domain of the arguments of predicative bases 
constitutes the domain of the resulting nominalizations. In addition, given that there are no 




characterization, I have provided additional evidence that degrees should not be treated as 
arguments with their own semantic type.  
 This chapter concludes the analytic part of this dissertation. The following chapter is devoted 










































































Conclusions, extensions and issues for further research 
 
In this chapter, I sum up the main insights of this dissertation, mention further extensions of the 
analysis, and lay out the far-reaching venues for investigation that this work has opened. The 
chapter is divided into two sections: in section 5.1, I summarize the main contributions of the 
dissertation, relating them to the questions that were posed in chapter 1. In section 5.2, I 
mention some extensions of the analysis and research lines that deserve further investigation.   
 
5.1 Main contributions of this dissertation 
As shown in chapter 1, deadjectival nominalizations have attracted the interest of researchers 
from different academic disciplines, like cognitive science, philosophy and theoretical linguistics, 
especially due to the fact that they express abstract concepts, which are elusive because they do 
not refer to tangible objects in the actual world. In this dissertation, the study of deadjectival 
nominalizations has led us to interesting conclusions that shed light on their semantic, 
morphological and syntactic properties, revealing that the elusiveness character of deadjectival 
nominalizations is not as such if we incorporate state-kinds and state-tokens in our semantic 
ontology.  
 From the semantic point of view, deadjectival nominalizations express abstract concepts 
because they have an eventuality nature, specifically they express states, which has important 
repercussions for the configuration of our semantic ontology, particularly about the role of 
kinds, degrees, qualities, tropes and states. Morphologically, deadjectival nominalizations show 
an interesting contrast with respect to deverbal ones, namely, that they do not include verbal 
morphology in their formation. In this dissertation, I have illustrated a critical consequence of 
this asymmetry in relation to viewpoint aspect, which casts serious doubts on the assumption 
that Spanish nominalizations cannot encode viewpoint aspect-related information. In addition, I 
have examined the mass nature of deadjectival nominalizations, concluding that it is explained 
because they are associated with a set of state-kinds that are ordered with respect to each 
other, which has relevant theoretical consequences related to the role of gradability and atelicity 
regarding the mass domain and morphological pluralization. Finally, from the syntactic point of 
view, I have explained the syntactic distribution of deadjectival nominalizations by classifying 
them into different types depending on their morphosemantic properties.  
 Thus, thanks to the study of deadjectival nominalizations, we can bring to light interesting 




and for other academic disciplines. Having presented the main contributions from a general 
perspective, we can enter into details in what follows. 
 The unifying thread of this dissertation is the hypothesis that our semantic ontology must 
include state-kinds and state-tokens in order to offer a comprehensive characterization of the 
properties of all types of deadjectival nominalizations, with a particular look at what I have called 
state-token and state-kind nominalizations. The questions that are posed in chapter 1 and their 
corresponding answers in light of the investigation carried out in this dissertation are presented 
below. Let us start by reviewing the main contributions of chapter 2, in which I provide a specific 
definition of stativity and their interaction with causation, homogeneity and gradability, in order 
to properly construct a model that articulates the semantics of deadjectival nominalizations on 
the basis of stativity: 
 
(a) What is the defining property of states? Following Vendler (1957) and Dowty (1979), I have 
defined states as temporal objects that do not involve any changes in their participants, in 
contrast to events, which are temporal objects that do involve change in at least one of their 
participants. Thus, in order to know whether an eventuality predicate is either a state or an 
event, we need to focus on their participants and to find out whether they undergo some kind 
of change, mainly a physical, an emotional or a spatial change. 
 
(b) Do gradable adjectives, which constitute the base for nominalizations, express states? Yes, they 
do. On the one hand, they accept temporal and frequency modifiers, and aspectual ones when 
triggering a perfective interpretation, which means that they are subject to time, i.e. they 
constitute eventualities. On the other hand, they do not involve any changes in their 
participants, which reveals that they express states rather than events.  
 
(c) What lies behind the distinction among individual-level, stage-level and Davidsonian states? 
Causation. In particular, individual-level states express non-caused properties; stage-level states 
express externally caused properties, where the external causer is a direct causer in the sense of 
Maienborn & Herdtfelder (2017); and Davidsonian states or stative causatives express internally 
caused properties following Leferman (2017). Thus, causation is not a defining property of 
stative predicates, since it can be manifested in different ways, but it plays a central role in 
configuring the typology of states. In this sense, my proposal is very innovative (although it 
certainly draws from insights by Sanromán 2003, 2012, Arche 2006 and Fábregas 2016), since I 
have provided evidence that the individual-level/stage-level distinction is not based on 




(d) What is the role of strict homogeneity and gradability in relation to stativity? Like causation, 
they do not constitute defining properties of states, but they play an important role to provide a 
complete characterization of the typology of states. Concerning homogeneity, states are 
cumulative, but not all of them are strictly divisible or divisible in instants. Building on Dowty 
(1979) and Rothstein (2004), I have shown that stative predicates like triste ‘sad’ are divisible in 
instants, whereas stative predicates like esperar ‘to wait’ are, like activities, divisible in intervals, 
which gives rise to temporal readings when occurring in gradable structures. In relation to 
gradability, stative predicates can be either gradable, like querer ‘to love’ and triste ‘sad’, or non-
gradable, like pertenecer ‘to belong’; therefore, contrary to what is claimed by Baglini (2015), 
states are not characterized by being gradable in the relevant sense. 
 
(e) What is the basic composition of gradable adjectives and their nominalizations? I have 
proposed, in line with Anderson & Morzycki (2015), that gradable adjectives are stative 
predicates that have an internal ordering according to which they are associated with units of 
measurement, which we can call degrees. However, unlike in most degree-based theories, where 
degrees are construed as numerical points (or intervals), for Anderson & Morzycki degrees are 
derived from state-kinds, which has the main advantages of accounting for the co-occurrence of 
gradable adjectives with manner modifiers and of dispensing with degrees as ontological 
objects, thus making the model simpler.  
 Nevertheless, I have proposed one refinement to their proposal. Given that this model, in 
which gradable adjectives encode a state variable s, would incorrectly predict that their different 
types of nominalizations express states too, I have proposed, in the spirit of Gehrke’s (2011, 
2015, 2017) insights on adjectival passives in German, that gradable adjectives are predicates of 
state-kinds that can trigger a state-token reading when an aspectual node attaches to the 
structure. I have also argued that the state-token reading is not unrestricted, but rather it holds 
when the adjectival property is predicated of an individual, in which case the property 
necessarily holds at a particular time.  
 
Having provided a specific definition of stativity, which constitutes the backbone of the 
semantics of deadjectival nominalizations, in chapter 3 I have delved into state-token 
nominalizations, which have monopolized the literature and are characterized by being flanked 
by the definite determiner, by the presence of their arguments and by triggering an episodic 
reading. Specifically, in this chapter I have examined the interaction of state-token 
nominalizations with temporal, frequency, aspectual, locative and manner modification, as well 




have offered a morphosyntactic composition that captures their main properties and have 
discussed the semantic role of deadjectival suffixes. Let us examine the questions formulated in 
chapter 1 and the answers that I can offer now by virtue of my investigation:  
 
(a) What do deadjectival nominalizations express? What implications does it have? My analysis 
belongs to the group of what we can call state-based analyses (Roy 2010; Villalba 2013; Borer 
2013; Baglini 2015; Glass 2019), according to which deadjectival nominalizations express states. I 
have offered empirical evidence that the state-token reading holds when the arguments of the 
nominalization are present, in which case an aspectual node AspP is responsible for instantiating 
a state-kind. However, unlike the existing state-based analyses, I have proposed in line with Zato 
(2020) that deadjectival nominalizations express imperfective states, which explains why they are 
compatible with temporal and frequency modification, but they are incompatible with aspectual 
modifiers. Specifically, adjectives constitute a defective category that need the assistance of the 
copula in order to acquire a perfective interpretation, so they trigger imperfective 
interpretations by default; given that deadjectival nominalizations do not include the copula in 
the derivation, they express imperfective states as well.  
 The significance of this analysis is threefold: first, it allows us to dispense with qualities as 
ontological objects, since what other authors treat as qualities are actually either imperfective 
states or individual-level states. Second, contra what is claimed in Fábregas & Marín (2012), 
Spanish nominalizations can encode some viewpoint aspect-related information, in addition to 
lexical aspect-related information, which opens the way to the unexplored field of demarcating 
the role of viewpoint aspect in the domain of nominalizations in Spanish and, presumably, in 
other languages. Third, this analysis has been very useful to refine the tests that are used in the 
literature to identify eventualities: while temporal and frequency modification allows us to 
identify eventualities, aspectual modifiers allow us to identify perfective eventualities, so these 
three types of modifiers should not be treated homogeneously. 
 
(b) Why is the kind-token dichotomy important to account for these nominalizations? With respect 
to state-token nominalizations, the kind-token dichotomy is important to account for their 
combination with frequency and manner adjectives as well as measure phrases. Regarding 
frequency adjectives, based on Gehrke & McNally (2015), I have shown that these can trigger 
temporal and non-temporal readings: in this dissertation, I have argued that frequency 
adjectives that co-occur with deadjectival nominalizations trigger temporal interpretations, in 
which the state-token holds frequently, in predicative, prenominal and post-nominal position; in 




in post-nominal position exclusively. Therefore, the kind-token distinction can explain the 
semantics and distribution of frequency modifiers when accompanying deadjectival 
nominalizations. 
 In relation to manner adjectives, I have argued that they are predicates of state-kinds and 
that the manner reading arises when they modify eventualities. In addition, I have shown that 
they do not give rise to entailments to the positive when combined with deadjectival 
nominalizations. Finally, measure phrases are, like manner adjectives, treated as predicates of 
state-kinds too, with the difference that the former are inherently ordered. Both manner 
adjectives and measure phrases can appear in predicative position, which can be accounted for 
by a model in which degrees are derived from state-kinds. Thus, the model defended here 
presents an important advantage over degree-based theories, because these rely on the 
assumption that degree adverbs/adjectives and measure phrases must be adjacent to gradable 
predicates in order to bind the degree variable, which is proven to be too restrictive.  
 
(c) Are there any relevant distinctions between gradable adjectives and their nominalizations? Yes, 
there is one relevant difference. Following Fábregas (2016), deadjectival nominalizations can 
trigger quality or degree readings in the absence of explicit mass quantifiers or measure 
phrases; for instance, la belleza del jardín ‘the beauty of the garden’ can mean either ‘the 
garden’s quality of being beautiful’ or ‘the garden’s degree of beauty’. However, contrary to 
Fábregas, I have not assumed the existence of qualities or degrees as basic objects, but rather I 
have argued that in both cases deadjectival nominalizations express states. In the quality 
reading, EVAL provides a standard of comparison, while in the degree reading EVAL does not 
appear in the derivation. Thus, la belleza del jardín ‘the beauty of the garden’ denotes the state 
of the garden’s being beautiful in the quality reading and the state of having some beauty in the 
degree reading. In this respect, deadjectival nominalizations differ from their base adjectives, 
since the former do not have to be assessed with respect to a standard of comparison. 
 Furthermore, I have argued that underived nouns like temperatura ‘temperature’ and coste 
‘cost’ and the exceptional nominalizations altura ‘height’ and anchura ‘width’ can only express 
degree readings in the absence of explicit mass quantifiers or measure phrases; in other words, 
these nouns cannot include EVAL in their derivation. However, they express states that select for 
their own arguments, which explains why two DPs like la temperatura de Madrid ‘the 
temperature of Madrid’ and la temperatura de Barcelona ‘the temperature of Barcelona’ do not 
refer to identical objects even if they are associated with the same degree on the scale of 




 Despite this relevant difference with respect to the standard of comparison, the rest of 
properties of deadjectival nominalizations are inherited from their base adjectives. In this 
respect, I have provided empirical evidence that deadjectival nominalizations can trigger 
individual-level, stage-level or stative causative readings depending on their base adjectives, so 
the resulting nominalizations do not alter the causal properties of their base adjectives. The 
same holds with respect to the scalar properties and the comparison classes involved; in other 
words, deadjectival nominalizations inherit the scalar properties of their base adjectives and 
invoke the same comparison class (either a between-individual or a within-individual comparison 
class in terms of Sassoon & Toledo 2011) of their base adjectives too. 
 
(d) What is the semantic role of the nominalizer? I have argued that nominalizers can take the 
whole domain of their base adjectives, which is the most usual situation, or rather restrict it, but 
they cannot broaden it. What this analysis aims to capture is semantic narrowing or 
specialization, whereby there are some pairs of nominalizations, like simplicidad ‘simplicity’ / 
simpleza ‘foolishness’ or frescor ‘freshness’ / frescura ‘vividness’, that express specialized 
meanings. In particular, I have posited that the nominalizer is just an affix that changes the 
category of the base into a noun in most cases, like in alto ‘tall’ > altura ‘height’, but in a few 
cases the nominalizer can restrict the domain of the adjectival function, as in simple ‘simple, fool’ 
> simplicidad ‘simplicity’ / simpleza ‘foolishness’. Although semantic narrowing can be captured 
as a regular morphosyntactic process, the bases to which it applies, the choice of the suffix and 
the proper subset of state-kinds that is taken by the nominalizer hinge on idiosyncratic factors 
and, therefore, cannot be predicted by regular principles or constraints. 
 
Once I have provided empirical evidence that state-token nominalizations express imperfective 
states and have presented a morphosyntactic analysis that accounts for their main properties, in 
chapter 4 I explain their mass nature, delineating the role of gradability and atelicity with respect 
to the mass domain and morphological pluralization and setting out the factors that amount to 
the licensing of the plural marking. In addition, I have examined state-kind nominalizations, 
classifying them into four types, definite, indefinite, quantified and bare nominalizations, 
depending on their syntactic distribution and their morphosemantic properties. In this chapter, I 
have also provided a basic characterization of participant and event nominalizations in order to 
compose the whole typology of deadjectival nominalizations, which has allowed me to posit a 
fundamental constraint for the process of nominalization, according to which the number and 
type of nominalizations that a certain base is able to form depends on their arguments. Based 




rather than ontological objects. Let us examine the questions and answers concerning this 
chapter:  
 
(a) Must the analysis of deadjectival nominalizations be subsumed under the analysis of canonical 
mass nouns? No, it must not. Although deadjectival nominalizations form mass nouns because 
they denote sets of elements that are ordered with respect to each other, their respective 
domains are not exactly the same. Canonical mass nouns like agua ‘water’ are associated with 
join semi-lattices, whose ordering is partial because it includes portions that are ordered by the 
part-whole relation and other portions that cannot be ordered with respect to each other. This 
property explains why they give rise to quantity and kind readings when combined with certain 
exclamative and interrogative determiners. In contrast, deadjectival nominalizations are 
associated with scales, which are defined as sets of state-kinds that are totally preordered, which 
means that they are not subject to antisymmetry, so two different state-kinds can occupy the 
same place on the scale. The fact that they are total explains why the quantity and the kind 
readings neutralize when combined with exclamative and interrogative determiners. 
 
(b) What is the constraint that regulates the formation of mass nominalizations? In line with 
Grimm (2014), I have provided evidence that the standard analysis (Mourelatos 1978 and others) 
according to which there is a mapping from atelicity onto the mass domain is incorrect. 
Nevertheless, unlike Grimm, who does not propose any precise alternative analysis, I have 
argued that there is a mapping from gradability onto the mass domain, which holds because 
gradable predicates can also be taken as sets of elements (specifically, state-kinds) that are 
ordered with respect to one another. On the one hand, non-gradable bases like pertenecer ‘to 
belong’ form count nominalizations; certainly, these do not normally pluralize, but this is 
because morphological pluralization demands heterogeneity and states are homogeneous by 
definition. Thus, pluralization entails countability, but the converse is not the case. Nonetheless, 
stative nominalizations that are derived from non-gradable predicates like pertenencia 
‘belonging’ can exceptionally pluralize if they hold at different times. On the other hand, 
gradable bases like inteligente ‘intelligent’ form mass nominalizations in normal circumstances. 
In this case, nominalizations derived from gradable predicates can pluralize if they express states 
that hold at different times, if they hold to different degrees on the scale or if they are 
associated with different domains of state-kinds, where only the first case is exceptional.   
 
(c) Why is the kind-token dichotomy important to account for state-kind nominalizations? Because 




the base adjective remains in the domain of kinds. State-kind nominalizations are characterized 
by the fact that their arguments are not present and trigger a generic reading, so they reject 
temporal modification and frequency modifiers with a temporal reading.  
 Regarding definite nominalizations, these are preceded by the definite determiner, as la 
honestidad ‘(lit.) the honesty’ in La honestidad abunda ‘Honesty abounds’. Definite state-kind 
nominalizations were identified by Roy (2010), who calls them quality nominalizations. Unlike 
Roy (2010), who claims that the quality qua generic reading is derived from the state reading 
when an arbitrary Proarb is bound by a generic operator, I argue that the basic reading is the 
state-kind qua generic reading. Following Espinal & Borik’s (2015) insights on DPs that denote 
entity-kinds like el dodo ‘(lit.) the dodo’ in El dodo fue exterminado ‘(lit.) The dodo was 
exterminated, Dodos were exterminated’, I have proposed that an analysis à la Roy (2010) would 
force us to posit that the determiner can also introduce a generic operator GEN in order to 
account for the DPs under examination; however, that would mean that the definite determiner 
has an additional denotation, given that it normally introduces the iota operator ι when entity-
tokens are involved, as in La silla se rompió ‘The chair broke’. On the contrary, assuming that 
gradable adjectives are predicates of state-kinds and that the absence of arguments prevents 
the insertion of an aspectual node that is responsible for instantiating a state-kind, we can 
maintain the same semantics for the definite determiner; accordingly, la honestidad ‘(lit.) the 
honesty’ denotes the unique state-kind of honesty. 
 Indefinite nominalizations are flanked by the indefinite determiner un(a) ‘a’ and either by a 
manner modifier, as in una belleza impresionante ‘an impressive beauty’ or by a measure phrase 
functioning as an adnominal modifier, as in una altura de dos metros ‘a height of two meters’. 
On the other hand, quantified nominalizations are preceded by a mass quantifier or a measure 
phrase functioning as a mass quantifier, as in mucha altura ‘a lot of height’ and dos metros de 
altura ‘(lit.) two meters of height’, respectively. Following Eguren & Pastor’s (2014, 2015) 
syntactic analysis, I have assumed that indefinite nominalizations project an NP, while quantified 
nominalizations project a QP. In addition, drawing from Schwarzschild’s (2002) insights on 
English pseudo-partitives and compounds, I have provided evidence that indefinite 
nominalizations constitute count nouns, while quantified nominalizations constitute mass nouns. 
This double behavior of deadjectival nominalizations is possible, on the one hand, because they 
are associated with a set of totally preordered state-kinds, which captures their mass behavior, 
and, on the other hand, because state-kinds are discrete or atomic units, which captures their 
count behavior. 
 Finally, bare nominalizations, like Esta partícula tiene altura ‘(lit.) This particle has height’, are 




question might not be associated with any degree on the scale or, in other words, a context that 
imposes a zero on the scale. In general, bare nominalizations do not give rise to entailments to 
the positive, which provides additional evidence that deadjectival nominalizations are not 
obligatorily evaluated with respect to a standard of comparison, as concluded in chapter 3 in 
relation to degree readings and the semantics of manner adjectives. However, the 
nominalizations that are derived from open scale evaluative adjectives do amount to 
entailments to the positive, since, in not being associated with objective units of measurement, 
they invoke between-individuals comparison classes.   
 
(f) What are the constraints that regulate the process of nominalization? Based on the fact that 
gradable adjectives can form state, participant and event nominalizations and that eventive 
verbs can form event and participant nominalizations, I have proposed that the domain of the 
arguments of predicative bases constitutes the domain of the resulting nominalizations. 
Nevertheless, in order to account for the formation of event deadjectival nominalizations, it is 
necessary to posit that idiosyncratic factors can also be involved, namely, that certain mental 
state adjectives can select for subjects that denote in the domain of events. In fact, a deeper 
investigation is necessary in this respect, since we can find deverbal nominalizations formed out 
of locative adjuncts, such as dormitorio ‘bedroom’ (< dormir ‘to sleep’).  
 I have taken advantage of the constraints that regulate the phenomenon of nominalization 
to provide additional evidence that degrees do not constitute basic objects of our semantic 
ontology, since there are no deadjectival nominalizations denoting in the domain of degrees 
regardless of their characterization. This analysis casts serious doubts on the Degree Semantics 
Parameter formulated by Beck et al. (2009), according to which languages like Spanish do 
encode degrees as basic objects of type d because they make use of degree morphology in 
gradable constructions. In light of the empirical evidence shown in this dissertation, we are 
ready to state that even languages that make use of degree morphemes, like Spanish, do not 
encode degrees as primitives.   
 
Having presented the main contributions of this dissertation, in the following section I mention 
several extensions and further venues that this dissertation has opened for further investigation. 
 
5.2 Extensions and issues for further research 
I close this dissertation by mentioning two interesting extensions of the analysis defended in this 
research that are related to the process of nominalization, where the incorporation of kinds and 




 The hypothesis defended here whereby stative predicates are predicates of state-kinds rather 
than state-tokens automatically raises the question of whether event deverbal nominalizations 
can receive the same treatment (see Ignjatović 2016). I believe that it is the case. For example, 
certain deverbal nominalizations derived from activity verbs, such as natación ‘swimming’ (< 
nadar ‘to swim) and patinaje ‘skating’ (< patinar ‘to skate’), can appear in generic contexts, see 
(1a), but they are never accompanied by their arguments, see (1b); do not accept temporal or 
locative modifiers, see (1c, c’); and are incompatible with tener lugar ‘to take place’, see (1d): 
 
(1)  a. La   natación / el patinaje es saludable. 
     the swimming the skating  is   healthy 
  ‘Swimming/Skating is healthy.’ 
  b. *la   natación  / el  patinaje   del  niño 
       the swimming  the skating of.the  kid   
  c. *la     natación  durante el partido / en la piscina 
   the swimming  during the game     in the  pool 
  c’. *el  patinaje durante el partido / en la pista 
   the  skating  during the game    on the court 
  d. *la    natación  / el  patinaje tuvo lugar   ayer 
    the swimming  the skating  took place yesterday  
 
 Analogously, other deverbal nominalizations that can take arguments in other contexts 
behave as natación ‘swimming’ when their arguments are not present: 
 
(2)  a. la construcción del  puente durante la   república 
     the   building   of.the bridge   during  the  republic  
  b. La construcción (*durante la monarquía) es el  motor de la  economía española. 
     the    building        during  the monarchy  is the motor  of the economy  Spanish 
  ‘Building (during the monarchy) is the driven force of Spanish economy.’  
(3)  a. El   reciclaje de los productos tuvo lugar   ayer. 
     the recycling of the  products   took place yesterday  
  b. El   reciclaje es beneficioso para el medio ambiente (*y   tuvo lugar  el  año pasado). 
     the recycling is   beneficial    for  the   environment    and  took place the year  last 





 An extension of the analysis defended in this dissertation can capture the previous contrasts 
by positing that event predicates denote event-kinds and can express event-tokens when their 
arguments are introduced; in this case, an aspectual node would instantiate an event-kind from 
the set of event-kinds. Therefore, the application of the analysis defended in this dissertation to 
the study of (event) deverbal nominalizations may provide additional endorsement for the 
inclusion of kinds and tokens in our semantic ontology.  
 Another interesting extension of the analysis is that it may offer a satisfactory solution for the 
fact that complex words, such as nominalizations and compounds, constitute closed domains or, 
in other words, their constitutive parts are inaccessible to syntactic operations, such as 
extraction or binding. The property whereby words constitute a closed domain for syntax is 
often called the Lexical Integrity Hypothesis or similarly (see Lapointe 1980; Di Sciullo & Williams 
1987; Lieber 1992, 2004, 2016; Lieber & Scalise 2006; Fábregas 2011) and poses a serious 
challenge for constructionist theories, in which the formation of words holds in the syntax and, 
therefore, is regulated by syntactic rules. Constructionist theories explain lexical integrity effects 
by positing that words constitute phases in the sense of Chomsky (1995) or islands in the 
classical theory (Chomsky 1981). However, as Fábregas (2011) notes, although this hypothesis 
could account for extraction phenomena, it cannot explain binding phenomena, since islands do 
not block binding. Observe the following examples: 
 
(4)  a. The person [CP that Mary introduced to Johni] already knew himi. 
  b. John is a [NP trucki driver]. *Iti is a type of vehicle. 
(Adapted from Fábregas 2011: 12) 
    
 In (4a) the complementizer phrase (CP) constitutes an island, but the antecedent John can be 
referred to by the anaphoric clitic him. In contrast, in (4b) even assuming that the compound 
word truck driver constitutes an island, the lexical base truck cannot be referred to anaphorically 
by the clitic it. Although Fábregas observation is correct, we must note that binding effects are 
subject to another factor. The contrasts in (4) rely on the assumption that truck is a predicate of 
entity-tokens, which are referential; however, the fact that there is no anaphoric access to it can 
be accounted for by positing that truck is a predicate of entity-kinds, which are not referential. 
Thus, by incorporating kinds into the domain, the contrasts in (4) receive a natural explanation. 
As claimed in this dissertation, the process of derivation, and compounding by extension, 
involves bases that denote in the domain of kinds and, only when the nominalization is already 
formed, a functional node can attach to the whole structure to realize a token. What this means 




the domain of kinds, which blocks anaphoric reference because kinds are not referential. 
Certainly, Fábregas is aware that the kind hypothesis is a strong candidate to explain the 
blocking of binding phenomena, but the author precludes it on the basis of examples in which a 
noun that is supposed to denote in the domain of entity-kinds can be referred to anaphorically: 
 
(5)  Juan tiene cochei. proi está en  el  garaje. 
  Juan  has    car      pro    is   in the garage 
  ‘Juan has a car. It is in the garage.’ 
 
 In (5) the count noun coche ‘car’ appears in singular and combines directly with the verb 
tener ‘to have’ without the mediation of a determiner. Although coche ‘car’ denotes in the kind 
domain by hypothesis, it can bind the empty category pro. However, as Espinal & McNally 
(2011) claim for other similar examples in Spanish and Catalan, the licensing of examples like (5) 
depends on pragmatic factors according to which the antecedent is accommodated by the 
hearer in the common ground, where the common ground comprises common knowledge, 
beliefs and another type of information assumed by the participants of a conversation. More 
specifically, we can claim that pro in (5) does not pick up the entity-kind car, but rather a specific 
car that is present in the common ground, which explains why it can be located spatially (cf. 
*Juan tiene coche en el garaje ‘(lit.) Juan has car in the garage’). In sum, an extension of the 
analysis defended in this dissertation could derive the Lexical Integrity Hypothesis by means of 
the interaction of syntactic islands and kinds.    
 
Last, but not least, let me mention several future theoretical and empirical lines of research that 
my investigation on deadjectival nominalizations has opened. First, one important contribution 
of this dissertation is that it provides a precise characterization of stativity according to which 
the essential property that characterizes states is that they do not involve any changes in their 
participants. Notions like causation, strict homogeneity and gradability are relevant to 
distinguish different types of states, but they do not constitute defining properties of stativity. 
Thus, the difference between states and events is not that the latter are dynamic strictly 
speaking, but rather that the latter impose some kind of change on their arguments; hence, if 
dynamism does not characterize events, we may wonder whether events are as basic as states or 
they can be derived from them. In line with some of Leferman’s (2017) reflections, we could 
derive events from states; specifically, events would consist in a succession of heterogeneous 
states that may give the false impression that they involve dynamism when transitioning from 




succession of heterogeneous images that give the false impression of moving when 
transitioning from one image to another one.  
 Think for example about the event of swimming: there is an individual, an agent, that moves 
their arms and legs in the water in a specific way and, as a consequence, that individual changes 
their position. The event itself is not dynamic, but rather it is the agent that undergoes a change 
of position; accordingly, the event of swimming can be decomposed into a succession of 
different states in which the agent is associated with a different position in each of the 
constitutive states. I cannot offer here a precise characterization of events on the basis of states, 
but I believe that the complexity that characterizes events in comparison with states may be due 
to the fact that the former are precisely composed of heterogeneous states, so this is an 
interesting hypothesis to be explored in the future. 
 A second interesting line of research is linked to figuring out what constraints regulate the 
formation of deadjectival nominalizations. In this dissertation, I have assumed that it is gradable 
adjectives that form deadjectival nominalizations, which is true with few exceptions that can be 
treated as lexical gaps: for example, the gradable adjective lleno ‘full’ does not form any 
nominalization in contemporary Spanish. More interestingly, it must be noted that there are 
non-gradable predicates that can form deadjectival nominalizations:  
 
(6)  a. la rectangularidad  del campo 
     the rectangularity of.the field 
  b. la  esfericidad  del  planeta 
      the sphericity of.the planet 
(7)  a. la       soltería     /     viudez    del  policía 
     the bachelorhood widowhood of.the  cop 
  b. la   españolidad de Ceuta 
      the Spanishness of  Ceuta 
 
 In principle, the nominalizations included in (6) and (7) are derived from the non-gradable 
predicates rectangular ‘rectangular’, esférico ‘spherical’, soltero ‘bachelor’, viudo ‘widow’ and 
español ‘Spanish’. In this respect, Roy (2010) claims for French that gradability is not the critical 
property that regulates the formation of deadjectival nominalizations, but rather the adjective’s 
ability to appear in predicative position. Accordingly, we could posit that the predicates in 






(8)  a. El campo es rectangular. 
     the field   is  rectangular 
  b. El planeta es esférico. 
     the planet  is spherical 
(9)  a. El policía está soltero / viudo. 
     the  cop     is    single   widowed 
  b. Ceuta es española. 
      Ceuta is   Spanish 
 
 However, I am not convinced that this hypothesis is entirely applicable to Spanish, since 
there are many relational adjectives that can appear in predicative position but cannot form 
nominalizations: 
 
(10) a. Esta empresa  es  algodonera. (> *algodoneridad ‘cotton.growerity’) 
      this  company is cotton.grower 
  b. Esta lesión es muscular. (> *muscularidad ‘muscularity’) 
     this  injury  is  muscular 
  c. Esta estructura es molecular. (> *molecularidad ‘molecurality’) 
      this  structure   is  molecular 
  d. Este cuadro es abstracto. (> *abstracticidad ‘abstracticity’) 
     this painting is   abstract 
   
 The relational adjectives that appear in (10) can appear in predicative position, but they 
cannot form nominalizations. I do not have any clear explanation yet to account for the 
existence of the nominalizations in (6) and (7), but I can contribute two reflections: first, the 
adjectives rectangular ‘rectangular’ and esférico ‘spherical’ do not really pose any problems for 
the hypothesis that deadjectival nominalizations are formed out of gradable adjectives, since 
they can be gradable when used figuratively or approximatively:  
 
(11) a. El  ataque   del  Real Madrid es muy perpendicular. 
     the attack of.the Real Madrid is  very perpendicular 
  ‘Real Madrid’s attack is very offensive.’ 
  b. El  forastero tiene una cara muy esférica. 
     the foreigner  has    a   face very spherical 




 Second, it is not clear that the nominalizations occurring in (7) are derived from the 
adjectives included in (9); perhaps they could be gathered with nominalizations like capitalidad 
‘(lit.) capitality, capital status’ (< capital ‘capital’) and ciudadanía ‘citizenship’ (< ciudadano 
‘citizen’), which are denominal. Hence, soltería ‘bachelorhood’, viudez ‘widowhood’ and 
españolidad ‘Spanishness’ could be rather derived from the nouns soltero ‘bachelor’, viudo 
‘vidower’ and español ‘Spaniard’. 
 There is another set of nominalizations that deserve a future investigation, namely, those that 
can refer to temporal periods, especially when occurring without their arguments, as in durante 
la niñez / vejez / juventud / antigüedad ‘during infancy, old age, youth, antiquity’, etc. The 
problem that these nominalizations pose is whether temporal periods should be considered 
ontological semantic objects or rather they can be derived from other more basic notions.    
 Another line of investigation that this dissertation has opened is related to the analysis of 
adjectives in attributive position. Traditionally, adjectives are considered predicates of individuals 
of type <e,t>, but an extension of the analysis defended here would be to posit that they 
denote properties of state-kinds of type <sk,t>; given that adjectives do not have arguments 
when occurring in attributive position, the aspectual node AspP would not intercede. In that 
case, the question is how to account for their combination with entity-denoting predicates, 
which would be of type <ek,t>. Moreover, adjectives can also modify event-denoting nouns in 
attributive position, so the analysis becomes more complicated. Consider the following data: 
 
(12) a. la   hermosa torre 
     the beautiful tower 
  b. la   hermosa tormenta 
     the beautiful    storm 
 
 In (12a) the noun torre ‘tower’ is a predicate of entity-kinds and the adjective hermosa 
‘beautiful’ is a predicate of state-kinds, so they cannot combine intersectively. In (12b) there is a 
similar problem, with the difference that the noun tormenta ‘storm’ denotes a property of event-
kinds. One possible solution to the problem is to postulate the existence of a new semantic rule 
that allows us to combine different sets of ontological objects. Another possible solution is to 
posit that adjectives are just predicates of kinds that have an unspecific type <α,t>. In addition, 
in order to account for their stative nature when occurring in predicative position and when 
forming nominalizations, we could posit that they can project, when necessary, an additional 




 Finally, another interesting field to be explored in future investigations is the semantics of the 
structures involving gradable adjectives preceded by the neuter determiner lo ‘the’ (see Bosque 
& Moreno 1990, Gutiérrez-Rexach 1999, Alexiadou & Iordăchioaia 2012, 2014 and Villalba 2013 
for Spanish; Beauseroy & Knittel 2007 and Lauwers 2008 for French; Alexiadou 2011b for Greek; 
Arsenijević 2011 for Serbo-Croatian; Glass 2014, 2019 for English; McNally & de Swart 2015 for 
Dutch; Richtarcikova 2017 for Slovak). According to Bosque & Moreno (1990), Spanish has 
available two main structures: 
 
(13) a. Lo    interesante   del  libro  es  el  primer capítulo. 
     the.N interesting of.the book  is  the   first   chapter 
  ‘The interesting part of the book is the first chapter.’ 
  b. Me   asusta     lo    peligroso de la  empresa. 
      me frightens the.N dangerous of the  mission 
  ‘It frightens me how dangerous the mission is.’ 
 
 According to the authors, in (13a) the DP lo interesante del libro ‘(lit.) the.N interesting of the 
book’ refers to the unique entity, which is part of the book, to which the adjectival property is 
ascribed; in contrast, in (13b) the DP lo peligroso de la empresa ‘(lit.) the.N dangerous of the 
mission’ involves degree quantification on the scale invoked by the adjective. The challenge for 
the analysis defended here would be to offer a semantic composition for the DPs in question 
based on the hypothesis that gradable adjectives are predicates of state-kinds, ideally by 
positing only one denotation for the neuter determiner.    
 
To conclude, in this dissertation I have addressed the analysis of deadjectival nominalizations in 
Spanish, providing evidence that our semantic ontology must include state-kinds and state-
tokens. My contributions range from an explanation of their abstract nature to their syntactic 
distribution, drawing interesting conclusions with respect to lexical and viewpoint aspect, their 
combination with different types of modifiers, their morphosyntactic composition, their 
semantic structure and their interaction with the mass and count domains and the constraints 
that regulate them. An extension of my investigation could have interesting implications for 
morphological theory, specifically to account for the process of nominalization as a constrained 
phenomenon in which kinds and tokens play a crucial role. In addition, this dissertation opens a 
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